






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THE
HISTORY
OF
ANCIENT GREECE,
ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earliest Accounts till the
Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF
LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL. D. F. A. S.

Εἰ μὲν τοιγε τῆς ἀπάντων πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμπλοκῆς καὶ παραθεσεως,
ἐτι δὲ ὁμοιοτητος καὶ διαφορας, μονως αν τις εΦικοιτο καὶ δυηθει
κατοπτευσας, ἀμα καὶ το χρησιμον καὶ το τερπνον εκ τῆς ἱστορίας
λαβειν.
POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

VOL. IV.

BASIL:

Printed for J. J. TOURNEISEN; and J. L. LEGRAND.

M D C C X C.

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IT does honor rather to the modesty than to the judgment of Xenophon, that he has excluded, from his general history of Grecian affairs, the account of an expedition, in which he himself acted so distinguished a part, and which immediately occasioned very important transactions both in Asia and in Europe. After the downfall

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B

CHAP.
XXVII.
Tissa-
phernes
prepares
to make
war on the
Lacedæ-
monian

2 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P. of Athenian greatness, the Spartans were naturally
 XXVII. exposed to the jealousy and resentment of Persia,
 allies in Asia, by order of Artaxerxes. Olymp. xcv. 2. A. C. 399. by their dominion in Greece, by their conquests on the coast of Asia, by the pre-eminence of their naval power, and especially by their open participation in the rebellious designs of Cyrus. The former circumstances rendered their republic the rival of the king of Persia; but their co-operation with an ambitious rebel rendered them the personal enemies of Artaxerxes. His resolution to chastise their audacity was communicated to Tissaphernes, who, after harassing the retreat of the Greeks to the foot of the Carduchian mountains, beyond which he had not courage to follow them, returned with a powerful army towards Lower Asia, to resume the government of Caria, his hereditary province, as well as to take possession of the rich spoils of Cyrus, bestowed on him by the gratitude of his master, in return for his recent and signal services against that dangerous pretender to the throne.

Attacks
 the Æolian
 cities.

Honored with this magnificent present, Tissaphernes was farther intrusted with executing the vengeance of the great king against the Spartans. Without any formal declaration of war, which the late hostilities in the East seemed to render unnecessary, he attacked the Æolian cities; the satrap Pharnabazus readily entered into his views, and concurred with all his measures. The Lacedæmonian garrison, supported by the townsmen, defended themselves with their usual courage, earnestly soliciting, however, a reinforcement from

home, which might enable them to resist and to surmount such an unexpected danger¹.

On this important occasion, the Spartan senate and assembly were not wanting to the assistance of their garrisons, or to the hopes of their Æolian allies. They immediately levied a body of five thousand Peloponnesian troops, and demanded a considerable supply from the Athenians. The latter sent them three hundred horsemen, who having served under the thirty tyrants, were cheerfully sacrificed to this dangerous duty by the partisans of the new democracy. The command of the joint forces was intrusted to the Spartan Thimbron, who had orders², as soon as he arrived in Æolis, to take into pay the Greeks who had engaged in the expedition of Cyrus, and who were actually employed in the dishonorable service of an ungrateful Barbarian. The mean and perfidious behaviour of Seuthes, who, in his new character of prince, still retained his original manners of a Thracian robber, rendered the proposal of joining Thimbron extremely agreeable to Xenophon, who conducted to the Lacedæmonian standard six thousand men, the venerable remains of an army exhausted and ennobled by unexampled toils and dangers³.

Having received this powerful reinforcement, Thimbron opened the campaign against the lieutenant of Artaxerxes, at the distance of two years after Cyrus had marched from Ephesus to dispute

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XXVII.

The Spartans send Thimbron with an army to their assistance;

which is reinforced by the Greeks who had returned from Upper Asia.

Thimbron opens the campaign with success; Olymp. xciv. 3. A. C. 398.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 40. Diodor. Sicul. l. xiv. p. 416.

² Xenoph. Hellen. p. 550. Diodor. p. 416.

³ Xenoph. Anabaf. l. vii. p. 427.

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C H A P.
XXVII.

fails in the
siege of
Larissa ;

recalled
and dis-
graced ;

is succeed-
ed by Der-
cyllidas ;

ad.
ters
equal
y the

the crown of Persia. The first impressions of the Grecian arms were attended with considerable success. Thimbron took, or regained, the towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Halisarnia, Myrina, Cymé, and Grynium. But the walls of Larissa, a strong city in the Troade, defied his assault; the vigilant garrison baffled all his contrivances for depriving them of fresh water; and, assisted by the inhabitants of the place, made a vigorous sally, repelled the besiegers, and burned or demolished their works.

Nothing but continual action, and an uninterrupted career of victory, could restrain the licentious passions of the troops, composed of a motley assemblage from so many different, and often hostile communities. Their seditious spirit rendered them formidable to each other, and to the Greeks of Asia. Their rapacity spared not the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who loudly complained to the senate, ascribing the violence of the troops to the weakness of the general. In consequence of this representation, Thimbron was recalled and disgraced*, and the command, for which he seemed so ill qualified, was bestowed on Dercyllidas, a man fertile in resources, who could often vary his conduct without changing his principles; who knew when to relax, and when to enforce the discipline of the camp, and who, to the talents of an able general, added the reputation of being the best engineer of his times. By a judicious direction of the machines of war which he invented, or improved, Dercyllidas overcame the obstinacy of

* Xenoph. p. 481.

Larissa; and in the space of eight days, reduced eight other cities in the province of Pharnabazus. The rapidity of his conquests recommended him to the Spartan senate, and his moderate use of victory endeared him to the Asiatic colonies. He lessened their taxes, encouraged their industry, heard their complaints with candor, and decided their differences with the most impartial justice. Disdaining the cruel example of his predecessors, he imposed not any arbitrary exactions on the peaceful citizens and husbandmen; and lest the maintenance of his troops should prove burdensome to the allies and subjects of Sparta, he fixed his winter-quarters in Bithynia, where the valor of Xenophon and his followers had lately spread the terror of the Grecian name.

Early in the spring, commissioners were sent from Sparta to inspect the affairs of Asia, and to prorogue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, provided their observations and inquiries confirmed the very favorable accounts that had been given of his administration. On their arrival at Lampacus, where the army was then assembled, they visited the camp, and assured the soldiers, that the magistrates of the republic as much approved their conduct in the last, as they had condemned it in the preceding, year. A captain, expressing the sense of the multitude, replied, that the different behaviour of the troops, now and formerly, was yet less different than the characters of Thimbron and Dercyllidas. This testimony of military approbation was not more flattering to the

C H A P.

XXVII.

affairs of
war and
peace.Commis-
sioners
sent from
Sparta to
prorogue
his autho-
rity.

xcv. 4.

A. C. 427.

6 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P. XXVII. general, than satisfactory to the commissioners; who afterwards, at his request, visited the neighbouring towns of Æolis and Ionia, and found them in a condition extremely happy and flourishing.

Dercyllidas fortifies the Chersonesus.

Before taking leave of Dercyllidas they acquainted him, that the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonesus had lately sent to Sparta an embassy, requesting assistance against the fierce Barbarians who inhabited the adjoining territory; and that, should circumstances permit him to afford protection to those industrious and distressed Greeks, he would perform a signal service to the state. The inactivity of Tissaphernes, who notwithstanding the powerful army which he had conducted from Upper Asia, still expected further reinforcements from the East, encouraged the Grecian general to undertake this useful and meritorious enterprise. The Chersonesus was one of the most fertile⁵ and best cultivated spots in the ancient world. In an extent of fifty miles in length, and fifteen in breadth, it contained eleven rich and flourishing cities, and several commodious harbours. The fields, producing the most valuable grains, were interspersed and adorned with delightful plantations and orchards, as well as with lawns and meadows, stored with all sorts of useful cattle. Had this beautiful country enjoyed an insular form, its happiness would have been complete; but a neck of land, thirty-seven furlongs in breadth, joined it to the territories of the

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 487.

⁶ Παιδαγωγικὴν καὶ ἀριστήν. Xenoph. p. 488.

fiercest tribes in Thrace. The troops of Dercyllidas could easily have repelled their inroads. They might have punished their cruelty by destroying their miserable villages in the open country; but the Barbarians would have found a secure refuge in their woods and mountains, and whenever the army was withdrawn, would have again poured down on the helpless Chersonesus with their native fury, heightened by revenge. Dercyllidas afforded a more useful assistance to those unhappy Greeks; and employed in their defence, not the courage, but the labor, of his soldiers. With incessant toil, begun in the spring, and continued almost to the autumn, they formed a strong wall across the isthmus; the space was marked out, and the labor distinctly apportioned to the separate communities from which the army had been levied; and the spur of emulation was sharpened by the incitement of gain, the general in person superintending the work, and bestowing rewards (lavishly furnished by the wealthy Chersonites) on the most diligent and deserving⁷.

Dercyllidas had scarcely returned from this employment, justly ennobled by its utility, when the combined forces of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes appeared in the neighbourhood of Ephesus. The general collected his whole strength in order to give them battle; the European soldiers displayed a noble ardor for action; but the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, who had flocked to his standard,

C H A P.
XXVII.

Enters
into treaty
with Tif.
saphernes.

⁷ Xenoph. p. 488.

8 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P. were intimidated by the sight of an enemy whose
XXVII. numbers far exceeded their own. This panic might have proved fatal, had not the troops of Tissaphernes felt the terror which they inspired. They recollected the bravery of the ten thousand who had accompanied Cyrus; they perceived that the forces with whom they now had to contend exceeded that number; but they did not reflect that the army of Dercyllidas was swelled by the degenerate Greeks of Æolis and Ionia, whose minds had been enfeebled and degraded by a long series of oppression. The cowardice of the Persians engaged Tissaphernes, much against the inclination of Pharnabazus, to propose a conference; the cowardice of the Ionians engaged Dercyllidas to accept the proposal. Hostilities were thus suspended; mutual hostages were given; overtures of peace were made; and messengers were dispatched for instructions to the Spartan council, and to the court of Persia.

The Persians secretly prepare to renew the war.

The design of Tissaphernes, however, was only to gain time by amusing the enemy. The most solemn oaths and engagements had long lost their power over his perfidious mind. He treacherously watched an opportunity to renew the war, waiting with impatience for the promised reinforcements from the East, and especially for the equipment of a fleet, which Artaxerxes was preparing, with silence and celerity, in the ports of Phœnicia. These secret preparations were communicated to the Spartan magistrates by the patriotism of Herodas, a Syracusan, who, animated by the love of

Greece, betrayed his Phœnician master. The Spartans were alarmed with the danger, indignant at the treachery of Tiffaphernes, and perhaps displeased with the too easy credulity of their general. But the death of king Agis had given them, in the person of their first magistrate, a commander who equalled Dercyllidas in merit, and who has far surpassed him in renown.

The destructive expedition against the Eleans was the last exploit of the long and warlike reign of Agis. On his death-bed he acknowledged for his son Leotychides, whose legitimacy, the levity or the guilt of his mother Tymæa had exposed to just suspicion. But this late avowal of a successor, whom he had so long disowned, did not satisfy the partisans of Agefilaus, who was the brother of Agis on the side of his father Archidamus, but younger by many years, being born of a different mother, and failing Leotychides, the nearest heir to the throne. Under a diminutive and ignoble form, Agefilaus concealed a vigorous and fervid mind, a manly elevation of character, a generous ambition of soul. These respectable qualities, adorned by the milder virtues of modesty, candor, condescension, and unlimited complaisance for his friends, early attracted the notice, and merited the esteem, of the first names of Sparta; and of none more than Lyfander, who, as his personal hopes of grandeur were blasted by the universal jealousy and resentment that had been justly excited in Sparta against his ostentatious abuse of power, confined all his projects of ambition to the aggrandizement

Agefilaus
declared
king of
Sparta.

CHAP. of his favorite. That eloquence and address*,
 XXVII. which would have been ineffectual if employed
 for himself, succeeded in behalf of another; and
 by the influence and intrigues of Lyfander, still
 more than by the strong claims of justice and of
 merit, Agesilaus was declared successor to the
 vacant throne; and, at the distance of about two
 years, commander in chief of the Greek forces in
 Asia; an office less splendid in name than that of
 king of Sparta, but carrying with it more solid
 weight and authority.

Cinadon's
 confpi-
 racy,

In the interval of these successive honors, he
 approved his attentive vigilance in the service of
 the republic, of which the safety, and even the
 existence, was endangered by a daring and bloody
 conspiracy. A youth named Cinadon, distin-
 guished above his companions by extraordinary
 strength and agility, was not less conspicuous for
 undaunted courage and ambition. Descended of
 an obscure family, Cinadon felt and regretted the
 mortifying partiality of the government under

* The partisans of Leotychides, in pleading his cause before the
 assembly, alleged an oracle that exhorted the Spartans to beware of a
 lame reign. This pointed at Agesilaus, who limped in walking. But
 Lyfander, by one of those ready and unexpected turns, which often
 decide the resolutions of numerous assemblies, directed the battery of
 the oracle against Leotychides, asserting, that it was the lameness of
 the title only which Apollo must have had in view, since it was a
 matter indifferent to the gods whether the Spartan kings walked
 gracefully; but a matter of high importance whether they descended
 from Hercules, the son of Jupiter, or Alcibiades, an Athenian
 profligate and exile. Com. Plut. in Agesil. et Lyfand. et Xenoph.
 Agesil. Panegyr. et Hellen. l. iii. p. 493.

which he lived. His pride was deeply wounded c H A P.
 with the reflection, that whatever abilities his XXVII.
 youth might promise, and his manhood mature,
 the unfortunate circumstances of his birth must
 for ever exclude him from the principal dignities of
 the state, which circulated among a few Spartan
 families, without the possibility of extending be-
 yond that very limited sphere. The warmth of
 his character, and the impetuosity of his passions,
 prompted him to seek justice and revenge: nor
 was his blind and headlong ferocity alarmed by the
 means, however atrocious, that must lead to this
 favorite end. He communicated the horrid design
 to men of his own, and of an inferior condition,
 exaggerating their cruel treatment by a stern aristo-
 cracy, which he contrasted with the mild equality
 of the neighbouring communities; and perhaps
 asserting, that if they must submit to a master, it
 would be better to have one than many; that even
 the subjects of a monarchy enjoyed greater equality
 and liberty than the members of the Spartan re-
 public*, since the former all equally participated
 in those preferments and honors, to which not
 only the slaves, the Helots, and freedmen, but
 the whole body of the Lacedæmonian people,
 were forbidden to aspire. After this general repre-
 sentation, he neglected not, what was more ef-
 fectual and important, to arraign the arrogance

* This language I have often heard from the *subjects* of a modern
 republic, whose *citizens* are not more remarkable for their firmness in
 maintaining power, than for their moderation in exercising it.

C H A P. and cruelty of particular senators, and to inflame
 XXVII. the resentment of individuals against their private
 and domestic foes; nor did he forget to encourage
 them all with the certain prospect of success, by
 contrasting their own strength and numbers with
 the weakness of an enemy, who might be taken
 unarmed, and cut off by surprise¹⁰.

is disco-
 vered
 when ripe
 for execu-
 tion.

The time for action approached, and the author
 of the conspiracy commanded his associates to stay
 at home, that they might be ready at a call. Age-
 filaus, meanwhile, performed the accustomed vows
 and sacrifices for the safety of the republic; the
 appearance of the entrails announced some dread-
 ful and concealed danger; a second victim was
 slain, and the signs were still more unfavorable;
 but after examining the third sacrifice, the priest
 exclaimed, "We seem, O Agesilaus! to be in
 the midst of our enemies." Soon afterwards, a
 person, whose name has not been thought worthy
 of record, denounced Cinadon to the magistrates,
 as guilty of a treasonable design, of which he had
 endeavoured to render himself an accomplice.
 When the informer was desired to explain his de-
 claration more fully, he told them, that Cinadon
 having conducted him to the great square of the
 city, which, being destined for the public assembly
 and the market, was the usual place of rendezvous,
 desired him to count the number of Spartans whom
 he saw in that spacious resort. That he counted
 the king, the ephori, the senators, and about forty

¹⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 493, et seqq.

others, and then asked Cinadon, for what purpose he had required him to take that seemingly useless trouble? Because, replied the conspirator, I reckon the Spartans to be enemies, and all the rest, whose great numbers you behold in the market-place, to be friends. Nor does this proportion apply to Sparta only; in the farms and villages adjacent to the city, we shall in each house and family have one enemy, the master, but all the servants will be our friends. Cinadon then acquainted him with the object and cause of the conspiracy, which had been formed by men of probity and fortitude, and which was soon to be communicated to the slaves, peasants, and the whole body of Lacedæmonian people, whose animosity against the Spartans was too violent to be concealed. That the greatest part of the conspirators, being trained for war, had arms in their hands; that the shops of the armorers, the tools of those artificers who wrought in metal, wood, and stone, and even the instruments of agriculture, might furnish such weapons to the rest, as would fully answer the purpose against unarmed men.

This alarming intelligence roused the activity, without shaking the firmness, of the Spartan magistrates. It would have been imprudent to seize Cinadon in the capital, as they were unacquainted with the extent of his resources, and the number of his associates. On pretence of the public service, they contrived to send him to Aulon (for in similar expeditions they had often employed his ready arm and enterprising valor), that he might

Activity
and pru-
dence of
the Spar-
tan ma-
gistrates.

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XXVII.

Cinadon
and his
accomplices
seized and
punished.

Agefilaus
takes the
command
of the
Greek
forces in
Asia.
Olymp.
xcvi. 1.
A. C. 396.

seize, in that licentious city, and bring within the reach of justice, several daring violators of the Spartan laws, among whom was a very beautiful woman, who corrupted the manners of young and old¹¹. The senate prepared waggons for conveying the prisoners, and furnished every thing necessary for the journey. A body of chosen horsemen was appointed to accompany Cinadon, who set out without suspecting that this long train of preparation was destined against himself alone. But no sooner had he reached a proper distance from the city, than he was seized as a traitor, and compelled, by the terror of immediate death, to denounce his accomplices. Their names were sent to the senate, who instantly secured their persons. Cinadon, Tisamenus, a priest, and the other leaders of the conspiracy, were scourged through the city, gored with instruments of torture, and finally relieved by death.

The rash enterprise of Cinadon still filled the Spartans with alarm, when intelligence was conveyed of the formidable preparations of Artaxerxes, against whom the persuasive influence of Lyfander encouraged them to employ the great and solid, but as yet unknown, abilities of their young and warlike prince. Since the reign of Agamemnon, Agefilaus was the first Grecian king who led the united forces of his country to make war in Asia; and his expedition, though not less

¹¹ Ἀγαγεῖν δ' ἐκελευσεν τὴν γυναῖκα ἢ καλλιῆ μὲν εἰλετο αὐτῇ εἶναι, λυμαινεσθαι δ' ἐωκεῖ τῆς ἀσκησάμενης Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων. Xenoph. p. 494.

important than the exploits of the sons of Atreus and Achilles, is much inferior in renown; because the panegyric of Xenophon, warm and splendid as it is, even beyond the usual color of his compositions, must yet, like all the works of man, be for ever eclipsed by the lustre of the Iliad. But the conquests of Agesilaus, however different in fame, yet surpassed in misfortune, the war of Troy. Both were pernicious to the interests of Greece; but of the two, the victories of Agesilaus proved the most fatal, not indeed in their immediate, but in their remote consequences.

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In the spring of the year three hundred and ninety-six before Christ, he left Sparta, with three thousand Lacedæmonian freedmen, and a body of foreign troops, amounting to six thousand, chiefly collected from the confederate cities of Peloponnesus. Since the irregular and unjustifiable conduct of Agis, in his unfortunate expedition against Argos, the Spartan kings were usually attended in the field by a council of ten senators, whose concurrence was held necessary in all public measures. Agesilaus demanded a council, not of ten, but of thirty Spartans: a refined stroke of policy, which strongly indicates that artful dexterity with which, during a long administration, he uniformly promoted the views of his interest and ambition. By augmenting the number of the council, he diminished its importance. Each member, as he possessed less weight and influence, felt himself less concerned in the honor of the body; and the whole were more easily swayed and governed by

Disgraces
Lyfander,
who alone
rivalled
his autho-
rity.

C H A P. the king. Lyfander alone, whose name in Asia
 XXVII. was illustrious or terrible, rivalled for a while the
 power of Agesilaus. But the colleagues of Lyfander were the first to dispute his pretensions, and to control his authority. Agesilaus availed himself of their envy, and listened too easily to the dictates of selfishness, in humbling the arrogance of a rival who had been the chief author of his own greatness. By thwarting the measures of Lyfander, by denying his requests, by employing him in offices unbecoming his dignity¹², he rendered him contemptible in the eyes of those by whom he had been so long feared. This ungenerous treatment of a benefactor, as well as the aspiring pride of the benefactor himself, which could excite such black ingratitude in an otherwise virtuous breast, doubly prove the instability of friendship between ambitious minds. After a disgraceful rupture, which ended in an affected reconciliation, Lyfander was sent by Agesilaus and his council to command the Lacedæmonian squadron in the Hellespont, an inactive and subordinate service, in which he could not expect an opportunity to perform any thing worthy of his ancient fame. He returned, therefore, in a few months to Sparta, covered with disgrace, enraged by disappointment, and vowing implacable revenge against the cruel ingratitude of his friend, which

¹² Lyfander was known in the East as a conqueror; Agesilaus made him a commissary. Vid. Plut. in Agesil. et Lyfand. et Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 497.

he felt more deeply than the injustice of all his enemies together.

Agésilas fixed his head-quarters at Ephesus, a place recommended by its central situation, as the most convenient rendezvous for the recruits which flocked to his standard from every part of the coast; at the same time that such a station enabled him to conceal from the enemy which of their provinces was the intended object of his invasion. Thither Tissaphernes sent an embassy, demanding the reason of such mighty preparations. Agésilas replied, "That the Greeks in Asia might enjoy the same liberty with their brethren in Europe." The messengers of Tissaphernes had orders to declare, that the king was inclined to acknowledge the ancient freedom and independence of the Grecian colonies; that the report of his hostile intentions against either them or the mother-country was totally void of foundation; and that, in consequence of the recent transactions between Tissaphernes and Dercyllidas, ambassadors might shortly be expected from Susa, empowered to ratify a firm and lasting peace between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. Until this desirable work should be completed, Tissaphernes earnestly desired a continuation of the truce, which, on his side, he was ready to seal by whatever formalities Agésilas thought proper to require. The Spartan king frankly avowed his suspicions of treachery; yet being unwilling to embroil his country in an unnecessary war, he dispatched Dercyllidas, with two members of the Spartan council, to renew his late

C H A P.

XXVII.

Treachery
of Tissa-
phernes.

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C H A P. XXVII. engagements with Tiffaphernes. The perfidious satrap swore and deceived for the last time. No sooner had he received the long-expected auxiliaries from the East, than he commanded Agesilaus to leave Ephesus, and to evacuate the coast of Asia; if he delayed to comply, the weight of the Persian arms would enforce obedience. The prudent, or pious Spartan, while his friends were alarmed with this unexpected declaration, assumed an unusual gaiety of countenance, observing, that he rejoiced to commence the war under such favorable auspices, since the treachery of Tiffaphernes must render the gods his enemies.

Innocent stratagem of Agesilaus.

Meanwhile he prepared to encounter the insidious arts of the satrap, with equal, but more innocent address. It was industriously given out, that he intended to march into the province of Caria, the favorite residence of Tiffaphernes, which was adorned by his voluptuous parks and palaces, and strengthened by a fortress, the repository of his treasures. The intervening cities were ordered to mend the roads, to furnish a market, and to prepare every thing most necessary to facilitate the march of the Grecian army. Tiffaphernes, not doubting that Caria was the intended scene of war, especially as the mountainous nature of that province rendered it improper for horse, in which the Greeks were very poorly provided, encamped with his own numerous cavalry in the plains of the Meander, in order to intercept the passage of the enemy. But Agesilaus having posted a sufficient garrison in Ephesus, left that city, and

He defeats the Persians, and plunders Irygia.

turning to the north, advanced by rapid marches into Phrygia, the rich plunder of which rewarded the active diligence of his soldiers. The selfish satrap was unwilling to relieve the province of Pharnabazus, by weakening the defence of his own; and accordingly remained inactive on the fruitful banks of the Meander, whose winding stream skirts the northern frontier of Caria, still suspecting an invasion of the Greeks from Ephesus and the neighbouring sea-ports. During the greatest part of the summer Agesilaus ravaged Phrygia; the Barbarians were shamefully defeated in several rencounters; at length they ceased to resist his arms; nor attempted even to harass his retreat, when having gratified the just resentment of his country, he returned, loaded with spoil, to winter in Ephesus¹³.

In the Phrygian expedition, Agesilaus shared, and surpassed, the toils of the meanest soldier, from whom he refused to be distinguished by his dress, his food, or his accommodations, by day or night. The inactive season of the year was most diligently and usefully employed. Ephesus and the neighbouring towns glowed with the ardor of military preparation. The Phrygian wealth was employed to urge the hand of industry. Shields, spears, swords, and helmets, filled every shop, and crowded every magazine. The inhabitants of the country were allured by great rewards to form their best horses to the discipline of the field; and

C H A P.
XXVII.

Employ-
ment of
the Greeks
during
their
winter-
quarters
in Phry-
gia.

¹³ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 492, et seqq.

C H A P. the wealthy citizens were exempted from the service of the ensuing campaign, upon condition only that they furnished a horseman, properly equipped, to perform their vicarious duty. The veteran soldiers, as well as the new levies, were daily exercised within the walls of Ephesus, in those martial amusements which represented a faithful image, and which formed the best school, of war. Agefilaus often condescended to dispute the prize of valor or dexterity; his popular manners endeared him to the troops; the superiority of his talents commanded their willing obedience; they vied with each other in loyalty to their prince; they vied in gratitude to the gods with their prince himself, who, as often as he obtained the crown of victory, dedicated the honorable reward in the admired temple of Ephesian Diana. "What then (adds a soldier, a philosopher, and a man of piety) might not be expected from troops who delighted in the exercise of war, respected their general, and revered the gods¹⁴?"

Agefilaus
prepares
for the
ensuing
campaign.
Olymp.
xcvi. 2.
A. C. 395.

The expectation of Xenophon, who beheld the interesting scenes at Ephesus, which he has inimitably described, was fully gratified by the success of the ensuing campaign. Agreeably to the annual revolution of offices in the Lacedæmonian republic, a commission of thirty Spartans was sent early in the spring to supply the place of Lyfander and his colleagues. Among the members of this new council Agefilaus distributed the various

¹⁴ Xenoph. Panegy. Agefil.

departments of military command. The superior abilities of Herippidas were intrusted with the veteran army who had served under Cyrus. Xenocles was appointed to conduct the cavalry. Mygdo commanded the Asiatic levies; Scythes, the Lacedæmonian freedmen; for himself, as his peculiar care, the general reserved the faithful and warlike body of Peloponnesian allies, chosen from the flower and vigor of many flourishing republics. With a view to encourage his soldiers before taking the field, he ordered the Phrygian prisoners to be brought forth, stripped, and exposed to sale. The Greeks viewed with contempt the delicate whiteness of their skins, their flaccid muscles, their awkward motions, their shapeless forms, their unwieldy corpulence, and the effeminate softness of their whole persons. Such an enemy they considered as nothing superior to an army of women¹⁵.

Agefilaus had declared, that he would be no longer satisfied with ravaging the extremities, but was determined to attack the centre, of the Persian power. Tissaphernes, fearful of being deceived by a second feint, again conducted his squadrons to the banks of the Meander, and reinforced with the flower of his infantry the garrisons of Caria, which (as the contrary had been industriously reported) he concluded to be the main object of approaching hostilities. But the Spartan was too able a general to repeat the same game. On this

C H A P.
XXVII.

Attacks
the centre
of the Per-
sian do-
minions in
Lower
Asia.

¹⁵ Xenoph. p. 500.

CHAP.
XXVII.

Death of
Tissapher-
nes.

occasion, therefore, he carried into execution the design which had been made public, marched toward the royal city of Sardis, and ravaged the adjoining territory without opposition. He had acquired much valuable booty, and shaken the fidelity of the Lydians, before any enemy appeared to resist his progress. That resistance, which was made too late, proved ineffectual. After several successful skirmishes, he defeated the Persians in a general engagement on the banks of the Pactolus, surrounded and took their camp, in which, beside other riches, he found seventy talents of silver. He likewise expected to have taken the unrelenting enemy of the Greeks, the perfidious Tissaphernes; but that crafty traitor, suspecting the event of the battle, had thrown himself, with a considerable body of troops, within the strong walls of Sardis, where his cowardice continued to reside, displaying the inglorious pride of pomp and luxury, while the provinces of Artaxerxes fell a prey to the hostile invader. The time of his punishment, however, was now arrived. His whole life had been disgraceful to himself; but its last scene had disgraced the arms of his master, who cancelled, by one stroke of royal ingratitude, the merit of innumerable perfidies and cruelties committed for his service. Tithraustes was sent from court to take off the head of the obnoxious satrap; who, being allured to a conference, was caught by his own arts ¹⁶, and met with a just fate; although

¹⁶ Polyænus, l. vii. The fact is mentioned with few circumstances in Diodorus, and with none in Xenophon, p. 501.

the author of his death was, perhaps, the only man in Persia or in Greece with whom Tissaphernes had any claim of merit. C H A P. XXVII.

Tithraustes, who had come from Babylon escorted by a powerful body of cavalry, possessed the mandate of the great king for assuming the government of Lower Asia, and the conduct of the war. Having removed the only rival who had interest or ability to dispute this extensive and honorable commission, his next care was to send an embassy to Agesilaus, which, instead of indicating the character of a great general (for such Tithraustes was esteemed in the East), betrayed the mean and temporizing genius of his worthless predecessor. The ambassadors were instructed to declare, "That Tissaphernes, the author of those troubles which embroiled Greece and Persia, had suffered a just death; and that the king, who had been too long deceived by his artifices, was now ready to acknowledge the independence of the Grecian colonies, on condition that Agesilaus withdrew his troops from Asia." The Spartan honestly replied, "That the alternative of war or peace depended, not on himself, but on the resolution of the assembly and senate; nor could he remove his forces from the East without the express command of his republic." The artful satrap perceiving that it was impossible for him to interrupt, determined at least to divert, the course of hostilities. None knew better than Tithraustes the use of money as an instrument of negociation. He condescended to purchase from Agesilaus, by a very

He is succeeded by Tithraustes, who pursues the same line of conduct.

C H A P. large sum, the tranquillity of Lydia; and as it
 XXVII. seemed a matter of indifference to the Spartan king whichever part of the Persian dominions felt the weight of his invasion, he evacuated that province, and again entered Phrygia.

Agefilauſ
 intruſted
 with the
 command
 of the
 Grecian
 fleet;
 Olymp.
 xvi. 3.
 A. C. 394.

While he purſued his march northwards, he was overtaken in Ionia by a welcome meſſenger from home, who delivered him a letter, teſtifying the grateful admiration of his countrymen, prolonging the term of his military command, and intruſting him with the numerous fleet, which had failed two years before, to counteract the deſigns of the enemy¹⁷. This fleet, conſiſting of ninety gallies, was actually commanded by Pharax, who, during the glorious career of Ageſilaus's victories, had ſilently performed very uſeful and meritorious ſervice. The naval preparations of Artaxerxes, which, as above mentioned, firſt excited the alarm in Greece, were ſtill carried on with activity. Various ſquadrons were equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Cilicia, and other maritime provinces, of which the combined ſtrength far exceeded the fleet of Greece. But the vigilant diligence of Pharax prevented their union. His ſhips were victualled by Nephres, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt; with whom, in the name of Sparta, he had contracted an alliance. The ports of Cyprus, Rhodes, and the Greek cities in the Carian Cheroſoneſus, were open to his cruifers. Availing himſelf of thoſe important advantages, he

¹⁷ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 501.

steered with rapidity along the hostile shores; and seasonably dividing or combining his fleet, effectually restrained the enemy from making their projected descents on Peloponnesus, and even deterred them from sailing the Asiatic seas ¹⁸. Agesilaus, unmindful of this essential service, which had prevented any diversion of the Greek forces in the East, deprived Pharax of the command, and substituted in his stead Pisander, a near relation of his own, who possessed indeed the ambitious valor and manly firmness of the Spartan character, but neither the experience, nor the abilities, sufficient to qualify him for this weighty trust.

which he
commits
to Pisander.

The first effects of this fatal error were eclipsed by a momentary blaze of glory. Agesilaus entered Phrygia; attacked, conquered, and pursued Pharnabazus; who, flying from post to post, was successively driven from every part of his valuable province ¹⁹. The fame of the Grecian victories struck terror into the neighbouring countries. Cotys ²⁰, or Corylas, the proud tyrant of Paphlagonia, who disdained the friendship of the great king ²¹, sent humbly to request that the native valor of his numerous and invincible cavalry might be associated with the Spartan arms ²². The inferior satraps, and especially their oppressed

Agesilaus
entertains
hopes of
conquer-
ing the
Persian
empire;

¹⁸ Isocrat. Panegy. He does not give the name of the admiral, which we find in Xenophon's Gr. Hist.

¹⁹ Xenophon compares him to the Scythian Nomades.

²⁰ He is called Cotys in Xenoph. Gr. Hist. Plutarch, and Diodorus; and Corylas in Xenoph. Anabaf. l. v. p. 370.

²¹ Xenoph. ibid.

²² Plut. in Agesil.

C H A P.
XXVII.

subjects, courted the protection of Agesilaus, expecting that the unknown dominion of Greece would be lighter than the yoke of Persia, of which they had long felt and regretted the severity. The deceitful Ariæus, who had shared the guilt, without sharing the punishment of Cyrus, could never be heartily reconciled to a master against whom he had once rebelled. His actual wealth, and ancient honors, gave him a powerful influence over the numerous Barbarians who had followed the standard of Cyrus and his own; and whose discontented spirits might easily be inflamed into a second revolt²³. The commotion was general in Lesser Asia; and, as Egypt had already rebelled, Agesilaus, at the head of about twenty thousand Greeks, and innumerable Barbarian allies, might entertain a very rational expectation to shake the throne of Artaxerxes; especially as the experience of his friend and admirer, Xenophon, who was still the companion of his arms, must have powerfully encouraged him to that glorious enterprise²⁴.

which are
blasted by
unexpected
intelligence from
Greece.

But an undertaking of which the success, however splendid, could not probably have been followed by any solid advantages, because the diminutive territory and population of Sparta formed a basis far too feeble to support such a weight of conquest, was blasted, in the bloom of hope, by intelligence equally unexpected and distressful. Tithraustes, who knew the power of gold over the

²³ Plut. in Agesil. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 439.

²⁴ Diodor. ibid. et Xenoph. Agesil. Panegy. et Plut. in Agesil.

Grecian councils, determined, with the approba-
 tion of the king his master, to give full play to
 this main-spring of politics. The Cretan and
 Ægean seas were carelessly guarded by the un-
 suspecting confidence of the new admiral. Ti-
 thraustes perceived the neglect; and dispatched,
 without any fear of capture, various emissaries into
 Greece, well qualified, by bribes and address, to
 practise with the discontented and factious dema-
 gogues, the natural enemies of Sparta, of aristo-
 cratic government, and of the public tranquil-
 lity²⁵.

The principal instrument of these secret nego-
 ciations was Timocrates of Rhodes, a man of an
 intriguing and audacious spirit, who carried with
 him no less a sum than fifty talents (above nine
 thousand pounds sterling), which he distributed,
 with lavish promises of future bounty, to Cyclon
 of Argos, to Timolaus and Polyantes of Corinth,
 to Androclides Ismenias and Galaxadorus of
 Thebes; names for the most part obscure in the
 annals of war, but important in the history of
 domestic faction. The tyranny of Sparta was the
 perpetual theme of these venal hirelings, not only
 in their respective communities, but in every
 quarter of Greece, to which they were successively
 carried with a mercenary diligence. They painted
 in the strongest colors the injustice, the cruelty,
 and the immeasurable ambition of that haughty
 republic, who had made foldiers of her slaves,

C H A P.
XXVII.

Means by
 which the
 Persians
 kindle a
 war in
 that coun-
 try.

²⁵ Xenoph. p. 513, et seqq.

C H A P. that she might make slaves of her allies. The
XXVII. destructive and impious devastation of the sacred territory of Elis was arraigned with every term of reproach. The same calamities, it was prophesied, must soon overwhelm the neighbouring countries, unless they prepared (while it was yet time to prepare) for a vigorous defence; since Sparta pursued her conquests in Asia with no other view but to lull the security, and rivet the chains, of Greece ²⁶.

Motives
by which
the ene-
mies of
Sparta
were actu-
ated.

Strong as these invectives may appear, and interested as they certainly were, they did not exceed the truth; and, what is of more importance, they were addressed to men well disposed to believe them. Since the subversion of the Athenian power, the imperious government of Sparta had rendered her almost alike odious to her old, and to her new, confederates. The former, and particularly the Corinthians, Arcadians, and Achæans, complained with the warmth which justice gives, that, after sharing the toils and dangers of the Peloponnesian war, they had been cruelly deprived of the fruits of victory. The latter, and especially such communities as had revolted from Athens, lamented that their blood and treasure had been spent in vain. They had fought for freedom and independence; but their valor had been rewarded by a more intolerable servitude. Argos had long been the enemy, and Thebes aspired to become the rival, of Sparta. Above all, the

²⁶ Xenoph. p. 514.

Athenians, animated by the patriotism of Thrasybulus, their deliverer from the Spartan yoke, longed to employ the first moments of returning vigor in the pursuit of glory and revenge.

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The corruption of those morbid humors, which must have soon fermented of themselves, was accelerated by the mercenary emissaries of Tithraustes. The occasion, too, seemed favorable for assaulting the domestic strength of a republic, whose arms were ambitiously employed in extending her distant conquests. The conduct of the Thebans had already announced this design. They not only refused assistance to Agesilaus towards carrying on his eastern campaign, but treated him without respect or decency, while he crossed their dominions; and, were not ambition blind, he must have perceived and repented their hostility, and have delayed to undertake his expedition against Asia, till he had extinguished the seeds of war in Greece.

Circumstances which encouraged their hostility.

But, notwithstanding the concurring causes which hastened a rupture, such was the terror of the Spartan name, increased by the recent glory of Agesilaus, that none of her numerous enemies had courage openly to take arms, and to avow their just animosity. After various, but secret conferences, held in the principal cities, it was determined to wound that republic through her allies, the Phocians, who were distinguished, amidst the very general discontent, by their unshaken attachment and fidelity. The Locri Ozolæ, a fierce

Their caution in beginning the war.

C H A P. and insolent people²⁷, who lived in the neighbour-
 XXVII. hood of Phocis, were easily persuaded to levy con-
 tributions from a district on their eastern frontier,
 to which they had not the smallest claim, and of
 which the dominion had been long a matter of
 dispute between the Phocians and Thebans. Both
 these states seem to have been injured, and exactly
 in the same degree, by this aggression; but the
 Phocians, who were the enemies of the Locri,
 took arms to revenge, while the Thebans, who
 were their friends, prepared to abet, their injustice.
 They expected, and their expectation was grati-
 fied, that the Spartans would quickly interfere in a
 quarrel that affected the most important interests of
 their Phocian allies; a measure which tended
 precisely to that issue which prudence and policy
 required, since the Thebans would be compelled
 to arm in their own defence, and must appear to
 all the neutral states of Greece, and even to their
 Lacedæmonian enemies, to be undesignedly drag-
 ged into a war, not from an inclination to com-
 mit, but from the necessity to repel, injuries²⁸.

Campaign
 of Lyfan-
 der in
 Bœotia.

The irascible pride of Sparta, ever prone to
 chastise the smallest offences with unbounded se-
 verity, conspired with the most sanguine hopes
 of Thebes and her allies. Instead of condescend-
 ing to remonstrate, instead of demanding satis-
 faction, instead of ordering the Thebans to

²⁷ Thucyd. l. i. p. 4. et p. 47.

²⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. ad fin. Diodor. xiv. 32. Plutarch. in
 Lyfand. p. 448, et seqq.

evacuate the territory of Phocis, and to abstain C H A P. XXVII.
 from future injury, the Spartans flew to arms, and
 marched to invade Bœotia. On the first rumor
 of hostilities, the activity of Lyfander had been
 employed to assemble their northern confederates,
 the Maleans, Heracleans, with those who inhabited
 the villages of Doris and Mount Oeta. He pene-
 trated into the Theban territory, gained Lebadea
 by force, Orchomenus by address, and prepared
 to assault the walls of Haliartus, which, next to
 Thebes, was the strongest of the Bœotian cities.
 The difficulty of this enterprise made him dispatch
 a messenger to hasten the arrival of Pausanias, the
 Spartan king, who had led forth six thousand
 Peloponnesians, to co-operate with this experi-
 enced commander. The unfortunate messenger
 was taken by the scouts of the Thebans, and with
 him a letter, in which Lyfander had signified his
 purpose, and appointed the time of rendezvous
 with Pausanias, that they might surprise Haliartus
 with their combined forces²⁹.

At the same time that this useful intelligence
 was brought to Thebes; there arrived in that city
 a powerful reinforcement of Athenian troops, who,
 though their own capital was unwallèd and defence-
 less, had been persuaded by Thrasybulus to brave
 the resentment of Sparta. To these generous
 auxiliaries the Thebans committed their city, their
 wives, their children, and every object of their
 most tender concern; while the warlike youth,

The The-
 bans
 march in
 the night
 to the de-
 fence of
 Haliartus.

²⁹ Xenoph. Hellen. p. 503, et seqq.

C H A P. XXVII. and almost all those of a military age, assembled in complete armor, set out in the dead of night, and performing a journey of fifteen miles with silence and celerity, reached, while it was yet dark, the gates of Haliartus. Their unexpected arrival struck a pleasing terror into their friends, who were affected still more deeply, when they understood the cause of this nocturnal expedition. The Thebans dispelled their fear, and animated their hope, expecting not only to save Haliartus, but to obtain a signal advantage over the unsuspecting confidence of the assailants.

Stratagem
by which
they de-
feat the
assailants.

For this purpose, they sent a strong detachment to lie in ambush without the walls. The rest, reinforced by the townsmen, formed themselves in battle-array, and stood to their arms, behind the gates. Lyfander arrived in the morning; but Pausanias, who had not received his message, still continued in the neighbourhood of Plataea. The soldiers, flushed by recent victory, disdained to depend on the tardy motions of their auxiliaries. They requested Lyfander to lead them against the place; a measure to which he was otherwise much inclined, being eager to snatch the glory to himself, without dividing it with Pausanias, his rival and enemy.

Battle of
Haliartus,
and death
of Ly-
fander.

He approached the town, and boldly began the attack, perceiving the walls and battlements to be unguarded. But before any breach was made, the different gates at once flew open, while the Thebans and Haliartians rushed forth with one consent, and with irresistible fury. Lyfander, with a

priest

priest who attended him, was slain on the first onset. His men began to rally, but the Thebans, posted in ambush without the city, occasioned a new terror. The enemy every where gave way; above a thousand fell in the field of battle, the rest were routed, put to flight, and pursued with great slaughter.³⁰

The first intelligence of this fatal disaster brought Pausanias to the scene of action, that he might examine the full extent of the calamity. It would have been fruitless to attempt the siege of Haliartus; but it was necessary to carry off the bodies of the slain. Pausanias held a council of war, to determine whether this pious duty should be effected by force, or whether he might condescend to solicit the humanity of the victors. Force seemed dangerous, as the principal destruction had happened immediately under the walls of the place, which it would be impossible to approach without suffering extremely from the missile weapons of the enemy, and without being exposed to a second attack, perhaps more bloody than the first. It was therefore unanimously resolved to send a Spartan herald to Haliartus, requesting leave to bury the dead. The demand was granted, on condition that the Peloponnesian army should immediately evacuate Bœotia. Pausanias complied, and returned to Sparta. His want of success, rather than his demerit, subjected him to trial and condemnation. He escaped

³⁰ Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, et seqq. Plutarch. in Lyfand.

C H A P. capital punishment by flying to Tegea, where
XXVII. he soon afterwards sickened and died. His son
 Agesipolis assumed the Spartan sceptre, which,
 at that juncture, required the direction of more
 experienced hands³¹.

³¹ Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, et seqq. Plutarch. in Lyfand.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Recal of Agesilaus from the East. — He invades Boeotia. — Views of Evagoras King of Cyprus. — His friendship with Conon. — The latter intrusted with the Persian Fleet. — He defeats the Lacedaemonians. — Battle of Coronæa. — The Corinthian War. — Conon rebuilds the Walls and Harbours of Athens. — Conquests of Conon and Thrasylbulus. — Peace of Antalcidas.

THE defeat at Haliartus, which exasperated, without humbling, the Spartans, confirmed the courage of their enemies, and hastened the defection of their allies. The league was openly ratified and avowed by the republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth. The spirit of revolt seized Eubœa, pervaded the provinces of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the rich cities of Chalcis, and the warlike principalities of Thesfaly¹. The whole fabric of the Spartan power, raised and cemented by a war of twenty-seven years, was shaken to the foundation; their victorious leaders were no more; nor did any resource remain, but that of recalling Agesilaus from his Asiatic victories, that the fortune and valor of

C H A P.
XXVIII.

The league formed against Sparta obliges that republic to recal Agesilaus from the East. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394.

¹ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 443. Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 507.

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C H A P. this accomplished general might sustain the falling
XXVIII. ruins of his country. He received the fatal scy-
talé², intimating his recal, at the important crisis
of his fortune. He had completed his prepara-
tions for marching into Upper Asia, and his heart
already beat with the ardor of promised conquest
and glory³.

He com-
municates
his recal
to the
troops.

Having assembled the confederates, he com-
municated the revered order of the republic, with
which he expressed his resolution immediately to
comply. The generous troops, having associated
their own honor with the renown of the general,
testified their grief and their reluctance by tears
and entreaties. But Agesilaus remained firm in
his purpose, to obey the command of Sparta, to
set bounds to his triumphs in the East, and to turn
the direction of his arms towards a less promising
field, to which he was summoned by the danger
of his country⁴. Before crossing the Hellespont,
he detached four thousand veteran soldiers, to
strengthen the Asiatic garrisons; several of which
he visited in person, every where assuring his
friends, that it was his most earnest wish to rejoin
them in Asia, whenever the troubles of Greece
should permit his absence.

² See Vol. II. c. xii. p. 124.

³ Plutarch. in Agesil. et Xenoph. Hellen. I. iv. p. 513.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. et Panegy. Agesil. et Plutarch. in Agesil. bestow
seemingly immoderate praises on this resolution; but it is to be con-
sidered, that in the tumultuary governments of Greece, it was not
uncommon to behold a successful general, proud of the zeal and
strength of his followers, set at defiance the feeble authority of his
republic.

The greater part of the army, and particularly the new levies of Ionians and Æolians, who had passed their apprenticeship in arms under his fortunate standard, declared, with tears of affection, that they never would abandon their beloved general. Agesilaus encouraged this disposition, which was extremely favorable to his views; and lest it might be nothing but a fally of temporary enthusiasm, artfully secured its permanence, by proposing the distribution of valuable rewards, in the Thracian Chersonesus, to such officers as brought the best companies of foot or cavalry for the service of his intended expedition. He was able to perform his promises with a generous magnificence; since, after defraying the necessary expenses of the war, he carried from Asia above a thousand talents, or an hundred and ninety-three thousand pounds sterling⁵.

When the whole forces were assembled in the Chersonesus, they probably amounted to about ten thousand men. Their nearest rout into Greece lay through the same countries that had been traversed near a century before by Xerxes; but the activity of Agesilaus accomplished in a month what, to eastern effeminacy, had been the journey of a laborious year. In the long interval of time between these celebrated expeditions, the Barbarians of Thrace and Macedon, through whose countries it was necessary to march, seem not to have made

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Their desire to follow him prudently encouraged by Agesilaus.

His return to Greece.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. et Panegyri. Agesil. et Plutarch. in Agesil. et Diodor. p. 441.

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He defeats
the Thes-
salian ca-
valry.

much improvement in the arts of war or peace. They were still undisciplined and disunited; and their desultory arms were alike incapable of opposing the Spartan and the Persian. Agefilæus descended without resistance into the plains of Thessaly, where his progress was stopped for a moment by the numerous cavalry of that country, whose petty princes had acceded to the alliance formed against the ambition of Sparta. By a judicious disposition of his forces, and by evolutions equally skilful and rapid, he speedily surmounted this obstacle. To the charge of the Thessalian cavalry, he opposed the weight of his heavy-armed men, by whom the enemy were routed and put to flight. Then with his own horsemen, who would have proved an unequal match for the unbroken vigor of the Thessalians, he pursued them with great slaughter, took many prisoners, and erected a trophy of his victory, between the mountains Prantes and Nanthacium*, which form the western boundary of the extensive plain of Coronæa.

Invades
Bœotia.

Instead of continuing his journey through the hostile country of Locris, whose weakness he disdained to chastise, he marched through the friendly territories of Doris and Phocis, that he might turn the shock of the war against the daring and rebellious Thebans. He found them in arms with their powerful allies, rather provoked, than discouraged, by a bloody but undecisive battle, which, soon after the disaster at Haliartus, had been

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 517.

fought against the Lacedæmonians at Epiecia, a small town on the common frontier of Corinth and Sicyon. The confederate army was still about twenty thousand strong; the forces of Agesilaus fully equalled that number, as he had received considerable supplies from Sparta and Phocis; and as the secondary cities, particularly Orchomenus of Bœotia, and Epidaurus of Argolis, had joined his arms, prompted by their usual envy and resentment against their respective capitals. The hostile battalions approached; those of Agesilaus marching, in good order, from the banks of the Cephissus, while the Thebans impetuously descended from the mountains of Helicon. Before they arrived at the scene of action, in the Bœotian plain of Coronæa⁷, a city thirty miles distant from Thebes, the superstition of both armies was alarmed by an eclipse of the sun; and the wisdom of Agesilaus was alarmed, far more justly, by most unexpected intelligence from the East⁸.

Since his unfortunate partiality had intrusted the Lacedæmonian fleet to the obstinacy and inexperience of his kinsman Pisander, the Persian, or rather Phœnician, squadrons had been committed to the direction of a far more able commander. After the decisive engagement at Ægos-Potamos, which was followed by the taking of Athens, and the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, Conon,

Evagoras
recovers
his heredi-
tary do-
minion in
Cyprus.

⁷ The places distinguished by that name are described by Strabo, p. 407. 410, 411, and 434.

⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 518. Plut. in Agesil.

C H A P. the Athenian admiral, escaped with a few gallies
XXVIII. into the harbour of Salamis, the capital of the isle of Cyprus. That city, and a considerable part of the island, was then subject to Evagoras, a man whom the voice of panegyric represents as governing, with consummate wisdom⁹, a kingdom, which he had acquired by heroic valor. This admired prince boasted a descent from Teucer, who, returning from the siege of Troy eight hundred years before the reign of Evagoras, had founded the first Grecian colony on the Cyprian shore. During that long space of time, Salamis had undergone various revolutions. Evagoras was born and educated, under the reign of an usurper, who fell by the dagger of an assassin, who in his turn assumed the crown. Evagoras fled to Cilicia, obtained the protection of the satrap of that province, returned to Salamis with a handful of men, surprised and dethroned the new tyrant, to whom he was not bound by any tie of allegiance.

His attachment to Athens, and friendship for Common the Athenian.

From the moment that he began to reign, he discovered the most partial fondness for Athens, in whose language, arts, and institutions, his youth had been liberally instructed; and which afterwards formed the study and delight of his manhood, the amusement and consolation of his declining age. But unfortunately for the sensibility and affectionate gratitude of Evagoras towards a country to which he owed his education and his happiness, he

⁹ Isocrates's panegyric of Evagoras may be entitled the picture of a great king: the character is only too perfect.

lived at a period when, before the situation of his principality enabled him to afford any effectual assistance to Athens, he beheld that proud republic deprived of the splendor and dominion which she had enjoyed above seventy years. He lamented her misfortunes with a filial tenderness, and received with the kindest hospitality her oppressed and afflicted citizens. The virtuous and enterprising Conon deserved his affection and esteem, and soon acquired the unlimited confidence of a mind congenial to his own. They acted with the happiest concert for the security and aggrandizement of the little kingdom, alluring new inhabitants from Greece, increasing their arts and industry, extending navigation and commerce; and, in a short time, Salamis was able to fit out a considerable naval power, and to subdue and incorporate with her own subjects several of the neighbouring communities. The great king, who had long been considered as lord paramount of Cyprus, interfered not in the domestic concerns of the island, provided he received from thence his small customary tribute. The flourishing state of Evagoras's affairs might enable him to pay, and to exceed, the stipulated sum; though it is probable that he early meditated, what he afterwards attempted to accomplish, the deliverance of his country from this mark of bondage.

But a design which actually engaged him more deeply, and to which he was strongly incited by the ardent solicitations of Conon, was the restoration of Athens (which he considered as his

C. H. A. P.
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Evagoras
and Co.
non deter-
mine to
retrieve
the for-
tune of

C H A P. adoptive country and parent) to that state of glory
 XXVIII. and pre-eminence from which she had miserably
 that re- fallen. The virtuous and patriotic friends (for as
 public. such contemporaries describe them) are represented
 as pilots and mariners watching the tides and
 currents, and catching every propitious gale that
 might facilitate the execution of this hazardous
 enterprise. The victories of Agesilaus in the East,
 which threatened to shake the throne of Arta-
 xerxes, furnished an opportunity too favorable to
 escape their vigilance. Conon had been already
 recommended to the great king by Evagoras; and
 the recommendation had been enforced by Phar-
 nabazus, who knew and admired his merit. The
 experienced skill of the illustrious Athenian, and
 of his countrymen Hieronymus and Nicodemus,
 had assisted in equipping the Barbarian squadrons
 in the Cilician and Phœnician harbours. But
 the abilities of Pharax, the Spartan admiral, and
 the cowardice or negligence of the Persian com-
 manders, hitherto rendered useless a fleet of near
 three hundred sail, which was ill manned, and which
 often wanted money.

Conon in-
 trusted
 with the
 command
 of the Per-
 sian fleet.

The activity of Conon undertook to remedy
 these evils. He left Cilicia, travelled to Thap-
 sacus, embarked on the Euphrates; and, as his vessel
 was moved by the combined impulse of winds,
 oars, and stream, he descended with rapidity along
 the winding channel to Babylon^{1°}. The only ob-
 stacle to his intended conference with Artaxerxes

^{1°} Diodorus, l. xiv. p. 442.

was, his unwillingness to degrade the Athenian character by depressing the body, bending the knee, and paying the usual marks of respectful submission, which were readily granted by Barbarians to the monarch of the East; but which the Greeks refused to man, and reserved for the majesty of the gods. This difficulty, however, was at length obviated by those whose mutual interest strongly solicited an interview. Conon represented to the trembling monarch, who was still agitated by the terror of Agesilaus's victories, the necessity of opposing the Spartans vigorously by sea. Their fleet alone had acquired, and maintained, the command of the Asiatic coast. A single defeat at sea would excite their allies to revolt, and drive their armies from Asia. But to obtain this advantage, the great king must employ an admiral worthy to command, and men willing to obey. In looking for the first, the valor of Pharnabazus could not escape his notice. The second might be purchased by money. And should Artaxerxes intrust him with the requisite sum, he pledged his life that he would soon collect such a number of sailors (chiefly from the Grecian coasts and islands) as would enable him to defeat the fleet of Sparta, and to compel that republic to abandon her eastern conquests. The proposal pleased Artaxerxes, the money was raised, and Conon returned to Cilicia to accomplish his undertaking.

From various sea-ports of Asia, from the smaller Greek cities, the reluctant subjects of Sparta, from several maritime towns whose inhabitants were

He de-
feats the
Spartans,
and takes

C H A P.
XXVIII.

C H A P. ready to serve any master for pay, but chiefly from
XXVIII. the powerful islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, he
 fifty gal- soon collected a naval force exceeding his most
 lies. sanguine hopes; and which might have enabled
 Olymp. him (independent of the Barbarian squadrons com-
 xcvi. 3. manded by Pharnabazus) to contend on nearly
 A. C. 394. equal terms with Pisander. With their combined
 strength, Conon and Pharnabazus sailed westward in
 quest of the hostile fleet, persuaded that the rash
 confidence of the Spartan admiral would not de-
 cline battle with a superior enemy. As the united
 armament doubled the northern point of Rhodes,
 they perceived the Lacedæmonian squadron,
 amounting to near a hundred gallies, in the ca-
 pacious bay which is formed between the projec-
 tions of the Dorian shore, and the small islands
 called Sporades, from the careless irregularity with
 which they seem to have been scattered by the
 hand of nature¹¹. The unexpected approach of
 such a formidable fleet did not shake the sullen ob-
 stinacy of Pisander. He commanded (as it had
 been foreseen) his men to prepare for battle. They
 bore up against the enemy, but on a nearer survey
 were alarmed and terrified with the excessive dis-
 proportion of numbers. The greater part turned
 their prows, and retired towards the friendly shore
 of Cnidus. Pisander advanced in the admiral
 galley, and died fighting bravely in defence of the

¹¹ Virgil expresses, in few words, the geography described in the text:

— — Et crebris legimus freta confita terris.

Virg. Æneid. iii. v. 129.

Spartan honor, vainly endeavouring to maintain, by the vigor of his arm, what had been betrayed by the weakness of his counsels. The victors pursued; and after destroying great numbers of the enemy, took and carried off fifty gallies; a capture sufficient to decide the fate of any Grecian republic¹².

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It was the intelligence of this battle, of which he anticipated the consequences, in the loss of the Spartan dominions from Cnidus to Byzantium, that justly alarmed and afflicted the patriotic breast of Agesilaus. He assembled the troops, honestly confessed the death of Pisander, but artfully declared, that, though the admiral was slain, his fleet had obtained a complete victory, for which it became himself and them to pay the usual tribute of thanks and sacrifices to the protecting gods. He then crowned himself with a chaplet of flowers, and set the example of performing this pious duty.

The battle
of Coro-
næa.
Olymp.
xcvi. 3.
A. C. 394.

¹² Polybius seems to consider the battle of Cnidus as the æra at which the Spartans lost the command of the sea, which they had acquired by their victory at Ægos-Potamos. He says, their dominion lasted twelve years. This number, however, is too large for the interval between those battles, as appears from the text. Other writers say, that the Lacedæmonian empire, which the Greeks speak of as synonymus with the command of the sea, lasted thirty years, reckoning from the battle of Ægos-Potamos to the defeat at Leuctra. But this number again is too small for the interval between those events; a remarkable proof of the carelessness of Greek writers in matters of chronology. See Isocrat. de Pace, et Casaub. ad Polyb. vol. iii. p. 97 — 99. edit. Gronov.

C H A P. XXVIII. The devout stratagem was attended with a very salutary effect; for in a skirmish between the advanced guards, immediately preceding the battle, the Lacedæmonian troops, animated by their imagined victory in the East, defeated and repelled the enemy. Meanwhile the main bodies of their army advanced into the plain of Coronæa, at first in awful silence; but having approached within a furlong of each other, the Thebans raised an universal shout, and ran furiously to the charge. Their impetuosity bore down every thing before them; but the troops immediately commanded by Agesilaus, repelled the left wing of the enemy, chiefly consisting of Argives and Athenians. Already those who surrounded his person saluted him as conqueror, and adorned him with the crown of victory; when it was told, that the Thebans had broke and totally routed the Orchomenians, and were advancing to seize the baggage. Agesilaus, by a rapid evolution, prepared to intercept them, in order to frustrate this design. The Thebans perceiving this movement, wheeled about, and marched in an opposite direction, that they might join, and rally their allies, who fled towards the mountains of Helicon. In the rencounter which followed, Xenophon is disposed to admire rather the valor, than the prudence, of the Spartan king. Instead of allowing the Thebans to pass, that he might attack their rear and flanks, he boldly opposed their progress, and assailed their front. The shock was terrible; their shields meeting, clashed;

they fought, flew, and were slain. No voice was heard, yet none was silent; the field resounded with the noise of rage and battle¹³; and this was the most desperate and bloody scene of an action, itself the most desperate and bloody of any in that age. At length, the firmness of the Thebans effected their long attempted passage to Helicon; but could not encourage their allies to renew the engagement. The Spartans thus remained masters of the field, the sight of which seems to have deeply affected a spectator whose mind was habituated to such objects of horror. It was covered with steel and blood, with the bodies of friends and foes heaped promiscuously together, with transfixed bucklers and broken lances, some strewed on the ground, others deeply adhering in the mortal wounds which they had inflicted, and others still grasped by the cold and insensible hands of the combatants who had lately fought with such impetuous ardor¹⁴.

Agefilas himself had received several wounds from various kinds of weapons; yet did he restrain his resentment in the moment of victory. When informed that about fourscore of the enemy had taken refuge in a neighbouring temple of Minerva, he religiously respected the right of sanctuary,

¹³ Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν ὕδαμινα παρήν, ἔ μὲν ὅδε σιγῇ. Φωνὴ δὲ τις ἢ τοιαύτη, διὰν ὀρυγὴ τε καὶ μάχῃ παρῆσθαι' αὐν. Xenoph. Agefilas, c. xii. Such passages, inimitable in any other language, show the superiority of the Greek.

¹⁴ Xenoph. Agefil. c. xii.

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C H A P. XXVIII. ordered his soldiers to abstain from hurting them, and even appointed a body of horse to conduct them to a place of security. The next day was employed by the victors in erecting a trophy on the scene of this important action ; while the enemy acknowledged their defeat, by requesting the bodies of the slain. Notwithstanding his fatigue and wounds, Agesilaus then travelled to Phocis, that he might dedicate the tenth of his Asiatic spoil (amounting to above a hundred talents) in the temple of Delphian Apollo. Having returned towards the Peloponnesus, he disbanded his eastern troops, most of whom were desirous to revisit their respective cities ; his Peloponnesian, and even Lacedæmonian, forces inclined also to return home, that they might reap the fruits of harvest¹⁵ ; and the general, probably to avoid a journey painful to his wounds, failed to Sparta, and joined in the celebration of the Hyacinthian festival.

The Co-
rinthian
war.
Olymp.
xcvi. 3.
A. C. 394.
Olymp.
xcviii. 2.
A. C. 387.

The sea-fight off Cnidus, and the battle of Coronæa, were the most important and decisive actions in the Bœotian or Corinthian war, which lasted eight years. The contending republics seem at once to have put forth their sting ; and afterwards to have retained their resentment when they had lost the power of gratifying it. Petty hostilities indeed were carried on by mutual inroads, and ravages in the spring and autumn ; the Lacedæmonians issuing from Sicyon, and the Thebans

¹⁵ The solar eclipse, mentioned above in the text, fixes the battle of Coronæa to the fourteenth of August.

from

from Corinth. The inhabitants of the latter city C H A P. XXVIII. had eagerly promoted the alliance against Sparta; but when their country was made the seat of war, they began to repent of this rash measure. The noble and wealthy part of the community, who had most to fear, as they had most to lose, talked of a separate peace; and, as they were abetted by a majority of the people, their dependents or clients, they intended to summon an assembly which might confirm this laudable resolution. But the partisans of Timolaus and Polyarches, who, though the mercenaries of a Barbarian slave, were the patrons of Corinthian liberty, anticipated a design so unfavorable to their interests, by committing one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. They chose the Eucleian festival¹⁶, a circumstance which seemed to blacken the atrocity of a crime which nothing could aggravate. Many of the citizens were then enjoying themselves in the market-place, or assembled at the dramatic entertainments. The assault was rapid and general. The Corinthians were assassinated in the circles of conversation, some in the public walks, most in the theatre; the judges on the bench, the priests at the altar: nor did those monsters cease from destroying, till they had cut off whomever they deemed most willing, or most able, to oppose their measures. The great body of the people, who

Massacre
in Corinth

¹⁶ Xenophon, with the superstitious insensibility of his age, dwells on the enormous impiety of this choice.

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perceived that even the temples, and adored images of the gods (whose knees they grasped), afforded not any protection to the victims of this impious fury, prepared to fly from their country; when they were restrained, first, by the lamentable cries of their wives and children, and then by the declaration of the assassins, that they intended nothing farther than to deliver the city from traitors, the partisans of Sparta and slavery. This abominable massacre infected Corinth with the plague of sedition, which silently lurked, or openly raged, in that unfortunate republic, during the six following years. The Spartans and Argives assisted their respective factions; Corinth was alternately subject to the one and the other, but always to a foreign power; and of the two Corinthian harbours, which were considered as an important part of the capital, the Lechæum was long garrisoned by the Spartans, while the Cenchreæ remained in possession of the Argives.

The Spartans successful by land, and the Athenians by sea.

After the battles of Cnidus and Coronæa, there was not any general engagement by land or sea; and it is worthy of observation, that the partial actions, which happened on either element, generally followed the bias of those important victories. Success for the most part attended the sailors of Athens, and the soldiers of Sparta; though the naval exploits of Teleutias, the kinsman of Agefilaus, who surprised the Piræus with twelve gallies, took many merchantmen, destroyed several ships

of war, and scoured the coast of Attica, formed an exception extremely honorable to that commander; and the military advantages of Iphicrates the Athenian, though unimportant in their consequences, announced those great talents for war, which afterwards rendered him so illustrious. But, in general, Agesilaus and the Spartans maintained their superiority in the field; while Conon, Thra-sybulus, and Chabrias, proved successful against Thimbron, Anaxibius, and the other naval commanders of the enemy¹⁷.

In the actual state of Greece, the respective successes of the contending powers were not accompanied by proportional advantages. The Lacedæmonians derived not any solid or permanent benefit from their victory at Coronæa, unless we account as such the gratification of their revenge, in ravaging without resistance the Argive and Bœotian territory; but their defeat at Cnidus deprived them in one day of the fruit of many laborious campaigns, since, with the assistance of a superior naval force, and with the command of the Persian treasury, Conon found little difficulty in detaching for ever from their dominion the whole western coast of Lesser Asia. This enterprise must have been effected with uncommon rapidity, and, unless the Persian fleet kept the sea in the middle of winter (which is not at all probable), could only

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XXVIII.

Conquests
of Conon.

¹⁷ Diodor. l. xiv. ad Olymp. xcvi. 4. et Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. 5.

C H A P. employ about three months. The measures taken
 XXVIII. by the Spartans, either to preserve or to recover
 their important possessions in the East, have scarcely
 deserved the notice of history, if we except their
 resistance at Abydus, a place less famous for this
 memorable defence, (such is the love of fiction,
 and the contempt of truth!) than for the fabulous
 amours of Hero and Leander. Dercyllidas had
 obtained the government of this strong and popu-
 lous town, as the reward of his military services.
 Instead of imitating the pusillanimity of the neigh-
 bouring governors, many of whom, alarmed by the
 disaster at Cnidus, fled in precipitation from the
 places intrusted to their command, Dercyllidas
 assembled the Abydenians; assured them that one
 naval defeat had not ruined the power of Sparta¹⁸,
 who, even before she had attained the sovereignty
 of the sea, now unfortunately lost, was able to
 reward her benefactors, and to punish her enemies.
 "The moment of adversity furnished an occasion
 to display their inviolable attachment to the re-
 public; and it would be glorious for them alone,
 of all the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, to brave
 the power of Persia." Having confirmed the cou-
 rage of the Abydenians, he sailed to the town of

¹⁸ The remarkable expression of Xenophon shows the importance of this defeat in the general estimation of the Abydenians, and of Dercyllidas himself, though he would fain dissemble it. Εἰ δὲ ἔχῃς ὅτως ἔχον, εἰ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ἐκράτηθῃμεν, ὅθεν ἀρὰ ἐστὶ ἐσμεν. "The matter stands not thus, that because we have been worsted in the sea-fight, we are therefore nothing."

Sestos, across the most frequented and narrowest passage of the Hellespont. Sestos was the principal place of the Thracian Chersonesus, the inhabitants of which owed their protection and safety to the useful labors of Dercyllidas¹⁹; and this claim of merit enabled him to secure their allegiance. The fidelity of these towns, amidst the general defection of the coast of Europe and of Asia, prevented the inconveniences and hardships to which the expelled Spartans, who had been employed in the garrisons of those parts, must have been otherwise exposed; and delivered them from the necessity of undertaking a winter's journey to the Peloponnesus, through the territories of many hostile republics. The unfortunate governors and garrisons, who had fled, or who had been driven from the places of their respective command, took refuge within the friendly walls of Sestos and Abydos. Their numbers increased the security of those cities, and enabled Dercyllidas, who excelled in the art of fortification, to put them in such a posture of defence as baffled the attempts of Conon and Pharnabazus.

But the success of these commanders was still sufficiently complete; and the importance of their services excited the warmest gratitude in the breast of Artaxerxes. The merit of the satrap was acknowledged soon afterwards, by his obtaining in marriage the daughter of the great king.

¹⁹ See above, p. 6.

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Conon re-
builds the
walls and
harbours
of Athens.
Olymp.

xcvi. 4.

A. C. 393.

The patriotic Conon neither desired nor received any personal reward ; but employed his favor with Artaxerxes to retrieve the affairs of Athens, the interest of which formed the honorable motive that had alone engaged, and that still retained him, in the Persian service. He inflamed the resentment which both Pharnabazus and his master had justly conceived against Sparta, and encouraged them, early in the spring, to send their victorious armament towards Greece, to retaliate the ravages committed in the East by the arms of Agesilaus. But he instructed them, that if they would render their vengeance complete, and humble for ever the Spartan pride, they must raise the fallen rival of that imperious republic. The disbursement of a sum of money, which would be scarcely felt by the treasury of Persia, might suffice to rebuild the walls and harbours of Athens ; a measure by which they would inflict the deepest wound on the power, as well as on the pride, of their ambitious enemy. The proposal was heard with approbation ; the expense was liberally supplied ; the Persian fleet set sail, reduced the Cyclades and Cythera, ravaged the coast of Laconia, and, after performing in detached squadrons whatever seemed most useful for the Persian service, assembled in the long-deserted harbours of the Phalerus, Munichia, and Piræus. There, the important task of restoring the ancient ornaments and defence of the city of Minerva, was begun, carried on, and accomplished, with extraordinary

diligence. The ready service of the crews belonging to the numerous fleet, assisted the industry of mercenary workmen, whom the allurements of gain had brought from every quarter of Greece; and the labor of both was seconded and encouraged by the voluntary and eager exertions of the Bœotians and Argives; but, above all, by the zeal of the Athenians themselves, who justly regarded their actual employment as the second foundation of their once glorious capital.

The work was completed before the return of spring; and the mortifying intelligence, when brought to Sparta, affected the magistrates of that republic with the cruelest anxiety. They were ready to abandon for ever the prospect of recovering their lost dominion in the East; they were desirous to obtain an accommodation with Artaxerxes on the most humiliating terms; they were willing to deprive themselves of the only advantage yet in their power, to forego even the pleasure of revenge, and to abstain from ravaging the territories of their neighbours and enemies, provided only the great king and his satraps would grant them a condition, with which it was easy to comply, since it required nothing but that they should cease to lavish their own money in raising the dangerous power of the Athenians. For effecting this purpose, they sent successive embassies to the court of Persia, as well as to Teribazus, who had lately succeeded Tithraustes in the government of the southern provinces. They industriously neglected Pharnabazus, from whom they could not reasonably

C H A P.
XXVIII.

Sparta, alarmed by that measure, solicits peace from Persia.
Olymp. xcvi. 1.
A. C. 392.

C H A P. expect any favor, as the hostilities of Agesilaus
XXVIII. had peculiarly excited the resentment of that warlike
fatrap.

Employ
Antalcidas as
their minister.

Among the ministers employed by Sparta, in this negociation, was Antalcidas, a man whose prior history is little known. He appears to have had an intercourse of hospitality with several noble Persians²⁰; it is not improbable that he had served under the standard of Cyrus, and perhaps continued in the East during the successive expeditions of Thimbron, Dercyllidas, and Agesilaus. If we except the artful and daring Lyfander, Sparta never employed a more proper agent to treat with the Barbarians. Antalcidas was bold, eloquent, subtle, complying, a master in all the arts of insinuation and address, and equally well qualified, by his abilities and vices, to execute an insidious commission at a corrupt court. The revered institutions of his country were the objects of real or well-feigned contempt; he derided the frugal and self-denying maxims of the divine Lycurgus; but peculiarly delighted the voluptuous, cowardly, and treacherous fatraps and courtiers, when he directed the poisoned shafts of his ridicule against the manly firmness, the probity, and the patriotism of Leonidas and Callicratidas, names equally glorious to Sparta and dishonorable to Persia.

His negociation facilitated by the un-

The success of such a minister, almost ensured by his own character and talents, was hastened by the imprudent ambition of Conon and the Athenians,

²⁰ Xenoph. Hellen.

too soon and too fatally intoxicated by the deceitful gifts of prosperity. When this illustrious commander co-operated with Pharnabazus in expelling the Lacedæmonians from the East, he earnestly exhorted the satrap to confirm the Asiatic Greeks in the enjoyment of their ancient liberties, lest the fear of oppression might suggest the means of resistance, and oblige them to form a general alliance for their own defence, which might prove unfavorable to Artaxerxes. In this plausible advice the patriotic Athenian had a farther view than it was possible for the Persian at that time to discover. After rebuilding the walls and harbours of Athens, he requested Pharnabazus, who prepared to return to his province, that he might be allowed, for a few months longer, to employ a squadron of Persian ships, in conjunction with his own, to invest the territories of Sparta and her allies. The satrap, naturally unsuspicious, and perhaps betrayed by his resentment, readily granted this demand. But Conon, unmindful of his promised operations against the common enemy, thought only of promoting the interest of his republic. He sailed to the Cyclades, to Chios, to Lesbos, and even to the coast of Eolis and Ionia, displayed the strength of his armament, described the flourishing fortune of Athens, and endeavoured to persuade or to compel the astonished Asiatics and islanders to acknowledge the just authority of their ancient metropolis or sovereign, who having risen more splendid from her ruins, required only the attachment of her former allies and subjects, to

C H A P.

XXVIII.

seasonable
ambition
of Conon
and the
Atheni-
ans-

Θ Η Α Ρ. resume her wonted power, and recover her hereditary renown.

Negociations of the adverse states with Persia.

The success of this extraordinary enterprise is not particularly described, nor is the omission material, since this last expedition of Conon had not any other permanent effect but that of ruining himself. His unjustifiable ambition furnished powerful weapons to the dexterity of Antalcidas, who represented him as guilty of the most unexampled audacity, aggravated by the most perfidious ingratitude, in attempting to alienate and to conquer the king's dominions, even by the assistance of the king's forces, to which both his country and himself owed so many recent and signal benefits. The accusation was probably rendered more welcome to Teribazus, by the jealousy which he naturally entertained of the neighbouring satrap, the friend of Conon, and his own rival. But after the last unwarrantable transaction of the Athenian, which he could defend only by the obsolete Greek maxim, that every thing is lawful to a man in the service of his country, even his late colleague Pharnabazus seems to have withdrawn from him the protection and friendship by which he had been so long distinguished, so that the influence of that powerful satrap formed not any opposition to the negociations and intrigues of Antalcidas. The Athenians, however, sent Dion, Hermogenes, with other emissaries, to watch and counteract his measures. Conon was named at the head of this deputation; and as he knew not the full extent of Teribazus's animosity, inflamed and

exasperated by the address of Antalcidas, he expected that the personal presence of a man, who had formerly served the Persians with fidelity and success, might obtain an easy pardon from the satrap, and perhaps prove useful to the affairs of Athens. The Bœotians and Argives likewise sent their ambassadors, who had instructions to act in concert with Conon and his colleagues. But *their* overtures were little regarded, while those of Antalcidas met with warm approbation from Teribazus.

C H A P.
XXVIII.

The Lacedæmonian ambassador declared that he had been commanded to offer such terms of peace as suited equally the dignity and the interest of the great king. "The Spartans resigned all pretensions to the Greek cities in Asia, which they acknowledged to be dependences of the Persian empire. Why should Artaxerxes, then, continue to lavish his treasure in vain? since the Spartans not only ceded to him the immediate object of dispute, but earnestly desired to promote the future prosperity of his dominions, by settling the affairs of Greece, as best answered his convenience. For this purpose they were ready to declare all the cities and islands, small and great, totally independent of each other; in consequence of which there would not be any republic sufficiently powerful thenceforth to disturb the tranquillity of Persia." These conditions, which the most insolent minister of the great king might himself have dictated, were too advantageous not to be liable to suspicion, But Teribazus was so

The overtures of Sparta most acceptable to the Persian ministers.

C H A P. XXVIII. blinded by partiality for the Spartan minister, that he seems not to have entertained the smallest doubt of his sincerity. The terms of peace were transmitted to the court of Susa, that they might be approved and ratified by Artaxerxes. The subtilty of Antalcidas was rewarded by a considerable sum of money; and the patriotism of Conon (a patriotism which had carried him beyond the bounds of justice and propriety) was punished by immediate death²¹, or by an ignominious confinement²². His fate is variously related; but his actions justly rank him with the first of Grecian names; and the fame of an illustrious father was supported and rivalled by that of his son Timotheus²³.

Death of
Conon.

Obstacles
to the con-
clusion of
the treaty
of peace.
Olymp.
xcvii. 3.
A. C. 390.

It might have been expected that a plan of accommodation, so advantageous and honorable for Persia, should have been readily accepted by Artaxerxes. But the negociation languished for several years, partly on account of the temporary disgrace of Teribazus, who was succeeded by Struthas; a man who, moved by some unknown motive, warmly espoused the interest of the Athenians; and partly by the powerful solicitations and remonstrances of the Bœotian and Argive ambassadors, who accused the sincerity, and unveiled the latent ambition, of Sparta.

Military
opera-
tions.

Meanwhile the war was carried on with unremitting activity. The Lacedæmonians and their

²¹ Isoc. Panegy.

²² Xenoph. Gr. Hist. l. iv.

²³ Dinarch. adv. Demost. p. 94. et Corn. Nepos, in Vit. Conon. et

allies sallied from their strong garrisons in Sicyon and the Lechæum, to destroy the harvests and the villages of their Peloponnesian enemies. The Bœotians and Argives retaliated these injuries by several hostile incursions into the territories of Sparta; while the Athenians, as if they had again attained the command of the sea, bent the whole vigor of their republic towards an element long propitious to their ancestors.

The recent splendor of Conon had eclipsed the ancient and well-merited renown of Thrasylbulus, whose extraordinary abilities, and more extraordinary good fortune, had twice rescued his country from the yoke of tyrants. But after the lamented death or captivity of the former, the Athenian fleet, amounting to forty sail, was intrusted to Thrasylbulus; who, having scoured the Ægean sea, sailed to the Hellespont, and persuaded or compelled the inhabitants of Byzantium, and several other Thracian cities, to abolish their aristocratic government, and to accept the alliance of Athens. His activity was next directed against the isle of Lesbos, in which the Lacedæmonian interest was still supported by a considerable body of troops. Having landed his men, he joined battle with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Methymna, and obtained a complete victory, after killing with his own hand Therimachus, the Spartan governor and general. The principal cities of the island acknowledged the Athenian power, and seasonably reinforced the fleet, by the terror of which they had been subdued. Encouraged by

C H A P.
XXVIII.

Conquests
of Thrasyl-
bulus.

C H A P. this success, Thraſybulus ſailed toward Rhodes, in
XXVIII. order to aſſiſt the democratic faction, who equally
contended for the intereſt of Athens and their
own.

He is ſur-
prized and
ſlain.

Before proceeding, however, to that important iſland, he determined to multiply the reſources, and to confirm the affections, of the fleet. For this purpoſe he raiſed conſiderable ſupplies of whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for his expedition from the maritime towns of Aſia, and at length entered the mouth of the Eurymedon (the glorious ſcene of Cimon's victories), and levied a heavy contribution on Aſpendus, the principal ſea-port and capital of Pamphylia. But here his good fortune ended ²⁴. The patient timidity of the Barbarians had endured the public depredation, to which they were long accuſtomed; but even *their* fervility could not brook the private rapacity and intolerable exactions of the ſailors and troops, which were imputed (not perhaps without reaſon) to the unrelenting avarice of the commander. The reſentment of the Pamphylians overcame their cowardice. They attacked the Grecian tents in the night, and ſurprized the ſecurity of Thraſybulus, who thus fell a ſacrifice to a very unjuſtifiable defect, which if we may believe a contemporary writer, greatly debaſed the dignity of his otherwiſe illuſtrious character ²⁵.

²⁴ Corn. Nep. in Vit. Thraſybul.

²⁵ Lyſias againſt Ergocles. This Ergocles was the friend and confidant of Thraſybulus. He had aſſiſted him in expelling the thirty

The unjust treatment of Aspendus, which had been retorted by such signal revenge, would never perhaps have reached the ears of Artaxerxes, had not his voluptuous indolence been beset by the active importunity of Antalcidas. This vigilant and artful minister let slip no opportunity to rouse the jealousy of the great king against the Athenians, his hereditary foes, and to obliterate his resentment against the Spartans, his recent but less natural enemies. The severe exactions from Pamphylia, a province acknowledging his authority, afforded a powerful topic of persuasion, which the Spartan ambassador could not fail to employ; but it is uncertain whether even this important argument would have conquered the reluctance of the Persian monarch to concur with the measures of a people, who had enabled the rebellious Cyrus to dispute his throne, and who had recently invaded and plundered, not a maritime city, but the interior provinces of the empire. His interest and inclination were combated by his resentment and his pride; when his fluctuating irresolution was at length decided by the Athenians, whose mad imprudence crowned the triumph of Antalcidas.

C H A P.
XXVIII.
Activity of
Antalci-
das at the
Persian
court.
Olymp.
xcvii. 4.
A. C. 389.

tyrants, and had recently accompanied him in his expedition to the coast of Thrace, mentioned in the text. The military exploits of Thraſybulus in Thrace were highly honorable and meritorious; but his private behaviour was the reverse. He stuck at nothing by which he could enrich himself or his dependants. Ergocles was condemned to death for the share which he had taken in this unjustifiable peculation and rapacity. Lyſias's Orations against Ergocles and Philocrates. See likewise Aristophanes Eccleſiaz. v. 356. et Schol. ad locum.

C H A P.

XXVIII.

Revolt of
Cyprus
abetted by
the Athe-
nians.

The signal victories of Conon and Thrasybulus, and the rising fortune of Athens, encouraged Evagoras king of Salamis, who had received some late cause of disgust, to execute his long-meditated design of revolting from Persia. Egypt was actually in rebellion; Artaxerxes had undertaken a war against the barbarous Carduchians²⁶, who were by no means a contemptible enemy. These were very favorable circumstances; but the Persian fleet, which, after performing the service for which it had been equipped, had continued to lie inactive in the Phœnician and Cilician harbours, was ready to be employed in any new enterprize. The skilful and experienced bravery of the king of Salamis, seconded by the youthful ardor of his son Protagoras, obtained an easy victory over the first squadrons that were sent to invade his island. But there was reason to dread the arrival of a far superior force. In this danger Evagoras requested, and obtained, the assistance of the Athenians; who not only enjoyed peace with Persia, but whose ambassadors were endeavouring to prevent that court from making peace with their enemies.

The great
king dic-
tates the
terms of
a general
peace.
Olymp.
xcviii. 1.
A. C. 388.

This extraordinary measure of a people, in preferring their gratitude to their interest; a gratitude which they might have foreseen to be useless to him whom they meant to oblige, and pernicious to the most important interests of their republic, finally determined Artaxerxes to espouse

²⁶ These and the following circumstances concerning the war of Cyprus are scattered through Diodorus, Isocrates's Panegyric of Athens, and the panegyric of Evagoras.

the cause of the Spartans; and to dictate the terms of a general peace, almost in the same words which had been proposed by Antalcidas: "That the Greek cities in Asia, with the island of Cyprus and the peninsula of Clazomené, should be subject to Persia; Athens should be allowed to retain her immemorial jurisdiction in the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; but all the other republics, small and great, should enjoy the independent government of their own hereditary laws. Whatever people rejected these conditions, so evidently calculated for preserving the public tranquillity, must expect the utmost indignation of the great king, who, in conjunction with the republic of Sparta, would make war, on their perverse and dangerous obstinacy, by sea and land, with ships and money²⁷."

Teribazus and Antalcidas returned from the East, charged with the definitive resolutions, or rather the haughty mandate of Artaxerxes, which had been confirmed by the unalterable sanction of the royal signet. There was reason, however, to apprehend that Thebes, Athens, and Argos, might still reject the terms of a peace proposed by their avowed enemies, pernicious to their particular and immediate interests, and equally disadvantageous and dishonorable to the whole Grecian name. The remembrance of the glorious confederacy, for defending the Asiatic colonies against the

Which the
Grecian
states are
compelled
to accept.
Olymp.
xcviii. 2.
A. C. 387.

²⁷ The last words are literally translated from Xenoph. p. 550. See likewise Diodor. l. xiv. c. cx. Plut. Agesil. p. 608; and Artaxerx. p. 1022.

C H A P. oppression of Barbarians, could not indeed much
 XXVIII. influence the degenerate councils of those republics; but the Thebans must resign, with reluctance, their real or pretended authority over the inferior cities of Bœotia, the Argives must unwillingly withdraw their garrison from Corinth, and leave that important capital in the power of the aristocratic or Lacedæmonian faction; and the Athenians must abandon, with regret, the fruits of their recent victories, and the hopes of recovering their ancient grandeur. The opposition of these states had been foreseen by Antalcidas, who took the most effectual measures to render it impotent. By the assistance of Persian money he equipped a fleet of eighty sail, from the mercenary sea-ports of Greece and Asia, from the intermediate isles, and even from the coasts of Italy and Sicily. This armament was independent of the squadrons with which Teribazus prepared to attack the isle of Cyprus, if the presumption of Evagoras, unassisted and alone, should dare to provoke his hostility. The satrap also had collected a very considerable army, which was ready to embark for Greece, and to co-operate with Agesilaus, who had assembled the domestic troops and allies of Sparta to march, at the first summons, against any city or republic that might reject the peace of Antalcidas²⁸. These vigorous preparations, intimidating the weakness of the confederates, compelled them into a reluctant compliance with the terms of the treaty. The

²⁸ Τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδε εἰρήνης καλεσμένης. Xenoph. p. 277.

Thebans made the strongest and most obstinate resistance; but their pretensions were finally silenced by the threats of the Spartan king, the inveterate enemy of their republic. The Bœotian cities were acknowledged to be independent, and admitted as parties in the peace. The Argives retired from Corinth, which being deserted by the leaders of the democratical faction, became a faithful ally to Sparta. The military and naval operations ceased, tranquillity was restored, and the armies and fleets were, on both sides, disbanded and dissolved²⁹.

But amidst this universal and most obsequious submission to the court of Persia, one man avowed his discontent, and prepared to maintain his opposition. The article respecting Cyprus was loudly rejected by Evagoras, who asserted the independence of his native island; and, with a magnanimity that formed a striking contrast with the degenerate and disgraceful softness of his Grecian allies, set the power of Artaxerxes at defiance. Evagoras trusted to the resources of his own vigorous mind, to the superior skill of his seamen, and to the assistance of Acoris king of Egypt. But the numerous squadrons of Teribazus prevailed over all his hopes. He was discomfited in a naval engagement; his territories were invaded and ravaged; he was reduced to his capital Salamis; and even Salamis was threatened with a siege. His resistance had already exceeded what his strength warranted, or what his dignity required. His

C. H. A. P.
XXVIII.

Evagoras
alone re-
jects the
authority
of Persia.

²⁹ Διαλύθη μὲν τὰ πρῆξια, etc. Xenoph. p. 951.

68 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P. enemies were incapable of perseverance, or unwilling to drive him to despair. He resigned his
XXVIII. numerous and recent conquests in Cyprus, but retained possession of the ancient principality of Teucer, which his fortunate arms had recovered from an usurper; and submitted, without dishonor, to imitate the example of many preceding princes of Salamis, and to acknowledge himself the tributary of the king of Persia³⁰.

Submits to
 an honor-
 able com-
 promise.
 Olymp.
 xcviij. 4.
 A. C. 385.

³⁰ Diodor. l. xv. p. 462.

CHAP. XXIX.

Reflections upon the Peace of Antalcidas. — Ambitious Views of Sparta. — State of Arcadia. — Siege of Mantinea. — Olynthian Confederacy. — The Spartans make War on Olynthus. — Submission of that Republic. — Pella becomes the Capital of Macedon. — Phæbidas seizes the Theban Citadel. — The Measure approved by Agesilaus. — Conspiracy of the Theban Exiles. — The Theban Democracy restored.

THE peace of Antalcidas forms an important and disgraceful æra in the Grecian history. The valuable colonies in Asia, the cause, the object, and the scene, of so many memorable wars, were resigned and abandoned for ever to the power of a Barbarian master. The king of Persia dismembered the distant dependences, and controlled the domestic arrangements of a people who had given law to his ancestors¹. Their ancient confederacies were dissolved; the smaller cities were loosened from dependence on their powerful neighbours; all were disunited and weakened;

CHAP.
XXIX.

Reflections on the peace of Antalcidas.

¹ See the articles of the treaty concluded in 449, A. C. Vol. II. c. xii. p. 214.

C H A P. and Greece felt the languor of peace, without
XXIX. enjoying the benefits of security.

But if the whole Grecian name was dishonored by accepting this ignominious treaty, what peculiar infamy must belong to the magistrates of Sparta, by whom it was proposed and promoted? What motives of advantage could balance this weight of disgrace? Or rather, what advantage could the Spartans derive from such ignoble condescension as seemed totally unworthy of their actual power, but far more unworthy of their ancient renown? This question, like most political questions, may be best answered by facts; and the transactions which both preceded and followed the peace of Antalcidas clearly discover and ascertain the secret, but powerful, causes of that dishonorable, and seemingly disadvantageous, measure.

Motives
which en-
gaged the
Spartans
eagerly to
embrace
that trea-
ty.

The ambition of making conquests in the East, which it now appeared impossible to retain, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of an authority, or rather dominion, in Greece, acquired by the success of the Peloponnesian war, and which they might have reasonably expected to preserve and to confirm. Not only their power, but their safety, was threatened by the arms of a hostile confederacy, which had been formed and fomented by the wealth of Persia. Athens, their rival, their superior, their subject, but always their unrelenting enemy, had recovered her walls and fleet, and aspired to command the sea. Thebes and Argos had become sensible of their natural strength, and disdained

to acknowledge the pre-eminence, or to follow the standard, of any foreign republic. The inferior states of Peloponnesus were weary of obeying every idle summons to war, from which they derived not any advantage but that of gratifying the ambition of their Spartan masters. The valuable colonies in Macedon and Thrace, and particularly the rich and populous cities of the Chalcidic region, the bloodless conquests of the virtuous Brasidas, had forsaken the interest of Sparta, when Sparta forsook the interest of justice. Scarcely any vestige appeared of the memorable trophies erected in a war of twenty-seven years. The Eastern provinces (incomparably the most important of all) were irrecoverably lost; and this rapid decline of power had happened in the course of ten years, and had been chiefly occasioned by the fatal splendor of Agesilaus's victories in Asia.

About a century before, and almost on the same scene, the Spartans had been first deprived of their hereditary fame, and prescriptive honors². Almost every interference, in peace or war, with the Ionian colonies, had hurt the interests of their republic. They naturally began to suspect, therefore, that such distant expeditions suited not the circumstances of Sparta, an inland city, with a fertile territory, but destitute of arts, industry, and commerce; and whose inhabitants, having little genius for the sea, were naturally unable to equip, or to maintain, such a naval force as might

Advantages
which they
derived
from it.

² See above, Vol. II. p. 192.

C H A P. command the obedience of an extensive coast, at-
XXIX. tached by powerful ties to their Athenian rivals. The abandoning, therefore, of what they could not hope to regain, or, if regained, to preserve, seemed a very prudent and salutary measure; since, in return for this imaginary concession, they received many real and important advantages. They were appointed to superintend and to direct the execution of the treaty; and in order to make their authority effectual, entitled to demand the assistance of Persian money, with which they might easily purchase Grecian soldiers. The condition requiring the smaller cities to be declared free and independent (although the dexterity of Antalcidas had proposed it as the best means of preventing the future invasion of Asia), was peculiarly beneficial to the Spartans. It represented them as the patrons of universal liberty, and restored them that honorable reputation which they had long lost. From the nature of the condition itself, it could only apply to such places as being kept in a reluctant subjection, still possessed courage to vindicate their freedom. In the secondary towns of Messenia and Laconia, the stern policy of Sparta had crushed the hope, and almost the desire, of obtaining this inestimable benefit. The authority of other capitals was less imperious and imposing; the sovereign and subject were more on a footing of equality; and it was a maxim in Greece, "That men are disposed to reject the just rights of their equals, rather than to revolt against the unlawful

tyranny of their masters¹. But Sparta expected not only to detach the inferior communities from their more powerful neighbours, but to add them to the confederacy of which she formed the head; and by such multiplied accessions of power, of wealth, and of fame, to re-establish that solid power in Greece, which had been imprudently abandoned for the hope of Asiatic triumphs².

That such considerations of interest and ambition, not a sincere desire to promote the public tranquillity, had produced this perfidious treaty, could not long be kept secret; notwithstanding the various artifices employed to conceal it. Thebes and Argos were required to comply with the terms of the peace; but no mention was made of withdrawing the Lacedæmonian garrisons from the places which they occupied. Lest this injustice might occasion general discontent, the Athenians were allowed the same privilege. The possession of the unimportant isles of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros, flattered their vain hopes, and lulled them into false security; and, as they expected to reap the fruits of the victories of Conon and Thrasybulus, they were averse to renew the war for the sake of their allies, whose interests were now separated from their own. Meanwhile the Spartan emissaries negotiated and intrigued in all the subordinate cities, encouraging the aristocratical

C H A P.
XXIX.

Their ambitious designs immediately after that event.

³ Thucyd. passim. See particularly the speech of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Vol. II. c. xv. p. 337.

⁴ Vid. Isocrat. de Pace, passim.

C H A P. XXIX. factions, and fomenting the animosities of the citizens against each other, and against their respective capitals. The jealousies and complaints, which had been principally occasioned by these secret cabals, were usually referred to the Spartan senate; whose affected moderation, under pretence of defending the cause of the weak and the injured, always decided the contest in the way most favorable for themselves. But the warlike disciples of Lycurgus could not long remain satisfied with these juridical usurpations. They determined to take arms, which they probably hoped to employ with such artful dexterity as might prevent any general, or very dangerous, alarm; beginning with such cities as had not entered into the late confederacy against them, gradually extending their hostilities to the more powerful members of that confederacy; and thus conquering successively those, whose entire and collective strength it would have been vain to assail⁵.

State of
Arcadia.
Olymp.
xcviii. 3.
A. C. 386.

The first victim of this ambitious policy was the flourishing republic of Mantinæa, whose territory was situate almost in the centre of Arcadia, itself the centre of the Peloponnesus. The origin of Mantinæa was the same with that of Tegea, Stymphalis, Heræa, Orchomenos, and other neighbouring cities, which had grown into populousness and power from the scattered villages of shepherds inhabiting the vallies and mountains of

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. p. 551. et Diodor. l. xv. p. 448.

Arcadia. The exuberant fertility, the inland situation, the generous warmth, yet lively verdure⁶, together with the picturesque and animating scenery of this delightful region, seemed peculiarly adapted to inspire, and to gratify, the love of rural happiness; and to afford, in all their elegance and dignity, *those sublime and sacred joys of the country*, which the genius of ancient poets hath felt, and described with such affecting sensibility. Every district of Arcadia was marked and diversified by hills, some of which, could we credit the inaccuracy of geographical description, ascend two miles in perpendicular height⁷, and which supply innumerable streams, that water and fertilize the rich vallies which they enclose and defend. This secure and insulated position of their territory long preserved the Arcadians ignorant and uncorrupted; and a little before the period of history now under review, they were distinguished by the innocent simplicity of their manners, and by their fond attachment to a pastoral life. But the turbulent ambition of their neighbours had often obliged them to employ the sword instead of the sheep-hook. They had *reluctantly* taken arms; yet, when compelled by necessity, or excited by honor, the mountaineers of Arcadia had displayed such stubborn valor, and exerted such efforts of vigor and activity, as made their services eagerly desired,

C H A P.
XXIX.

⁶ These circumstances are common to Arcadia with the mountainous districts of Greece, as well as with the islands of the Archipelago. TOURNEFORT.

⁷ Descript. Græc. apud Gronov. vol. I.

C H A P. and purchased with emulation, by the surrounding
 XXIX. states. Nor had they trusted to their personal strength and bravery alone for the defence of their beloved possessions. Having quitted their farms and villages, they had assembled into walled towns, from which their numerous garrisons were ready to fall forth against an hostile invader. The dangerous vicinity of Sparta had early driven the companions of Pan and the Nymphs from the vocal woods of mount Mænalus⁸, into the fortifications of Tegea, formerly the principal city of the province⁹, but afterwards rivalled and surpassed by Mantinæa, which was become an object of jealousy and envy, not only to the neighbouring cities of Arcadia, but even to Sparta herself.

The proud
 message of
 the Spar-
 tans to the
 Mantinæ-
 ans.
 Olymp.
 xcvi. 3.
 A. C. 386.

In the year immediately following the treaty of Antalcidas, Lacedæmonian ambassadors were sent to Mantinæa, to discharge a very extraordinary commission. Having demanded an audience of the assembly, they expressed the resentment of their republic against a people, who, pretending to live in friendship with them, had in the late war repeatedly furnished with corn their avowed enemies the Argives. That, on other occasions, the Mantinæans had unguardedly discovered their secret hatred to Sparta, rejoicing in her misfortunes, and envying her prosperity. That it was time to anticipate this dangerous and unjust animosity; for

⁸ Mænalus argutumque nemus pinosque loquentes
 Semper habet; semper pastorum ille audit amores
 Panaque, etc. VIRG. Ecl. viii. v. 22.

⁹ Herodot. l. vi. c. 105.

which purpose the Spartans commanded them to demolish their walls, to abandon their proud city, and to return to those peaceful villages in which their ancestors had lived and flourished¹⁰. The Mantinæans received this proposal with the indignation which it merited; the ambassadors retired in disgust; the Spartans declared war; summoned the assistance of their confederates; and a powerful army, commanded by king Agesipolis, invaded the hostile territory.

But the most destructive ravages could not bend the resolution of the Mantinæans. The strength and loftiness of their walls bade defiance to assault; nor could a regular siege be undertaken with certain success, as the magazines of Mantinæa were abundantly stored with various kinds of grain, the crops of the former year having been uncommonly plentiful. Agesipolis, however, embraced this doubtful mode of attack, and drew first a ditch, and then a wall, entirely round the place, employing one part of his troops in the work, and another in guarding the workmen. This tedious service exhausted the patience of the besiegers, without shaking the firmness of the Mantinæans. The Spartans were afraid to detain longer in the field their reluctant confederates; but Agesipolis proposed a new measure, which was attended with complete and immediate success. The river Ophis, formed by the collected torrents from

C H A P.
XXIX.

Mantinæa
besieged.

¹⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. 2, et seqq. Diodor. l. xv. c. 7, et seqq.

C H A P. XXIX. mount Anchisius, a river broad, deep, and rapid, flowed through the plain, and the city of Mantinæa. It was a laborious undertaking to stop the course of this copious stream; which was no sooner effected, than the lower parts of the walls of Mantinæa were laid under water. According to the usual practice of the Greeks, the fortifications of this place were built of raw bricks, which being less liable to break into chinks, and to fly out of their courses, were preferred as the best defence against the battering-engines then in use. But it is the inconvenience of raw bricks, to be as easily dissolved by water, as wax is melted by the sun¹¹. The walls of Mantinæa began to yield, to shake, to fall in pieces. The activity of the inhabitants propped them with wood, but without any permanent advantage; so that, despairing of being able to exclude the enemy, they sent to capitulate, requesting that they might be permitted to keep possession of their city, on condition that they demolished their fortifications, and followed, in peace and war, the fortune of Sparta.

The town
capitu-
lates.

Hard con-
ditions to
which the
inhabit-
ants are
compelled
to submit.
Olymp.
xcviii. 4.
A. C. 385.

Agessipolis and his counsellors refused to grant them any other terms of peace than those which had been originally proposed by the republic. He observed, that while they lived together in one populous city, their numbers exposed them to the delusions of seditious demagogues, whose address

¹¹ This is the expression of Pausanias, in Arcad. who mentions the name of the river Ophis, omitted by Xenophon and Diodorus.

and eloquence easily seduced the multitude from their real interest, and destroyed the influence of their superiors in rank, in wealth, and in wisdom, on whose attachment alone the Lacedæmonians could safely depend. They insisted, therefore, that the Mantinæans should destroy their houses in the city; separate into four distinct communities¹²; and return to those villages which their ancestors had inhabited. The terror of an immediate assault made it necessary to comply with this humiliating demand but the most zealous partisans of democracy, to the number of sixty, afraid of trusting to the capitulation, were *allowed* to fly from their country; which is mentioned as an instance of moderation¹³ in the Lacedæmonian soldiers, who might have put them to death as they passed through the gates.

This transaction was scarcely finished, when the Spartan magistrates seized an opportunity of the domestic discontents among the Phliasians, to display the same tyrannical spirit, but with still greater exertions of severity. The little republic of Phlius, like every state of Greece in those unfortunate, at least turbulent times, was distracted by factions. The prevailing party banished their opponents, the friends of Sparta and aristocracy. They were allowed to return from exile, in consequence of the commands and threats of Agesi-

The Spartans regulate, with a strong hand, the affairs of Phlius. Olymp. xcix. 1. A. C. 384.

¹² Xenophon says four, Diodorus five.

¹³ Or rather of good discipline; *πειθαρχία*. The nobles of the Mantinæans, *οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων*, were not so temperate; vide Xenoph. p. 552.

● H A P. laus¹⁴; but met not with that respectful treatment
 XXIX. which seemed due to persons who enjoyed such powerful protection. They complained, and Agelilaus again interfered, by appointing commissioners to try and condemn to death the obnoxious Phliasians; an odious office, which must have been executed with unexampled rigor, since the city of Phlius, which had hitherto been divided by a variety of interests, thenceforward continued invariably the steadfast ally of Sparta¹⁵.

Embassy
 of Acan-
 thus and
 Apollonia
 to Sparta.

Meanwhile ambassadors arrived from Acanthus and Apollonia, two cities of the Chalcidicé, requesting the Lacedæmonian assistance against the dangerous ambition of Olynthus. This city, of which we had occasion to mention the foundation towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was situate nine miles from the sea, in a fertile and secure district, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnias, which flow into the lake Bolyca, a name improperly bestowed on the inmost recesses of the Toronaic gulph. The vexatious government of Athens first drove the maritime communities of the Chalcidic region within the walls of Olynthus; the oppressive tyranny of Sparta obliged them to strengthen those walls, as well as to provide sufficient garrisons to defend them; and the subsequent misfortunes of these domineering republics, together with the weakness of Macedon, encouraged and enabled the inhabitants of

¹⁴ Xenoph. in Agefil. et Hellen. l. v. p. 553.

¹⁵ Ibid. l. vii. p. 624.

Olynthus successfully to employ, in offensive war, the forces which had been raised with no other view than to maintain their own independence. The towns which they subdued were either incorporated or associated with their own; and Olynthus became the head of a confederacy, whose extent, power, resources, and hopes, occasioned just alarm among the neighbouring communities of Greeks and Barbarians. They had already conquered the southern shores of Macedon, which comprehended the delightful regions of Chalcis and Pieria, indented by two great and two smaller bays, and affording, in the highest perfection, the united benefits of agriculture, pasturage, and commerce. They aspired at acquiring the valuable district of mount Pangæus, whose timber and mines alike tempted their ambition and avarice; and Olynthus being favorably situate in the centre of the Chalcidicé, itself the centre of the Macedonian and Thracian coasts, might have preserved and extended her dominion, if the ambassadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not completely effected the object of their commission at Sparta. They applied to the Ephori, who introduced them to the greater assembly, consisting, not only of the Spartans and Lacedæmonians, but of the deputies sent by their confederates. Cleigenes, the Acanthian, spoke in the name of his colleagues: "We apprehend, O Lacedæmonians, and allies! that amidst the multiplied objects of your care and correction, you have overlooked a great and growing

C H A P.
XXIX.

They petition the assistance of that republic against the

C H A P.

XXIX.

Olynthian
confede-
racy.

disorder which threatens, like a pestilence, to infect and pervade Greece. The ambition of the Olynthians has increased with their power. By the voluntary submission of the smaller cities in their neighbourhood, they have been enabled to subdue the more powerful. Emboldened by this accession of strength, they have wrested from the king of Macedon his most valuable provinces. They actually possess Pella, the greatest city in that kingdom; and the unfortunate Amyntas is on the point of abandoning the remainder of his dominions, which he is unable to defend. There is not any community in Thrace capable to stop their progress. The independent tribes of that warlike but divided country, respect the authority, and court the friendship of the Olynthians, who will doubtless be tempted to extend their dominion on that side, in order to augment the great revenues which they derive from their commercial cities and harbours, by the inexhaustible mines in mount Pangæus. If this extensive plan should be effected, what can prevent them from acquiring a decisive superiority by sea and land? and should they enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (a measure actually in contemplation), what will become, we say not, of the hereditary pre-eminence of Sparta, but of its independence and safety? The present emergency, therefore, solicits, by every motive of interest and of honor, the activity and valor of your republic. By yielding a seasonable assistance to Acanthus and

Apollonia, which, unmoved by the pusillanimous example of their neighbours, have hitherto spurned the yoke, and defied the threats of Olynthus, you will save from oppression two peaceful communities, and check the ambition of an usurping tyrant. The reluctant subjects of the Olynthians will court your protection; and the Chalcidian cities will be encouraged to revolt, especially as they are not yet inseparably linked with the capital by the ties of intermarriage and consanguinity, and by the interchange of rights and possessions¹⁶. When such a connexion shall take place (for the Olynthians have made a law to encourage it), you will be unable to break the force of this powerful and dangerous confederacy."

The speech of Cleigenes, and the ambitious views of the republic to which it was addressed, afford reason to conjecture that the ambassadors neither asked any thing in favor of their own communities, nor urged any accusation against Olynthus, which had not been previously suggested by the Spartan emissaries in Macedon. The reception given to the proposal of Cleigenes tends to confirm this conclusion. The Lacedæmonians, with affected impartiality and indifference, desired the opinion of their allies, before declaring their own. But there was not any occasion to declare what none could be so blind as to mistake. The confederates with one consent, but especially those

C H A P.
XXIX.
The Spartans readily listen to a request probably suggested by themselves.
Olymp. xcix. 2.
A. C. 383.

¹⁶ Επιγαμιαῖς καὶ εὐκτησεσὶ παράλληλαι. Xenoph. p. 555.

C H A P. XXIX. Their preparations for the Olynthian war. who wished to ingratiate themselves with Sparta¹⁷, determined to undertake the expedition against Olynthus. The Spartans commended their resolution, and proceeded to deliberate concerning the strength of the army to be raised, the mode of levying it, and the time for taking the field. It was resolved, that the whole forces should amount to ten thousand effective men; and a list was prepared, containing the respective contingents to be furnished by the several cities. If any state should be unable to supply the full complement of soldiers, money would be taken in their stead, at the rate of half a drachm a day (or three-pence halfpenny) for each man; but if neither the troops nor the money were sent in due time, the Lacedæmonians would punish the disobedience of the obstinate or neglectful, by fining them eight times the sum which they had been originally required to contribute.

The ambassadors then rose up and Cleigenes, again speaking for the rest, declared that these were indeed noble and generous resolutions; but, unfortunately, could not be executed with such promptitude as suited the urgency of the present crisis. The dangerous situation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate assistance. He proposed, therefore, that those troops which were ready, should instantly take the field; and insisted

¹⁷ Καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐχθροὶ χάριζεσθαι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις.
Xenoph. p. 555.

on this measure as a matter of the utmost importance to the future success of the war.

The Lacedæmonians acknowledged the expedience of the advice; and commanded Eudamidas, with two thousand men, to proceed without delay to Macedon, while his brother Phœbidas collected a powerful reinforcement in order to follow him. A very extraordinary event, which we shall have occasion fully to explain, retarded the arrival of those auxiliaries, until the season for action had been nearly spent. But Eudamidas, with his little band, performed very essential service. He strengthened the garrisons of such places as were most exposed to assaults from the enemy; the appearance of a Spartan army encouraged the spirit of revolt among the allies and subjects of Olynthus; and soon after his march into the Chalcidicé, Eudamidas received the voluntary surrender of Potidæa, a city of great importance in the isthmus of Palenê.

Such was the first campaign of a war which lasted four years, and was carried on under four successive generals. Eudamidas, too much elated by his first success, ravaged the Olynthian territory, and unguardedly approached the city. He was intercepted, conquered, and slain, and his army dispersed or lost¹⁸.

Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, whose naval exploits have been already mentioned with applause, assumed the conduct of this distant

C H A P.

XXIX.

First campaign against Olynthus. Olymp. xcix. 2. A. C. 383.

Eudamidas defeated and slain.

Second campaign under Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus.

¹⁸ Xenoph. p. 556.

C H A P. expedition, with a body of ten thousand men.
XXIX. He was assisted by Amyntas, king of Macedon,
 Olymp. and still more effectually by Derdas, the brother of
 xcix. 3. that prince, and the governor, or rather sovereign,
 A. C. 382. of Elymea, the most western province of Macedon,
 which abounded in cavalry. By the united efforts
 of these formidable enemies, the Olynthians, who
 had been defeated in various rencounters, were
 shut up within their walls, and prevented from
 cultivating their territory. Teleutias at length
 marched with his whole forces, in order to invest,
 or if he found an opportunity, to assault the place.
 His surprise and indignation were excited by the
 boldness of the Olynthian horse, who ventured to
 pass the Amnias in sight of such a superior army;
 and he ordered the targeteers, who were com-
 manded by Tlemonidas, to repel their insolence.
 The cavalry made an artful retreat across the Am-
 nias, and were fiercely pursued by the Lacedæ-
 monians. When a considerable part of the latter
 had likewise passed the river, the Olynthians sud-
 denly faced about, and charged them. Tlemoni-
 das, with above a hundred of his companions,
 fell in the action. The Spartan general beheld
 with grief and rage the successful bravery of the
 enemy. Grasping his shield and lance, he com-
 manded the cavalry, and the remainder of the
 targeteers, to pursue without intermission; and,
 at the head of his heavy-armed men, advanced
 with less order than celerity. The Olynthians at-
 tempted not to stop their progress, till they arrived
 under the walls and battlements. At that moment

the townsmen mounted their ramparts, and assailed the enemy with a shower of darts and arrows, and every kind of missile weapon, which greatly added to the confusion occasioned by the rapidity of their march. Meanwhile the flower of the Olynthian troops, who had been purposely drawn up behind the gates, sallied forth with irresistible violence; Teleutias, attempting to rally his men, was slain in the first onset; the Spartans who attended him gave ground; the whole army was repelled, and pursued with great slaughter, while they fled in scattered disorder towards the friendly towns of Acanthus, Apollonia, Spartolus, and Potidæa¹⁹.

This mortifying disaster did not cool the ardor of the Spartans for gaining possession of Olynthus. In the year three hundred and eighty-one before Christ, which was the third of the war, they sent Agesipolis, with a powerful reinforcement, into Macedon. The arrival of this prince early in the spring, revived the hopes of the vanquished, and confirmed the attachment of the Lacedæmonian allies. He invaded and ravaged such parts of the Olynthian territory as had been spared in former incursions, and took by storm the strong city of Torona. But while he prepared to avail himself of these advantages for rendering his success complete, he was seized by a calenture, a disease incident to warm climates, and, as the name expresses, affecting the patient with a painful sensation of burning heat, which he is eager to

C H A P.
XXIX.

Teleutias
likewise
defeated
and slain.

Third
campaign
under king
Agesipolis.
Olymp.
xcix. 4.
A. C. 381.

who dies
of a calen-
ture.

¹⁹ Xenoph. p. 561, et seqq.

C H A P. XXIX. extinguish by the most violent and dangerous remedies²⁰. Agesipolis had lately visited the temple of Apollo at Aphytis, a maritime town on the Toranaic gulph. In the paroxysm of his disorder, he longed for the fanning breezes, the shady walks and groves, and the cool crystalline streams, of that delightful retreat. His attendants indulged his inclination, but could not save his life. He died on the seventh day of the disease, within the precincts of the consecrated ground. His remains, embalmed in honey, were conveyed to Sparta²¹. His brother Cleombrotus succeeded to the throne; and Polybiades, a general of experience and capacity, was invested with the command in Macedon.

Fourth
campaign
under
Polybi-
ades. D. A.
Olymp.
c. 1.
A. C. 380.

Polybiades, imitating the example of his predecessors, conducted a powerful reinforcement against Olynthus, which was completely surrounded by land, while a squadron of Lacedæmonian galleys blocked up the neighbouring harbour of Mecyberna. The events of the siege, which lasted eight or ten months, have not been thought worthy of record. It is probable that the Olynthians no longer ventured to rally forth against such a superior force: yet they must have been exceedingly distressed by famine before their

²⁰ It is supposed, with great probability, that the sailors who suddenly disappear in the Mediterranean, during the heat of summer, have been attacked in the night by the calenture, and have thrown themselves into the sea. Cyclopæd. Par. ad voc. The disorder is examined by Dr. Shaw, Phil. Trans. Abridg.

²¹ Xenoph. p. 564.

obstinacy could be determined to capitulate. They formally relinquished all claim to the dominion of the Chalcidicé: they ceded the Macedonian cities to their ancient sovereign; and engaged, by solemn oaths, to obey, in peace and war, the commands of their Spartan confederates and masters²².

In consequence of this humiliating treaty, or rather of this absolute submission of the Olynthians, Polybiades led off his victorious army, and Amyntas forsook the royal residence of *Ægæ* or *Edeffa*, and re-established his court at *Pella*, a place of great strength and beauty, situate on an eminence, which, with an adjoining plain of considerable extent, was defended by the rivers *Axius* and *Lydias*, and by impervious lakes and morasses. The city was distant only fifteen miles from the *Ægean* sea, with which it communicated by means of the above-mentioned rivers. It had been of old founded by Greeks, by whom it was recently conquered and peopled; but in consequence of the misfortunes and surrender of *Olynthus*, *Pella* became, and thenceforth continued, the capital of *Macedon*.

The commencement, and especially the conclusion of the *Olynthian* war, breathed the same spirit with the peace of *Antalcidas*, and proved the degenerate ambition of the Spartans, who were prepared to aggrandize the Barbarians on every side, in order to obtain their assistance towards extending their own dominion in Greece. This selfish and

C H A P.
XXIX.

Olynthus
finally
submits.

Pella re-
stored to
Amyntas,
and con-
tinues
thence-
forth the
capital of
Macedon.

Daring
enterprise
of the
Spartan
Phœbidas.

²² Xenoph. p. 565.

CH A P. XXIX. cruel system of policy deserved the indignation and resentment of the whole Grecian name, who were at length excited against Sparta by a very extraordinary transaction, to which we already had occasion to allude. When Eudamidas undertook the expedition against Olynthus, it was intended that his brother Phœbidas should follow him at the head of eight thousand men. This powerful reinforcement marched from Peloponnesus, and in their journey northwards, encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, which was then torn by the inveterate hostility of contending factions. Ismenias, whose name has already occurred on a very dishonorable occasion, headed the democratical party; Leontiades supported the interest of Sparta and aristocracy; and both were invested with the *archonship*, the chief magistracy in the commonwealth. It is not absolutely certain that Phœbidas had previous orders to interfere in this dissension²³, when he was accosted by Leontiades, “who exhorted him to seize the opportunity, which fortune had thrown in his way, of performing a signal service to his country. He then explained to the Lacedæmonian the distracted state of Thebes, and the facility with which he might become master of the citadel; so that while his brother Eudamidas was carrying on the war against

²³ Diodorus boldly asserts that Phœbidas acted by orders of his republic, and that the feigned complaints against him were nothing but a mask to disguise or to conceal the injustice of the community.

Olynthus, he himself would acquire possession of a much greater city ²⁴. ”

A contemporary historian, whose known partiality for the Lacedæmonians disposed him to regard this singular enterprise as an act of private audacity, represents Phœbidas as a man of a light and vain mind, who loved the fame of a splendid action more than life itself, and who embraced, with childish transports of joy ²⁵, the proposal of Leontiades. The mode of executing their plan was soon settled between them. To elude suspicion Phœbidas made the usual preparations for continuing his journey, when he was suddenly recalled by his associate. It was the month of July; the heat was intense; and, at mid-day, few or no passengers were to be seen in the roads or streets. The Theban matrons celebrated the festival of Ceres, and prayed that bountiful divinity to preserve the hope of a favorable harvest. The appropriated scene of their female worship was the Cadmæa, or citadel, of which the gates had been purposely thrown open, and which was totally defenceless, as the males were universally excluded from this venerable ceremony. Every circumstance conspired to facilitate the design of Leontiades, who conducted the Lacedæmonians to the fortress, without finding the smallest opposition. He immediately descended to the senate, which,

C H A P.

XXIX.

In time of
peace he
seizes the
Theban
citadel.
Olymp.
xcix. 2.
A. C. 383.

²⁴ Xenoph. p. 297, et seqq. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. p. 457.

²⁵ *Ἀνεκδιόσθη* is the expression used by Xenophon.

C H A P. though it usually assembled in the Cadmæa, was
XXIX. then sitting in the market-place; declared that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his advice, and without any purpose of hostility; seized Ismenias with his own hand as a disturber of the public peace, and ordered the other leaders of the republican faction to be taken into safe custody. Many were caught and imprisoned, and about four hundred escaped to Athens²⁶.

The measure approved by Agesilaus.

When the news of this event reached Sparta, the senate and assembly resounded with real or well-feigned complaints against the madness of Phœbidas, who, unprovoked by any injury, had violently seized a place in alliance and amity with the republic. Agesilaus, however, undertook his defence; his ambitious mind had long fomented the domineering arrogance of his country; possibly he had prompted the enterprise of Phœbidas, which he warmly approved; and his influence being as extensive as his abilities, he easily persuaded his countrymen to justify the fortunate rashness²⁷ of that commander, by keeping possession of the Theban citadel.

The cruelties of Sparta drive the Thebans to despair.

During five years the Spartans maintained, in the Cadmæa, a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Protected by such a body of foreign troops, which might be reinforced on the shortest warning, the

²⁶ Xenoph. p. 557.

²⁷ To save appearances, however, Phœbidas was fined. Even his accusers were offended, not at his injustice, but at his acting without orders. Xenoph. *ibid.* et Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 336.

partisans of aristocracy acquired an absolute ascendant in the affairs of the republic, which they conducted in such a manner as best suited their own interest, and the convenience of Sparta. Without pretending to describe the banishments, confiscations, and murders, of which they were guilty, it is sufficient for the purpose of general history to observe, that the miserable victims of their vengeance suffered similar calamities to those which afflicted Athens under the thirty tyrants. The severity of the government at length drove the Thebans to despair; and both the persecuted exiles abroad, and the oppressed subjects at home, prepared to embrace any measures, however daring and hazardous, which promised them a faint hope of relief ²⁸.

Among the Theban fugitives, who had taken refuge in Athens, and whose persons were now loudly demanded by Sparta, was Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, a youth whose distinguished advantages might have justly rendered him an object of envy, before he was involved in the misfortunes of his country. He yielded to none in birth; he surpassed all in fortune; he excelled in the manly exercises so much esteemed by the Greeks, and was unrivalled in qualities still more estimable, generosity and courage. He had an hereditary attachment to the democratic form of policy; and, previous to the late melancholy revolution, was

Conspira-
racy of the
Theban
exiles.
Olymp.
c. 3.
A. C. 378.

²⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. iv. Plut. in Pelopid. idem de Genio Socratis, p. 322, et seqq.

C H A P. marked out by his numerous friends and adherents
XXIX. as the person most worthy of administering the government. Pelopidas had often conferred with his fellow-sufferers at Athens about the means of returning to their country, and restoring the democracy; encouraging them by the example of the patriotic Thraſybulus, who, with a handful of men, had issued from Thebes, and effected a ſimilar, but ſtill more difficult, enterpriſe. While they ſecretly deliberated on this important object, Mello, one of the exiles, introduced to their nocturnal aſſembly his friend Phyllidas, who had lately arrived from Thebes; a man whoſe enterpriſing activity, ſingular addreſs, and crafty boldneſs, juſtly entitle him to the regard of hiſtory.

Assisted by
 Phyllidas,
 ſecretary
 to the
 Theban
 council.

Phyllidas was ſtrongly attached to the cauſe of the exiles; yet, by his inſinuating complaiſance, and officious ſervility, he had acquired the entire confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other magiſtrates, or rather tyrants²⁹, of the republic. In buſineſs and in pleaſure, he rendered himſelf alike neceſſary to his maſters; his diligence and abilities had procured him the important office of ſecretary to the council; and he had lately promiſed to Archias and Philip, the two moſt licentious of the tyrants, that he would give them an entertainment, during which they might enjoy the converſation and the perſons of the fineſt women in Thebes. The day was appointed for this infamous rendezvous, which theſe magiſterial

²⁹ Την περι Αρχιων τυραννιδα. Xenoph.

debauchees expected with the greatest impatience; and, in the interval, Phyllidas set out for Athens, on pretence of private business ³⁰. C H A P. XXIX.

In Athens, the time and the means were adjusted for executing the conspiracy. A body of Theban exiles assembled in the Thriasian plain, on the frontier of Attica, where seven ³¹, or twelve ³², of the youngest and most enterprising, voluntarily offered themselves to enter the capital, and to co-operate with Phyllidas in the destruction of the magistrates. The distance between Thebes and Athens was about thirty-five miles. The conspirators had thirteen miles to march through a hostile territory. They disguised themselves in the garb of peasants, arrived at the city towards evening with nets and hunting poles, and passed the gates without suspicion. During that night, and the succeeding day, the house of Charon, a wealthy and respectable citizen, the friend of Phyllidas, and a determined enemy of the aristocracy, afforded them a secure refuge, till the favorable moment summoned them to action.

The time and means of execution adjusted.

The important evening approached, when the artful secretary had prepared his long-expected entertainment in the treasury. Nothing had been omitted that could flatter the senses, and lull the activity of the mind in a dream of pleasure. But a secret and obscure rumor, which had spread in the city, hung, like a drawn dagger, over the voluptuous joys of the festivity. It had been darkly

Fidelity of the conspirators to each other.

³⁰ Xenoph. p. 566.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Plutarch. in Pelopid.

C H A P. XXIX. reported, that some unknown strangers, supposed to be a party of the exiles, had been received into the house of Charon. All the address of Phyllidas could not divert the terrors of his guests. They dispatched one of their lictors or attendants to demand the immediate presence of Charon. The conspirators were already buckling on their armor, in hopes of being immediately summoned to execute their purpose. But what was their astonishment and terror, when their host and protector was sternly ordered to appear before the magistrates! The most sanguine were persuaded that their design had become public, and that they must all miserably perish, without effecting any thing worthy of their courage. After a moment of dreadful reflection, they exhorted Charon to obey the mandate without delay. But that firm and patriotic Theban first went to the apartment of his wife, took his infant son, an only child, and presented him to Pelopidas and Mello, requesting them to retain in their hands this dearest pledge of his fidelity. They unanimously declared their entire confidence in his honor, and entreated him to remove from danger an helpless infant, who might become, in some future time, the avenger of his country's wrongs. But Charon was inflexible, declaring, "That his son could never aspire at a happier fortune, than that of dying honorably with his father and friends."

Their dissimulation and address.

So saying, he addressed a short prayer to the gods, embraced his associates, and departed. Before he arrived at the treasury, he was met by

Archias

Archias and Phyllidas. The former asked him, in the presence of the other magistrates, whose anxiety had brought them from table, "Who are those strangers said to have arrived the other day, and to be now entertained in your family?" Charon had composed his countenance so artfully, and retorted the question with such well-dissembled surprise, as considerably quieted the solicitude of the tyrants, which was totally removed by a whisper of Phyllidas, "That the absurd rumor had doubtless been spread for no other purpose but that of disturbing their pleasures."

They had scarcely returned to the banquet, when Fortune, as if she had taken pleasure to confound the dexterity of Phyllidas, raised up a new and most alarming danger. A courier arrived from Athens with every mark of haste and trepidation, desiring to see Archias, to whom he delivered a letter from an Athenian magistrate of the same name, his ancient friend and guest. This letter revealed the conspiracy; a secret not intrusted to the messenger, who had orders, however, to request Archias to read the dispatch immediately, as containing matters of the utmost importance. But that careless voluptuary, whose thoughts were totally absorbed in the expected scene of pleasure, replied with a smile, "Business to-morrow;" deposited the letter under the pillow of the couch, on which, according to ancient custom, he lay at the entertainment; and resumed his conversation with Phyllidas concerning the ladies, whom he had promised to introduce. Matters

C H A P.
XXIX.


The Theban magistrates assassinated.

CHAP. were now come to a crisis; Phyllidas retired
 XXIX. for a moment; the conspirators were put in motion; their weapons concealed under the flowing swell of female attire, and their countenances overshadowed and hid by a load of crowns and garlands. In this disguise they were presented to the magistrates intoxicated with wine and folly. At a given signal they drew their daggers, and effected their purpose³³. Charon and Mello were the principal actors in this bloody scene, which was entirely directed by Phyllidas. But a more difficult task remained. Leontiades, with other abettors of the tyranny, still lived, to avenge the murder of their associates. The conspirators, encouraged by their first success, and conducted by Phyllidas, gained admission into their houses successively, by means of the unsuspected secretary. On the appearance of disorder and tumult, Leontiades seized his sword, and boldly prepared for his defence. Pelopidas had the merit of destroying the principal author of the Theban servitude and disgrace. His associates perished without resistance; men whose names may be consigned to just oblivion, since they were distinguished by nothing memorable but their cruel and oppressive tyranny.

The prisoners set
 at liberty.

The measures of the conspirators were equally vigorous and prudent. Before alarming the city, they proceeded to the different prisons, which were crowded with the unfortunate victims of arbitrary

³³ Xenoph. p. 567. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 470.



power. Every door was open to Phyllidas. The captives, transported with joy and gratitude, increased the strength of their deliverers. They broke open the arsenals, and provided themselves with arms. The streets of Thebes now resounded with alarm and terror; every house and family were filled with confusion and uproar; the inhabitants were universally in motion; some providing lights, others running in wild disorder to the public places, and all anxiously wishing the return of day, that they might discover the unknown cause of this nocturnal tumult.

During a moment of dreadful silence, which interrupted the noise of sedition, a herald proclaimed, with a clear and loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and summoned to arms the friends of liberty and the republic. Among others who obeyed the welcome invitation was Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, a youth of the most illustrious merit; who united the wisdom of the sage, and the magnanimity of the hero, with the practice of every mild and gentle virtue; unrivalled in knowledge and in eloquence; in birth, valor, and patriotism, not inferior to Pelopidas, with whom he had contracted an early friendship. The principles of the Pythagorean philosophy³⁴, which he had diligently studied under Lysis of Tarentum, rendered Epaminondas averse to engage in the conspiracy, lest he might embroil his hands in civil blood³⁵. But when the sword was once

C H A P.
XXIX.

Epami-
nondas
joins the
insur-
gents.

³⁴ See Vol. II. p. 152 — 176.

³⁵ Plutarch. de Genio Socratis, p. 279, et passim.

C H A P.
XXIX.

drawn, he appeared with ardor in defence of his friends and country ; and his example was followed by many brave and generous youths who had reluctantly endured the double yoke of domestic and foreign tyranny.

The Theban democracy restored.
Olymp.
c. 3.
A. C. 378.

The approach of morning had brought the Theban exiles, in arms, from the Thriasian plain. The partisans of the conspirators were continually increased by a confluence of new auxiliaries from every quarter of the city. Encompassed by such an invincible band of adherents, Pelopidas and his associates proceeded to the market-place; summoned a general assembly of the people; explained the necessity, the object, and the extent of the conspiracy; and, with the universal approbation of their fellow-citizens, restored the democratic form of government ³⁶.

The revolution communicated to the Athenians, who assist in expelling the Lacedæmonian garrison.

Exploits of valor and intrepidity may be discovered in the history of every nation. But the revolution of Thebes displayed not less wisdom of design, than enterprising gallantry in execution. Amidst the tumult of action, and ardor of victory, the conspirators possessed sufficient coolness and foresight to reflect that the Cadmæa, or citadel, which was held by a Lacedæmonian garrison of fifteen hundred men, would be reinforced, on the first intelligence of danger, by the resentful activity of Sparta. To anticipate this alarming event, which must have rendered the consequences of the conspiracy incomplete and precarious, they

³⁶ Xenoph. Diodor. et Plutarch. *ibid.*

commanded the messenger, whom, immediately after the destruction of the tyrants, they had dispatched to their friends in the Thriasian plain, to proceed to Athens, in order to communicate the news of a revolution which could not fail to be highly agreeable to that state, and to solicit the immediate assistance of the Athenians, whose superior skill in attacking fortified places was acknowledged by Greeks and Barbarians. This message was attended with the most salutary effects. The acute discernment of the Athenians eagerly seized the precious opportunity of weakening Sparta³⁷, which, if once neglected, might never return. Several thousand men were ordered to march; and no time was lost, either in the preparation, or in the journey, since they reached Thebes the day after Pelopidas had re-established the democracy.

The seasonable arrival of those auxiliaries, whose celerity exceeded the most sanguine hopes of the Thebans, increased the ardor of the latter to attack the citadel. The events of the siege are variously related³⁸. According to the most probable account, the garrison made a very feeble resistance, being intimidated by the impetuous alacrity and enthusiasm, as well as the increasing numbers of the assailants, who already amounted to fourteen thousand men, and received continual accessions of strength from the neighbouring cities of Bœotia. Only a few days had elapsed, when the Lacedæ-

C H A P.
XXIX.

The Cadmea surrenders.
Olymp.
c. 3.
A. C. 378.

³⁷ Dinarch. Orat. contra Demosth. p. 100.

³⁸ Diodorus differs entirely from Xenophon and Plutarch, whom I have chiefly followed.

C H A P.

XXIX.

monians desired to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to depart in safety with their arms. Their proposal was readily accepted; but they seem not to have demanded, or at least not to have obtained, any terms of advantage or security for those unfortunate Thebans, whose attachment to the Spartan interest strongly solicited their protection. At the first alarm of sedition, these unhappy men, with their wives and families, had taken refuge in the citadel. The greater part of them cruelly perished by the resentment of their countrymen; a remnant only was saved by the humane interposition of the Athenians³⁹. So justly had Epaminondas suspected, that the revolution could not be accomplished without the effusion of civil blood.

³⁹ Xenoph. et Plutarch. *ibid.*

C H A P. XXX.

The Bæotian War. — Unsuccessful Attempt of Sphodrias against the Piræus. — Doubts concerning Xenophon's Account of that Transaction. — Agesilaus invades Bæotia. — Military Success of the Thebans. — Naval Success of the Athenians. — Congress for Peace under the Mediation of Artaxerxes. — Epaminondas, Deputy from Thebes. — Cleombrotus invades Bæotia. — Battle of Leuctra. — State of Greece. — Jason of Thessaly. — His Character and Views. — Assassinated in the midst of his Projects.

THE emancipation of Thebes gave a deep wound to the pride and tyranny of Sparta; and the magistrates of the latter republic prepared to punish, with due severity, what they affected to term the unprovoked rebellion of their subjects. The Thebans firmly resolved to maintain the freedom which they had assumed; and these dispositions on both sides occasioned a memorable war, which, having lasted with little interruption during seven years, ended with the battle of Leuctra, which produced a total revolution in the affairs of Greece.

The ardent mind of Agesilaus had long inspired, or directed, the ambitious views of his country.

C H A P.
XXX.

The Bæo-
tian war.
Olymp.

6. 3.
A. C. 378.

First cam-
paign un-
der Cle-
ombrotus,

C H A P. He enjoyed the glory, but could not avoid the
 XXX. odium, attached to his exalted situation; and fearing to increase the latter, he allowed the conduct of the Theban war to be committed to the inexperience of his unequal colleague. In the heart of a severe winter, Cleombrotus, with a well-appointed army, entered Bœotia. His presence confirmed the obedience of Thespiæ, Plataea, and other inferior communities. He defeated some straggling parties of the Thebans, repelled their incursions, ravaged their territory, burned their villages, but attempted not to make any impression on the well-defended strength of their city. After a campaign of two months, he returned home, leaving a numerous garrison in Thespiæ, commanded by Sphodrias, a general of great enterprise, but little prudence.

Sphodrias
 left with a
 garrison in
 Thespiæ.

Stratagem
 of Thebes
 for widening the
 breach between
 Athens
 and
 Sparta.

Meanwhile the Athenians, alarmed by the nearer view of danger, publicly disavowed the assistance which they had given to Thebes; and having disgraced, banished, or put to death¹, the advisers of that daring measure, renewed their alliance with Sparta. The Thebans felt the full importance of this defection, and left nothing untried to prevent its fatal tendency, a design (could we believe tradition) in which they succeeded by a very singular stratagem. The light and rash character of Sphodrias was well known, we are told, to the Theban chiefs, who employed secret emissaries

¹ Xenoph. p. 334. I have endeavoured to reconcile Xenophon and Dinarchus, cited above.

to persuade him, by arguments most flattering to his passions, to attack by surprise the imperfectly repaired harbour of Athens. These artful ministers of deceit represented to Sphodrias, that it was unworthy of his dignity, and of his valor, to employ the arms of Sparta in a predatory war, while an object of far more importance and glory naturally solicited the activity of his enterprising mind. "The Thebans, indeed, were vigilant in guard; and, being animated by the enthusiasm of newly-recovered freedom, were determined, rather than surrender, to bury themselves under the ruins of their country. But their secret and perfidious ally, whose assistance had recently enabled them to throw off the Spartan yoke, was lulled in security. The moment had arrived for crushing the implacable hatred of the Athenians, by surprising the Piræus, their principal ornament and defence; an action which would be celebrated by posterity above the kindred glory of Phœbidas, who, during the time also of an insidious peace, had seized the Theban citadel²."

The distance between Thebes and Thespiæ, which was not more than twenty miles, furnished an easy opportunity for carrying on these secret practices; but the distance, which exceeded forty miles, between Thebes and Athens, rendered the enterprise of Sphodrias abortive. He marched from Thespiæ with the flower of his garrison, early in the morning, expecting to reach the Piræus

Unsuccessful attempt of Sphodrias to seize the Piræus.

² Xenoph. p. 340. Diodorus, p. 472.

C H A P. before the dawn of the succeeding day. But he
 XXX. was surpris'd by the return of light in the Thria-
 sian plain. The borough of Eleufis was alarmed;
 the report flew to Athens, and the citizens, with
 their ufual alacrity, feized their arms, and pre-
 pared for a vigorous defence. The mad defign,
 and the ftill greater madnefs of Sphodrias, in
 ravaging the country during his retreat, provoked
 the fury of the Athenians. They immediately
 feized the perfons of fuch Lacedæmonians as hap-
 pened to refide in their city. They fent an em-
 baffy to Sparta, complaining, in the moft indignant
 terms, of the insult of Sphodrias. The Spartans
 difavowed his conduct. He was recalled and tried,
 but faved from death by the authority of Agefi-
 laus. This powerful protection was obtained by
 the interceffion of his fon Cleonymus, the beloved
 companion of Archidamus, the fon and fucceffor
 of the Spartan king. Archidamus pleaded, with
 the modelt eloquence of tears, for the father of a
 friend, his equal in years and valor, with whom
 he had been long united in the moft tender affec-
 tion. Cleonymus declared on this occafion, that
 he fhould never difgrace the ardent attachment of
 the royal youth: and illuftrious as Archidamus
 afterwards became, Xenophon affirms, that his
 early and unalterable love of Cleonymus forms not
 the fhade, but rather the faireft light, of his ami-
 able and exalted character³.

³ Xenoph. p. 570.

Such is the account of this transaction, given originally by Xenophon, and faithfully copied by other writers, ancient and modern. But there is some reason to suspect that Agesilaus was not totally unacquainted with the ambitious and unwarrantable design of Sphodrias; that the Spartans would have approved the measure, had it been crowned with success; and that even the philosophic Xenophon, a partial admirer of Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonians, has employed the persuasive simplicity of his inimitable style, to varnish a very unjustifiable transaction. Such, at least, it appeared to the Athenian assembly, who, offended by the crime, were still more indignant at the acquittal, of Sphodrias. From that time they began to prepare their fleet, to enlist sailors, to collect and to employ all the materials of war, with a resolution firmly to maintain the cause of Thebes and their own.

While they were busied in such preparations, Agesilaus repeatedly invaded Bœotia, without performing any thing worthy of his former renown. His army amounted to eighteen thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse. The enemy were assisted by a considerable body of mercenaries, commanded by Chabrias the Athenian, who finally repelled the Spartan king from Thebes, by a stratagem not less simple than uncommon. The Theban army prepared to act on the defensive against a superior force, and occupied a rising ground in the neighbourhood of their city. Agesilaus detached a body of light-armed troops, to

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XXX.

Doubts concerning Xenophon's account of this transaction.

Agesilaus repeatedly invades Bœotia. Olymp. c. 4. A. C. 377 & Olymp. ci. 1. A. C. 376.

C H A P. XXX. provoke them to quit this advantageous post; but the Thebans cautiously maintained their ground, and obliged the enemy to draw out their whole forces, in order to dislodge them. Chabrias, waiting their approach, commanded his troops to execute a new movement, which he had recently taught them for such an emergency. They supported their advanced bodies on their left knee, extended their shields and spears, and thus firmly maintained their ranks *. Alarmed at the determined boldness of an unusual array, which seemed to bid him defiance, Agesilaus withdrew his army from the capital, and contented himself with committing farther ravages on the country.

* The words of Nepos, in Chabria, are better explained by reading, "Qui obnixo genu scuto, projectâque hastâ, impetum excipere hostium decuit." This agrees with the statue of Chabrias in the Villa Borghese, whose singular attitude has given so much trouble to antiquaries. Winkelmann conjectures this master-piece of art to be the most ancient statue in Rome, from the form of the letters in the name Agasias with which it is inscribed. He observes, that it is erroneously supposed to be a gladiator, since the Greeks never honored gladiators with such monuments; and the style of the workmanship proves it more ancient than the introduction of that inhuman spectacle into Greece. The body of the statue is advanced, and rests on the left thigh; the right arm grasps a javelin, or spear; around the left is seen the leather thong, or handle of a shield. It seems, says Winkelmann, the particular attitude of a warrior on some dangerous emergency. What this emergency was, the learned and ingenious Lessing fortunately discovered, by the words of Cornelius Nepos. "Hoc (the stratagem of Chabrias) usque eò tota Græcia famâ celebratum est, ut illo statu Chabrias sibi statuem fieri voluerit, quæ publicè ei ab Atheniensibus in foro constituta est."

In the skirmishes which happened after his retreat, the Thebans proved repeatedly victorious. He returned home, and continued at Sparta during the following year, to be cured of his wounds; where he suffered the mortifying reproaches of his adversary Antalcidas, "for teaching the Thebans to conquer." The generals who succeeded him had not better success. Phœbidas, the original author of the war, who had been appointed governor of Thespiæ, was defeated and slain, with the greatest part of the garrison of that place. Pelopidas, with his own hand, killed the Spartan commander in the action at Tanagra; and in the pitched battle of Tegyra, the Lacedæmonians, though superior in number, were broken and put to flight; a disgrace which, they reflected with sorrow, had never befallen them in any former engagement.

While the war was thus carried on by land, the Athenians put to sea, and gained the most distinguished advantages on their favorite element. The Lacedæmonian fleet, of sixty sail, commanded by Pollis, was shamefully defeated near the isle of Naxos, by the skilful bravery of Chabrias, who performed alternately, and with equal abilities, the duties of admiral and general⁵. But the principal scene of action was the Ionian sea, where Timotheus⁶ and Iphicrates every where

C H A P.
XXX.

Success of
the The-
bans.
Olymp.
ci. 2.
A. C. 375

Naval suc-
cess of the
Atheni-
ans.
Olymp.
ci. 1.
A. C. 376.

⁵ Xenoph. p. 577. Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. ci. 1.

⁶ Corn. Nep. in Vit. Timoth. et Dinarch. adv. Demosth.
Such was the good fortune of Timotheus, that the satirical

C H A P. prevailed over the commanders who opposed them.
XXX. The fleet of Sparta was totally ruined by the victors, who repeatedly ravaged the coasts of Laconia⁷, and laid under heavy contributions the islands of Corcyra, Zacinthus, Leucadia, and Cephalenia. Even the isles and cities more remote from the scene of this naval war, particularly the valuable island of Chios, and the important city of Byzantium, deserted their involuntary connexion with the declining fortune of Sparta, and once more accepted the dangerous alliance of the Athenians⁸.

The
Greeks
assist Ar-
taxerxes
in the
Egyptian
war.

These hostile operations, which weakened, without subduing, the spirit of the vanquished, were interrupted by the sollicitations and bribes of the king of Persia, who earnestly promoted the domestic tranquillity of Greece, that he might enjoy the assistance of its arms in crushing a new rebellion in Egypt. His emissaries met with equal success in Athens and Sparta, which were alike weary of the war, the former having little more to hope, and the latter having every thing to fear, from its continuance. Many of the inferior states, being implicitly governed by the resolves of these powerful republics, readily imitated their example. And so precarious and miserable was the condition of them all, in that disorderly period, that about twenty thousand men abandoned

artists of the times painted him asleep, covered with a net, in which the cities and islands entangled and caught themselves. Plutarch. de invid. et odio.

⁷ Xenoph. p. 578.

⁸ Id. ibid.

their homes and families, and followed the standard of the Persians. The merit of Iphicrates justly entitled him to the command of his countrymen, which was unanimously conferred on him. But the expedition produced nothing worthy of such a general, who in a few months returned to Athens, disgusted with the ignorant pride, and slothful timidity, of the Persian commanders, who durst not undertake any important enterprize, without receiving the slow instructions of a distant court^a.

Meanwhile the Thebans, who, elated by a flow of unwonted prosperity, had proudly disregarded the representations of Artaxerxes, profited of the temporary diversion made by the Egyptian war, to reduce several inferior cities of Bœotia. The walls of Thespiæ were rased to the ground; Plataea met with the same fate; and its inhabitants, after suffering the cruellest indignities, were driven into banishment. It might be expected that the unfortunate exiles should have sought refuge in Sparta, whose authority they had uniformly acknowledged, since the dishonorable peace of Antalcidas. But so dissimilar were the fluctuating politics of Greece to the regular transactions of modern times (governed by the lifeless but steady principle of interest), that the Platæans had recourse to Athens, a city actually in alliance with the people by whom they had been so unjustly persecuted. Their eloquence, their tears, the memory of past services, and the promise of future

C H A P.
XXX.

The The-
bans rase
Plataea.
Olymp.
ci. 3.
A. C. 374.

^a Corn. Nepos in Iphicrat. Diodorus, l. xv. ad Olymp. c. iv.

C H A P. XXX. gratitude, prevailed on the Athenian assembly, who kindly received them into the bosom of their republic, and expressed the warmest indignation against their insolent oppressors¹⁰.

Congress
for peace
held un-
der the
mediation
of Arta-
xerxes.
Olymp.
cii. l.
A. C. 372.

This affecting transaction threatened to deprive the Thebans of an ally, to whom they were in a great measure indebted for their prosperity. Their subsequent conduct tended still farther to widen the breach. They marched troops into Phocis, with an intention to reduce that country. They heard with equal disdain, the remonstrances of their friends, and the threats of their enemies. Their unusual arrogance totally alienated the Athenians, who seemed finally disposed to conclude a lasting peace with Sparta, on the principles of the treaty of Antalcidas, that their respective garrisons should be withdrawn from foreign parts, and the communities, small as well as great, be permitted to enjoy the independent government of their own equitable laws. The interest of the king of Persia, who still needed fresh supplies to carry on the Egyptian war, induced him to employ his good offices for promoting this specious purpose; and a convention of all the states was summoned to Sparta, whither the Thebans deigned indeed to send a representative; but a representative, whose firmness and magnanimity were well fitted to sustain and elevate the aspiring pretensions of his republic.

¹⁰ Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. et Isocrat. Orat. pro Plat.

In effecting this glorious revolution, which gave freedom to Thebes, as well as in the military operations, which immediately followed that important event, the youthful merit of Pelopidas had acquired the fame of patriotism, valor, and conduct. The nobility of his birth, and the generous use of his riches, increased the ascendant due to his illustrious services. Every external advantage, the manly grace of his person, the winning affability of his deportment, his superior excellence in the martial exercises so highly prized by the Greeks, and especially by the Thebans, gained him the admiration of the multitude; or, in other words, of the legislative assembly of his country. He had been successively elected, during six years, to the first dignity of the republic; nor had the Thebans ever found reason to repent their choice²¹. Yet in the present emergency, when they were required to appoint a deputy for the convention at Sparta (the most important charge with which any citizen could be intrusted), Pelopidas, with all his merit, was not the minister whom they thought proper to employ.

Epaminondas, naturally his rival, but always his friend, had hitherto been contented with a subordinate station: yet every office which he exercised, whether in the civil or military department, derived new lustre from his personal dignity. His exterior accomplishments were not inferior to those of Pelopidas; but he had learned from the

C H A P.

XXX.

Epaminondas appears as deputy from Thebes.

His character.

²¹ Plut. in Pelopida.

C H A P. philosophy of Lysis the Pythagorean, to prefer the
 XXX. mind to the body, merit to fame, and the rewards of virtue to the gifts of fortune. He resisted the generous solicitations of his friends to deliver him from the honorable poverty in which he was born; continuing poor from taste and choice, and justly delighting in a situation, which is more favorable, especially in a democratical republic, to that freedom and independence of mind which wisdom recommends as the greatest good. Nor was he more careless of money than avaricious of time, which he continually dedicated to the study of learning and philosophy, or employed in the exercise of public and private virtue. Yet to become useful he was not desirous to be great. The same solicitude which others felt to obtain, Epaminondas showed to avoid, the dangerous honors of his country. His ambitious temper would have been better satisfied to direct, by a personal influence with the magistrates, the administration of government from the bosom of his beloved retirement¹², when the unanimous voice of the citizens, and still more the urgency of the times, called him to public life; and such was his contempt for the glory of a name, that had he lived in a less turbulent period, his exalted qualities, however admired by select friends, would have probably remained unknown to his contemporaries and posterity.

¹² The conduct of Epaminondas coincides with, and confirms, the account above given of the Pythagorean philosophy.

Such was the man to whose abilities and eloquence the Thebans committed the defence of their most important interests in the general congress of the Grecian states. The Athenians sent Antocles and Callistratus; the first a subtle¹³, the second an affecting orator¹⁴. Agefilas himself appeared on the part of Sparta. Matters were easily adjusted between those leading republics, who felt equal resentment at the unhappy fate of Thespiæ and Plataea. They lamented their mutual jealousy, and unfortunate ambition, which had occasioned so many bloody and destructive wars; and commemorated the short but glorious intervals of moderation and concord, which had tended so evidently to their own and the public felicity. Instructed by fatal experience, it was time for them to lay down their arms, and to allow that tranquillity to themselves and to their neighbours, which was necessary to heal the wounds of their common country. The peace could not be useful or permanent, unless it were established on the liberal principles of equality and freedom, to which all the Grecian communities were alike entitled by the treaty of Antalcidas. It was proposed, therefore, to renew that salutary contract, which was accepted by the unanimous consent of Athens, of Sparta, and of their respective confederates.

C H A P.

XXX.

Confer-
ence at
Sparta.Olymp.
cii. 1.

A. C. 372.

¹³ *Επισπεφὸς πνέων*. Xenoph. l. vi.

¹⁴ The pathetic pleading of Callistratus, for the citizens of Oropus, first inspired Demosthenes with the ambition of Eloquence. Plut. in Demosth.

C H A P.

XXX.

Demands
of Epa-
minondas.

Epaminondas ¹⁵ then stood up, offering to sign the treaty in the name of the Bœotians. "The Athenians," he took notice, "had signed for all the inhabitants of Attica; the Spartans had signed not only for the cities of Laconia, but for their numerous allies in all the provinces of the Peloponnesus. Thebes was entitled to the same prerogatives over her dependent cities, which had anciently acknowledged the power of her kings, and had recently submitted to the arms of her citizens." Agesilaus, instead of answering directly a demand which could neither be granted with honor, nor denied with justice, asked, in his turn, Whether it was the intention of the Thebans to admit, in terms of the treaty, the independence of Bœotia? Epaminondas demanded, Whether it was the intention of Sparta to admit the independence of Laconia? "Shall the Bœotians," said the king, with emotion, "be free?" "Whenever," replied Epaminondas with firmness, "you restore freedom to the Lacedæmonians, the Messenians, and the oppressed communities of Peloponnesus, whom, under the name of allies, you retain in an involuntary and rigorous servitude."

¹⁵ The convention of Sparta is noticed by Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos. The first writer is silent with regard to Epaminondas. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos furnish the hints which I have made use of in the text. It is not impossible that there were two conventions, at different times, respecting the same object. In that case, Xenophon must have totally omitted one of them.

Then turning to the deputies of the allies, he represented to them the cruel mockery by which they were insulted. "Summoned to deliberate concerning the general freedom and independence, they were called to ratify a peace, which, instead of establishing these invaluable and sacred rights, confirmed the stern tyranny of an imperious master." That "the cities, small and great, should be free," was the verbal condition of the treaty; but its real drift and import was, that Thebes should give freedom to Bœotia, and thereby weaken her own strength, while Sparta kept in subjection the extensive territories of her confederates, in whose name she had signed that perfidious contract, and whose assistance she expected, and could demand, towards giving it immediate effect. If the allies persisted in their actual resolution, they consented to destroy the power of Thebes, which was the only bulwark to defend them against Spartan usurpation: they consented to continue the payment of those intolerable contributions with which they had long been oppressed; and to obey every idle summons to war, of which *they* chiefly suffered the fatigues and dangers, while the advantage and glory redounded to the Spartans alone. If they felt any respect for the glorious name of their ancestors; if they entertained any sense of their own most precious interests, they would be so little disposed to promote the reduction of Thebes, that they would imitate the auspicious example of that ancient and noble city, which had acquired the dignity of independent

C H A P.

XXX.

He addresses the deputies of the allies.

C H A P. government, not by *inscriptions*¹⁶ and treaties, but
 XXX. by arms and valor.

Perma-
 nent effect
 of his re-
 presenta-
 tions.

The just remonstrances of Epaminondas made a deep impression on the deputies. Agesilaus, alarmed at its effect, answered him in a strain very different from that despotic brevity¹⁷ which the Spartans usually affected. His speech was long and eloquent. He reasoned, prayed, threatened. The deputies were awed into submission, less perhaps by the force of his eloquence, than by the terror of the Spartan armies ready to take the field. But the words of Epaminondas sunk deep into their hearts. They communicated, at their return, the powerful impression to their constituents; and its influence was visible in the field of Leuctra, and in the events which followed that memorable engagement.

Reflec-
 tions on
 his con-
 duct;

As the Grecian states were accustomed to grant more unreserved powers to their generals and ministers, than are allowed by the practice of modern times, we must be contented to doubt, whether, in this important negociation, Epaminondas acted merely by the extemporary impulse of his own mind, or only executed, with boldness and dignity, the previous instructions of his republic. It is certain, that his refusal to acknowledge the freedom of Bœotia, not only excluded

¹⁶ The public deeds and transactions of the Greeks were *inscribed* on pillars of marble. Thucyd. et Xenoph. passim.

¹⁷ Epaminondas said, or more probably it was said for him, that he had compelled the Spartans to lengthen their monosyllables. Plut. in Agesil.

Thebes from the treaty, but exposed her to the immediate vengeance of the confederates; and according to the received principles of modern policy, there is reason to accuse both the prudence and the justice of the admired Theban; his prudence, in provoking the strength of a confederacy, with which the weakness of any single republic seemed totally unable to contend; and his justice, in denying to *several* communities of Bœotia their hereditary laws and government. Yet the conduct of Epaminondas has never been exposed to such odious reproaches. Success justified his audacity; and the Greeks, animated by an ambitious enthusiasm to aggrandize their respective cities, were taught to dignify by the names of patriotism and magnanimity, qualities which, in the sober judgment of posterity, would be degraded by very different appellations. There are reasons, however, not merely specious, by which Epaminondas might justify his conduct at an impartial bar. He could not be ignorant that Thebes, unassisted and alone, was unable to cope with the general confederacy of Greece: but he knew that this confederacy would never exist but in words, since the jealousy of several states, and particularly of Athens, would be disposed rather to commiserate, than to increase, the calamities of a people at variance with Sparta¹⁸. He perceived the effect of his spirited remonstrances on the most steadfast adherents of that republic; and contemplating the circumstances of

C H A P.
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¹⁸ Xenophon hints at this disposition, l. vi. p. 608.

C H A P. his country, and of the enemy, he found several
 XXX. motives of encouragement to the seemingly unequal contest.

which is
 justified
 by the
 state of
 Sparta.

The Spartans had been weakened by the defection and loss of their dominions, and dejected by their unfortunate attempts to recover them. They had been deprived of their prescriptive honors, and had forsaken their hereditary maxims. Their ancient and venerable laws had in a great measure ceased to govern them; and the seeds of those corruptions were already sown, which have been censured by philosophers and statesmen with equal justice and severity¹⁹. Nor were they exposed to the *usual* misfortunes, only, of a degenerate people; the institutions of Lycurgus formed one consistent plan of legislation, which could not be partially observed and partially neglected. While the submissive disciples of that extraordinary lawgiver remained satisfied with their simplicity of manners, their poverty, and their virtue, and had scarcely any other object in view, but to resist the solicitations of pleasure, and to repel the encroachments of enemies, the law, which discouraged a commercial intercourse with foreign nations, and which excluded strangers, whatever merit they might possess, from aspiring to the rank of citizens, was an establishment strictly conformable to the peculiar spirit of the Lacedæmonian constitution. But when Sparta abandoned the simplicity of her primitive maxims, became ambitious, wealthy,

¹⁹ Aristot. Politic. l. ii. c. 9.

triumphant, and almost continually engaged in war, not as the means of defence, but as the instrument of power and conquest, consistency required that she should have laid aside her pretensions to those exclusive honors which she no longer deserved. When she relinquished the virtuous pre-eminence of her ancestors, the warlike inhabitants of Peloponnesus were not unworthy to be ranked with her citizens; and by admitting them to this honor, she would have given them an interest in her victories, and rendered them willing partners of her danger. But, instead of adopting this generous policy, which possibly might have rendered her what Rome, with more wisdom indeed, but not with more virtue or more valor, afterwards became, the mistress of the world, she increased her pretensions in proportion to the decline of her merit; spurned the equality of a federal union, to which the Peloponnesians were entitled; deprived even the Lacedæmonians of their just share in the government, and concentrated all power and authority within the senate and assembly of Sparta. A long course of almost uninterrupted hostilities had deprived her of the best half of her citizens, whose numbers were continually diminishing, without the possibility of ever being repaired; nor could it be difficult to overthrow an empire which depended on the address and bravery of about four thousand warriors, the splendor of a great name, and the

C H A P.

XXX.

C H A P. reluctant assistance of insulted allies and oppressed
xxx. subjects²⁰.

The consideration of these circumstances, which could not fail to present themselves to the sagacity of Epaminondas, might have encouraged him to set the threats of his adversaries at defiance, especially when he reflected on the actual condition of Thebes, whose civil and military institutions had recently acquired new spirit and fresh vigor.

Compar-
ed with
that of
Thebes

The Thebans, with their subjects or neighbours in Bœotia, had been long regarded as an unworthy and faithless race, with strong bodies but ignoble souls, and infamous among the Greeks, on account of their ancient alliance with Xerxes and the Barbarians. The divine genius of Pindar had not redeemed them from the character of a sluggish and heavy people, noted even to a proverb for stupidity²¹. From the age of that inimitable writer, they appear, indeed, to have been little addicted to the pursuit of mental excellence; but they uniformly continued to cultivate, with peculiar care, the gymnastic exercises, which gave the address and dexterity of art to the ponderous strength of their gigantic members. To acquire renown in

²⁰ The condition of Sparta, represented in the text, is taken from the history of the times in Xenophon and Diodorus, from Aristotle's Politics, l. ii. c. 9. the Oration of Archidamus, and the Panathenæan Oration of Isocrates. The last writer reduces the number of Spartan citizens to two thousand; a diminution principally occasioned by the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, which happened a considerable time before the composition of that discourse.

²¹ Bœotum in crasso jurares aëre natum. Hor. Epist. i. l. 11.

war, such people only wanted that spark of ethereal fire which is kindled by a generous emulation. The tyranny of Sparta first animated their inactive languor. Having spurned an oppressive yoke, they boldly maintained their freedom; and in the exercise of defensive war, gained many honorable trophies over enemies who had long despised them. Success enlivened their hopes, inflamed their ambition, and gave a certain elevation to their national character, which rendered them as ambitious of war and victory, as they had formerly been anxious for peace and preservation. They had introduced a severe system of military discipline; they had considerably improved the arms and exercise of cavalry; they had adopted various modes of arranging their forces in order of battle, superior to those practised by their neighbours. Emulation, ardor, mutual esteem, and that spirit of combination, which often prevails in turbulent and distracted times, had united a considerable number of their citizens in the closest engagements, and inspired them with the generous resolution of braving every danger in defence of each other. This association originally consisted of about three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and commanded by Pelopidas, the glorious restorer of his country's freedom. From the inviolable sanctity of their friendship, they were called the Sacred Band, and their valor was as permanent as their friendship. During a long succession of years, they proved victorious wherever they fought; and at length fell together, with immortal

C H A P. glory, in the field of Chæronea, with the fall of
XXX. Thebes, of Athens, and of Greece. Such, in general, were the circumstances and condition of those rival republics²², when they were encouraged by their respective chiefs to decide their pretensions by the event of a battle.

Cleom-
 brotus in-
 vades
 Bœotia.
 Olymp.
 cii. 2.
 A. C. 371.

The Spar-
 tans and
 their con-
 federates
 assemble
 in the
 plain of
 Leuctra.

In the interval of several months, between the congress at Sparta and the invasion of Bœotia, Agesilaus and his son Archidamus collected the domestic strength of their republic, and summoned the tardy aid of their confederates. Sicknefs prevented the Spartan king from taking the field in person; but his advice prevailed with the Ephori and senate, to command his colleague Cleombrotus (who, in the former year, had conducted a considerable body of troops into Phocis, in order to repel the Thebans from that country) to march without delay into the hostile territory, with assurance of being speedily joined by a powerful reinforcement. The rendezvous was appointed in the plain of Leuctra, which surrounded an obscure village of the same name, situate on the Bœotian frontier almost at the equal distance of ten miles from the sea and from Plataea. The plain was encompassed on all sides by the lofty ridges of Helicon, Cithæron, and Cynocephalæ; and the village was hitherto remarkable only for the tomb of two Theban damsels, the daughters of Scedafus, who had been violated by the brutality of three Spartan youths. The dishonored females had

²² Plut. in Pelopid. v. II. p. 355 — 366.

ended their disgrace by a voluntary death ; and the afflicted father had imitated the example of their despair, after imploring vengeance in vain from gods and men ²³.

C H A P.
XXX.

The Spartans and their confederates joined forces in this neighbourhood, after repelling a few Theban detachments which guarded the defiles of Mount Helicon. Their army amounted to twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans could not muster half that strength, after assembling all their troops, which had been scattered over the frontier, in order to oppose the desultory irruptions of the enemy. Their cavalry, however, nearly equalled those of the Spartans in number, and far excelled them in discipline and in valor. Epaminondas exhorted them to march, and repel the invaders, if they would prevent the defection of Bœotia, and avoid the dangers and disgrace of a siege. They readily obeyed, and proceeded to the neighbouring mountains, on which having encamped, they obtained a commanding view of the forces in the plain.

The Thebans encamp on the neighbouring mountain.

Having heard an account of the superior numbers of the enemy, the Thebans still determined to give them battle. But as the eyes are the most timorous of the senses, they were seized with terror and consternation at beholding the massy extent of the Spartan camp. Several of the colleagues of Epaminondas (for he had no fewer than six) were averse to an engagement, strongly dissuading the

Proceedings of Epaminondas before the battle.

²³ Xenoph. p. 595.

C H A P. general from this dangerous measure, and artfully
 XXX. increasing the panic of the troops, by recounting many sinister omens and prodigies. The magnanimous chief opposed the dangerous torrent of superstitious terror, by a verse of Homer²⁴, importing, that to men engaged in the pious duty of defending their country, no particular indication was necessary of the favorable will of Heaven, since they were immediately employed in a service peculiarly agreeable to the gods. At the same time, he counteracted the dejection of their imaginary fears, by encouragements equally chimerical. It was circulated, by his contrivance, that the Theban temples had opened of their own accord, in consequence of which the priestesses had announced a victory; that the armor of Hercules, repositied in the Cadmæa, had suddenly disappeared, as if that invincible hero in person had gone to battle in defence of his Theban countrymen; above all, an ancient oracle was carefully handed about, denouncing defeat and ruin to the Spartans near the indignant tomb of the daughters of Scedafus. These artifices gained the multitude, while arguments more rational prevailed with their leaders, of whom the majority at length ranged themselves on the side of the general.

His magnanimity
 seconded
 by fortune.

Before conducting them to battle, Epaminondas displayed his confidence of victory, by permitting all those to retire, who either disapproved his cause, or were averse to share his danger; a permission

²⁴ 'Εἰς οὐδὲν ὀρίστος ἀμυνεσθαι περίπατος. H. xli. v. 243.

which the Thespians first thought proper to embrace. The unwarlike crowd of attendants, whose services were useless in time of action, gradually seized the same opportunity to leave the camp. The swelling multitude appeared as a second army to the Spartans, who sent a powerful detachment to oppose them. The fear of being cut off by the enemy threw them back on the Thebans, whose hopes were enlivened by the unexpected return of such a considerable reinforcement. Thus encouraged, they determined unanimously to stand by their admired chief, and either to defend their country, or to perish in the attempt; and the ardor of the troops equalling the skill of the general, the union of such advantages rendered them invincible.

Cleombrotus had disposed his forces in the form of a crescent, according to an ancient and favorite practice of the Spartans. His cavalry were posted in squadrons along the front of the right wing, where he commanded in person. The allies composed the left wing, conducted by Archidamus. The Theban general, perceiving this disposition, and sensible that the issue of the battle would chiefly depend on the domestic troops of Sparta, determined to charge vigorously with his left, in order to seize or destroy the person of Cleombrotus; thinking that should this design succeed, the Spartans must be discouraged and repelled; and that even the attempt must occasion great disorder in their ranks, as the bravest would hasten, from

Disposi-
tion of the
forces on
both sides.

C H A P. every quarter, to defend the sacred person of
 XXX. their king. Having resolved, therefore, to commit the fortune of the day to the bravery of the left division of his forces, he strengthened it with the choice of his heavy-armed men, whom he drew up fifty deep. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppose the Spartan horse, whom they excelled in experience and valor. Pelopidas, with the Sacred Band, flanked the whole on the left; and deeming no particular station worthy of their prowess, they were prepared to appear in every tumult of the field, whither they might be called, either by an opportunity of success, or by the prospect of distinguished danger. The principal inconvenience to which the Thebans were exposed, in advancing to the charge, was that of being surrounded by the wide-extended arms of the Spartan crescent. This danger the general foresaw; and in order to prevent it, he spread out his right wing, of which the files had only six men in depth, and the ranks proceeding in an oblique line, diverged the farther from the enemy, in proportion as they extended in length.

Battle of
 Leuctra.
 Olymp.
 cii. 2.
 A. C. 371.

The action began with the cavalry, which, on the Spartan side, consisted chiefly of such horses as were kept for pleasure by the richer citizens in time of peace; and which, proving an unequal match for the disciplined valor of the Thebans, were speedily broken, and thrown back on the infantry. Their repulse and rout occasioned considerable disorder in the Lacedæmonian ranks,
 which

which was greatly heightened by the impetuous c H A P.
onset of the Sacred Band. Epaminondas availed XXX.
himself of this momentary confusion, to perform
one of those rapid evolutions which commonly
decide the fortune of battles. He formed his
strongest, but least numerous division, into a com-
pact wedge, with a sharp point and with spread-
ing flanks; expecting that the Lacedæmonians, as
soon as they had recovered their ranks, would
attack the weaker and more extended part of his
army, which, from the oblique arrangement in
which it had been originally drawn up, seemed
prepared for a retreat. The event answered his
expectation. While the Lacedæmonians advanced
against his right wing, where they found little or no
resistance, he rushed forward with his left; and dart-
ing like the beak of a galley²⁵ on the flank of the
enemy, bore down every thing before him, until
he arrived near the post occupied by Cleombrotus.
The urgency of the danger recalled to their ancient
principles the degenerate disciples of Lycurgus.
The bravest warriors flew from every quarter to the
assistance of their prince, covered him with their
shields, and defended him with their swords and
lances. Their impetuous valor resisted the in-
trepid progress of the Thebans, till the Spartan
horsemen, who attended the person of Cleombro-
tus, were totally cut off, and the king himself,
pierced with many wounds, fell on the breathless

²⁵ Xenophon employs this expression on a similar occasion, in relating the battle of Mantinea.

C H A P. or expiring bodies of his generous defenders.
XXX. The fall of the chief gave new rage to the battle. Anger, resentment, and despair, by turns agitated the Spartans. According to the superstitious ideas of paganism, the death of their king appeared to them a slight misfortune, compared with the disgraceful impiety of committing his mangled remains to the insults of an enemy. To prevent this abomination, they exerted their utmost valor, and their strenuous efforts were successful. But they could not obtain any further advantage. Epaminondas was careful to fortify his ranks, and to maintain his order of battle; and the firmness and rapidity of his regular assault gained a complete and decisive victory over the desperate resistance of broken troops. The principal strength of the allies had hitherto remained inactive, unwilling rashly to engage in a battle, the motives of which they had never heartily approved. The defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of Cleombrotus, decided their wavering irresolution. They determined, almost with one accord, to decline the engagement; their retreat was effected with the loss of about two thousand men; and the Thebans remained sole masters of the field ²⁶.

The Spartans crave permission to bury their dead.

The care of burying the dead, and the fear of reducing the enemy to despair, seem to have prevented Epaminondas from pursuing the vanquished to their camp; which, as it was strongly fortified, could not be taken without great slaughter of the

²⁶ Xenoph. p. 596, et seqq. et Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, et seqq.

assailants. When the Lacedæmonians had assembled within the defence of their ditch and rampart, their security from immediate danger allowed them time to reflect with astonishment and sorrow on the humiliating consequences of their recent disaster. Whether they considered the number of the slain, or reflected on the mortifying loss of national honor, it was easy for them to perceive, that, on no former occasion, the glory of their country had ever received such a fatal wound. Many Spartans declared their disgrace too heavy to be borne; that they never would permit their ancient laurels to be buried under a Theban trophy; and that, instead of craving their dead under the protection of a treaty (which would be acknowledging their defeat), they were determined to return into the field, and to recover them by force of arms. This manly, but dangerous resolution, was condemned in the council of war, by the officers of most experience and authority. They observed, that of seven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred had fallen; that the Lacedæmonians had lost one thousand, and the allies two thousand six hundred. Their army indeed still outnumbered that of the enemy; but their domestic forces formed scarcely the tenth part of their strength, nor could they repose any confidence in the forced assistance of their reluctant confederates, who, emboldened by the misfortunes of Sparta, declared their unwillingness to renew the battle, and scarcely concealed their

C H A P. XXX. satisfaction at the humiliation and disgrace of that haughty and tyrannical republic. Yielding, therefore, to the necessity of this miserable juncture, the Spartans sent a herald to crave their dead, and to acknowledge the victory of the Thebans²⁷.

News of
the defeat
at Leuctra
brought to
Sparta.

Before they found it convenient to return home, the fatal tidings had reached their capital; and, on this memorable occasion, the Spartans exhibited that striking peculiarity of behaviour, which naturally resulted from the institutions of Lycurgus. Availing himself of the extraordinary respect which uncultivated nations bestow on military courage, in preference to all other virtues and accomplishments, that legislator allowed to the man who had lost his defensive armor, or who had fled in the day of battle, but one melancholy alternative, more dreadful than death to a generous mind. The unfortunate soldier was either driven into perpetual banishment, and subjected to every indignity which, in a rude age, would naturally be inflicted by the resentment of neighbouring and hostile tribes; or, if he submitted to remain at home, he was excluded from the public assemblies, from every office of power or honor, from the protection of the laws, and almost from the society of men, without the shadow of a hope ever to amend his condition. The influence of this stern law, which seems to have been forgotten in the field of Leuctra, was illustrated in a very striking manner, after that unfortunate battle.

²⁷ Xenoph. p. 596, et seqq. et Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, et seqq.

The messenger of bad news arrived, while the Spartans, according to annual custom, were celebrating, in the month of July, gymnastic and musical entertainments, and invoking Heaven to preserve the fruits of the approaching autumn. Being introduced to the Ephori, he informed them of the public disaster. These magistrates commanded the festival to proceed; sending, however, to each family a list of the warriors whom it had lost, and enjoining the women to abstain from unavailing lamentations. Next day, the fathers and other relations of such as had perished in the field of battle, appeared in the public places, dressed in their gayest attire, saluting and congratulating each other on the bravery of their brethren or children. But the kinsmen of those who had saved themselves by a shameful flight, either remained at home, brooding in silence over their domestic affliction, or, if they ventured abroad, discovered every symptom of unutterable anguish and despair. Their persons were shamefully neglected, their garments rent, their arms folded, their eyes fixed immovably on the ground; expecting in humble resignation, the sentence of eternal ignominy ready to be denounced by the magistrate against the unworthy causes of their sorrow²⁸. But, on this critical emergency, the rigor of the Spartan discipline was mitigated by Agesilaus, whom the number and rank of the criminals deterred from inflicting on them the merited punishment. He

C H A P.

XXX.

Singular
behaviour:
of the
Spartans
on that
occasion.²⁸ Xenoph. p. 596.

C H A P.

XXX.

Decision
of Agefi-
laus re-
specting
the van-
quished in
the field of
Leuctra.

endeavoured to atone for abandoning the spirit of the laws, by what may appear a very puerile expedient; "Let us suppose," said he, "the sacred institutions of Lycurgus to have slept during one unfortunate day, but henceforth let them resume their wonted vigor and activity:" a sentence extravagantly praised by many writers, as preserving the authority of the laws, while it spared the lives of the citizens. But as, on the one hand, we cannot discover the admired sagacity of Agefilas in dispensing this act of lenity; so, on the other, we cannot condemn as imprudent the act itself, which the present circumstances of his country rendered not only expedient, but necessary. If Sparta had been the populous capital of an extensive territory, the lives of three hundred citizens might, perhaps, have been usefully sacrificed to the honor of military discipline. But a community exceedingly small, and actually weakened by the loss of four hundred members, could scarcely have survived another blow equally destructive. No distant prospect of advantage, therefore, could have justified such an unseasonable severity.

State of
Greece
after the
battle of
Leuctra.
Olymp.
cii. 2.
A. C. 371.

When the intelligence was diffused over Greece, that the Thebans, with the loss of only three hundred men, had raised an immortal trophy over the strength and renown of Sparta, the importance of this event became every-where conspicuous. The desire, and hope, of a revolution in public affairs, filled the Peloponnesus with agitation and tumult. Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, every

people who had been influenced by Spartan councils, or intimidated by Spartan power, openly aspired at independence. The less considerable states expected to remain thenceforth unmolested, no longer paying contributions, nor obeying every idle summons to war. The more powerful republics breathed hatred and revenge, and gloried in an opportunity of taking vengeance on the proud senators of Sparta, for the calamities which they had so often inflicted on their neighbours.

But amidst this general ferment, and while every other people were guided rather by their passions and animosities, than by the principles of justice or sound policy, the Athenians exhibited an illustrious example of political moderation²⁹. Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, a Theban herald, adorned with the emblems of peace and victory, had been dispatched to Athens, in order to relate the particulars of the engagement, and to invite the Athenians to an offensive alliance against a republic, which had ever proved the most dangerous, as well as the most inveterate enemy of their country. But the assembly of Athens, governed by the magnanimity, or rather by the prudence, of Timotheus and Iphicrates, determined to humble their rivals, not to destroy them.

Affected
moderation
of
Athens.

The ancient and illustrious merit of the Spartans, their important services during the Persian war, and the fame of their laws and discipline, which still rendered them a respectable branch of the

Views of
that re-
public.

²⁹ Xenoph. p. 593.

C H A P. Grecian confederacy, might have a considerable
 xxx. influence in producing this resolution. But it chiefly
 proceeded from a jealousy of the growing power
 of Thebes, the situation of whose territories might
 soon render her a more formidable opponent to
 Athens, than even Sparta herself. This political
 consideration for once prevailed over a deep-rooted
 national antipathy. The Theban herald was not
 received with respect, nor even with decency. He
 was not entertained in public, according to the
 established hospitality of the Greeks; and although
 the senate of the Five Hundred (who usually
 answered foreign ambassadors) was then assembled
 in the citadel, he was allowed to return home
 without receiving the smallest satisfaction on the
 subject of his demand. But the Athenians,
 though unwilling to second the resentment, and
 promote the prosperity of Thebes, prepared to
 derive every possible advantage from the misfor-
 tunes and distress of Sparta. Convinced that the
 inhabitants of Peloponnesus would no longer be
 inclined to follow her standard, and share her
 danger and adversity, they eagerly seized the op-
 portunity of delivering them for ever from her
 yoke; and, lest any other people might attain the
 rank which the Spartans once held, and raise their
 own importance on the ruins of public freedom,
 ambassadors were sent successively to the several
 cities, requiring their respective compliance with
 the treaty of Antalcidas. Against such as rejected
 this overture, war was denounced in the name of
 Athens and her allies; which was declaring to all

Greece, that the battle of Leuctra had put the balance of power in her hands, and that she had determined to check the ambition of every republic whose views were too aspiring³⁰.

Disappointed of the assistance of Athens, the Thebans had recourse to an ally not less powerful. The extensive and fertile territory of Thessaly, which had been so long weakened by division, was fortunately united under the government of Jason of Pheræ, a man whose abilities and enterprising ambition seemed destined to change the face of the ancient world³¹. To the native virtues of hospitality and magnificence, which peculiarly distinguished his country, Jason added indefatigable labor and invincible courage, with a mind capable to conceive the loftiest designs, and a character ready to promote them by the meanest artifices³². His family descended from the ancient kings of the heroic ages, and formed the wealthiest house in Pheræ, which had already attained considerable pre-eminence over the neighbouring cities of Thessaly. By contrivances extremely unworthy of that greatness to which they frequently conduct, Jason deceived his brothers and kinsmen, and appropriated almost the sole use of his domestic opulence. With this he hired a well-appointed body of mercenaries, by whose assistance he acquired greater authority in Pheræ, than any former general or king had ever enjoyed³³. But the

C H A P.
XXX.

The Thebans court the alliance of Jason of Thessaly.

His character, and fortunes.

³⁰ Xenoph. p. 602.

³¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. et seqq.

³² Polyæn. Stratagem.

³³ Plut. Polit. et fan. tuend.

C H A P. government of a single city could not satisfy his
 XXX. aspiring mind. By stratagem, by surprise, or by
 force, he extended his dominion over the richest
 parts of Thessaly; and was ready to grasp the
 whole, when his designs were obstructed by the
 powerful opposition of Polydamas the Pharsa-
 lian³⁴.

His ambi-
 tion op-
 posed by
 Polyda-
 mas.

Next to Pheræ and Larissa, Pharsalus was the
 largest and most flourishing city in that northern
 division of Greece. But the inhabitants, distracted
 by factions, exhausted their strength in civil dis-
 cord and sedition, until a ray of wisdom illuminat-
 ing both parties, they committed their differences,
 and themselves, to the probity and patriotism of
 Polydamas, which were equally respected at home
 and abroad. For several years Polydamas com-
 manded the citadel, and administered justice and
 the finances with such diligence and fidelity, as
 might reasonably have entitled him to the glori-
 ous appellation of Father of his country. He
 firmly opposed and counteracted the secret prac-
 tices, as well as the open designs, of Jason, who
 eagerly solicited his friendship by every motive
 that could actuate a mind of less determined
 integrity.

Confer-
 ence be-
 tween
 them.

At a conference which was held between them
 at Pharsalus, where Jason had come alone and
 unattended, the better to gain the confidence of a
 generous adversary, the Pheræan displayed the

³⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. et seqq.

magnitude of his power and resources, which it seemed impossible for the weakness of Pharsalus to resist ; and promised , that , on surrendering the citadel of that place , which must otherwise soon yield to force , Polydamas should enjoy in Thessaly the second rank after himself ; that he would regard him as his friend and colleague ; nor could there remain a doubt that their united labors might raise their common country to that station in Greece which it had been long entitled to hold. That the subjugation of the neighbouring states opened vaster prospects , which forced themselves irresistibly on his mind , when he considered the natural advantages of Thessaly , the fertility of the soil , the swiftness of the horses , the disciplined bravery and martial ardor of the inhabitants , with whom no nation in Europe , or in Asia , was able to contend.

Polydamas heard with pleasure the praises of his native land , and admired the magnanimity of Jason. But he observed , that his fellow-citizens had honored him with a trust which it was impossible for him ever to betray ; and that their community still enjoyed the alliance of Sparta , from which the neighbouring cities had revolted. That he was determined to demand the protection of that republic ; and if the Lacedæmonians were willing and able to afford him any effectual assistance , he would defend to the last extremity the walls of Pharsalus. Jason commended his integrity and patriotism , which , he declared,

C H A P.
XXX.

Deter-
mined in-
tegrity of
Polyda-
mas.

C H A P. inspired him with the warmer desire to obtain the friendship of such an illustrious character.

XXX.

Jason declared
leader of
the Theffalians.
Olymp.
cii. 3.
A. C. 370.

Soon afterwards Polydamas went to Sparta, and proposed his demand in the council; exhorting the magistrates not only to undertake the expedition, but to undertake it with vigor; for if they expected to oppose the forces of Jason by their undisciplined peasants, or half-armed slaves, they would infallibly bring disgrace on themselves, and ruin on their confederates. The Lacedæmonians were deeply engaged in the Theban war, which had been hitherto carried on unsuccessfully. They prudently declined, therefore, the invitation of Polydamas; who, returning to Theffaly, held a second conference with Jason. He still refused to surrender the citadel, but promised to use his best endeavours for making the Pharsalians submit of their own accord; and offered his only son as a pledge of his fidelity. Jason accepted the offer, and, by the influence of Polydamas, was soon afterwards declared captain-general of Pharsalus and all Theffaly; a modest appellation, under which he enjoyed the full extent of royal power³⁵.

His admirable discipline;

He began his reign by adjusting, with equity and precision, the proportion of taxes, and the contingent of troops, to be raised by the several cities in his dominions. The new levies, added to his standing army of mercenaries, amounted to eight thousand horse, twenty thousand heavy-armed

³⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. et seqq. et Diodor. Sicul. l. xv. p. 488.

foot, and such a body of targeteers, as no nation of antiquity could match³⁶. But numbers formed the least advantageous distinction of the army of Jason. Every day he exercised his troops in person; dispensed rewards and punishments; cashiered the slothful and effeminate; honored the brave and diligent with double, and sometimes treble pay, with large donatives in money, and with such other presents as peculiarly suited their respective tastes. By this judicious plan of military administration, the soldiers of Jason became alike attached to their duty, and to the person of their general, whose standard they were ready to follow into any part of the world³⁷.

C H A P.
XXX.

He began his military operations by subduing the Dryopes³⁸, the Dolopians, and the other small but warlike tribes, inhabiting the long and intricate chain of mounts Oeta and Pindus, which form the southern frontier of Thessaly. Then turning northwards, he struck terror into Macedonia, and compelled Amyntas to become his ally, and most probably his tributary. Thus fortified on both sides, he retaliated the inroads of the Phocians, who had long profited of the divisions, and insulted the weakness, of his country; and by conquering the small and uncultivated district of Epirus, which then formed a barbarous

and rapid
success.

³⁶ Xenophon expresses it more strongly; *πελταστικόν γε μὴν ἱκανὸν πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀντιταχθῆναι*, p. 600.

³⁷ Xenoph. p. 600.

³⁸ Strabo, l. viii. p. 299.

S H A P. principality under Alcetas ³⁹, an ancestor of the
XXX. renowned Pyrrhus, he extended the dominion of
 Thessaly from the Ægean to the Ionian sea, and
 encompassed, as with a belt, the utmost breadth
 of the Grecian republics.

His views
 on Greece.

It cannot be doubted that the subjugation, or
 at least the command, of those immortal common-
 wealths, was the aim of the Thessalian prince,
 who declared to his friends, that he expected, by
 the assistance of Greece, to imitate the glorious
 example of Cyrus and Agesilaus, and to effect, by
 the united strength of the confederacy, what these
 generals had nearly accomplished by a body of
 ten or twelve thousand soldiers ⁴⁰. While the
 Spartans, however, preserved their long-boasted
 pre-eminence, and regarded it as their hereditary
 and unalienable right to conduct their confederates
 to war, Jason could not hope to attain the princi-
 pal command in an Asiatic expedition. As the
 natural enemy of that haughty people, he rejoiced
 in their unprosperous war against the Thebans;
 nor could he receive small satisfaction from be-
 holding the southern states of Greece engaged in
 perpetual warfare, while he himself maintained a
 respected neutrality, and watched the first favorable

³⁹ In speaking of Arrybas (the son of Alcetas, and the grand-
 father of Pyrrhus), who received his education at Athens, Justin
 says, "Quanto doctior majoribus suis, tanto et gratior populo
 fuit. Primus itaque leges et senatum annuosque magistratus et
 reipublicæ formam composuit. Et ut a Pyrrho sedes, sic vita cultior
 populo ab Arryba statuta."

⁴⁰ Xenoph. p. 600.

occasion of interfering, with decisive effect, in the final settlement of that country. C H A P.

XXX.

His alliance with Thebes.

He seldom ventured indeed into the Peloponnesus; but, in order to examine matters more nearly, he undertook, upon very extraordinary pretences, several journeys to Athens and Thebes. From policy, and perhaps from inclination, he had formed an intimate connexion with the most distinguished characters of those republics, and particularly with Pelopidas and Timotheus. The latter, after serving his country with equal glory and success, was, according to the usual fortune of Athenian commanders, exposed to a cruel persecution of his rivals and enemies, which endangered his honor and his life. On the day of trial the admirers and friends of that great man appeared in the Athenian assembly, in order to intercede with his judges; and among the rest Jason, habited in the robe of a suppliant, humbly soliciting the release of Timotheus, from a people who would not probably have denied a much greater favor to the simple recommendation of so powerful a prince⁴¹. In a visit to Thebes he endeavoured to gain or secure the attachment of Epaminondas, by large presents and promises; but the illustrious Theban, whose independent and honorable poverty had rejected the assistance of his friends and fellow-citizens, spurned with disdain the insolent generosity of a stranger⁴². Yet, by the intervention of Pelopidas, Jason contracted

⁴¹ Demosthenes et Cornel. Nepos in Timoth.

⁴² Plut. Apophtheg.

C H A P. an engagement of hospitality with the Thebans,
XXX. in consequence of which he was invited to join
 their arms, after their memorable victory at
 Leuctra.

Rapidity
 of his
 move-
 ments.

The Theſſalian prince accepted the invitation, though his deſigns reſpecting Greece were not yet ripe for execution. He was actually engaged in war with the Phocians, of which, whatever might be the pretence, the real object was to obtain the ſuperintendence of the Delphic oracle, and the adminiſtration of the ſacred treaſure. To avoid marching through a hoſtile territory, he ordered his gallies to be equipped, as if he had intended to proceed by ſea to the coaſt of Bœotia. His naval preparations amused the attention of the Phocians, while Jaſon entered their country with a body of two thouſand light horſe, and advanced with ſuch rapidity that he was every where the firſt meſſenger of his own arrival.

His views
 in medi-
 ating a truce
 between
 Thebes
 and Spar-
 ta.

By this unuſual celerity, he joined, without encountering any obſtacle, the army of the Thebans, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Leuctra, at no great diſtance from the enemy. Inſtead of an auxiliary, Jaſon thought it more ſuitable to his intereſt to act the part of a mediator. He exhorted the Thebans to reſt ſatiſfied with the advantages which they had already obtained, without driving their adverſaries to deſpair; that the recent hiſtory of their own republic and of Sparta, ſhould teach them to remember the viciffitudes of fortune. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, he reminded of the difference between a

victorious

victorious and vanquished army. That the present crisis seemed totally adverse to the re-establishment of their greatness; that they should yield to the fatality of circumstances, and watch a more favorable opportunity to restore the tarnished lustre of their arms. His arguments prevailed; hostilities were suspended; the terms of a peace were proposed and accepted: but it is remarkable, that the Spartans and their allies had so little confidence in this sudden negociation, that they decamped the night following, and continued to march homeward, with the diligence of distrust and fear, until they got entirely beyond reach of the Thebans⁴³.

Jason had not, probably, more confidence in a treaty hastily concluded between enemies, whose resentments were irritated and inflamed by so many mutual injuries offered and retorted. Nothing could have been more contrary to his views than a sincere and lasting peace between these powerful republics; but as this was not to be apprehended, he wished to obtain the reputation of appeasing the dissensions of Greece; a circumstance of great importance to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.

In his return home, he demolished the walls of Heraclea, a town situate near the straits of Thermopylæ, not fearing, says his historian⁴⁴, that any of the Greek states should invade his dominion from that side, but unwilling to leave a

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XXX.

He is assassinated in the midst of his projects. Olymp. cii. 3. A. C. 379.

⁴³ Xenoph. p. 600. ⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 599.

C H A P. place of such strength on his frontier, which, if
XXX. seized by a powerful neighbour, might obstruct his passage into Greece. Thither he determined to return at the celebration of the Pythian games, at which he meant to claim the right of presiding, as an honor due both to his piety and to his power. He commanded, therefore, the cities and villages of Thessaly to fatten sheep, goats, swine, and oxen, and proposed honorable rewards to such districts as furnished the best victims for the altars of Apollo. Without any burdensome imposition on his subjects, he collected a thousand oxen, and, of smaller cattle, to the number of ten thousand. At the same time, he prepared the whole military strength of his kingdom, by whose assistance, still more effectually than by the merit of his sacrifices, he might maintain his pretensions to the superintendence of the games, the direction of the oracle, and the administration of the sacred treasure, which he regarded as so many previous steps to the conquest of Greece and Asia. But, amidst these lofty projects, Jason, while reviewing the Pheræan cavalry, was stabbed, by seven youths, who approached him, on pretence of demanding justice against each other. Two of the assassins were dispatched by his guards. Five mounted fleet horses, which had been prepared for their use, and escaped to the Grecian republics, in which they were received with universal acclamations of joy, and honored as the saviours of their country from the formidable power of a brave but

ambitious tyrant⁴⁵. The projects and the empire of Jason perished with himself; Thessaly, as we shall have occasion to explain, relapsed into its former state of division and weakness: but it is the business of history to relate not only great actions, but great designs; and even the designs of Jason announce the approaching downfall of Grecian freedom.

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XXX.

⁴⁵ Xenoph. et Diodor. *ibid.* et Valerius Maximus, l. ix.

CHAP. XXXI.

Tumults in the Peloponnesus — Invasion of Iacania. — Epaminondas rebuilds Messenè. — Foundation of Megalopolis. — Archidamus restores the Fortune of Sparta. — Affairs of Thessaly and Macedon. — Negotiations for Peace. — The Pretensions of Thebes rejected. — Epaminondas invades the Peloponnesus. — Revolutions in Achaia. — Speech of Archidamus in the Spartan Council. — Designs of Thebes. — Disconcerted by Athens. — Pelopidas's Expedition in Thessaly. — The Arcadians seize the Olympic Treasure. — Battle of Mantinea. — Agesilaus's Expedition into Egypt.

C H A P.

XXXI.

History of
the last
stage of
Grecian
freedom.

THE death of Jason removed the terror of Greece; but of a country which owed its safety to the arm of an assassin, the condition may justly be regarded as extremely unstable and precarious. There elapsed, however, thirty-three years of discord and calamity, before the Greeks finally experienced, in Philip of Macedon, such ambition and abilities as enabled him fully to accomplish the lofty designs of the Thessalian. The history of this last stage of tumultuous liberty comprehends the bloody, but indecisive wars, which exhausted Greece during eleven years that intervened between the battle of Leuctra, and the accession of Philip to the Macedonian throne, together with the active reign of that prince; a memorable period of twenty-two years, illuminated by

the success and glory of Macedon, and clouded by the disgrace and ruin of the Grecian republics.

The unexpected issue of the battle of Leuctra was doubly prejudicial to the Spartans, by weakening their own confederacy, and strengthening that of their enemies. In less than two years after that important event, the alliance of Peloponnesus, over which Sparta had so long maintained an ascendant, was totally dissolved, and most cities had changed not only their foreign connexions, but their domestic laws and government. During the same period, the confederacy, of which Thebes was the head, had, on the contrary, been very widely extended. Many communities of the Peloponnesus courted her protection, and, in the north of Greece, the Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, the whole breadth of the continent, from the Ionian to the Ægean sea, and even the isle of Eubœa, increased the power, and in some measure acknowledged the dominion of Thebes. The history of these revolutions is very imperfectly related by ancient writers; but their consequences were too remarkable not to be attended to and explained. The Peloponnesians, after being delivered from the oppression of the Spartan yoke, were subjected to the more destructive tyranny of their own ungovernable passions¹. Every state and every city was torn by factions which frequently blazed forth into the most violent seditions. The exiles from several republics were nearly as numerous as those who

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Tumults
and sedi-
tions in
the Pello-
ponnesus
after the
battle of
Leuctra.

Olymp.

cii. 3.

A. C. 370.

¹ Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, et seqq. Isocrat. in Archidam. et de Pace.

C. H. A. P. had expelled them. Fourteen hundred were banished from Tegea; two thousand² were slain in Argos; in many places the contending factions alternately prevailed; and those who, in the first encounter, had got possession of the government and the capital, were sometimes attacked³ and conquered by the numerous fugitives, who formed a camp in the adjoining territory. The Mantinæans alone seem to have acted wisely. With one accord, and with equal diligence, they labored to rebuild their walls, which the insolence of Sparta had demolished. The work was soon brought to a conclusion; and the Mantinæans, united in one democracy, fully determined thenceforth to preserve the strength of their city, which appeared necessary to maintain their political independence.

The exiles
fly to
Sparta.

Neither the Thebans nor the Spartans immediately interfered in this scene of disorder. The former found sufficient employment for their arms and negotiations in the northern parts of Greece; and the latter were so much humbled by their defeat at Leuctra, that they contented themselves with preparing to defend the banks of the Eurotas, and to repel the expected assault of their capital. For this purpose they had armed the aged and infirm, who were legally exempted from military

² This number is made out by comparing different authors, and uniting in one view the different scenes of the sedition, which is called the Scytalism by Diodorus (*ubi supra*), and Pausanias (*Corinth*), from the Greek word σκυταλη, signifying a club, which, it seems, was the principal instrument of slaughter.

³ Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, et seqq.

service ⁴. They had commanded into the field even those citizens who were employed in such sacred and civil offices as are deemed most useful in society; and, as their last resource, they talked of giving arms to the Helots. But the convulsions of Peloponnesus soon supplied them with less dangerous auxiliaries ⁵. The incensed partisans of aristocracy, who had been expelled from Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia, had recourse to the most ancient and distinguished patrons of their political principles. Encouraged by this seasonable reinforcement, the Spartans set at defiance the Theban invasion, by which they had been so long threatened, and sent a considerable detachment to recover their lost authority in Arcadia. But it was the fate of Sparta, to regain neither in that, nor in any other state of the Peloponnesus, the influence which she had lost in the field of Leuctra. Polytropos, who commanded her allies in this expedition, was defeated and slain in the first rencounter with the Arcadians and Lycomedes, their intrepid and magnanimous leader. Nor did Agesilaus perform any thing decisive against the enemy. He was contented with ravaging the villages and delightful fields of Arcadia, in which he met with little resistance from the inhabitants, who declined an engagement, until they should be joined by the Theban confederacy, whose assistance they had sent to solicit, and had just reason to expect ⁶.

C H A P.
XXXI.That re-
public at-
tempts in
vain to re-
cover her
authority
in Arcadia.⁴ Xenoph. l. vi. p. 597.⁵ Id. p. 603.⁶ Id. p. 605.

C H A P.

XXXI.

The The-
bans take
the field
at the
head of
their al-
lies.

Olymp.

iii. 4.

A. C. 369.

The Spar-
tans eva-
cuate Ar-
cadia.

At length the far-renowned Thebans took the field, having carefully pondered their own strength, and collected into one body the flower and vigor of their numerous allies. They were accompanied by the warlike youth of the towns and villages of Bœotia, by the Acarnanians, Phocians, Locrians, and Eubœans, and by a promiscuous crowd of needy fugitives, who were attracted to their camp by the allurements of plunder. They had no sooner arrived on the frontier of Arcadia, than they were joined by the inhabitants of that country, as well as by the Elians and Argives. This united mass of war exceeded any numbers, that either before or afterwards ever assembled in Greece under one standard, amounting to fifty, some say to seventy thousand men⁷. The Thebans, and the rest of the Bœotians, were commanded by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to whom the generous admiration of their colleagues had voluntarily resigned their authority. Apprized of the march of such a formidable army, conducted by generals of such unquestionable merit, Agesilaus prepared to evacuate Arcadia, a measure which he fortunately effected, before his soldiers beheld the fires kindled in the hostile camp, and thus avoided the disgrace of retiring before the enemy⁸. His unresisted devastation of the territory which he had invaded, as well as his successful retreat, gave fresh spirits to his followers, and made them return with better

⁷ The numbers differ in Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. Pausan. Bœotiq. Diodorus, l. xv. et Plut. in Pelopid.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 606.

hopes to defend their own country, which was now threatened with invasion. C H A P.

XXXI.

Invasion of
Laconia.

The Thebans, though they had no longer any occasion to protect the Arcadians from insult, were determined, by many powerful motives, to employ the vast preparations which they had collected. Their particular resentment against Sparta was heightened by the general voice of their allies who exhorted them to embrace an opportunity which, perhaps, might never return, utterly to destroy a people who neither could enjoy tranquillity nor allow their neighbours to enjoy it. The inhabitants of Carya, and of several other towns in Laconia, declared their resolution to revolt from Sparta, as soon as the enemy should enter their boundaries. In a council of war summoned by the Theban generals, it was therefore determined to march without farther delay into the Lacedæmonian territories, to lay waste the country, and, if possible, to take possession of the capital.

That this resolution might be executed with the greater celerity and effect, the army was thrown into four divisions, destined, by separate roads, to break into the devoted province, to join forces at Sellasia, and thence to march in one body to Sparta. The Bœotians, Elians, and Argives penetrated, without opposition, by the particular

Brave defence of
the district
Sciritis.

⁹ They at first opposed the eagerness of the Arcadians, Elians, and Argives, for invading Laconia, considering *ὅτι δυσεμβάλωτατή μιν ἡ Λακωνικὴ ἐλέγετο εἶναι, Φρῆρας δὲ καθίσταται ἐνομιζόν ἐπὶ τοῖς εὐπροσόδωτατοῖς.* "That it would be difficult to penetrate into a country defended by the natural strength of its frontier, or by vigilant garrisons." Xenoph. p. 607.

C H A P. routes which had been assigned them. But when
 XXXI. the Arcadians, who formed the fourth division of the army, attempted to traverse the district Sciritis, the brave Ischilas, who guarded that important pass, determined to repel them, or to perish. The example of Leonidas at Thermopylæ kindled a generous enthusiasm in the breast of this gallant Spartan. The number of the Arcadian levies so far exceeded his own, that death seemed the sure reward of his courage. Yet he exhorted all those to decline danger who were not ambitious to share it. He even *commanded* the youth to leave his camp before the engagement, deeming their lives too precious to be risked in so desperate an enterprise. He, with the old soldiers who followed him, chose the present opportunity to meet a glorious death in defence of their country. But their lives were sold dearly. The action was long doubtful: the loss of the Arcadians great; nor did the battle cease till the last of the Spartans had perished¹⁰.

Devasta-
 tion of
 Laconia.

The confederates having soon after assembled at Sellasia, the place of rendezvous, marched forward to Sparta, burning and destroying all before them. During five hundred years Laconia had not experienced a similar calamity. The guards who defended the city were thrown into consternation. The women were terrified by the smoke and tumult raised by the invaders; a spectacle,

¹⁰ Xenoph. l. vi. p. 607. et Diodor. l. xv. p. 376. The former indeed adds, *εἰ μὴ τις ἀμφοτέρωθεν διαφύγε*. "Unless, perhaps, some one escaped unknown through the enemy."

concerning which it had been their usual boast, that they alone of all the Grecian females, had never beheld it in their native land. Alarmed by the danger which threatened them, and which they were sensible of their own inability to repel, the Spartans embraced the doubtful expedient of giving arms to their peasants and slaves, whom they commonly treated with such an excess of cruelty. Not less than six thousand of these unhappy men were engaged, by threats or promises, to undertake the reluctant defence of the proud tyrants, whom they detested. Their formidable numbers increased the general panic, which had seized the magistrates and citizens, and which did not finally cease until the arrival of a powerful body of men from Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Pallené; cities which, though they had ever opposed the *despotism*, were unwilling to permit the *destruction* of Sparta.

This seasonable reinforcement not only removed the consternation of the Spartans, but made them pass with rapidity from the depths of despondency to the joys of success. The kings and magistrates could scarcely restrain their impetuosity from rushing into the field: and this martial enthusiasm, guided by the consummate prudence of Agesilaus, enabled them to repel the first assaults of the enemy, and to convince them that every succeeding attempt to get possession of the city, must be attended with such fatigue, and danger, and loss of men, as could not be compensated by the success of that enterprise. The conduct of Agesilaus, during this critical emergency, has been highly extolled by all

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XXXI.

Vigilant
intrepidi-
ty of Age-
filaus.]

C H A P. writers ¹¹, and never beyond its merit. By a well-contrived ambush in the temple of the Tyndaridæ ¹², he defeated the designs of the assailants: by very uncommon presence of mind ¹³, he quelled a dangerous insurrection; and while, by force or stratagem, he overcame the united efforts of domestic and foreign enemies, he negotiated the most powerful assistance for the relief of his country.

The Spartans and their allies negotiate at Athens a treaty of defence.

Immediately after the battle of Leuctra the Athenians had declared their resolution to renew and confirm the treaty of Antalcidas, which, though it diminished the grandeur, yet secured the tranquillity of Greece, and prevented the weakness of any one republic from falling a prey to the ambition of another. But notwithstanding this declaration, which was universally approved by their neighbours, they had, either from resentment or from policy, remained above two years spectators of the decline of the Lacedæmonian, and the growth of the Theban league. Whatever uneasiness might be occasioned by the increasing strength of their

¹¹ Xenoph. et Plut. in Agesilao. Diodorus, l. xv. et Pausanias Lacon.

¹² Castor and Pollux, so called from their mother Tyndaris, or Leda.

¹³ The mutineers had entered into a conspiracy to seize an important post in the city. Agesilaus observed them as they marched thither, and immediately suspecting their design, called out, that they had mistaken his orders; adding his meaning to be, that they should separate into different divisions, and repair to the several posts which he named. The conspirators naturally concluded that he knew nothing of their purpose, and separating, as he commanded, could never afterwards find an opportunity to unite in such numbers as rendered them dangerous.

new rival, was sufficiently balanced by the decay C H A P.
and downfall of their ancient and inveterate enemy. XXXI.

But though, doubtless, they ardently desired the ruin of the Spartan power, they could not sincerely approve the cruel destruction of their persons, and of their city. When informed of the terrible devastation of Laconia, they naturally felt a return of compassion for a people whose exploits, on many memorable occasions, had done such signal honor to the Grecian name.

The emissaries of Agefilas, whose superior mind had assumed dictatorial power amidst the distress of his country, seized the favorable opportunity to urge, with the Athenians, many motives of action, which seldom operate amidst the cold lifeless politics of modern times. They took notice that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had often mutually assisted each other in seasons of distress, and that the most glorious æra of their story was that in which the two republics had united their councils and measures against a common enemy. That when the spirit of rivalry and ambition had unhappily divided Greece, and the Athenians were exposed to the calamities of a long and unfortunate war, they had been protected by the humanity of Sparta against the implacable rage of the Thebans, who wished to demolish the city of Athens, and to reduce its territory to the barren solitude of the Crissean plain. That by the moderation of Sparta, the Athenians had not only been saved from the vengeance of foreign enemies, but delivered from the yoke of domestic tyrants, and the cruel tyranny

Arguments
which
they em-
ployed for
this pur-
pose.

CHAPTER. of the Pisistratidæ. The merit of these services
XXXI. deserved the reward of gratitude; the hereditary renown of Athens urged her to protect the miserable; and justice demanded that she should assert, and maintain, the conditions of a recent treaty, which she herself had proposed, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had so manifestly violated.

How received by the Athenians.

A loud and discordant murmur ran through the assembly. Some approved the demand, others observed that the Spartans changed their language with their fortune; that they had formerly, and probably would again, whenever they became powerful, assume a very different tone, and, instead of coloring by false disguises, display in its native force, their inveterate enmity to Athens. That the late treaty of peace could not entitle them to any assistance, since they themselves had begun the war by the invasion of Arcadia; a war undertaken from the unjust motive of supporting the tyrannical usurpation of the nobles of Tegea over the rights of their fellow-citizens.

Speech of Cleiteles the Corinthian.

Together with the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, had come those of Corinth and Phlius, cities eminently distinguished by an unshaken fidelity to their ancient confederate and protector. Cleiteles the Corinthian, observing what turn the debate was likely to take, stood up and said, "Were it a matter of doubt, Athenians! who are the aggressors, the melancholy experience of our state would remove the difficulty. Since the renovation of the peace of Antalcidas, the Corinthians, surely, have

not committed hostilities against any power in Greece. Yet the Thebans have entered our territory, cut down our trees, burned our houses, plundered our cattle and effects. How, then, can you refuse your assistance to those who have been so manifestly injured, in direct violation of the treaty, to which, at your express desire, they acceded and swore?" The assembly loudly approved the discourse of Cleiteles, which was supported and confirmed by the arguments and eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian.

"It is manifest, I think, to all of you, Athenians! that should Sparta be destroyed, Athens must be the next object of the hostility of Thebes, since that city alone would then stand in the way of her ambition. The cause of the Lacedæmonians therefore is, in fact, your own. You must embrace it with ardor, as the last opportunity which the gods perhaps will afford you, of defending the general freedom at the head of your allies, and of preventing the dangerous domination of the Thebans; the effects of which, you, who are their neighbours, would feel with peculiar severity. By taking this resolution, which is equally generous and salutary, you will acquire a fund of merit, not only with the Spartans, than whom none were ever more mindful of favors, or more ambitious of honest fame, but also with us their allies, who, since we have continued faithful to our friends in their adversity, cannot be suspected of ingratitude to our prosperous benefactors. I have heard with admiration how, in ancient times, the injured and

C H A P.
XXXI.

Of Patro-
cles the
Phliasian.

C. H. A. P. afflicted always had recourse to Athens, and were
 XXXI. never disappointed of relief. I now no longer hear, but see, the Lacedæmonians, with their faithful allies, soliciting your protection against the Thebans, whose unrelenting cruelty could not persuade Sparta, in the height of her resentment and of her power, to desolate your country, and to reduce you into servitude. Your ancestors acquired just renown by saving the dead bodies of the Argives, to whom the impiety of Thebes denied the sacred rites of burial¹⁴. How much greater renown will redound to you, when the Lacedæmonians, by your generous assistance, shall be saved from death. It was deemed meritorious in *them* to have defended the children of Hercules against the unnatural persecution of Eurystheus; but it will be far more glorious for *you* to have defended not only the descendants of that hero, the hereditary kings of Lacedæmon, but, along with them, the senate, the magistrates, the people; in one word, to have delivered the whole nation from a danger dreadful in itself, and otherwise inevitable. During the prosperity of their empire, the Lacedæmonians prevented your destruction by a decree, which displayed their humanity, without exposing their safety. You are called to defend the Lacedæmonians, not by inactive decrees, but by arms and courage. Arm, then, in their behalf; and, forgetful of recent animosities, repay the important

¹⁴ See vol. i. c. i. p. 26. The facts alluded to in the text are related in all the panegyrics of Athens; by Plato, Lysias, Isocrates, and Thucydides.

services which, in the Barbarian war, the valor of Sparta rendered to Athens and to all Greece." C H A P. XXXI.

The assembly was so deeply affected by the persuasive discourse of the Phliasian, that they refused to hear any thing in opposition to it, and determined, almost unanimously, to take the field. Iphicrates was named general; twelve thousand men were ordered to repair to his standard; the sacrifices were propitious; the troops took a short repast; and such was their ardor to meet the enemy, that many of them marched forth without waiting the orders of their commander¹⁵.

Iphi-
crates,
with
twelve
thousand
men, sent
to defend
Laconia.

Epaminondas, meanwhile, had committed dreadful devastation in Laconia. His repulse from the capital had exasperated his hostilities against the country. He had desolated the fertile banks of the Eurotas, which were thick planted with houses, and abounding in all the conveniences of life known to the austere simplicity of Sparta. He had assaulted Helos and Gythium; and, traversing the whole province, had destroyed the villages by fire, and the inhabitants by the sword. Even these terrible ravages did not satisfy his resentment; he determined, that the invasion of Laconia should not be a temporary evil, which the labor of years might repair; and for this purpose employed an expedient, which, even after he might evacuate their country, must leave the Lacedæmonians exposed to the rage of an implacable enemy.

Epami-
nondas
continues
his ravages
in that
province.

We have had occasion to relate the various fortunes of the Messenians. About three centuries

Rebuilds
Messénie.
Olymp.
cii. 2.
A. C. 369.

¹⁵ This whole transaction is explained in Xenoph. p. 609—613.

C H A P. before the period now under review, their city had
 XXXI. been demolished by the Spartans; their territory had been seized, and divided among that people; the ancient inhabitants had been reduced into servitude, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of cruel masters; or dispersed in miserable banishment, over Greece, Italy, and Sicily. After two centuries of humiliation and calamity, the humanity, or perhaps the policy of Athens, took compassion on this unfortunate race, and settled them in the territory of Naupactus, and the neighbouring island of Cephallenia. The Messenians displayed their gratitude by important services during the Peloponnesian war; but their most vigorous exertions could not long retard the declining fortune of Athens. The event of that war rendered Sparta the arbiter of Greece; and the Messenians were the first objects of her memorable tyranny, being universally enslaved, banished, or put to death. It is probable that the scattered remains of this miserable community would flock from every quarter to the standard of Epaminondas, rejoicing in an opportunity to retaliate the unrelenting persecution of a people, who now suffered the calamities which they had so often inflicted. But the general voice of history ascribes to Epaminondas the merit of assembling the Messenians¹⁶. It is certain, that he rebuilt their city, and put them in possession of their territory; an act of generous compassion which inflicted a most unexpected and

¹⁶ Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 491. Pausan. Messen. p. 265.

cruel punishment on the Spartans, who beheld the
ashes of a nation, which they had twice endeavoured
to extinguish, revive and flourish in their neigh-
bourhood; continually increase by the accession
of Spartan subjects and slaves; and, encouraged by
a Theban garrison, and their own inveterate hosti-
lity, watch every favorable occasion to exert the
full power of their vengeance ¹⁷.

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Epaminondas had accomplished this extraor-
dinary enterprize, when he received intelligence of
the motions of the Athenian army commanded by
Iphicrates. That illustrious general had allowed
the ardor of his troops to evaporate, by pursuing
a conduct which it is impossible, at this distance of
time, to explain, but which the military historian ¹⁸
condemns, as highly unworthy of his former renown.
When celerity was of the utmost importance, he
wasted several precious days at Corinth, without
any necessity, or even pretence, for this unseason-
able delay. His soldiers loudly demanded to meet
the enemy, or even to assault the walls of Argos,
the strongest and most populous city in Pelopon-
nesus, and not inferior to Thebes itself in active
animosity against their common foe. Iphicrates,
however, embraced none of those measures, but led
his army towards Arcadia; expecting, perhaps,
what actually happened, that the news of his ar-
rival there would deliver Laconia from the hostile
invader.

The Athe-
nians take
the field.

It cannot be imagined, indeed, that Epami-
nondas feared the issue of an engagement with the

The The-
bans eva-
cuate La-
conia.

¹⁷ Diodor. l. xv. c. 16.

¹⁸ Xenoph. l. vi. versus finem.

C H A P. XXXI. Athenians. But he was justly alarmed with the interest which even that people had taken in the danger of Sparta. The indignation and resentment which they, the rivals and enemies of the injured, discovered on this occasion, taught him what sentiments his conduct must excite in more impartial states, should he persist in his original plan, destroy the Lacedæmonian capital, and, as the orator Leptines expressed it, "pluck out an eye of Greece"¹⁹. Many concurring causes tended also to accelerate his departure. The Arcadians were called home to defend their houses and families. The Elians and Argives were anxious to secure their booty by an expeditious retreat. Even the Thebans were weary of an expedition which had consumed several winter-months, a season in which they were not accustomed to keep the field. Provisions likewise grew scarce; and Epaminondas, pressed by difficulties on every side, prepared to evacuate the Lacedæmonian territories; but not (in the words of Xenophon) until "every thing of value had been consumed or plundered, poured out, or burned down"²⁰.

The Thebans and Athenians respectively accuse their commanders.

At the same time that the Thebans left Laconia, Iphicrates withdrew the Athenians from the country which they had invaded. The two armies filed off, as by mutual consent, and returned to their respective cities by separate roads, without any attempt to interrupt the progress of each other. Iphicrates was blamed for allowing an enemy, heavy with plunder, and exhausted by the fatigue

¹⁹ Aristot. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 10.

²⁰ Xenoph. p. 612.

of a winter's campaign, to pass unmolested through the Isthmus of Corinth. Pelopidas and Epaminondas were accused and tried before the Theban assembly, for protracting the term of their command beyond the time limited by law. The former discovered less courage than might have been expected from his impetuous and daring character. He, who had never feared the sword of an enemy, trembled at the angry voice of his insolent accusers. But Epaminondas displayed, on this occasion, the superiority of philosophical firmness, seated in the mind, to that constitutional courage which is the result of blood and spirits. The latter is sufficient for a day of battle; but the former alone can yield support in every vicissitude of fortune.

Instead of observing the formality of a regular defence, the illustrious Theban undertook the invidious task of pronouncing his own panegyric²¹. After relating his exploits, without amplification, and without diminution, he concluded by observing, "that he could submit to death without reluctance, secure of immortal fame, earned in the service of his country." The seditious demagogues were awed by his magnanimity; the anger of the assembly against himself and his colleague dissolved in admiration; and Epaminondas was conducted from the tribunal with as much glory as from the field of Leuctra.

Epami-
nondas
defends
his con-
duct.

²¹ Plutarch. de sui Laude, p. 540.

C H A P.

XXXI.

Intricacy
of the sub-
sequent
events.

From the invasion of Laconia to the general engagement at Mantinæa, there elapsed six years of indecisive war and tumultuous activity; battles lost and gained, conquests made and abandoned, alliances concluded and broken; treaties of peace proposed, accepted, and violated, by those who felt the unhappy effects of dissensions which their rancorous animosity was unwilling to terminate. In examining the history of this period, we may perceive the same confusion in the relation, which appears at first sight to have been in the events themselves. It is necessary, however, to reduce them into the form of a regular narrative. In important concerns, numerous bodies of men, however they may act without effect, cannot be supposed to act *entirely* without design: their motives, unsteady and capricious as they often are, form the invisible chain which it is the business of the historian to investigate and to follow; since it is otherwise impossible that the transactions which he describes, should afford either real instruction, or any rational entertainment.

The alli-
ance be-
tween
Athens
and Spar-
ta con-
firmed
and ex-
tended.
Olymp.
ciii. i.
A. C. 368.

Early in the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians, with the few allies who still adhered to their cause, dispatched an embassy to Athens, in order to strengthen the bands of amity and union with that republic. In the conference held for that purpose, it appeared that the Spartans were either very deeply affected by the recent obligations conferred on them, or that they very earnestly desired the continuance of similar favors. They acknowledged that the experience, the bravery, the naval victories

and fortune of Athens, justly entitled her to the sovereignty of the Grecian seas; and when this concession, which had hitherto been withheld with such disdain, could not satisfy the more patriotic, or rather the less generous, members of the assembly, they condescended to grant another acknowledgment still more inconsistent with the pride of their hereditary pretensions; that in such military expeditions as were undertaken by the joint forces of both republics, the command should be equal and alternate; so that an army of Lacedæmonians (a thing hitherto unexampled) would be commanded during half the campaign by Athenian generals. Patrocles the Phliasian, whose eloquence and address had been distinguished in the former negociation, was not less active in the present; chiefly by *his* intervention, matters were finally adjusted; an alliance of the most intimate kind was concluded between the two republics; and, by the assistance of the generous Phliasian, the Spartans obtained this important advantage, without the disgrace of many ineffectual overtures, or the mortification of long supplicatory speeches, which they deemed of all things the most grievous²².

The Spartan negociations, so fortunate in Athens, were equally successful with Dionysius tyrant of Sicily, and Artaxerxes king of Persia. The former, himself a Dorian, naturally lamented the humiliation and distress of a people, who, during seven hundred years, had formed the

C H A P.
XXXI.

The Spartans negotiate treaties with Dionysius and Artaxerxes.

²² Xenoph. p. 613 — 616.

C H A P. principal ornament and defence of the Dorian
 XXXI. race; and the latter pursued his ordinary system
 of politics, of assisting the weaker party, in order
 to balance the contending powers, and to per-
 petuate the hostilities of Greece.

Military
 opera-
 tions.

While the Lacedæmonians gained strength by these important alliances, their enemies took the field. The Arcadians began the campaign by entering the territory of Pallené, an Achæan republic, which still remained faithful to Sparta. The country was laid waste, the villages burned, the city taken by storm, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred men, partly Lacedæmonians, put to the sword. Soon after this success, the Arcadians were joined by the Elians and Argives. Epaminondas likewise marched southward at the head of the Thebans, their foot amounting to seven thousand, and their cavalry to five hundred. Before he reached the Isthmus, the Lacedæmonians had been reinforced by a body of two thousand Sicilian troops, agreeably to their treaty with Dionysius; and the Athenians had taken the field, under the command of Chabrias, actually the most respected, or at least the most popular, of their generals. It was naturally the object of the Spartan and Athenian commanders, to prevent the junction of Epaminondas with the southern allies. For this purpose they strongly guarded, and even fortified the Isthmus; an expedient which had not been put in practice since the expedition of Xerxes. The Thebans, however, broke through, took Sicyon, and assaulted Corinth.

But Chabrias, who happened at this time to enjoy the alternate command, repulsed them with such loss, that Epaminondas judged proper to retire homeward; on which account he was blamed and disgraced by his countrymen, who, insolent with prosperity, thought themselves entitled always to conquer.

C H A P.

XXXI.

Retreat
of the
Thebans.

The unexpected retreat of the Thebans, of which it is not easy to conjecture the real cause²³, occasioned much dissatisfaction among their confederates, particularly the Arcadians. This simple, but warlike people, had obtained distinguished honor in several recent expeditions. They were usually conducted by the Mantinæan Lycomedes, a man gallant in enterprise and persevering in execution; rich, noble, eloquent, generous, and affable. Under a commander equally respected and beloved, the Arcadians found nothing too arduous for their courage. In regular engagements, they commonly proved victorious wherever they fought. But their principal merit was displayed in ambushes and surprise, and all the dangerous stratagems of desultory war. When a favorable occasion summoned their activity, neither length of way, nor difficult mountains, nor storms, nor darkness, could interrupt their course, or prevent their unexpected assault²⁴. Unassisted and alone, they had often defeated superior strength

Pretension of the
Arcadians.

²³ The Theban demagogues, as we learn from Diodorus and Plutarch, accused Epaminondas of treacherous correspondence with the enemy, or at least of secretly favoring their cause; but this is altogether improbable.

²⁴ Vid. Xenoph. 618, et seqq.

C H A P. and numbers; and when, together with their Pe-
 XXXI. loponnesian allies, they served under the Theban
 standard, their prowess had been acknowledged
 and admired by the united army.

Encou-
 raged by
 Lycome-
 des.

The repulse and retreat of Epaminondas gave relief and splendor to the recent glory of Arcadia, and inspired Lycomedes with an ambition which he easily communicated to his countrymen. He told them, "That they were the most ancient, the most populous, and surely not the least warlike community, in Peloponnesus; but that they had hitherto neglected to profit of the advantages which they possessed. In the memorable war of twenty-seven years, they had joined with the Lacedæmonians, whom they had raised to an authority, of which the Arcadians, as well as the rest of Greece, felt the intolerable oppression. That of late years they had acted with the Thebans, who, by *their* assistance chiefly, had attained a very alarming degree of power, which they occasionally exerted or remitted, as suited their own convenience, without the smallest regard to the interest of their confederates. If this power should be increased, might not the yoke of Thebes become as grievous as that of Sparta? It was time for the Arcadians to know their own worth; to disdain following the standard of any foreign state; and not only to vindicate their freedom, but to claim their just pre-eminence." The assembly applauded the manly ²⁵ resolution of Lycomedes;

²⁵ Xenophon's expression is lively; *καὶ μόνον ἀνδρὰ ἡγῶντες*, "thinking him the only man." L. vii. p. 618.

and, in order to render it effectual, determined to keep possession of such places as they had taken from the Lacedæmonians or their allies in Elis and Achaia, and to complete their conquests in these and the neighbouring provinces of Peloponnesus.

For several months they met with little interruption in this design, the Spartans, after the departure of their auxiliaries, not venturing to take the field until the beginning of the ensuing year, when they received a new supply of troops from Dionysius, and both troops²⁶ and money from Artaxerxes. The Theban arms were actually employed in Thessaly and Macedon, as we shall have occasion hereafter to relate; so that every circumstance conspired to hasten the march of Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonians. But the infirmities incident to old age made him decline the command, which was intrusted to his son Archidamus, his colleague Agesipolis not possessing great abilities either for war or government.

The rapid success of Archidamus, who seemed destined to restore the declining fortune of Sparta, justified the prudent choice of the magistrates and people. He expelled the hostile garrisons from the inferior cities of Laconia, stormed Caryæ, and put the rebellious inhabitants to the sword. From thence he hastened to Arcadia, laid waste the southern frontier of that province, and prepared to attack the populous city of Parrhasia, when the united strength of the Arcadians,

C H A P.
XXXI.

The Spartans take the field to oppose the designs of the Arcadians. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

Glorious campaign of the Spartans under Archidamus.

²⁶ These were not Persians, but ξενικοί, Greek mercenaries. Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619.

C H A P. XXXI. commanded by Lycomedes, and reinforced by the Argives, approached to its relief. Their arrival made Archidamus withdraw to the hills that overhang the obscure village of Midea. While he encamped there, Cissidas, who commanded the Sicilians, declared that the time limited for his absence was expired, and, without waiting an answer, ordered his forces to prepare their baggage, and to march towards Laconia. But the nearest passage into that country had been seized by the Messenians. In this difficulty Cissidas applied to Archidamus, who hastened to his defence. The Arcadians and Argives at the same time decamped. The hostile armies encountered near the joining of the two roads which led towards Sparta from Midea and Eutresios. As soon as Archidamus beheld the enemy prepared for an engagement, he commanded the Spartans to form, and when they were ready to advance, addressed them as follows: "Fellow-citizens and friends! if we are still brave, we may look forward with confidence; we may yet retrieve our affairs, and deliver down the republic to posterity as we received it from our ancestors. Let us strive, then, by one glorious effort, to recover our hereditary renown; and let us cease being the reproach (instead of what the Spartans once were, the ornament and defence) of our friends, our parents, our families, and our country."

Battle of
Midea
won by
the Spar-
tans with-

While he yet spoke, it thundered on the right, though the day was clear and serene. The soldiers, roused by the noise, looked towards the direction

from which it came, and beheld, in a consecrated grove at no great distance, an altar and statue of Hercules, the great progenitor of Archidamus and the Spartan kings. Animated by the wonderful concurrence of such auspicious circumstances, they were transported with an enthusiasm of valor, and impetuously rushed against their opponents, in full confidence of victory. The enemy, who thought that they had to do with a vanquished and spiritless people, were astonished at their mien and aspect as they advanced to the attack. The few who waited their approach, were totally destroyed; many thousands perished in the pursuit; it is said by ancient historians²⁷, that the Spartans lost not a man. Archidamus erected a trophy, and dispatched a messenger to Sparta. The people were assembled, when he communicated his extraordinary intelligence. The aged Agesilaus shed tears of joy. The Ephori and senators sympathized with the emotions of their king. The patriotic weakness was communicated from breast to breast; the amiable contagion spread; the sternest members of this numerous assembly dissolved in softness, and melted in sensibility²⁸.

The Spartans were prevented from reaping the full fruits of this victory, by a considerable reinforcement which the Arcadians soon afterwards received from Thebes. By the assistance of these troops, the Menalians and Parrhasians, who, from

C H A P.

XXXI.

out the
loss of a
man.

Founda-
tion of
Megalo-
polis.

²⁷ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 620. Diodor. et Plut. ubi supra.

²⁸ Xenoph. ibid. He observes, ὅτω κοινόν τι ἀπὸ χαρῆς καὶ λυγρῆς δακρυῶς ἐστίν. "So common are tears to joy and sorrow."

C H A P. their situation on the southern frontier of Arcadia;
 XXXI. were most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; found means to execute a design said to have been formerly suggested by Epaminondas. They abandoned twenty straggling and defenceless villages; and chusing an advantageous situation in the centre of their territory, erected a fortress there, which they surrounded with a strong wall. The benefit of security attracted new inhabitants; the walls were extended; the place acquired the magnificent name of Megalopolis ²⁹, the last city built by the Greeks, while they preserved the dignity of independent government ³⁰.

Revolu-
 tions in
 Thessaly.

The temporary success of the Spartans under Archidamus, which is generally ascribed to the valor of that commander, was principally occasioned by the withdrawing from Peloponnesus, at a very critical juncture, the numerous army of Thebes; which was at that time called northward, in order to take an important and honorable part in the affairs of Macedon and Thessaly. Since the atrocious murder of the heroic Jason, the latter kingdom had been afflicted by a continued train of crimes and disorders. Just gratitude and respect towards the memory of their generous and warlike chief, engaged the Thessalians to perpetuate the honors of his family. He was succeeded by his brothers Polydore and Polyphron; of whom the latter, not being

²⁹ "The great city."

³⁰ I have melted together Pausanias in Bœotic. and Diodorus, l. xv. p. 384. but followed the chronology of the latter.

able to endure the restraint of a limited, much less of a divided rule, attained, by the assassination of his colleague, the sole dominion of Thessaly. His stern despotism was abolished by the hand of Alexander, who avenged the blood of his kinsman³¹ Polydore, the only meritorious action of his life. For Alexander (as his character is represented to us) exceeded the cruelties of Polyphron, and of all the detested tyrants that have ever been condemned to the infamy of history. The Thessalians were delivered from such a monster by the domestic conspiracy of his wife Thebé, the daughter of Jason, and her brothers Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron; who governed with precarious sway, till the power and address of Philip destroyed their usurpation, and rendered their distracted country, which seemed incapable of freedom, a province of Macedonia. Such, in few words, were the revolutions of Thessaly; but the bloody reign of Alexander demands more particular attention, being connected with the general revolutions of Greece.

A cautious reader will always receive, with some distrust, the accounts transmitted by ancient republicans of the lives and actions of tyrants³².

Tyranny
of Alex-
ander.

³¹ His brother, uncle, or father, according to different authors.

³² The acceptation of the word tyrant in Greek history is well known. The Greeks called τυραννοι, "tyrants," those who had acquired sovereignty, in states formerly republican. Thessaly, Sicily, Corinth, etc. were governed, not by βασιλεις, but τυραννοι, "not by kings, but tyrants; whereas, Macedonia, which had never been subject to any species of popular government, was ruled, not by τυραννοι, but βασιλεις, "not by tyrants, but kings."

C H A P. XXXI. The popular histories of Alexander remind us of the fanciful descriptions of Búfiris or Pygmalion. Yet it cannot be doubted that the tyrant of Thessaly was cruel to his subjects, perfidious to his allies, implacable to his enemies, a robber by land, and a pirate at sea³³: but that it was his usual diversion to bury men alive, to inclose them in the skins of wild beasts, as a prey to ravenous dogs, to mutilate and torture children in the presence of their parents³⁴, can scarcely be reconciled with his shedding tears for the imaginary sufferings of Hecuba and Andromaché, during the representation of the Troades³⁵. It is true, that he is said to have been ashamed of this weakness, and to have left the theatre with confusion; but what could have engaged a monster, such as Alexander is described, to listen to the pathetic strains of the tender Euripides? What pleasure, or what pain, could a tyger, thirsting for human blood, receive from such an entertainment? Although we abstract from his story many incredible fictions, Alexander might well deserve the resentment of the Thessalians. His injured subjects took arms, and solicited the protection of Thebes, whose justice or ambition readily embraced their cause. As Epaminondas still continued under the displeasure of his country, the Theban army was conducted by Pelopidas and Ismenias. Their arrival struck terror into the conscious breast of the tyrant, who,

The affairs
of Thes-
saly settled
by Pelopi-
das.

³³ These are the words of Xenophon, p. 601.

³⁴ Plut. in Pelopid.

³⁵ Id. de Fort. Alexand.

without daring to trust his defence to the numerous guards and mercenaries by whom his usurpation was supported, implored the clemency of the Theban generals, submitting to the most humiliating conditions which their wisdom might judge proper to exact for the future security of his subjects³⁶.

This transaction was scarcely ended, when the Thebans, whose reputation and success rendered them the most proper mediators in the affairs of their neighbours, were invited into Macedon, which, since the death of Amyntas II. had been a prey, during six years, to all the calamities of a disputed succession. Amyntas left three legitimate sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and a natural son, Ptolemy, whose intrigues chiefly occasioned the disorders of the kingdom. He could not prevent the accession of Alexander to the throne, as that prince had attained the age of manhood at the time of his father's death. But he embittered and shortened his reign, which lasted only one year; after which Ptolemy assumed the reins of government, as guardian of the minority of Perdiccas, and protector of Macedon. It soon appeared, however, that his ambition would not rest satisfied with the borrowed power of a regent. He gained a considerable party to his interest, baffled the opposition of Perdiccas's partisans, and boldly usurped the sovereignty. The friends of that unfortunate prince had recourse to the justice

C H A P.
XXXI.

Pelopidas
establishes
Perdiccas
on the
throne of
Macedon,
and re-
ceives
Philip
as a
hostage.
Olymp.
ciii. 2.
A. C. 367.

³⁶ Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. et Plut. in Pelopid.

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C H A P. and power of Thebes. Pelopidas entered Macedon at the head of his army; restored the numerous exiles whom Ptolemy had banished; asserted the just rights of Perdiccas to the throne; and, after receiving hostages from the contending factions, among whom was Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, afterwards king of Macedon, and conqueror of Greece, returned towards Thessaly, having finally re-established the tranquillity of the neighbouring kingdom³⁷.

Is treacherously seized and imprisoned by Alexander, in his journey through Thessaly. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

In his journey through a country where he had so lately acted the part of a judge and master, it seemed as if little danger could reasonably be apprehended. Pelopidas had sent before him a considerable detachment of his army, to conduct the Macedonian hostages towards Thebes. With the remainder he marched securely through the territory of his Thessalian confederates, when he was informed that Alexander had come to meet him at the head of his mercenaries. Even this suspicious circumstance could not undeceive the sanguine credulity of the Theban chief. He imagined that the tyrant had taken this measure in order to show him respect, and to justify himself against some recent complaints of his injured subjects. With an imprudence which all historians agree to condemn³⁸, both Pelopidas and Ismenias threw themselves

³⁷ Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. et Plut. in Pelopid.

³⁸ Besides Diodorus and Plutarch, the sage Polybius severely arraigns the imprudent confidence of Pelopidas. Polyb. Casaub. t. ii. p. 58. Polybius in that passage speaks of the expedition as an embassy. I have carefully compared the different writers, and adopted the account that seemed most probable and consistent.

into the hands of a traitor, who gloried in despising C H A P, laws human and divine. They were instantly XXXI. seized by his order, carried to Pheræ, bound, imprisoned, and exposed to the insulting eyes of an invidious multitude.

It might be expected that the Theban soldiers should have been animated with indignation and rage at the unexampled treatment of their beloved chiefs. But their numbers were too small to contend with the Thessalian mercenaries; and when a powerful reinforcement arrived from Bœotia, they fatally experienced, in the first encounters with the enemy, the absence of Pelopidas, and the degradation of his magnanimous friend. The army was reduced to the utmost difficulties, encompassed on every side, unwilling to fight, and unable to fly. The troops justly accused the inexperience of their commanders, remembering their glorious campaigns in the Peloponnese, where they contended with far more formidable enemies. Epaminondas, who had commanded them on those memorable occasions, actually served in the ranks. The soldiers with one accord saluted him general. The singular abilities of this extraordinary man soon changed the posture of affairs; the tyrant was defeated in his turn, and compelled to retire. Epaminondas, instead of pushing him to extremity, which might have turned his desperate fury against the valuable lives of the Theban prisoners, hovered round with a victorious army, ostentatiously displayed the advantages of military skill and conduct; and while he kept Alexander in continual

Delivered
by Epa-
minondas.

C H A P. respect and fear, yet left him sufficient time for re-
 XXXI. pentance and submission. This judicious plan of operations was attended with success. The tyrant implored peace; but he only received a truce of thirty days, on condition of restoring the persons of Pelopidas and Ismenias³⁹.

Interview
 of Pelopi-
 das, dur-
 ing his
 confine-
 ment,
 with
 Thebé
 queen of
 Theffaly.

Those who love to find in history events extraordinary and romantic, would not easily excuse my omitting to mention the interview of Pelopidas, during his imprisonment, with the Theffalian queen. The daughter of the heroic Jason united the beauty of the one sex with the courage of the other, and was beloved by her husband with such love as a tyrant can feel, which is always corrupted by suspicion. At her earnest and repeated entreaties, Thebé was permitted to see, and converse with, the Theban general, whose merit and fame she had long admired. But his appearance did not answer her expectation. At beholding his neglected and squalid figure, she was seized with an emotion of pity, and exclaimed, "How much, Pelopidas, do I lament your wife and family." "You, Thebé! are more to be lamented," replied the Theban hero, "who, without being a prisoner, continue the voluntary slave of a perfidious and cruel tyrant." The expression is said to have sunk deep into the heart of the queen, who remembered the reproach of Pelopidas, when, ten years afterwards, she supported the courage, and urged the hand, of the assassins of Alexander⁴⁰.

³⁹ Plut. in Pelopid. et Diodorus, ibid.

⁴⁰ Xenoph. p. 601.

But this moral narrative, however strongly authenticated, cannot be attentively read without occasioning some degree of scepticism concerning the history of Alexander. Had he been the monster which resentment or credulity have taken pleasure to delineate, who never entered the apartment of his wife without an armed attendant, who slept in a lofty inaccessible tower, to which he mounted by a ladder, and which was guarded by a fierce dog⁴¹, it is incredible that he should have permitted an interview between a secret and open enemy.

Nor will it be easy to reconcile with the fierceness of the Thessalian, another anecdote, which has probably been invented to display the magnanimity of Pelopidas, but which displays still more strongly the patience of Alexander. During the confinement of the former at Pheræ, the latter is said to have exceeded his usual cruelties towards the inhabitants of that city. Pelopidas consoled their affliction, and encouraged them to hope for vengeance. He even sent to reproach the absurdity of the tyrant, in destroying daily so many innocent men, from whom he had nothing to fear, while he allowed an enemy to live, who would employ the first moment of freedom to punish his manifold enormities. "And is Pelopidas so desirous to die?" was the answer of the Thessalian. "Yes," replied the prisoner, "that *you* may the

C H A P.
XXXI.

Anecdote
of Pelopidas and
Alexander.

⁴¹ Cicero de Offic. 1. 2. Plut. in Pelopid. But the story, as related by Xenophon, is divested of such improbable fictions; and Xenophon seems hardly to believe all that he relates. He says λεγεται ὑπο τινων, — and repeats that it was a hearsay, a few sentences below.

C H A P. sooner perish, having rendered yourself still more
 XXXI. obnoxious to gods and men⁴²." The resentment
 of Pelopidas, if ever it was expressed, proved an
 empty boast; for immediately after his deliverance,
 the Theban army was, for very urgent reasons,
 withdrawn from Thessaly.

Congress
 of Grecian
 deputies
 in Persia.
 Olymp.
 ciii. 2.
 A. C. 367.

The Theban expedition in the north had allowed
 the Spartans, in some degree, to recover their in-
 fluence in the south of Greece. Archidamus had
 obtained a complete victory over the Arcadians,
 the bravest and most powerful of the confederates.
 The crafty⁴³ Antalcidas, with Euthycles⁴⁴, a Spar-
 tan of abilities and intrigue, had been sent as am-
 bassadors to Persia, in order to hasten the supplies
 of troops, or money, expected from that country.
 It was time for Thebes to assert her interest in the
 Peloponnese, and to counteract the dangerous
 negociations of her enemies with Artaxerxes.
 Epaminondas, whose recent and illustrious merit
 had silenced the unjust clamors of faction, was
 confirmed in his military command; and Pelopi-
 das, whose unfortunate adventure in Thessaly was
 ascribed less to his own imprudence than to the trea-
 chery of Alexander, was dispatched to the East, as
 the person best qualified to conduct a negociation
 with the ministers of the great king. He was ac-
 companied by the ambassadors of Elis, Argos, and
 Arcadia; those of Athens followed soon after-
 wards; so that there appeared, for the first time,
 a general congress of the Grecian states, to settle

⁴² Plutarch. in Pelopid.

⁴³ Plut. in Artaxerx.

⁴⁴ Xenoph. Hellen.

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and adjust their interests at the court of a foreign prince. It might be expected, that a scene so new and interesting should have excited the attention of historians; yet they have left us ignorant in what city of his dominions Artaxerxes received the Greeks. At their arrival, the king treated Artalcidas with that partial kindness due to an ancient guest and favorite; but at their public audience, the appearance, the fame, and the eloquence of Pelopidas, more majestic than that of Athens, more nervous than that of Sparta⁴⁴, entitled him to a just preference, which the king, whose rank and temper alike disdained restraint, was at no pains to conceal.

The Theban represented, that in the battle of Platæa, fought above a century ago, and ever since that memorable engagement, his countrymen had uniformly adhered to the interest of Persia, at the risk of losing whatever men hold most precious. That the dangerous war in which they were actually engaged, had been occasioned by their open and steady opposition to the measures of the Spartans, previous to their destructive invasions of Asia. The imperious pride of Agesilaus could never forget the affront offered him at Aulis, when, in imitation of Agamemnon, he intended to offer sacrifice before his embarkation. He had begun hostilities without justice, and carried them on without success. The field of Leuctra had been alike fatal to the strength and glory of Sparta; nor would that ambitious republic have reason to

Representations of Pelopidas to the Persian monarch.

⁴⁴ Plut. in Pelopid.

C H A P.
XXXI.

Behaviour
of the
other de-
puties.

boast of its recent success in Arcadia, if, at that unfortunate juncture, the Thebans had not been prevented, by reasons equally important and honorable, from assisting their Peloponnesian confederates. Timagoras the Athenian, guided by motives which ancient ⁴⁶ history has not condescended to explain, seconded, with vigor and address, the arguments of the illustrious Theban. In vain did Leon, the colleague of Timagoras, remonstrate against his perfidy. The other deputies were confounded by his impudence; and before they had time to express their astonishment and indignation, the king desired Pelopidas to explain

⁴⁶ The extraordinary behaviour of Timagoras deserves attention. He co-operated with the enemy of his country, and the ambassador of a state actually at war with it. We may guess his motives by his reward. He received from the king of Persia, at his departure, gold and silver, and other valuable presents, particularly a bed of curious construction, with Persian slaves to make it, the Greeks being little acquainted with that operation; and he was carried in a sedan to the sea-shore at the king's expense. Yet this man had the effrontery to return to Athens, and to appear in the public assembly. He knew the force of eloquence and intrigue over the capricious minds of his countrymen; he knew that the practice of receiving bribes was so usual, that the Athenians had lost the proper sense of its baseness. He perhaps remembered the pleasant proposal of Epicrates, that instead of nine Archons, the Athenians should annually elect nine ambassadors, chosen from the poorest citizens, who might return rich from Persia. Epicrates had acquired a very undue proportion of wealth by this infamous means, as we learn from an oration of Lyfias. Yet the Athenians were less indignant at his guilt, than delighted with his humor. Timagoras, however, was not so fortunate; he was accused by his colleague Leon, and condemned to death, not, if we may credit Plutarch, because he had betrayed his trust, and accepted bribes, but because the Athenians were extremely displeased that Pelopidas had effected the object of his commission at the Persian court. Plut. in Pelopid.

the object of his commission, and the demand of his countrymen. The Theban replied, that he had been sent to propose and ratify a treaty between his republic and Persia, on conditions equally advantageous to both, since the carrying of them into execution would destroy the power of those states which had hitherto occasioned so much disturbance and danger to all their neighbours. His proposals were, that the Athenians should be commanded to lay up their fleet, and that the fertile country of Messenia should be declared totally independent of Sparta. If any opposition to the treaty were made by these powers, that war should be levied against them by Persia, Thebes, and their allies; and if the inferior cities of Greece declined to engage in so just a cause, that their obstinacy should be punished with an exemplary severity. The king approved these articles, which were immediately consigned to writing, confirmed by the royal seal, and read aloud to the ambassadors. On hearing the clause which related to Athens, Leon exclaimed, with the freedom peculiar to his country, "The Athenians, it seems, must look out for some other ally, instead of the king of Persia." After this daring threat, the ambassadors took leave, and returned to Greece with all possible expedition⁴⁷.

Pelopidas was accompanied by a Persian of distinction, intrusted with the instrument containing the treaty. On his arrival in Thebes, the people were immediately assembled, and being

C H A P.
XXXI.

Overtures
of the Per-
sians and
Thebans
rejected in
a conven-

⁴⁷ Xenoph. p. 621, et seqq.

C H A P.

XXXI.

tion of the
Grecian
states;

acquainted with the happy fruits of his embassy, they commended his diligence and dexterity. Without losing a day, messengers were dispatched to demand the attendance of representatives from the Grecian states, whose interests were all alike concerned in the late important negociation. It does not appear that either Athens or Sparta condescended to obey the summons. The convention, however, was very numerous. The Persian read the treaty, showed the king's seal, and, in the name of his master, required the agreement to be ratified with the formality of oaths usually employed on such occasions. The representatives almost unanimously declared that they had been sent to hear, not to swear; and that before the treaty could be ratified by general consent, its conditions must be previously discussed in the particular assembly of each independent republic. Such was the firm, but moderate answer of the other deputies; but the high spirited Lycomedes went farther than his colleagues. His friend and countryman, Antiochus, who had lately acted as the ambassador of Arcadia at the Persian court, returned disgusted by the contempt shown towards his country by the great king, who hesitated not to prefer Elis to Arcadia. In giving an account of his embassy to the Ten thousand (the name usually bestowed on the Arcadians since the re-union of their tribes in Mantinæa and Megalopolis), he indulged himself in many contumelious expressions against Artaxerxes and his subjects, which were greedily listened to by the resentment and envy of his hearers. "Neither

the wealth nor the power of the great king were so great in reality as flattery and falsehood represented them. The golden plane-tree, which had often been so ostentatiously described, could scarce afford shade to a grasshopper. He himself had been an attentive observer; yet all he could find in Persia was the idle retinue of vice and luxury, bakers, butlers, and cooks, a useless and servile train; but men fit to contend with the Greeks, he neither himself saw, nor thought it possible for others to discover." The proud disdain of Antiochus had been communicated entire to the breast of Lycomedes. He declared, that Arcadia needed not any alliance with the great king; and that were such a matter in agitation, Thebes would not be the proper place to determine it, since every convention tending to a general peace ought to be held in that country which had been the principal scene of war.

The Theban magistrates discovered the mingled symptoms of disappointment, indignation, grief, and rage. They accused Lycomedes as a traitor to Thebes, and an enemy to his country; but he despised their empty clamors, and, without deigning an answer, walked from the assembly, and was followed by all the deputies of Arcadia. Notwithstanding this severe mortification, the Thebans did not abandon the ambitious project at which they had long aimed. Nothing favorable, they perceived, could be expected in the general congress of the states, so that they allowed the assembly to break up without insisting farther on their demands.

C H A P.
XXXI.

and by
each re-
public in
particu-
lar.

C H A P.
XXXI.

But at the distance of a short time, they renewed the same proposal to the several republics, beginning with Corinth, one of the weakest, yet most wealthy, in hopes that whatever opposition the overtures of the king of Persia, and their own, had found in the united strength and confidence of the assembled confederacy, few single states at least would venture to provoke the indignation of such powerful adversaries. But in this, too, they were disappointed. The Corinthians declined entering into any alliance with the king of Persia, and set his power at defiance. The magnanimous example was imitated by their neighbours; the secret practices of the Thebans were equally fruitless with their open declarations and demands.

Epami-
nondas in-
vades the
Pelopon-
nesus.
Olymp.
ciii. 3.
A. C. 366.

Epaminondas encouraged his countrymen to acquire, by arms, that pre-eminence which they had vainly expected to obtain by negociation. His renown, justly increased by the recent transactions in Theffaly, rendered his influence irresistible. He was again intrusted with the command of a powerful army, with which, for the third time, he invaded the Peloponnesus. The Elians and Arcadians, though hostile to each other, were alike disposed for rebellion against Thebes; but instead of marching into their territories, a measure which might have engaged them to settle their private differences, and to unite against the common enemy, Epaminondas endeavoured to quash their disaffection by the rapid conquest of Achaia, which, stretching along the Corinthian gulph, skirted the northern frontiers of Elis and Arcadia.

From the nature of their government the Achæans usually enjoyed more tranquillity than their neighbours. They possessed not any great town, whose needy and turbulent inhabitants, seduced by popular demagogues, could rouse the whole province to arms and ambition. Towards the east and the isthmus of Corinth, the cities of Sicyon and Phlius had long been regarded as separate republics, unconnected with the general body of the Achæan nation. Ægium enjoyed the prerogative of constituting the usual place of convention for the states of Achaia; but Dymé, Tirtæa, and Pellené, scarcely yielded to Ægium in populousness and power, and ~~seem~~, with several places of inferior note, to have formed so many separate and independent communities, all alike subject to the same equitable system of Achæan laws. Immediately before the Theban invasion the aristocracy had acquired an undue weight in the constitution of Achaia, so that the principal nobles and magistrates were no sooner informed of the approach of an enemy, than they flocked from all quarters of the province to meet Epaminondas, soliciting his favor and friendship, and little anxious about the independence of their country, provided they might preserve their personal privileges and private fortunes. The people perceiving themselves betrayed by those who ought to have been their protectors, abandoned all thoughts of resistance. Epaminondas accepted the submission of the magistrates, and received pledges of their engagement, that Achaia should thenceforth adhere to the interest

C H A P.

XXXI.

Compels
the
Achæans
to accept
the The-
ban al-
liance.

C H A P. of Thebes, and follow the standard of that republic⁴⁸.

XXXI.

Revolu-
tions in
Achaia.

This conquest, which was effected without striking a blow, and without producing any internal revolution of government, was destructive and bloody in its consequences. Epaminondas, for reasons not sufficiently explained, returned with his army to Thebes; but before he arrived there, various complaints against his conduct had been made in the Theban assembly. The Arcadians and Argives complained that a people, who knew by their own recent experience the inconveniences of aristocracy, should have confirmed that severe form of government in a dependent province. The democratic faction in Achaia secretly sent emissaries to second the complaint. The enemies of Epaminondas seized the favorable opportunity of accusing and calumniating that illustrious commander, and the capricious multitude were persuaded to condemn his proceedings, and to send commissioners into Achaia, who, with the assistance of the populace, as well as of a considerable body of mercenaries, dissolved the aristocracy, banished or put to death the nobles, and instituted a democratic form of policy. The foreign troops had scarcely left that country, when the exiles, who were extremely numerous and powerful, returned with common consent, and, after a bloody and desperate struggle, recovered their ancient influence in their respective cities. The leaders of the populace were now, in their turn, put to death or expelled;

⁴⁸ Xenoph. p. 622.

the aristocracy was re-established; and the magistrates, knowing that it was dangerous to depend on the unsteady politics of Thebes, craved the protection of Sparta, which was readily granted them. The Achæans approved their gratitude by ravaging the northern, while the Lacedæmonians infested the southern frontier of Arcadia; and that unhappy province felt and regretted the inconvenience of its situation between two implacable enemies⁴⁹.

Sicyon, though governed by the Achæan laws, did not follow, on this occasion, the example of its neighbours. That unfortunate city, which had long been the seat of luxury and the arts, was reserved for peculiar calamities. Euphron, a bold, crafty, and ambitious demagogue, having already acquired great credit with the Lacedæmonians, was desirous of obtaining equal consideration among the enemies of that people, hoping, by so many foreign connexions, to render himself absolute master of his little republic. For this purpose he secretly reminded the Arcadians and Argives, that "Sicyon, having the same laws and government, would naturally embrace the same alliance with the neighbouring cities; but the danger of this event he would undertake to remove, with very slender assistance from Argos and Arcadia." The admonition was not lost; a body of armed men arrived at Sicyon; Euphron assembled the people; the government was changed; new magistrates were appointed, and Euphron was intrusted with the command of the national force, consisting chiefly

C. H. A. P.
XXXI.

Euphron
usurps the
govern-
ment of
Sicyon.
Olymp.
ciii. 3.
A. C. 366.

⁴⁹ Xenoph. p. 623.

C H A P. of mercenaries. Having obtained this, he obtained
 XXXI., all. By careffes, bribes, and flattery, the troops
 were gained over to his party, and became
 attached to his person. His colleagues in the
 government were removed by fecret treachery or
 open violence. His private enemies were held the
 enemies of the ftate, accused, condemned, and
 banished; and their confiscated eftates augmented
 the wealth of Euphron, whose rapacity knew no
 bounds, fparing neither the property of indivi-
 duals nor the public treasury, nor the confecrated
 gold and filver which adorned the temples of Si-
 cyon. The fums amaffed by fuch impious means
 enabled him to confirm his ufurpation. He aug-
 mented the number of his mercenary guards, who,
 while they oppreffed the republic, were useful
 auxiliaries to the Argives and Arcadians. What-
 ever thefe nations thought proper to command,
 the foldiers of Euphron were ready to obey; and
 partly by this alacrity in their fervice, partly by
 bribing⁵⁰ the principal men in Argos and Arcadia,
 the crafty tyrant expected to prevent thofe neigh-
 bouring communities from interfering in the do-
 mestic affairs of Sicyon.

His ufurp-
 ation
 overturn-
 ed by
 Æneas,
 the Stym-
 phalian.

Such was the venality and corruption of the
 Greeks, that this deteftable policy was attended
 with fuccefs, until Æneas, the Stymphalian,
 obtained the command of the Arcadians. This
 man, availing himfelf of the vicinity of Sicyon to
 Stymphalus, the place of his birth and refidence,
 had formed a connexion with the oppreffed citizens

⁵⁰ Τα μὲν τοὶ καὶ χρημασί διεπραγματο. Xenoph. p. 624.

of the former. Æneas, perhaps, had not sufficiently shared the largesses of Euphron; perhaps the humanity of his nature ⁵¹ lamented the sufferings of the Sicyonians. Whatever was his motive, it is certain that he endeavoured to expel their tyrant, and to restore their liberty.

Euphron, however, had the dexterity to engage successively in his favor the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Thebans. He spared neither pains, nor promises, nor bribes. He was commonly his own ambassador; and his activity and abilities must have risen far above the ordinary pitch, to engage the principal states of Greece, one after another, to support, in direct opposition to their principles, the tyranny of a single man. Insurrections at home, and hostilities from abroad, at length occasioned his downfall. He escaped to Thebes with the greatest part of his treasure. His enemies sent proper persons to counteract his intrigues there. The money, however, and the address of Euphron, prevailed with the Theban magistrates, and he expected to be restored in triumph by the Thebans, as he had already been by the Athenians. But the Sicyonians, who followed him to Thebes, perceiving his familiarity ⁵² with the principal men of that city, had recourse to the only expedient that seemed capable of frustrating his designs, and assassinated Euphron in the Cadmæa, while the Theban archons and

C H A P.
XXXI.

Euphron
is assassi-
nated at
Thebes.

⁵¹ Xenophon seems to approve this reason. He says Æneas, the Stymphalian, νομιστὰς καὶ ἀνεκτὼς εἶναι τὰ ἐν Σικυωνί. "Thinking the grievances of the Sicyonians intolerable."

⁵² Ὡς δὲ ἑώραν αὐτὸν οικειῶς τοῖς ἀρχαῖσι συνοῦντα. Xenoph. p. 630.

C H A P.

XXXI.

This ac-
tion pub-
licly jus-
tified.

senators were assembled within the walls of that edifice ⁵³.

The murderers were seized, and the atrocity, as well as the indignity of their crime, was strongly represented to the senate by one of the archons, who probably regretted the death of Euphron, as the loss of a wealthy client. The criminals denied the fact, till one, bolder than the rest, not only avowed but justified the assassination as equally lawful, advantageous, and honorable. And so little horror do men feel at crimes which prevail in their own age, and with which their fancies are familiar, that the assassins were unanimously acquitted by the Theban senate, whose award was approved by the assembly ⁵⁴.

The allies
of Sparta
ask per-
mission of
that re-
public to
negociate
a peace
with
Thebes.
Olymp.
ciii. 3.
A. C. 366.

Meanwhile the war languished on both sides, and the hostile confederacies were on the point of being dissolved. The Athenians and Arcadians, equally disgusted with their respective allies, concluded a treaty of peace and mutual defence, by the intervention of Lycomedes the Mantinæan, who was slain in his return from Athens by a party of Arcadian exiles. This negociation gave general alarm; the Arcadians, who had entered into treaty with Athens, were the allies of Thebes; and the united strength of these three republics was at that time sufficient to subdue and enslave the rest of Greece. The terror was increased when it appeared that the Athenians had little inclination to evacuate several places in the Corinthian territory which they had undertaken to defend against the

⁵³ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 630.

⁵⁴ Id. ibid. p. 631, et seqq.

Arcadians and Thebans. By seasonable vigilance the Corinthians anticipated a design, too unjust to be publicly avowed; they cautiously dissembled their fears; graciously thanked Chares, who had arrived with an Athenian fleet on pretence of offering them his service, but took care not to admit him within their harbours; and by extreme kindness and condescension, accompanied with warm professions of gratitude for the protection hitherto afforded them, they got rid of the foreign garrisons, without coming to an open rupture with the Athenians. But the narrow escape which they had made, and the dread of being exposed in future to any similar danger, made them extremely solicitous to promote a general peace on the terms proposed by Artaxerxes and the Thebans. Motives of the same kind influenced the cities of Achaia, and the little republic of Phlius, which, together with Corinth, were the only allies that remained faithful to Sparta. A similarity of interests occasioned a close communication of views and measures among all those communities; who agreed, by common consent, to dispatch an embassy to Sparta, requesting that she would accept the conditions of peace lately offered by Thebes, or if she thought it inconsistent with honor to cede her just pretensions to Messenë, that she would allow her faithful but helpless allies to enter into a separate negociation with the Theban republic.

C H A P.
XXXI.

The reasonableness, and even modesty, of this request must have been apparent to the Spartans,

Reason-
ableness of
this de-
mand.

C H A P.
XXXI.

when they reflected on the useful services of the allies, and considered how much they had already suffered in their cause. The Phliasians, in particular, had, during five years, given such illustrious proofs of their unshaken adherence to Sparta, as stand unrivalled in the history of national honor and fidelity. Situated in the midst of enemies, they had continually, since the battle of Leuctra, suffered the invasions and assaults of the Thebans, Arcadians, and Argives. Their territory was totally wasted; their city closely besieged; their citadel, more than once, surprised and taken; their wealth, public and private, was exhausted, and they subsisted precariously on provisions brought from Corinth, for the payment of which they had pledged their beasts of burden and instruments of agriculture. Yet, under the pressure of these multiplied calamities, they had preserved their fidelity inviolate; they had disdained to accept the peace which the Thebans offered them on condition of their forsaking Sparta; even, at last, they were determined to negotiate with Thebes for neutrality alone; nor had they humbly solicited permission to embrace this measure, until Corinth, the only source of their subsistence, seemed ready to forsake them⁵⁵.

The Spartans deliberate on that subject.

The strength of such arguments urged by the eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian, might have softened, if any thing could have softened, the inflexible temper of the Spartan senate, and disposed

⁵⁵ Xenoph. 624. et 634.

that assembly to prefer the interest of their allies, and their own immediate safety, to the insisting on a fruitless claim to Messen^é, which, unaided and alone, they could never expect to maintain. But the pretensions of this extraordinary people seem to have become more lofty, in proportion to their inability to support them; and, on that particular occasion, the proud obstinacy, natural to the Spartans, was increased by an animated speech of Archidamus, full of the most confident hopes, and glowing with all the warmth of his age and character.

Speech of
Archidamus.

He spoke with contempt concerning the defection of the confederates. "The Phliasians, the inhabitants of Corinth and Achaia, may, without exciting surprise, express an anxiety for peace; safety, not glory, is their aim. But the Spartans have a character to sustain, which it would be infamous to relinquish. They expect not barely to exist, but to enjoy fame and honor, the true sweeteners of existence; and, if that be impossible, they must perish! Yet is not their situation desperate: a nation cannot be reduced to any condition of distress, in which a warlike genius, and a well-regulated government, may not afford relief. But in military experience and abilities, we are still unrivalled; and such a system of policy as we enjoy, no other people can boast. We enjoy, besides, temperate and laborious habits, the contempt of pleasure and wealth; an ardor for martial glory, and an ambition of honest fame. These are powerful auxiliaries, when protected by the

C H A P. immortal gods, whose oracles anciently approved
 XXXI. our just conquest of Messen^é. Nor, though the
 Corinthians and Achæans forsake us, shall we be
 destitute of warlike allies. The Athenians, ever
 jealous of Thebes, their most formidable neigh-
 bour, will again take arms in our cause. Diony-
 sius, the tyrant of Sicily, gives us hope of farther
 assistance; the king of Egypt, and many princes
 of Asia, declared enemies of Artaxerxes, are all
 naturally our friends. We possess, besides, though
 not the persons and actual service, the hearts and
 affections at least, of whatever is most eminent in
 Greece. In all the republics, whoever is distin-
 guished by his fame, his wealth, or his virtues,
 though he may not accompany our standard,
 secretly wishes success to our arms. I am of opi-
 nion, too, that the crowd ⁵⁶ of Peloponnesus, that
 mob on which we at first too vainly relied, will at
 length return to their duty. They have obtained
 none of those advantages, the vain prospect of
 which urged them to revolt. Instead of acquiring
 the independent government of their own laws,
 they have fallen a prey to lawless anarchy, or been
 subjected to the inhuman cruelty of tyrants. The
 bloody seditions, of which they once knew the
 nature by report only, they have long experienced;
 and there are actually more exiles from particular
 cities, than were formerly from all Peloponnesus.
 But even banishment is happiness to those who,

⁵⁶ Οχλος. Isocrat. in Archid. He means the Arcadians, Elians,
 formerly allies of Sparta.

while they remained at home, butchered each other at the altars; and who, instead of that peaceful abundance which they enjoyed under the Spartan government, perished for want of bread. Such is the condition of the Peloponnesians, whose lands have been laid waste, their cities desolated, and that constitution and those laws, under which they once lived the happiest of men, overturned from the foundation. We might subdue them by force; but *that* is not necessary; they will voluntarily return to their allegiance, and solicit our protection, as alone capable to alleviate their misery, and prevent their total ruin.

“ But had we nothing of this kind to expect, and were the one half of Greece not more disposed to injure us, than the other to abet their injustice, I have still one resolution to propose, harsh indeed and severe, but becoming those sentiments which have ever animated the Spartans. Prosperity, that conceals the infamy of cowardice robs fortitude of half its glory. It is adversity alone that can display the full lustre of a firm and manly character. I propose, therefore, that rather than cede a territory, which your ancestors acquired by the blood and labor of twenty victorious campaigns, you should remove from Sparta your wives, children, and parents, who will be received with kindness in Italy, Sicily, Cyrené, and many parts of Asia. Those who are fit to bear arms must also leave the city, and carry nothing from thence that may not easily be transported. They must, then, fix on some post well fortified by nature, and which art

C H A P. may render secure against every hostile assault.

XXXI. This, thenceforth, must be their city and country; and from this, as a centre, they must on all sides infect the enemy, until either the Thebans remit their arrogance, or the last of the Spartans perish ⁵⁷. ”

The Spartans determine to persevere in the war.

The speech of Archidamus expressed the general sense of his country. The allies were dismissed with permission to act as best suited their convenience, but with assurance that Sparta would never listen to any terms of accommodation while deprived of Messen^e. With this answer the ambassadors returned to their respective cities. Soon afterwards they were dispatched to Thebes, where, having proposed their demands, they were offered admission into the Theban confederacy. They answered, that this was not peace, but only a change of the war; and at length, after various propositions and reasonings, they obtained the much-desired neutrality ⁵⁸.

Ambitious views of Epaminondas and the Thebans. Olymp. civ. i. A. C. 364.

The Spartans, thus deserted on every side, would probably have been the victims of their pride and obstinacy, if circumstances, unforeseen by Archidamus, had not prevented the Thebans and Arcadians from carrying on the war with their usual animosity. Projects of glory and ambition had disarmed the resentment of Epaminondas. That active and enterprising leader, who thought that nothing was done, while any thing was neglected, had set himself to render Thebes mistress

⁵⁷ Isocrat. in Archidam.

⁵⁸ Xenoph. ubi supra.

of the sea. The attention and labor of the re-
public was directed to this important object; pre-
parations were made at Aulis with silence and
celerity; and when the design seemed ripe for
execution, Epaminondas sailed to Rhodes, Chios,
and Byzantium, to concert measures with those mari-
time states, which had already begun to feel the severe
yoke of the Athenians, and become eager to shake
it off. But the vigilance of the latter, who had
sent out a strong fleet under Laches, a commander
of reputation and ability, prevented the dangerous
consequences of this defection, and the Theban
arms were, at the same time, summoned to a
service which more immediately concerned their
interest and honor.

C H A P.
XXXI.

Discon-
certed by
the acti-
vity of
Athens.

Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, began once
more to display the resources of his fertile genius,
and the inhuman cruelty of his temper. His
numerous mercenaries, whom he collected and
kept together with singular address, and the se-
cret assistance of Athens, enabled him to over-
run the whole territory, and to gain possession
of all the principal cities, of Thessaly⁵⁹. The
oppressed Thessalians had recourse to Thebes,
whose powerful protection they had so happily ex-
perienced on former occasions, and whose standard
they had uniformly followed, with an alacrity
which afforded a sufficient pledge of their grati-
tude. The Thebans decreed to assist them with
ten thousand men, and the command was

Last ex-
pedition
of Pelo-
pidas into
Thessaly.
Olymp.
civ. I.
A. C. 364.

⁵⁹ Plutarch. in Pelopid.

C H A P. intrusted to Pelopidas, the personal enemy of Alexander. But the day appointed for the march was darkened by an eclipse of the sun, which greatly diminished the army, as Pelopidas was unwilling to exact the reluctant services of men dispirited by the imaginary terrors of superstition. Such only as, despising vain omens, desired to follow their beloved general, were conducted into Thessaly; and being joined by their allies in that country near the town of Pharsalus, they encamped at the foot of the mountains of Cynoscephalæ.

He is slain
in the battle of Cynoscephalæ.

The tyrant approached with an army twenty thousand strong, boldly offering them battle. Nor did Pelopidas decline the engagement, though his foot were, in number, inferior to the enemy. The action began with the cavalry, and was favorable to the Thebans; but the mercenaries of Alexander having gained the advantage of the ground, pressed with vigor the Theban and Thessalian infantry. In this emergency, Pelopidas rode up, and encouraging the retiring troops with his voice and action, gave them such fresh spirits, that Alexander did not doubt their having received a considerable reinforcement. The mercenaries were pressed in their turn, and thrown into disorder. Pelopidas darting his eye through their broken ranks, espied Alexander in the right wing rallying his men, and preparing to advance with his usual intrepidity. At this sight the Theban was no longer master of his passion. Naturally a foe to tyrants, he beheld a personal foe in the tyrant Alexander. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he

impetuously rushed forward, calling aloud to his adversary, and challenging him to single combat. Alexander, fearing to meet the man whom he had injured, retired behind his guards, who received, first with a shower of javelins, and then with their spears, the little band of Pelopidas; who, after producing such carnage⁶⁰ as Homer ascribes to the rage of Diomed or Achilles, fell a victim to the blindness of his own ungovernable fury. Meanwhile, his troops advancing to the relief of their general, the guards of the tyrant were repelled; the Thebans, with their allies, proved victorious in every part of the battle; the enemy were dispersed in flight, and pursued with the loss of three thousand men.

But the death of Pelopidas threw a gloom over the victory. He was lamented by the Thebans and Thessalians with immoderate demonstrations of sorrow. Accompanied by an innumerable crowd of real mourners, his body was carried in procession to Thebes. The Thessalians, in whose service he had fallen, requested the honor of supplying the expenses of his funeral, which was celebrated with every circumstance of sad magnificence. The multitude recollected the eclipse which preceded his departure, and which, as they believed, announced his misfortune; and, in allusion

CHAP.
XXXI.

Honors
paid to his
memory.

⁶⁰ Diodorus says, that the bodies of those whom he slew covered a long tract of ground. Plutarch is equally hyperbolic. The battles of Homer rendered the marvellous in military description too familiar to the Greek historians, I mean, Diodorus, Plutarch, Pausanias; Thucydides and Xenophon knew their duty better.

C H A P. XXXI. to that fatal omen, exclaimed, "that the sun of Thebes was set, and her glory departed for ever."

The tyrant stripped of all his conquests.

The Thebans demolished Orchomenus.

The Thebans appointed Malcitas and Diogeiton to the command in Thessaly. The tyrant was again defeated, and stripped of all his conquests. But what appears extraordinary, he was allowed to live and reign in Pheræ⁶¹, while the neighbouring cities entered into a close alliance with Thebes.

The foreign expeditions which have been described, were not the only causes that diverted the attention of the Thebans from the affairs of Peloponnesus. While Epaminondas was employed abroad in the fleet, and Pelopidas in Thessaly, the government of Thebes was on the point of being overturned by an aristocratical faction. The inhabitants of Orchomenus, the second city in Bœotia, and anciently the rival of Thebes⁶², entered into this conspiracy, which was to be executed at the annual review of the Orchomenian troops. But the plot was discovered by the fears or the repentance of some accomplices, who became informers. The cavalry of Orchomenus, to the number of three hundred, were surrounded and cut to pieces in the Theban market-place. Nor did this vengeance satisfy the enraged multitude, who marched in a body to Orchomenus, besieged and took the city, rased it to the ground, put the men of full age to the sword, and dragged their wives and children into captivity⁶³.

⁶¹ Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

⁶² Pausanias Bœotic.

⁶³ Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

While operations, destructive or fruitless, employed the activity of Thebes, her allies in Arcadia were occupied with designs still more blameable. Their own strength and numbers, together with a confidence in Athens, their new confederate, encouraged the Arcadians to give full scope to their ambition, by which they had been long animated. To pave the way for the total conquest of the Peloponnesus, in which they had already obtained a dangerous ascendant, they began by wresting several places from the Elians, the least warlike, and most wealthy, of their neighbours. The Elians, worsted in every encounter with the enemy, craved the assistance of Sparta, which being reinforced by the Achæans (notwithstanding the neutrality so recently stipulated), made several vigorous, but unsuccessful efforts, for the defence of the Elian territory. The Arcadians still pushed their conquests in that country, gaining one town after another, and at length Olympia itself, the most precious jewel of the Elians, and the greatest ornament of the Peloponnesus. As possessors of the sacred city, and by virtue of a pretended right derived from the inhabitants of Pisa, an ancient but decayed place in the neighbourhood of Olympia, the Arcadians prepared to celebrate the hundred and fourth Olympiad, the time of which was at hand. At the approach of this august solemnity, the concourse, as usual, was great from every part of Greece; hostilities were suspended; and all parties united in common amusements, and common ceremonies of religion.

C H A P.

XXXI.

The Arcadians seize Olympia, and prepare to celebrate the games. Olymp. civ. 1. A. C. 364.

C H A P.

XXXI.

Which are
interrupt-
ed by the
arrival of
the Elians
in arms.

The prayers and sacrifices were performed, and the military games had begun, when the performers and spectators were alarmed by the sudden clashing of armor, and the sight of a *real* battle. The Elians had marched forth with their whole forces, and surprised the Arcadians, who, with two thousand Argives, and a body of Athenian cavalry amounting to four hundred, guarded the sacred groves and temples of Olympia. The vigor of their unexpected assault successively repelled these intruders, who fled in disorder through the streets, and were pursued by the Elians with an *inspired* valor, "since," says Xenophon, "Heaven alone can do, in one day, what no other power can accomplish but in great length of time; make cowards courageous *." The Arcadians, however, recovering from their consternation, began to rally. The assailants were resisted with obstinacy; but did not retire, till having lost Stratolas their commander, with other brave men, they retreated in good order, after giving a conspicuous proof of their courage and intrepidity to those who had long despised the softness of their unwarlike character. The Arcadians renewed the guard with double vigilance; fortified the avenues that led to the Stadium and Hippodrome; and having taken these necessary precautions against a second surprise, proceeded with the remaining ceremonies of the festival, which, though brought to an undisturbed

* Τοιςτοι γενομενοι εως την αρετην θεος μεν αν εμπνευσας δυνχισο και εν ημερα αποδεξαι. ανθρωποι εδε αν εν - πολλω χρονω της μη οντας αλκιμης ποιησειαν. P. 639.

conclusion, was never acknowledged in the records of the Elians ⁶⁵.

After celebrating the Olympic games, the mixed concourse of people returned to their respective homes, and the Arcadians found themselves sole masters of the city and temple of Jupiter, containing the collected treasures of many centuries, the rich gifts of vanity and superstition. Opportunity, joined to want, is naturally the mother of injustice. The Arcadians, who, to promote their ambitious designs, had raised a body of standing troops called Eparittoi, laid hold of the sacred treasure, in order to pay those mercenaries, whose demands they were otherwise incapable of satisfying, without great inconvenience. The Mantinæans first protested against this unwarrantable rapacity. Instead of accepting their proportion of the plunder, they imposed, for the payment of the mercenaries, a tax on themselves, of which they transmitted the produce to the archons, or magistrates, appointed by the Ten Thousand to administer the general concerns of the Arcadian nation. The archons, who had themselves freely handled the sacred money, represented to their constituents the affected delicacy of the Mantinæans as an obstinacy extremely dangerous to the states of Arcadia, and insinuated that this unseasonable regard for justice and piety most probably concealed some very criminal design.

C H A P.

XXXI.

The Arcadians seize the Olympic treasure

The Mantinæans protest against this impiety.

⁶⁵ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 638, et seqq. et Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

C H A P.

XXXI.

The
States
General of
Arcadia
approve
the resolu-
tion of the
Manti-
næans;

The Ten Thousand, or, as we should say, the States-General, listened to this insidious accusation; and summoned the municipal magistrates of Mantinæa to appear and answer for their conduct. They refused to obey; a detachment of the Eparittoi was sent to bring them by force; the Mantinæans shut their gates. This firmness roused the attention of the States; and many members of weight in that assembly began to suspect that the Mantinæans must possess some secret ground of confidence, that encouraged them to set at defiance an authority which they were bound to revere. They reflected first on the alarming consequences to which Arcadia might be exposed by plundering the shrines of Jupiter; and then on the injustice and impiety of the deed itself. These sentiments, enforced by the superstition of the age, spread with rapidity in the assembly; it was determined thenceforth to abstain from a consecrated fund, the violation of which might prove dangerous to themselves, and entail a curse on their posterity; and, to prevent the bad consequences of the desertion of the Eparittoi, whose pay must thereby be diminished, many wealthy Arcadians, who could subsist on their private incomes, enrolled themselves in their stead.

and re-
store
Olympia
to the
Elians.

These measures, though approved by the States, gave great uneasiness to the archons, to the mercenaries, and to all who had shared the Olympic spoil, lest they might be called to account for their rapacity, and compelled to refund the sums which they

they had embezzled. To prevent this danger, they had recourse to the Thebans, from whom they requested immediate assistance, on pretence that the States of Arcadia were ready to revolt to Sparta. The States, on the other hand, sent an embassy requesting the Thebans not to pass the Isthmus, until they should receive farther invitation. Nor were they satisfied with barely counteracting the negociations of their enemies. Having determined not to derive any benefit from the wealth of Olympia, they thought proper to restore that city, as well as the direction of the games, to those who had, from time immemorial, enjoyed both, and to conclude a peace with the Elians, who solicited it with much earnestness, as a measure highly conducive to the general interest of the Peloponnesus.

The congress, assembled for this beneficial purpose, was held at Tegea, and consisted of deputies from Elis, and from many cities of Arcadia. When matters were seemingly adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties, entertainments, as usual, were prepared; and the deputies, except those of Mantinæa, most of whom were invited home by the vicinity of their city, remained at Tegea to celebrate the feast of peace. While they were employed in drinking and merriment, the archons, and such others as dreaded the consequences of this hasty accommodation, addressed themselves to a Theban general, who commanded a considerable body of Bœotian troops that had long garrisoned Tegea, in order to secure the fidelity of that place and the adjacent territory. The Theban had

C H A P.
XXXI.

Those who had embezzled the Olympic treasure seize their opponents by assistance of the Thebans.

C H A P. himself made free with the sacred treasure, and was
 XXXI. therefore easily prevailed on to embrace any measure that might prevent an inquiry into that enormous crime. Nothing appeared so proper for this purpose as to seize and detain the unsuspecting deputies, who consisted of the leading men from most cities of Arcadia. This scheme was no sooner proposed, than carried into execution. The gates of Tegea were secured; a body of armed men surrounded the place of entertainment; the deputies, who had prolonged to a late hour the joys of festivity, were taken unprepared, and conducted to various places of confinement, their number being too great for one prison to contain⁶⁶.

The prisoners set at liberty.

Next day, the Mantinæans, being apprized of this unexpected event, dispatched messengers, demanding some few of their citizens who happened to remain at Tegea, after the departure of their companions; and at the same time acquainting the magistrates of that place, the archons, and the Theban general, that no Arcadian could be put to death without a fair and open trial. They likewise, without loss of time, dispatched an embassy to the several cities of Arcadia, rousing them to arms in their own defence, and exhorting them to rescue their imprisoned citizens, and to avenge the insult offered to the general body of their nation. When those who had committed the outrage, and especially the Theban general, were acquainted with the vigor of these proceedings, they began

⁶⁶ Xenoph. p. 640.

to be more alarmed than before. As they had seized but few Mantinæans, they could derive little advantages from the hostages of that city, whose resentment they had most reason to fear. They were sensible of deserving the indignation of Arcadia; and that the general voice of Greece must condemn the irregularity and violence of their measures. Intimidated by such reflections, the Theban commander at once set the prisoners at liberty; and, appearing next day before an assembly as numerous as could be collected in such troublesome times, endeavoured to excuse his conduct, by saying, that he had heard of the march of the Lacedæmonian army towards the frontier, and that several of the deputies, whom he had seized, were prepared to betray Tegea to the public enemy. The Arcadians were not the dupes of this shallow artifice; yet they abstained from punishing their own wrongs, and sent ambassadors to Thebes, who might describe the injury that had been committed, and impeach the criminals⁶⁷.

Upon hearing the accusation, Epaminondas, who was then general of the Bœotians, declared, that his countrymen had done better in seizing, than in discharging the Arcadians, whose conduct was highly blamable in making peace without the advice of their confederates. "Be assured" continued he to the ambassadors, "that the Thebans will march into Arcadia, and support their friends in that province." This resolution, which expressed

C H A P.
XXXI.

Epami-
nondas
prepares
to march
into the
Pelopon-
nesus, at
the head
of the
Bœotians
and their
confede-
rates.
Olymp.
civ. 2.
A. C. 363.

⁶⁷ Xenoph. p. 641.

C H A P. the general sense of the republic, was heard with
XXXI. great indignation by the Arcadian states, and their allies of Elis and Achaia. They observed, that the Thebans could not have felt, much less have expressed, any displeasure at the peace of Peloponnesus, if they had not deemed it their interest to perpetuate the divisions and hostilities of a country which they wished to weaken and to subdue. They entered into a stricter alliance with each other, and prepared for a vigorous defence; sending ambassadors to Athens and Sparta, that the former might be ready to thwart the measures of a neighbouring and rival state, and that the latter might take arms to maintain the independence of that portion of Greece, of which the valor of Sparta had long formed the strength and bulwark.

His last expedition into that country.
 Olymp.
 civ. 2.
 A. C. 353.

During these hostile preparations, Epaminondas took the field with *all* the Bœotians, with the Eubœans, and with a strong body of Thessalians, partly supplied by Alexander, and partly raised by the cities which Pelopidas had recently delivered from the yoke of that cruel tyrant. Upon his arrival in the Peloponnesus, he expected to be joined by the Argives, the Messenians, and several communities of Arcadia, particularly the inhabitants of Tegea and Megalopolis. With these hopes, he proceeded southward to Nemea, an ancient city in the Argive territory, distinguished by the games celebrated in honor of Hercules. There he encamped for several days, with an intention to intercept the Athenians, whose nearest route into

Peloponnesus lay through the district of Nemea; convinced that nothing could more contribute, than an advantage over that people in the beginning of the campaign, to animate the courage, as well as to increase the number of the Theban partisans in every part of Greece. But this scheme was defeated by the prudence of the Athenians, who, instead of marching through the Isthmus, failed to the coast of Laconia, and proceeded from thence to join their confederates at Mantinæa. Apprized of this design, Epaminondas moved his camp, and marched forward to Tegea, which being strongly fortified, and enjoying a lofty and central situation, was judiciously chosen as the place of rendezvous for his Peloponnesian confederates. Having continued several weeks at Tegea, he was much disappointed that none of the neighbouring towns sent to offer their submission, and to solicit the protection of the Theban arms. This waste of time gave him the more uneasiness, as his command was limited to a short term. The strength of the enemy at Mantinæa was continually increasing. Agesilaus had already conducted the Lacedæmonians to the frontier of Arcadia. If *they* likewise should join, the combined forces would prove superior to the army of Epaminondas, which amounted to thirty thousand in number, and of which the cavalry alone exceeded three thousand. Considering these circumstances, he suddenly determined on an enterprise, which, if crowned with success, would render the present

C H A P. hitherto fruitless expedition not unworthy of his
XXXI. former fame.

Fails in
his at-
tempt to
surprise
Sparta;

Having decamped with his whole army in the night, he performed a hasty march of thirty miles, in order to surprise Sparta; and had not the extraordinary swiftness of a Cretan deserter apprized Agefilaus of the danger, that city would have been taken unprepared, and totally incapable of defence⁶⁸. The bulk of the Lacedæmonian army had proceeded too far on the road to Mantinæa, to anticipate the design of the enemy; but the aged king, with his son Archidamus, returned, with a small but valiant band, to the defence of Sparta. The engagement which followed, as related by Xenophon, appears one of the most extraordinary that history records. Epaminondas had employed every precaution which his peculiar sagacity could suggest; he did not approach Sparta by those narrow roads, where a superiority of numbers would afford him small advantage; he did not draw up his forces in the plain, in which, while entering the town, they might have been annoyed with missile weapons; nor did he allow an opportunity of surprising him by stratagem or ambuscade, in the management of which the Spartans were at all times so dexterous. Seizing an eminence which commanded the town, he determined to descend into it with every advantage on

⁶⁸ Xenophon says, ὥσπερ νεοτρίαν πανταπασιν ἐπιμον τῶν ἀμυν-
σέων. Xenophon, p. 644. "As a nest quite destitute of its
defenders."

his side, and without the seeming possibility of being exposed to any inconvenience. But the issue of so well concerted an enterprise, the historian hesitates whether to refer to a particular providence of the gods, or to ascribe to the invincible courage of men actuated by despair. Archidamus, with scarcely a hundred men, opposed the progress of the enemy, cut down the first ranks, and advanced to assault the remainder. Then, strange to relate! those Thebans, says Xenophon, who breathed fire, who had so often conquered, who were far superior in number, and who possessed the advantage of the ground, shamefully gave way. The Spartans pursued them with impetuosity, but were soon repelled with loss; for the divinity, whose assistance had produced this extraordinary victory, seems also to have prescribed the limits beyond which it was not to extend⁶⁹.

Epaminondas, foiled in an attempt which promised such a fair prospect of success, did not sink under his disappointment. As he had reason to believe that the whole forces at Mantinæa would be withdrawn from that place to the defence of Sparta, he immediately founded a retreat, returned

and in
that a-
against
Manti-
næa;

⁶⁹ Plutarch tells a story, on this occasion, of a young Spartan named Isadas, who stripped naked, anointed himself with oil, sallied forth with a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other, and traced his path in blood through the thickest of the enemy. He returned unhurt, was crowned for his valor, but fined for fighting without his shield. Plut. in Agesil. To a modern reader, Xenophon's account of the battle will appear a pompous description of the effect of panic terror with which the Thebans were inspired, by finding, instead of *νεκρῶν ἐρημῶν*, "a defenceless nest," the vigorous opposition of men in arms.

C H A P.
XXXI.

which is
saved by
the Athe-
nian ca-
valry.

to Tegea with the utmost expedition, and allowing his infantry to take time for rest and refreshment, he, with admirable presence of mind, ordered the horse to advance forward to Mantinæa (which was distant only twelve miles), and to maintain their ground until his arrival with the rest of the army. He expected to find the Matinæans totally unprepared for such a visit, and as it was then autumn, he doubted not that most of the townsmen would be employed in the country, in reaping and bringing in the corn. His plan was wise, and well executed. The situation of the Mantinæans corresponded to his hopes. But it seemed as if fortune had delighted to baffle his sagacity. Before the Theban forces arrived at Mantinæa, a numerous and powerful squadron of Athenian cavalry entered that place, commanded by Hegelochus, who then first learned the departure of the allies to protect the Lacedæmonian capital. He had scarcely received this intelligence, when the Thebans appeared, and, advancing with great rapidity, prepared to effect the purpose of their expedition. The Athenians had not time to refresh themselves; they had eat nothing that day; they were inferior in number; they knew the bravery of the Theban and Theffalian cavalry, with whom they must contend; yet, regardless of every consideration but the safety of their allies, they rushed into the field, stopped the progress of the assailants, and, after a fierce and bloody engagement, which displayed great courage on both sides, obtained an acknowledged victory. The enemy craved the bodies of

their dead; the victors erected a trophy of their C H A P.
useful valor, which had saved the corn, cattle, XXXI.
slaves, women, and children ⁷⁰ of Mantinæa from
falling a prey to the invaders.

The repeated misfortunes, which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary commander, only determined Epaminondas to a general engagement, in which he might either wipe off the memory of his late disgrace, or obtain an honorable death, fighting to render his country the sovereign of Greece. The confederates had re-assembled at Mantinæa, strengthened by considerable reinforcements. Fresh succours had likewise arrived to the Thebans. Never had such numerous armies ⁷¹ taken the field during the perpetual wars in which those unhappy republics were engaged. But battles become really interesting, not so much by the number of the troops, as by the conduct of the generals. It is worth while, says the military historian ⁷², to observe the operations of Epaminondas on this memorable occasion. Having ranged his men in battalions, he led them, not along the plain, which was the nearest road to Mantinæa, but turning to the left, conducted them by a chain of hills which joined that city and Tegea, and skirted the eastern extremity of both. The enemy, apprized of his march, drew up their forces before the walls of Mantinæa; the Lacedæmonians, and such Arcadians as had embraced the more honorable cause, in the right wing, the

Epami-
nondas
deter-
mines to
risk a ge-
neral en-
gagement.

His move-
ments
preceding
the battle
of Manti-
næa.

⁷⁰ Xenophon, l. vii. p. 644.

⁷¹ Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

⁷² Xenoph. p. 645.

C H A P. XXXI. Athenians in the left, the Achæans and Elians forming the main body. Meanwhile Epaminondas marched slowly along, extending his circuit, as if he wished to decline the engagement. Having approached that part of the mountain which faced the hostile army, he ordered his men to halt, and to lay down their arms. His former movements had occasioned great doubt and perplexity; but now it seemed evident that he had laid aside all thoughts of fighting that day, and was preparing to encamp. This opinion, too lightly conceived, proved fatal to the enemy. They abandoned their arms and their ranks, dispersed in their tents, and lost not only that external arrangement, but that inward preparation⁷³, that martial ardor of mind, which ought to animate soldiers at the near prospect of an engagement. Epaminondas seized the decisive moment of attack. Facing to the right, he converted the column of march into an order of battle. His troops were thus disposed instantaneously in the same order in which he meant to fight. At the head of his left wing, which consisted of the flower of the Bœotians, and which, as at the battle of Leuctra, he formed into a firm wedge, with a sharp point, and with spreading flanks, he advanced against the Spartans and Mantinæans; and trusting the event of the battle to the rapid impulse of this unexpected onset, he commanded the centre and right wing, in which

⁷³ ΕΛΥΣΕ ΜΕΝ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΙΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΨΥΧΑΙΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΜΑΧΗΝ ΠΑΡΑ-
 ΘΚΕΥΗΝ. ΕΛΥΣΕ ΔΕ ΤΗΝ ΕΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΣΥΝΤΑΞΕΣΙΝ. Xenoph. p. 645.

he placed less confidence, to proceed with a slow C H A P.
XXXI.
pace, that they might not come up and grapple with the opposing divisions of the enemy, until the victory of his left wing had taught them to conquer.

This judicious design was crowned with merited success. The enemy, perceiving the dreadful shock to which they were exposed, flew to their arms, put on their bucklers and helmets, bridled their horses, and suddenly resumed their ranks; but these different operations were performed with the trepidation of surprise and haste, rather than with the ardor of hope and courage; and the whole army had the appearance of men prepared rather to suffer, than to inflict, any thing cruel or terrible ⁷⁴. The Spartans and Mantinæans, drawn up in firm order, sternly waited the first brunt of the assailants. The battle was fierce and bloody, and after their spears were broken, both parties had recourse to their swords. The wedge of Epaminondas at length penetrated the Spartan line, and this advantage encouraged his centre and right wing to attack and repel the corresponding divisions of the enemy. The Theban and Thessalian cavalry were equally successful. In the intervals of their ranks Epaminondas had placed a body of light infantry, whose missile weapons greatly annoyed the enemy's horse, who were drawn up too deep. He had likewise taken the precaution to

Battle of
Manti-
næa.
Olymp.
civ. 2.
A. C. 363.

⁷⁴ Πάντες δὲ πεισόμενοις τι μᾶλλον ἢ ποιήσας ἐώκεσκον. Xenoph.
p. 646.

C H A P. occupy a rising ground on his right with a considerable detachment, which might take the Athenians in flank and rear, should they advance from their post. These prudent dispositions produced a victory, which Epaminondas did not live to complete or improve. In the heat of the battle he received a mortal wound⁷⁵, and was carried to an eminence, which was afterwards called the Watchtower⁷⁶, probably that he might the better observe the subsequent operations of the field. But with the departure of their leader was withdrawn the spirit which animated the Theban army. Having impetuously broke through the hostile ranks, they knew not how to profit of this advantage. The enemy rallied in different parts of the field, and prevailed in several partial encounters. All was confusion and terror. The light infantry, which

⁷⁵ Pausanias, in Arcad. says, that Epaminondas was killed by Gryllus, the son of Xenophon the Athenian; and, as a proof of this assertion, mentions a beautiful picture of the battle of Mantinæa, in the Ceramicus of Athens, as well as the monument of Gryllus, erected by the Mantinæans on the field of battle; both subsisting in the time of Pausanias, and both ascribing to this Athenian the honor of killing Epaminondas. Plutarch, in Agefilao, says, that Anticrates, a Spartan killed Epaminondas with a sword; that his posterity were thence called Machairionides; and that, as late as the days of Plutarch, they enjoyed certain immunities and honors as a recompence for the merit of their ancestor Anticrates in destroying the worst enemy of Sparta. Gryllus the son of Xenophon fell in the battle of Mantinæa; and the words, or rather the silence of his father, is very remarkable concerning the death of Epaminondas: "The Theban column broke the Spartans, *but when Epaminondas fell*, the rest knew not how to use the victory." What sublimity in this passage, if Gryllus really slew Epaminondas!

⁷⁶ Pausan. ubi supra.

had been posted amidst the Theban and Thessalian c H A P.
 horse, being left behind in the pursuit, were re- XXXI.
 ceived and cut to pieces by the Athenian cavalry,
 commanded by Hegelochus. Elated with this suc-
 cess, the Athenians turned their arms against the
 detachment placed on the heights, consisting chiefly
 of Eubœans, whom they routed and put to flight,
 after a terrible slaughter. With such alternations
 of victory and defeat ended this memorable en-
 gagement. Both armies, as conquerors, erected
 a trophy; both craved their dead, as conquered⁷⁷;
 and this battle, which being certainly the greatest,
 was expected to have proved the most decisive, ever
 fought among the Greeks, produced no other con-
 sequence but that general languor and debility long
 remarkable in the subsequent operations of those
 hostile republics.

When the tumult of the action ceased, the most
 distinguished Thebans assembled around their
 dying general. His body had been pierced with a
 javelin; and the surgeons declared, that it was im-
 possible for him to survive the extraction of the
 weapon. He asked whether his shield was safe?
 which being presented to him, he viewed it with a
 languid smile of melancholy joy. He then de-
 manded, whether the Thebans had obtained the
 victory? Being answered in the affirmative (for the
 Lacedæmonians indeed had first sent to demand
 the bodies of their slain), he declared himself
 ready to quit life without regret, since he left his

Death of
 Epami-
 nondas.

⁷⁷ Xenoph. l. vii. ad fin.

C H A P. country triumphant. The spectators lamented,
 XXXI. among other objects of sorrow, that he should die without children, who might inherit the glory of his name, and the fame of his virtues. "You mistake," said he with a cheerful presence of mind, "I leave two fair daughters, the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, who will transmit my renown to the latest ages." So saying, he ordered the weapon to be extracted, and immediately expired. The awful solemnity of his death corresponded with the dignified splendor of an active and useful life. He is usually described as a perfect character⁷⁸; nor does the truth of history oblige us to detract any thing from this description, except that in some instances, and particularly in his last fatal invasion of the Peloponnesus, he allowed the blaze of patriotism to eclipse the mild light of justice and benevolence. He was buried in the field of battle, where his monument still existed, after four centuries, in the time of Pausanias, with an inscription in elegiac verse, enumerating his exploits. Hadrian, then master of the Roman world, added a second column; with a new inscription⁷⁹, in honor of a character, whom that unsteady emperor had genius to admire, but wanted firmness to imitate.

An elegant Roman writer gives a brief but comprehensive panegyric of Epaminondas, that during

⁷⁸ Cicero Acad. Quæst. l. i. et passim. Plutarch. Corn. Nepos, Pausan.

⁷⁹ Vid. Pausan. in Arcad. et Bœotic.

his lifetime Thebes was the arbiter of Greece ; C H A P. XXXI.
 whereas both before and afterwards, that republic
 continually languished in servitude or dependence⁸⁰.
 But this observation betrays the inaccurate parti-
 ality of a biographer, who often exalts the glory
 of a favorite hero, at the expense of historic
 truth. By the death of Epaminondas, Thebes
 was deprived of her principal ornament and de-
 fence, the source of her confidence, and the spring
 of her activity ; and her councils were thenceforth
 less ambitious, and her arms less enterprising⁸¹.
 But six years after that event, she controlled the
 decisions of the Amphictyonic council ; and, in-
 stead of being reduced to a condition of depend-
 ence, her power was still formidable to the most
 warlike of her neighbours.

Soon after the battle of Mantinæa, a general
 peace was proposed under the mediation of Ar-
 taxerxes, who wanted Grecian auxiliaries to check
 the insurrections in Egypt and Lesser Asia, which
 disturbed the two last years of his reign. The
 only condition annexed to this treaty was, that
 each republic should retain its respective possessions.
 The Spartans determined to reject every accom-
 modation until they had recovered Messenia ; and
 as Artaxerxes had uniformly opposed this demand,
 they transported forces into Egypt, to foment the

Agefi-
 laus's ex-
 pedition
 into E-
 gypt.
 Olymp.
 civ. 3.
 A. C. 362.

⁸⁰ Hujus de virtutibus vitæque satis erit dictum, si hoc unum
 adjunxero, *quod nemo eat inficiat* ; Thebas et ante Epaminondam
 natum, et post ejus interitum, perpetuo alieno paruisse imperio ;
 contra eas, quamdiu ille præfuerit reipublicæ, caput fuisse totius
 Græciæ. Corn. Nepos, in Epam.

⁸¹ Vid. Polyb. Hist. l. vi. c. xli.

C H A P. XXXI. defection of that province. At the head of a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, and ten thousand mercenaries, Agesilaus supported one rebel after another, having successively set on the throne Taches and Nectanebus⁸². In this dishonorable war he amassed considerable wealth, by means of which he probably expected to retrieve the affairs of his country. But returning home by Cyrenaica, he died on that coast, in the eighty-fourth year of his age, and forty-first of his reign⁸³. His character has been sufficiently illustrated in the course of this work. He was the greatest, and the most unfortunate of the Spartan kings. He had seen the highest grandeur of Sparta, and he beheld her fall. During the time that he governed the republic, his country suffered more calamities and disgrace than in seven centuries preceding his reign. His ambition and his obstinacy, doubtless, contributed to her disasters; yet so natural were the principles from which he acted, so probable his hopes of success, and so firm and manly his struggles for victory, that a contemporary writer, who could see through the cloud of fortune, ventured to bestow on Agesilaus a panegyric⁸⁴, which exalts him beyond the renown of his most illustrious predecessors.

His death.
Olymp.
civ. 4.
A. C. 361.

⁸² Plut. in Agesilao. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xxii.

⁸³ Diodor. l. xv. c. xxii.

⁸⁴ Ὁ λόγος εἰς Ἀγесίλαον, by Xenophon.

CHAP. XXXII.

State of Greece after the battle of Mantinea.—

The Amphictyonic Council. — Returning Prosperity of Athens. — Vices resulting from its Government. — Abuses of the judiciary Power. — Of the Theatre. — Degeneracy of Grecian Music. — Extreme Profligacy of the Athenians. — The Vices of Chares render him the Idol of the Multitude. — The Social War — Banishment of Timotheus and Iphicrates. — Disgraceful Issue of the War. — Philosophy. — Statuary. Praxiteles. The Cnidian Venus. — Painting. Pamphilus, Nicias, Zeuxis. — Literature. Xenophon. His Military Expeditions. Religious and Literary Retreat. Lysias. Isocrates. Plato. His Travels. He settles in the Academy. His great Views. Theology. Cosmogony. Doctrine of Ideas. Of the Human Understanding. The passions. Virtues. State of Retribution. Genius, and Character.

WITH the battle of Mantinea ended the bloody struggle for dominion, which had long exhausted Thebes and Sparta. In that, or in the preceding engagements, they had lost their

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Greece
after the
battle of
Manti-
nea.

¹ Xenophon's Greek history likewise ends with that battle. Henceforth we follow Plutarch and Diodorus, from whom we learn the principal circumstances of great events, which the orators

C H A P. ablest generals, and the flower of their troops. No
 XXXII. Theban arose to emulate the magnanimity of Epaminondas, and to complete the designs of that illustrious patriot. Archidamus, who succeeded on the Spartan throne, imperfectly justified the high opinion conceived of his early wisdom and valor. Weakened by their wounds, and fatigued by exertions long and fruitless, those republics sunk into such weakness, as encouraged pretensions of their neighbours that had long lain dormant.

The Amphictyonic council resumes its ancient authority. Olymp. civ. 4. A. C. 361.

During the *superiority*, or, in the language of ancient writers, during the *empire* of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, the majesty of the Amphictyonic council had degenerated into an empty pageant. Its deliberations were confined to matters of mere form; it regulated some ceremonies of superstition; it superintended games and spectacles; it preserved peace and good order among the crowd of strangers who assembled, at stated times, to consult the oracle of Apollo. But for more than a century past, the public measures of the Greeks had been directed by councils held, not at Delphi, the residence of the Amphictyons, but in Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, in one or other of which the allies convened on every important emergency, acknowledging, by their presence there, the respective authority of those capitals which were regarded as the heads of their several confederacies. But when first the Peloponnesian, then the Boeotian

Isocrates and Demosthenes, Aristotle's Treatise of Politics, and Xenophon's Discourses on the Revenues and Government of Athens, will enable us more fully to explain.

war, and last of all the battle of Mantinæa, had levelled the greatness, and overthrown the proud tyranny of those domineering republics, the Amphictyonic council once more emerged from obscurity; and the general states of Greece having assembled according to their national and hereditary forms, spurned the imperious dictates of any single community.

While this event strengthened the federal union, and tended to restore the primitive equality of the Grecian states, various circumstances concurred to revive the aspiring ambition of Athens. During the *Bœotian war*, the Athenians had acted as auxiliaries only; without making such efforts as enfeebled their strength, their arms had acquired great lustre. Their powerful rivals were humbled and exhausted: experience had taught them the danger of attempting to subdue, and the impossibility of keeping in subjection, the territories of their warlike neighbours: but the numerous islands of the *Ægean* and *Ionian* seas, the remote coasts of *Thrace* and *Asia*, invited the activity of their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign conquests, fearless of domestic envy. It appears, that soon after the death of *Epaminondas*, *Eubœa* again acknowledged the authority² of Athens; an

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The Athenians recover many of their maritime possessions.
Olymp.
cv. 1.—
cv. 3.
A. C. 360.
—358.

² Comp. *Diodor.* l. xvi. p. 513. et *Demosthenes* de *Chersoneso*, sub fine, et *Æschines* in *Ctesiphont*. It appears, however, from these authors that the *Thebans* soon afterwards endeavoured to recover *Eubœa*. The *Athenians* again rescued it from their power, at the exhortation of *Timotheus*, whose pithy speech is commended by *Demosthenes*: "What, my countrymen, the *Thebans* in the

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event facilitated by the destruction of the Theban partisans, belonging to that place, in the battle of Mantinæa. From the Thracian Bosphorus to Rhodes, several places along both shores submitted to the arms of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; men, who having survived Agesilaus and Epaminondas, were far superior, in abilities and in virtue, to the contemporary generals of other republics. The Cyclades and Corcyra courted the friendship of a people capable to interrupt their navigation and to destroy their commerce. Byzantium had become their ally, and there was reason to hope that Amphipolis would soon be rendered their subject. Such multiplied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, which once more commanded the sea, with a fleet of near three hundred sail, and employed the best half of her citizens and subjects in ships of war or commerce³.

The vices
ascribed to
the sup-
posed de-
generacy
of the
Atheni-
ans, re-
sulted
from the

This tide of prosperity, which flowed with most apparent force immediately after the battle of Mantinæa⁴, has been supposed productive of very important consequences. While Epaminondas lived, the Athenians, it is said, were kept vigilant in duty through jealousy and fear; but after the

island, and you still deliberating! Why not already in the harbour? why not embarked? why is not the sea covered with your navy?" Demosthen. ubi supra.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vii. p. 615. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xi. Isocrat. Panegy. et de Pace.

⁴ Justin. l. vi. c. ix. first made this observation, which has been so frequently repeated.

death of this formidable enemy, they sunk into those vices which occasioned their ruin. This specious remark is not founded in truth. Two centuries before the birth of Epaminondas, the injustice, the avarice, the total corruption of the Athenians, is forcibly described by one of the most respectable of their countrymen^s, who composed a system of wise laws in order to ascertain their rights, and to reform their manners. But it was difficult to correct abuses that seem inherent in the nature of democracy, which, even as regulated by Solon, but still more as new-modelled by Pericles, left the citizens tyrants in one capacity, and slaves in another. The division of the executive power of government among the archons, the senate, assembly, and even various committees of the assembly, rendered it impossible to perceive, or prevent, the hand of oppression. Men knew not from what quarter their safety might be assailed; and being called to authority in their turn, they, instead of making united opposition to the injustice of their magistrates, contented themselves with inflicting the same injuries which they had either previously suffered, or still apprehended, from the malice of their enemies. Nor is this inconvenience peculiar to the Greek republics. While human nature remains unchanged, and the passions

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nature of
their go-
vernment.

^s See above, vol. ii. c. xiii. p. 241. and the elegiac verses of Solon preserved in Demosthenes Orat. περί παραπρεσβείας; a title that can only be translated by a paraphrase, "the misconduct of Æschines in his embassy."

C H A P. of men run in their ordinary channel, the right to
 XXXII. exercise power will commonly be attended with a
 strong inclination to abuse it. Unless power,
 therefore, be counteracted by liberty; unless an
 impervious line of separation be drawn between
 prerogative and privilege, and that part of the
 constitution which sustains its political life, be
 kept separate and distinct from that which tends to
 corruption, it is of little consequence whether a
 country be governed by one tyrant or a thousand;
 in both cases alike the condition of man is pre-
 carious, and force prevails over law.

This sub-
 ject illus-
 trated;

This radical defect in the Grecian policies pro-
 duced many ruinous consequences in affairs foreign
 and domestic, which were commonly directed by
 the selfish passions of a few, or the fluctuating
 caprices of the multitude, rather than by the ra-
 tional and permanent interest of the community.
 But as diseases and other accidents often bring to
 light the latent weakness and imperfections of the
 body, so the vices of the Athenian government
 first appeared in their full magnitude after the un-
 fortunate war of Peloponnesus; and, although the
 excess of the malady sometimes checked itself, and
 returns of ease and prosperity sometimes concealed
 its virulence, yet the deep-rooted evil still main-
 tained its destructive progress, till it wrought the
 ruin of the constitution.

in the
 abuses of
 the judi-
 ciary
 power;

In the tumultuary governments of Greece,
 where the judiciary power frequently prevailed
 over the legislative, the sources of dissension were

innumerable ; while the feeble restraint of laws, ill administered, was unable to counteract their force. Although hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded, the poor and rich formed two distinct parties, which had their particular views and separate interests. In some republics the higher ranks bound themselves, by oath, to neglect no opportunity of hurting their inferiors⁶. The populace of Athens commonly treated the rich as if they had entered into an engagement not less atrocious⁷. During the intervals of party-rage, private quarrels kept the state in perpetual fermentation. Beside the ordinary disputes concerning property, the competitions for civil offices, for military command, for obtaining public honors, or eluding punishments or burdens, opened an ever-flowing source of bitter animosity. Among this litigious people, neighbours were continually at variance. Every man was regarded as a rival and enemy, who had not proved himself a friend⁸. Hereditary resentments were perpetuated from one generation to another; and the seeds of discord being sown in such abundance, yielded a never-failing crop of libels, invectives, and legal prosecutions. The usual employment of six thousand Athenians consisted in deciding law-suits, the profits of which afforded the principal resource of the poorer citizens. Their legal fees amounted annually to a hundred and fifty talents; the bribes

⁶ Aristot. Polit. Isocrat. et Lysias, passim.

⁷ Xenoph. de Rep. Athen.

⁸ See Lysias passim. et Xenoph. Memorab. l. ii. p. 748, et seqq.

C H A P. which they received, sometimes exceeded that sum;
 XXXII. and, both united, formed a sixth part of the Athenian revenues⁹, even in the most flourishing times. As the most numerous but most worthless class of the people commonly prevailed in the assembly, so they had totally engrossed the tribunals¹⁰; and it was to be expected that such judges would always be more swayed by favor and prejudice than by law and reason. The law punished with death the man guilty of giving bribes; but "we," say the Athenian writers¹⁰, "advance him to the command of our armies; and the more criminal he becomes in this respect, with the higher and more lucrative honors is he invested." Those who courted popular favor, lavished not only their own, but the public wealth, to flatter the passions of their adherents; an abuse which began during the splendid administration of Pericles¹¹, extended more widely under his unworthy successors; and, though interrupted during the calamities of the republic, revived with new force on the first dawn of returning prosperity¹².

and in
 those of
 the theatre.

In the licence of democratic freedom, the citizens, poor and rich, thought themselves alike entitled to enjoy every species of festivity. Pericles introduced the practice of exhibiting not only tragedies, but comedies, at the public expense, and of paying for the admission of the populace. At the period of which we write, a considerable portion

⁹ Aristoph. Vesp.

¹⁰ Isocrates de Pace, et Demosthenes, passim.

¹¹ Thucydides, p. 108, et seqq.

¹² Plut. in Pericle.

of the revenue was appropriated to the theatre; and some years afterwards¹³, a law was proposed, by the demagogue Eubulus, and enacted by the senate and people, rendering it capital to divert, or even to propose diverting, the *theatrical* money to any other end or object¹⁴. C H A P. XXXII.

Of all amusements known in polished society, the Grecian theatre was, doubtless, the most elegant and ingenious; yet several circumstances rendered it peculiarly liable to abuse. The great extent of the edifices in which plays were represented, naturally introduced masks, the better to distinguish the different *persons*¹⁵, or characters, of the drama; since the variations of passion, with the correspondent changes of countenance, which form the capital merit of modern performers, could scarcely have been observed by an immense crowd of people, many of whom must have been placed at a great distance from the scene. The same causes, together with the inimitable harmony of the Greek language, gave rise to musical declamation¹⁶, which might sometimes fortify passion, but always rendered speech more slow and articulate,

Circumstances which rendered the Grecian theatre peculiarly liable to abuse.

¹³ Before Christ 349, according to S. Petitus, de Leg. Attic. p. 385.

¹⁴ Plutarch. in Pericle, et Demosthen. Oration. passim.

¹⁵ It is well known that the word *persona* originally signified a mask, from *personare*, because the ancient masks, both Greek and Roman, were so made as to increase and invigorate sound.

¹⁶ Notwithstanding the assertions of Casaubon, Gravina, etc. the Greeks in ancient times seem not to have been acquainted with the absurd practice of dividing the acting and speaking between two persons. This is mentioned by Livy, as the invention of Titus Andronicus, who flourished 240 years before Christ.

C H A P. and therefore more easily heard by the remote
 XXXII. part of the audience. In combining the different parts of a tragic fable, the poet naturally rejects such incidents as are improper for representation. These, if necessary for carrying on the action of the piece, are supposed to be transacted elsewhere, and barely related on the theatre. The time required for such events, when they are not simultaneous with those exhibited on the stage, necessarily interrupts the representation, and leaves room for the choral songs, which being incorporated with the tragedy, heightens its effect, and increases the spectator's delight; consequences extremely different from those attending the act-tunes and detached airs of modern plays and operas, universally condemned by good judges, as suspending the action, and destroying the interest of the drama, and only affording opportunities to effeminate throats to shine in trills and divisions, at the expense of poetry and good sense. But in ancient, as well as modern times, the corrupt taste of the licentious vulgar was ever at variance with the discerning judgment of the wise and virtuous. The form and arrangement of the Grecian tragedy was exactly imitated in the extravagant pieces of Aristophanes, and his profligate contemporaries and successors¹⁷. These pernicious productions formed the favorite entertainment of the populace. The mask, disguising the countenance of the performer, allowed him to

¹⁷ See above, vol. ii. c. xiii. p. 280

indulge in the most unblushing licence of voice and gesture; the declamation was effeminate and vicious; above all, the music became glaring, tawdry, voluptuous, and dissolute in the highest degree, and suited only that perverse debauchery of soul from which it originally sprung, and which it served afterwards to inflame and nourish¹⁸.

A mysterious cloud hangs over the Grecian music, to which effects are ascribed far transcending the actual power of that art. Yet we cannot refuse our assent to the concurring testimony of ancient writers, who refer to this principle the extreme degeneracy and corruption which almost universally infected the Athenians at the period now under review. Causes which operate on the many, are not easily mistaken; but should we still doubt the cause, the effect at least cannot be denied. The Athenian youth are said to have dissipated their fortunes, and melted the vigor of mind and body, in wanton and expensive dalliance with the

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Extreme
profligacy
of the A-
thenians.

¹⁸ Aristotle, l. viii. de Republ. says ironically, "Every kind of music is good for something; that of the theatres is necessary for the amusement of the mob; being well suited to the perversion of their minds and manners, and let them enjoy it." Plato, Aristoxenus, and Plutarch, bitterly complain of the corruption of music, as the main source of vice and immorality. That art, which had anciently been used as the vehicle of religious and moral instruction, was employed in the theatres to excite every voluptuous and dissolute passion. Plato de Legibus, l. iii. Aristoxenus, quoted by Athenæus, l. xiv. et Plutarch. de Musicâ. In speaking of the vices of London, a writer, who had the spirit of an ancient legislator, says, "That were a man permitted to make all the ballads of a nation, he needed not care who should make its laws." Fletcher of Saltoun's Works, p. 266.

C H A P. female performers on the theatre ¹⁹. Weary and
 XXXII. fastidious with excess of criminal indulgence, they
 lost all capacity or relish for solid and manly occupations; and at once deserted the exercises of war, and the schools of philosophers. To fill up the vacuities of their listless lives, they, as well as persons more advanced in years, loitered in the shops of musicians, and other artists ²⁰; or fauntered in the forum and public places, idly inquiring after news, in which they took little interest, unless some danger alarmed the insipid uniformity of their pleasures ²¹. Dice, and other games of chance, were carried to a ruinous excess; and are so keenly stigmatized by the moral writers of the age, that it should seem they had begun but recently to prevail, and prove fatal ²². The people at large were peculiarly addicted to the sensual gratifications of the table; and, might we believe a poet quoted by Athenæus, had lately bestowed the freedom of their city (once deemed an honor by princes and kings ²³) on the sons of Chærephilus, on account of the uncommon merit of their father in the art of cookery ²⁴.

Their
 idleness,
 poverty,
 and ignorance.

Idleness, indulgence, and dissipation, had reduced the greater part of the Athenian citizens to

¹⁹ Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. who gives a general description of Athenian profligacy.

²⁰ Isocrat. in Areopag. and Lyſias's defence of a poor man accused before the senate, translated in the Life of Lyſias, p. 114.

²¹ Demosthen. Philipp. passim.

²² Athenæus, l. xii. Lyſias in Alcibiad.

²³ Demosthen. de Republic. ordinand.

²⁴ Athenæus, l. iii. p. 119.

extreme indigence. Although landed property was more equally divided in Greece than in any modern country, we are told that about one fourth of the Athenians were totally destitute of *immoveable* possessions²⁵. Their dress was frequently so mean and dirty, that it was difficult, by their external appearance, to distinguish them from slaves; a circumstance which arose not from slovenliness, but from poverty, since we are assured that such as could afford the expense spared no pains to adorn their persons; and that many who danced during summer in embroidered robes, spent the winter in places too shameful to be named²⁶. And how is it possible (to use the words of their own authors²⁷) that wretches, destitute of the first necessities of life, should administer public affairs with wisdom? We find accordingly, that they were extremely ill qualified for executing those offices with which they were intrusted. As the lower ranks had in a great measure engrossed the administration of justice, it was not uncommon to

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²⁵ See the Discourse of Lyfias upon a proposal for dissolving the ancient government of Athens. Lyfias's orations were chiefly written in the space of twenty years, between 404 and 384 before Christ. They afford an uniform picture of the poverty, misery, and vices of his contemporaries; which the reader will find abridged in the introduction to my translation of that writer. The Athenian affairs became more flourishing after the fall of Thebes and Sparta. Their resources were again exhausted by the war with their allies. The revenues were greatly raised by the conquests of Timotheus, Phocion, etc. and the good management of Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Plut. in Lycurg. in lib. de Dec. Orator.

²⁶ Isocrates on reforming the government of Athens.

²⁷ Isocrat. et Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

C H A P. bribe the clerks employed in transcribing the laws
 XXXII. of Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them. What is still more extraordinary, such a gross artifice frequently succeeded; nor was the deceit discovered until litigant parties produced in court contradictory laws²⁸. When their negligence could not be surpris'd, their avarice might be bribed; justice was sold; riches, virtue, eminence of rank or abilities, always expos'd to danger, and often ended in disgrace²⁹. For those needy Athenians, who formed the most numerous class in the republic, endeavour'd to alleviate their misery by a very criminal consolation; persecuting their superiors, banishing them their country, confiscating their estates, and treating them on the slightest provocation, and often without any provocation at all, with the utmost injustice and cruelty³⁰. Though occasionally directed by the equity of an Aristides, or the magnanimity of a Cimon, they, for the most part, listened to men of an opposite character. He who could best flatter and deceive them obtained most of their confidence. With such qualifications, the turbulent, licentious, and dissolute, in a word, the orator who most resembled his audience, commonly prevail'd in the assembly; and specious or hurtful talents carried off the rewards due to real merit. Isocrates³¹ assures us of the fact; and Xenophon³²

²⁸ Life of Lyfias, prefixed to his Orations, p. 116.

²⁹ See Lyfias's pleadings throughout.

³⁰ Isocrates de Pace; and the numerous examples of that kind, which have already occurred in this history.

³¹ In his oration on reforming the government of Athens.

³² In his treatise de Republic. Athen.

affirms, that it is perfectly conformable to the nature and principles of the Athenian form of government. C H A P.
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With such principles and manners, the Athenians required only a daring and profligate leader, to involve them in designs the most extravagant and pernicious. Such a personage presented himself in Chares, whose soldier-like appearance, blunt address, and bold impetuous valor, masked his selfish ambition, and rendered him the idol of the populace. His person was gigantic and robust, his voice commanding, his manners haughty; he asserted positively, and promised boldly; and his presumption was so excessive, that it concealed his incapacity not only from others, but from himself. Though an enterprising and successful partisan, he was unacquainted with the great duties of a general; and his defects appear the more striking and palpable, when compared with the abilities of Iphicrates and Timotheus, his contemporaries, who prevailed as often by address as by force, and whose conquests were secured to the republic by the moderation, justice, and humanity, with which they had been obtained, and with which they continued to be governed. Chares proposed a very different mode of administration; he exhorted his countrymen to supply the defects of their treasury, and to acquire the materials of those pleasures which they regarded as essential to their happiness, by plundering the wealth of their allies and colonies. This counsel was too faithfully obeyed; the vexations, anciently exercised against the tributary and

The vices
of Chares
render
him the
favorite
of the
multi-
tude.

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XXXII.

The social
war.
Olymp.
ev. 3.
A. C. 358

dependent states, were renewed and exceeded³³. The weaker communities complained, and remonstrated, against this intolerable rapacity and oppression; while the islands of Chios, Coos, Rhodes, as well as the city of Byzantium, prepared openly to revolt, and engaged with each other to repel force by force, until they should obtain peace and independence³⁴.

Chares, probably the chief instrument, as well as the adviser, of the arbitrary measures which had occasioned the revolt, was sent out with a powerful fleet and army, to quash at once the hopes of the insurgents. He sailed towards Chios, with an intention to seize the capital of that island, which was supposed to be the centre and prime mover of rebellion. The confederates, informed of his motions, had already drawn thither the greatest part of their force. The city of Chios was besieged by sea and land. The islanders defended themselves with vigor. Chares found it difficult to repulse their sallies. His fleet attempted to enter their harbour without success; the ship of Chabrias alone penetrated thus far; and that able commander, whose valor and integrity merited a better fortune, though deserted by the fleet, yet forsook not the ship intrusted to him by the republic. His companions threw away their shields, and saved themselves by swimming to the Athenian squadron, which was still within their reach.

³³ Diodor. l. xvi. et Isocrat. de Pace.

³⁴ Diodor. l. xvi. pp. 413. 423.

But

But Chabrias, fighting bravely, fell by the darts of the Chians, preferring an honorable death to a disgraceful life³⁵. C H A P.
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Encouraged by advantages over an enemy who had at first affected to despise them, the insurgents augmented their fleet, and ravaged the isles of Lemnos and Samos. The Athenians, indignant that the territories of their faithful allies should fall a prey to the depredations of rebels, fitted out, early in the next year, a new armament under the command of Mnestheus, the son of Iphicrates, and son-in-law of Timotheus, expecting that the new commander would respectfully listen to the advice of those great men, who perhaps declined acting as principals in an expedition where Chares possessed any share of authority. That general had raised the siege of Chios, and now cruised in the Hellespont; where, being joined by Mnestheus, the united squadrons amounted to a hundred and twenty sail. It was immediately determined to cause a diversion of the enemy's forces from Samos and Lemnos, by laying siege to Byzantium. The design succeeded; the allies withdrew from these islands, collected their whole naval strength, and prepared vigorously for defending the principal city in their confederacy.

The hostile armaments approached each other, with a resolution to join battle, when a sudden and violent storm arose, which rendered it impossible for the Athenians to bear up to the enemy, or even to keep the sea, without being exposed to

Chares accuses Timotheus and Iphicrates.

³⁵ Nepos in Chabr. et Diodor. l. xvi. p. 423, et seqq.

C H A P. shipwreck. Chares alone confidently insisted on
 XXXII. commencing the attack, while the other commanders, more cautious and experienced, perceived the disadvantage, and declined the unequal danger³⁶. His impetuosity, thus over-ruled by the prudence of his colleagues, was converted into resentment and fury; he called the soldiers and sailors to witness their opposition, which he branded with every odious epithet of reproach; and, with the first opportunity, dispatched proper messengers to Athens, to accuse them of incapacity, cowardice, and total neglect of duty. The accusation was supported by venal orators in the pay of Chares.

Their
 trial;

Timotheus and Iphicrates were tried capitally. The former trusted to his innocence and eloquence; the latter used a very extraordinary expedient to sway the judges, conformable, however, to the spirit of that age, when courts of justice were frequently instruments of oppression, governed by every species of undue influence, easily corrupted and easily intimidated. The targeteers, or light infantry, who had been armed, disciplined, and long commanded, by Iphicrates, enjoyed the same reputation in Greece, which the *Fabian* soldiers afterwards did in Italy. They were called the *Iphicratenian* troops, from the name of their commander, to whom they owed their merit and their fame, and to whose person (notwithstanding the strictness of his discipline) they were strongly

³⁶ We are not informed by Diodorus or Nepos, why the disadvantage and danger were on the side of the Athenians; probably, being better sailors, they expected to profit of their skill in *manœuvre*, which the storm rendered useless and unavailing.

the ties of gratitude and esteem. The
and bravest of this celebrated band readily
the injunctions of their admired general;
ed, on the day of trial, the benches of the
ates; and took care seasonably to display
nts of their daggers ³⁷.

was the law of Athens, that, after prelimina-
had been adjusted, and the judges assembled,
parties should be heard, and the trial begun
ended on the same day; nor could any person
be twice tried for the same offence. The rapidity
of this mode of procedure favored the views of
Iphicrates. The magistrates were overawed by
the imminence of a danger, which they had neither
strength to resist nor time to elude. They were
compelled to an immediate decision; but, instead
of the sentence of death, which was expected, they
imposed a fine ³⁸ on the delinquents, which no
Athenian citizen in that age was in a condition to
pay. This severity drove into banishment those
able and illustrious commanders. Timotheus
failed to Chalcis in Eubœa, and afterwards to the
isle of Lesbos, both which places his valor and
abilities had recovered for the republic, and which,
being chosen as his residence in disgrace, sufficiently
evinced the mildness of his government, and his

and ba-
nishment.

³⁷ It was probably during this trial, that Iphicrates being re-
proached with betraying the interests of his country, asked his
accuser, "Would you, on a like occasion, have been guilty of
that crime?" "By no means," replied the other. "And can
you then imagine," replied the hero, "that Iphicrates, should be
guilty?" Quintilian. l. v. c. xii.

³⁸ One hundred talents, about twenty thousand pounds.

C H A P. moderation in prosperity. Iphicrates travelled
 XXXII. into Thrace, where he had long resided. He had
 formerly married the daughter of Cotys, the most
 considerable of the Thracian princes; yet he lived
 and died in obscurity³⁹; nor did either he or
 Timotheus thenceforth take any share in the af-
 fairs of their ungrateful country⁴⁰. Thus did the
 social war destroy or remove Iphicrates, Chabrias,
 and Timotheus, the best generals whom Greece
 could boast; and, the brave and honest Phocion
 excepted, the last venerable remains of Athenian
 virtue⁴¹.

Chares in-
 trusted
 with the
 sole con-
 duct of the
 war;
 Olymp.
 cv. 4
 A. C. 357.

By the removal of those great men, Chares was
 left to conduct, uncontrolled, the war against the
 allies; and to display the full extent of his worth-
 lessness and incapacity. His insatiable avarice
 rendered him intolerable to the friends of Athens;
 his weakness and negligence exposed him to the
 contempt of the insurgents. He indulged his
 officers and himself in a total neglect of discipline;
 the reduction of the rebels was the least matter of
 his concern; he was attended by an effeminate
 crowd of singers, dancers, and harlots⁴², whose

³⁹ Diodorus only says, that he was dead before the battle of
 Charonea, which happened twenty years after his banishment.

⁴⁰ Nepos says, that after the death of Timotheus, the Athe-
 nians remitted nine parts of his fine; but obliged his son Conon
 to pay the remaining tenth, for repairing the walls of the Piræus,
 which his grandfather had rebuilt from the spoils of the enemy.

⁴¹ *Military* virtue. Hæc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Athe-
 nensium, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus; neque post illorum obitum
 quisquam dux in illâ urbe fuit dignus memoriâ. Nepos in Timoth.
 The biographer forgets Phocion.

⁴² Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

luxury exhausted the scanty supplies raised by the Athenians for the service of the war⁴³. In order to satisfy the clamorous demands of the soldiers, Chares, regardless of the treaties subsisting between Athens and Persia, hired himself and his forces to Artabazus, the wealthy satrap of Ionia, who had revolted from his master Artaxerxes Ochus, the most cruel and detestable tyrant that ever disgraced the throne of Cyrus. The arms of the Greeks saved Artabazus from the implacable resentment of a monster incapable to pity or forgive; and their meritorious services were amply rewarded by the lavish gratitude of the satrap.

This transaction, how extraordinary soever it may appear to the modern reader, neither surprised nor displeased the Athenians. They were accustomed to allow their commanders in foreign parts to act without instructions or control; and the creatures of Chares loudly extolled his good management in paying the Grecian troops with Persian money. But the triumph of false joy was of short duration. Ochus sent an embassy to remonstrate with the Athenians on their unprovoked infraction of the peace; and threatened, that unless they immediately withdrew their forces from Asia, he would assist the rebels with a fleet of three hundred sail. This just menace, want of success against the confederates, together with a reason still more important, which will soon come to be fully explained, obliged the Athenians to recal

C H A P.
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which
ends dis-
gracefully
for the
Athe-
nians.
Olymp.
cvi. i.
A. C. 356.

⁴³ Demosthen. Philipp. i.

C H A P. their armament from the East, and to terminate
 XXXII. the social war, without obtaining any of the purposes for which it had been undertaken. The confederates made good the claims which their boldness had urged; regained complete freedom and independence⁴⁴; and lived twenty years exempt from the legal oppression of subsidies and contingents, till they submitted, with the rest of Greece, to the arms and intrigues of Philip, and the irresistible fortune of the Macedonians.

State of
 philoso-
 phy.

Notwithstanding the decay of martial spirit, the extravagance of public councils, and the general corruption of manners, which prevailed in Athens, and in other cities of Greece, the arts and sciences were still cultivated with ardor and success. During the period now under review, the scholars of Hippocrates and Democritus enriched natural philosophy with many important discoveries⁴⁵. The different branches of mathematics, mechanics, and astronomy, received great improvements from Eudoxus⁴⁶ of Cnidus, Timæus⁴⁷ of Locri, Archytas of Tarentum, and Meton of Athens⁴⁸. The Megaric school flourished under Stilpo, the most learned and acute of that disputatious sect, which, from its continual wranglings, merited the epithet of contentious⁴⁹. The doctrines of Aristippus were maintained by his daughter Arete,

⁴⁴ Diodor. p. 424.

⁴⁵ Galenus de Natur. Facultat. et Hippocrat. Περὶ αἰσθητικῶν, etc.

⁴⁶ Laert. l. viii. sect. 86. et Suid. in Eudox.

⁴⁷ Jambl. de Pythagor.

⁴⁸ Censorin. de Die natal.

⁴⁹ Εἰσιγική. Laert. l. vi. sect. 107.

and improved by Hegesias and Anneceris, who C H A P.
paved the way for Epicurus ⁵⁰. The severe philo- XXXII.
sophy of Antisthenes had fewer followers ⁵¹. But
Diogenes alone was equal to a sect ⁵².

Statuary was cultivated by Polycletus and Canachus of Sicyon, by Naucydes of Argos, and by innumerable artists in other cities of Greece, Italy, and Ionia. The works of Polycletus were the most admired. His greatest work was the colossal statue of Argive Juno, composed of gold and ivory. Bronze and marble, however, still furnished the usual materials for sculpture. The Grecian temples, particularly those of Delphi and Olympia, were enriched with innumerable productions of this kind, during the period to which our present observations relate. One figure of Polycletus acquired peculiar fame. From the exactness of the proportions ⁵³, it was called the rule, or standard. Even Lyfippus, the contemporary

Of the
fine arts.
Statuary.

⁵⁰ Laertius et Suidas. ⁵¹ Ælian. Var. Histor. l. x. c. xvi.

⁵² We shall have occasion to speak more fully of Diogenes hereafter.

⁵³ Winckelmann, p. 653. and his translator Mr Huber, vol. iii. p. 34. differ from Pliny, l. 35. c. 19. They confound the statue, called the Rule, or Canon, with another called the Doryphorus, because grasping a spear. Pliny's words are, Polycletus Sicyonius Diadumenum fecit molliter juvenem, centum talentis nobilitatum; idem et Doryphorum viriliter puerum. Fecit et quem canona artifices vocant, lineamenta artis ex eo petentes, velut a lege quadam; solusque hominum artem ipse (forse ipsam) fecisse, artis opere judicatur. " They have followed Cicero de Clar. Orator. c. 86.—yet Cicero, speaking incidentally on the subject, might more naturally mistake than Pliny, writing expressly on sculpture.

C H A P. and favorite of Alexander, regarded it as a model of excellence, from which it was imprudent to depart.

The
works of
Praxi-
teles.
Olymp.
ev. I.
A. C. 360.

Between Polycletus and Lyfippus flourished Praxiteles, whose works formed the intermediate shade between the sublime style, which prevailed in the age of Pericles, and the beautiful, which attained perfection under Lyfippus and Apelles, in the age of Alexander. The statues of Praxiteles bore a similar relation to those of Phidias, which the paintings of Guido and Correggio bear to those of Julio Romano and Raphael. The works of the earlier artists are more grand and more sublime, those of the later more graceful and more alluring; the first class being addressed to the imagination, the second to the senses. The works of Praxiteles were in the Ceramicus of Athens; but neither in the Ceramicus, nor in any part of the world, was a statue to be seen equal to his celebrated Venus, which long attracted spectators from all parts to Cnidus. Praxiteles made two statues of the goddess at the same time, the one clothed, the other naked. The decent modesty of the Coans preferred the former; the latter was purchased by the Cnidians, and long regarded as the most valuable possession of their community. The voluptuous Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, languished after this statue; to purchase such unrivalled charms he offered to pay the debts of Cnidus, which were immense; but the Cnidians determined not to part with an ornament from which their republic derived so much celebrity. "Having considered,"

says an ancient author ⁵⁴, “ the beautiful avenues leading to the temple, we at length entered the sacred dome. In the middle stands the statue of the goddess, in marble of Paros. A sweet smile sits on her lips; no garment hides her charms; the hand only, as by an instinctive impulse, conceals those parts which modesty permits not to name. The art of Praxiteles has given to the stone the softness and sensibility of flesh. O Mars, the most fortunate of the gods!” But it is impossible to translate his too faithful description into the decency of modern language; a description more animated and voluptuous than even the chisel of Praxiteles.

C H A P.
XXXII.
The Cnidian Venus.

The honor which Polycletus and Praxiteles acquired in sculpture, was, during the same age, attained in painting by Eupompus and Pamphilus of Sicyon, by Euphranor of Corinth, by Apollodorus and Nicias of Athens; above all by Zeuxis and Timanthes ⁵⁵. The works of

The state of painting.

⁵⁴ Lucian. Amor.

⁵⁵ Pliny, in his 35th book. I have paid little attention to his pretended Epochs of Art, when inconsistent with the information of more ancient authors. The Greek historians, from whom he copied this part of his work, found it convenient, at every pause in their narrative, to give some account of men who had distinguished themselves in the arts and sciences, of whom they had no opportunity to make mention in relating public transactions, and describing wars and negotiations. The æra of every peace furnished a proper resting-place to the historian; from which he looked back, and collected the names worthy to be handed down to posterity. Every such æra, therefore, Pliny, and after him Winckelman, have considered as an epoch of art; not reflecting, that arts do not suddenly arise and flourish,

C H A P. Eupompus are now unknown, but in his own times
 XXXII. his merit and celebrity occasioned a new division of the schools, which were formerly the Grecian and the Asiatic; but after Eupompus, the Grecian school was subdivided into the Athenian and Sicyonian. Pamphilus, and his scholar Apelles, gave fresh lustre to the latter school, which seems to have flourished longer than any other in Greece, since the paintings exhibited at the celebrated procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus were all the productions of Sicyonian masters ⁵⁶.

works of
 Pamphi-
 lus.

Few works of Pamphilus are described by ancient authors. His picture of the Heraclidæ, carrying branches of olive, and imploring the assistance of the Athenians, has not, however, escaped the vigilant eye of national vanity ⁵⁷. He was by birth a Macedonian, but well versed in literature and science, which he thought indispensably necessary to a painter. He received about two hundred pounds from each of his scholars, and seems to have been the first who put a high price on his works. He lived to enjoy his fame, and rendered his profession so fashionable, that it became customary in Sicyon, and afterwards in other parts of Greece, to instruct the sons of wealthy families in the arts of design. This liberal profession was forbidden to slaves; nor, during the

and when once they flourish, do not suddenly decay; since the mind long retains the impulse which it has received; and the active powers of man, when once directed to their proper objects, are not easily lulled to repose.

⁵⁶ Athen. Deipn. l. v. p. 196.

⁵⁷ Aristoph. Plut. v. 385.

existence of Grecian freedom, did any celebrated production in sculpture or painting come from fervile hands⁵⁸. C H A P. XXXII.

Euphranor the Corinthian excelled both in painting and statuary. The dignity of his heroes was admired. He painted the twelve gods. He said that *his* Theseus had fed on flesh, that of Parrhasius on roses. He wrote on colors and symmetry. Apollodorus the Athenian was deemed the first who knew the force of light and shade⁵⁹. His priest in prayer, and his Ajax struck with lightning, were held in high estimation. Nicias, his fellow-citizen, excelled in female figures, and in all the magic of coloring. His Calypso, Iö, and Andromeda, claimed just fame; but his greatest composition was the Necromanteia of Homer⁶⁰.

Of Euphranor.

Apollodorus.

Nicias.

⁵⁸ Plin. l. xxxv. c. xxxvi. sect. 8.

⁵⁹ This is the commendation of Plutarch. Pliny speaks more highly of Apollodorus. "Festinus ad lumina artis, in quibus primus refulsit Apollodorus Atheniensis . . . neque ante eum tabula ullius ostenditur, quæ teneat oculos." Pliny's praises often clash with each other. He frequently calls different persons the first in the art, and even in the same branch of it. The warmth of his fancy leaves him no time for calculating the weight of his expressions. His credulity, love of wonder, and inaccuracy, cannot be defended. Yet his judgments on pictures and statues are not without their merit; since the perfection of those works of art consists in making a deep impression, in transporting and elevating the affections, and in raising that glow of sentiment, which Pliny is so happy in communicating to his readers.

⁶⁰ Long before all the celebrated works of art, Homer had viewed nature with a picturesque eye. For the innumerable pictures copied from him, see Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. vi. p. 345. Homer gave the idea of what is grand and pathetic in intellect, which painters and statuary translated into what is touching and awful to the eye.

C H A P. Attalus king of Pergamus (for Nicias lived to a
XXXII. great age) offered twelve thousand pounds for this picture; but the artist, who was extremely wealthy, gave it in a present to his native country. Praxiteles, when asked which of his statues he most valued, answered, "Those of which the models were retouched by Nicias."

Zeuxis.

Zeuxis is said to have been born at Heraclea, but it is uncertain in which of the cities known by that name. He acquired great wealth by his works; at length he refused money, boasting that no price could pay them. The modesty of his Penelopé was equal to a lesson of morality. He painted Hercules strangling the serpents in the presence of the astonished Amphitryon and Alcmena. His picture dedicated in the temple of Juno Lucina, at Agrigentum, has been often mentioned. Being allowed to view the naked beauty of that populous city, it is known that he chose as models five virgins, whose united charms were expressed in this celebrated piece. His greatest work was Jupiter sitting on his throne, and surrounded by the gods⁶¹.

⁶¹ Valerius Maximus, l. iii. c. vii. speaks of his Helena painted for the city of Crotona. On his naked Helen Zeuxis inscribed the following lines of Homer:

Οὐ νεμεσις, Τρώας καὶ εὐκνημιδᾶς Ἀχαιῆς

Τοιᾶδ' ἀμείβεται γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀλγέα πάσχειν

Αἰνῶς ἀθανάτοισι θεῆς εἰσὶν ὥπασα.

Il. iii. v. 154.

"They cry'd, No wonder such celestial charms
 For nine long years have set the world in arms:

What winning graces! what majestic mien!

She moves a goddess, and she looks a queen."

POPE.

Timanthes reached the highest perfection of his art; but his genius surpassed the art itself. In his sacrifice of Iphigenia, a gradation of sorrow was seen in the faces of the spectators. It was carried to the utmost height, consistent with beauty, in the countenance of her uncle Menelaus. But Agamemnon, who was still more deeply afflicted with the unhappy fate of his daughter, veiled his face with his robe. In several others of his pieces,

C H A P.

XXXII.

Timanthes.

Pope has paraphrased the last line, "For she is wonderfully like to the immortal gods." This must have sounded nobly to the Greeks, who would doubtless have considered "looking a queen," as a sinking in poetry. But I have cited the lines, to show by what different means poetry and painting attain the same end. Both Homer and Zeuxis convey a high idea of Helen's beauty; but Homer does it by the effects of this beauty, which could animate the cold age of Priam, Panthoos, etc. whom he has just inimitably described:

Τηραι δὴ πολεμοιο πεπαυμένοι, ἀλλ' αὐγορηταί
Εσθλοί, τεττιγεσσιν εἰοικέτες ὅτε καὶ ὕλην
Δενδρεῶ εφεζόμενοι οὔα λειριοεσσάν ἱεῖσι.

When the Greek monk Constantinus Manasses (Chron. p. 20.) describes the beauty of Helen.

Ἦν ἡ γυνὴ περικαλλὴς εὐοφρὺς εὐχρηστάτη
Εὐπαρεῖος εὐπρόσωπος βοῶπις χιονοχρᾶς;

and so on, through a dozen of lines, the imagination of the reader cannot follow him; each epithet of beauty drives the preceding from the memory; and we fancy that we see a man laboriously rolling stones up one side of a hill, which immediately roll down the other. Ariosto's description of the beauty of Alcina. (cant. viii.) is in the same bad taste. How different is Virgil's "Pulcherrima Dido." Virgil knew the difference between poetical and picturesque images. Our English romances abound with examples of this species of bad taste, arising from mistaking the boundaries of distinct, though kindred, arts. See above, vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 312.

C H A P. Timanthes discovered the power of transporting
 XXXII. the mind beyond the picture. He painted to the fancy rather than to the eye. In his works, as in the descriptions of Homer and Milton, more was understood than expressed.

Expres-
 sion of
 Greek
 painting.

The power of expression was carried to a degree of perfection which it is not easy to believe, and scarcely possible to comprehend. The civil and military arrangements of the Greeks gave, doubtless, great advantages to their artists in this respect. Aristides, a Theban painter, represented the sack-
 ing of a town; among other scenes of horror, a child was painted clinging to the breast of its wounded mother, who "*felt and feared*", that after she was dead the child should suck blood instead of milk." Parrhasius of Ephesus, in an earlier age, personified the people of Athens, in a figure that characterized them as at once cruel and compassionate, proud and humble, brave and cowardly, elevated and mean. Such discriminations, as well as such complications of passion, are unquestionably beyond the reach of modern art, and will therefore, by many, be pronounced impossible. It is worthy of remark, that the same Parrhasius, who seems to have united the excellences of Dominichino, Raphael, and Correggio, was distinguished by the gliding motion of his outline, and the sweetness with which it melted into the ground."

"² These are the words of Pliny.

"³ Pliny considers this as the perfection of art. "*Hæc est in picturâ summa sublimitas. Corpora enim pingere et media*

Ideal beauty, just proportion, natural and noble attitudes, a uniform greatness of style, are acknowledged to have equally belonged to the ancient painters and statuaries. But the vanity or envy of modern times is unwilling to allow any merit to the former, which the remains of the latter do not justify and confirm. The Greek painters, therefore, have been supposed deficient in coloring; and this supposition has been supported by the words of Pliny: "With four colors only, Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, and Nicomachus produced those immortal works, which were singly purchased by the common-wealth of cities and republics." The colors were white, red, yellow, and black. It has been often said that with these only on his palette, a painter cannot color like nature, far less attain the magic of the *clair obscur*. Yet a great artist of our own country thinks that four colors are sufficient for every combination required. The fewer the colors, the cleaner, he observes, will be their effect. Two

C H A P.

XXXII.

Color-
ing.

rerum, est quidem magni operis; sed in quo multi gloriam tulerint. Extrema corporum facere, et desinentis picturae modum includere, rarum in successu artis invenitur. Ambire enim debet se extremitas ipsa, et sic desinere, ut promittant alia post se; ostentatque etiam quae occultat." Ibid. c. xxxvi. sect. 5. Mr. Falconet, in his observations on this passage, is of a different opinion. He thinks it more difficult to paint the middle parts, than the shades and tones which round the extremities of objects; because the former, though exposed to the light, must have their form, relief, depth, and all the tints of nature. He instances the heads painted by Rubens and Vandyck seen in front. Pliny, had he lived in later times, might have instanced, in his turn, the sweet outlines and inimitable softness of Correggio.

C H A P. colors mixed together will not preserve the bright-
 XXXII. nefs of either of them fingle, nor will three be as
 bright as two “.” Pliny fays, that Apelles fspread
 over his pictures, when finifhed, a transparent
 liquid like ink, which increafed the clearnefs and
 brilliancy of the whole, while it foftened the glare
 of too florid colors. This, according to the
 fame excellent painter, is a true and artist-like
 defcription of fcambling or glazing, as practifed
 by the Venetian fchool, and by Correggio, in
 whose works, as well as thofe mentioned by Pliny,
 it was perceptible only to fuch as clofely examined
 the picture. He very reafonably concludes, there-
 fore, that if the mafter-pieces of ancient paint-
 ing remained, we fhould probably find them as
 correctly drawn as the Laocoon, and as admir-
 ably colored as the glowing productions of
 Titian.

Clair ob-
 fcure.

That the Greeks were acquainted with the effect
 of the clair obfcure, or the diftribution of all the
 tones of light and fhade relatively to the different
 plans of the picture, has been denied by thofe who
 allow them the higheft excellence in coloring
 fingle figures. They might excel, it has been faid,
 in a folo, but were incapable of producing a full
 piece for a concert of different inftruments.
 Whether this obfervation be well founded can only
 be difcovered by carefully examining ancient
 authors, from whom it would appear that even

“ See Sir Joshua Reynolds's notes on Mr. Mafon's translation
 of Fresnoy's Art of Painting.

in this branch the Greek painters were not deficient⁶⁵.

Of all the arts cultivated during the period now under review, none attained higher proficiency than composition in prose. The history of Thucydides was continued by Xenophon; but we should form a very imperfect notion of this amiable writer were we to judge him by his Grecian history, to which he seems not to have put the last hand. Yet in this, as well as in his more finished works, we see the scholar of Socrates; and, of all others, the scholar who most resembled his master in his sentiment and expression⁶⁶, in the excellences as well as in the respectable weaknesses⁶⁷ of

C H A P.

XXXII.

Literary
composition.

Xeno-
phon.

His cha-
racter.

⁶⁵ In speaking of Nicias, Pliny says, "Lumen et umbras custodivit, atque ut eminent à tabulis picturæ maxime custodivit." Unless the *clair obscure* be meant the second member of this sentence is a pleonasm. Another passage is highly to the purpose, l. xxxv. c. xi. "Tandem se ars ipsa distinxit, et invenit lumen atque umbras, differentiâ colorum alternâ viâ sese excitante. Deinde adjectus est splendor, alius hic quam lumen: quem, quia inter hoc et umbram esset, appellaverunt tonon; commissuras verò colorum et transitus, harmogen." *Clair obscure* in painting is something like counterpoint in music; and if the ancients cultivated neither of them, perhaps the more substantial parts of the arts lost nothing by the neglect. In melody and design, effect and expression, they probably excelled the most boasted productions of later ages.

⁶⁶ See the description which Alcibiades gives of Socrates's eloquence, in Plato's Symposium.

⁶⁷ It is remarkable that the superstitious belief of Xenophon in celestial warnings, of which see innumerable examples, particularly Anabaf. l. iii. c. i. l. v. c. viii. and l. vi. c. i. never encouraged him to any thing imprudent or hurtful, and never restrained him from any thing useful or virtuous. The admonitions likewise of Socrates's dæmon were always the same with the dictates of right reason.

C H A P. his character. The same undeviating virtue, the
 XXXII. same indefatigable spirit, the same erect probity,
 the same diffusive benevolence, the same credulity,
 the same enthusiasm, together with that unaffected
 propriety of thought and diction, whose native
 graces outshine all ornaments of art.

His mili-
 tary expe-
 ditions.

This admirable personage, who, had he lived
 before the Athenians were grown too conceited to
 learn, and too corrupt to mend, might have proved
 the saviour of his country, reached his fiftieth
 year in a happy obscurity, enjoying the confiden-
 tial society of Socrates and a few select friends.
 Of these Proxenus, an illustrious Theban exile,
 who well knew the worth of Xenophon, invited
 him to Sardis, from a desire to introduce him to
 Cyrus, the brother of Artaxerxes, and governor
 of Lower Asia, whose friendship he himself had
 found more valuable than the precarious honors
 of his capricious and ungrateful republic. Xeno-
 phon communicated the proposal to Socrates, who,
 suspecting that the Athenians might not relish his
 friend's design, because the Persians were then
 allied with Sparta, desired him to consult the ora-
 cle of Delphi⁶⁸. This counsel was but partially fol-
 lowed; for Xenophon, who seems to have been
 fond of the journey, asked not the oracle whether
 it ought to be undertaken, but only by virtue of
 what prayers and sacrifices it might be rendered
 successful. Socrates approved not this precipita-
 tion; yet as the god had answered, he thought it

⁶⁸ Anabaf. l. v. p. 356, et seqq.

necessary for Xenophon to obey. The important consequences of this resolution to the Ten thousand Greeks who followed the standard of Cyrus, have been related in a former part of this work. After his glorious retreat from Upper Asia, Xenophon remained several years on the western coast, and shared the victories of his admired Agesilaus, with whom he returned to Greece, and conquered in the battle of Coronæa.

Meanwhile a decree of banishment passed against him in Athens. But having acquired considerable riches in his Asiatic expedition, he had deposited them at Ephesus with the Sacristan of Diana's temple, with this injunction, that if he perished in battle, his wealth should be employed in honor of the goddess. Having survived the bloody engagement of Coronæa, which he afterwards so affectingly described in his Hellenica, he settled in the town of Scilluns, a new establishment formed by the Lacedæmonians, scarce three miles distant from Olympia. Megabyzus, the Sacrist of Diana, came to behold the games, and faithfully restored his deposit, with which Xenophon, as enjoined by an oracle, purchased in that neighbourhood a beautiful spot of ground, watered by the Sellenus, a name which coincided with that of the river near Ephesus. On the banks of Elia Sellenus, Xenophon erected a temple, incomparably smaller indeed, yet similar in form to the great temple of Diana. His image of the goddess resembled that at Ephesus, as much as a figure in cypress could resemble a statue of gold. The banks of the river

C H A P.
XXXII.

His religious and literary retreat.

C H A P. were planted with fruit trees. The surrounding
XXXII. plains and meadows afforded excellent pasture. The adjoining forests and mountains abounded in wild boar, red deer, and other species of game. There Xenophon's sons often hunted with the youth of the neighbouring towns and villages; and the whole inhabitants of the country round were invited and entertained by him at an annual festival sacred to Diana. A modest inscription on a marble column, erected near the temple, testified the holiness of the place. "This spot is dedicated to Diana. Let him, whoever shall possess it, employ the tenth of its annual produce in sacrifice, and the remainder in keeping in repair, and in adorning the temple. His neglect will not be overlooked by the goddesses⁶⁹." By this inscription, wherein Xenophon ventures not to mention the name of the founder, his mind seems to forebode the calamities which at last befel him. In the war between the Lacedæmonians and Elians, the town of Scilluns, together with the circumjacent territory, was seized by Elian troops; and the amiable philosopher and historian, who had, in this delightful retreat, composed those invaluable works, which will inspire the last ages of the world with the love of virtue, was compelled, in the decline of life, to seek refuge in the corrupt and licentious city of Corinth.

His works.

His Expedition, his Grecian History, his description of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian govern-

⁶⁹ Xenoph. Anabaf. l. v. p. 356, et seqq.

ments, have been noticed in their proper place. C H A P. XXXII.
 The *Cyropædeia*, or institutions of the elder Cyrus, is a philosophical romance, intended to exemplify the doctrines, taught by Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, and to prove the success which naturally attends the practice of wisdom and virtue in the great affairs of war and government. The highest panegyric of this work is, that many learned men have mistaken it for a true history, and, deceived by the inimitable *naïveté* and persuasiveness of the narrative, have believed it possible that, during the various stages of a long life, Cyrus should have invariably followed the dictates of the sublimest philosophy. In his *Oeconomics*, Xenophon undertakes the humbler but not less useful task, of regulating the duties of domestic life. The dialogue, entitled *Hiero*, paints the misery of tyrants contrasted with the happiness of virtuous princes, in colors so lively, and in lines so expressive, that an admirer of the ancients might challenge the ingenuity of modern ages to add a single stroke to the picture. In speaking of the works of Xenophon, we must not forget his treatise on the Revenues of Athens. It was written long after his banishment. Instead of resenting the obdurate cruelty of his countrymen, he gave them most judicious and seasonable advice concerning the improvement of the public revenues, which, there is reason to believe, was in part adopted.

The orators Lyfias and Ifocrates flourished in the period now under review. The former was distinguished by the refined subtilty of his pleadings ; The orators Lyfias and Ifocrates.

C H A P. the latter by the polished elegance of his moral
XXXII. and political orations ⁷⁰. Isocrates ventured not to speak in public, neither his constitution nor his voice admitting the great exertions necessary for that purpose. His school of oratory and composition was frequented by the noblest youths of Athens, of the neighbouring republics, and even by foreign princes; and as his maxims were borrowed from the Socratic school, his long and honorable labors tended to keep alive some sparks of virtue among his degenerate countrymen ⁷¹.

Plato.
 His birth
 and edu-
 cation.

But the man of learning in that age, whose abilities, if properly directed, might have most benefited his contemporaries, was the celebrated Plato, a man justly admired, yet more extraordinary than admirable. The same memorable year which produced the Peloponnesian war gave birth to Plato. He was descended from the Codridæ, the most illustrious as well as the most opulent family in Athens. His education was worthy of his birth. The gymnastic formed and invigorated his body; his mind was enlarged and enlightened by the studies of poetry ⁷² and geometry, from which he derived that acuteness of judgment, and that warmth of fancy, which, being both carried to excess, render him at once the most subtile and the most flowery writer of antiquity ⁷³. In his twentieth

⁷⁰ See the lives of Lysias and Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of their works. ⁷¹ Idem, *ibid.* ⁷² Diogen. Laert. l. ii.

⁷³ Plato's Dialogues are so different from each other, in point of thought and expression, that, if we knew not the versatility

year he became acquainted with Socrates; and having compared his own poetical productions with those of his immortal predecessors in this walk of literature, he committed the former to the flames, and totally addicted himself to philosophy. During eight years he continued an assiduous hearer of Socrates; an occasional ⁷⁴ indisposition prevented him from assisting at the last conversations of the sage, before he drank the fatal hemlock. Yet these conversations, as related to him by persons who were present, Plato has delivered down to the admiration of posterity; and the affecting sensibility with which he minutely describes the inimitable behaviour of Socrates, on this trying occasion, proves how deeply the author was interested in his subject.

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Fear or disgust removed the scholar of Socrates from the murderers of his master. Having spent some time in Thebes, Elis, and Megara, where he enjoyed the conversation of several of his fellow-disciples, the love of knowledge carried him of his genius, it would be difficult to believe them the works of one man. He is over-refined, wire-drawn, and trifling, in the *Cratylus*, *Parmenides*, *Meno*, *Theætetus*, and *Sophistes*. He is flowery, pompous, and tumid, in his *Timæus*, *Panegyric*, *Symposium*, and *Phædrus*. But in those invaluable writings, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Alcibiades*, *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, and the greater part of his books of laws, in which he adheres to the doctrines of Socrates, and indulges, without art or affectation, the natural bent of his own genius, his style is inimitably sweet and attractive, always elegant, and often sublime. His *Republic*, which is generally considered as the greatest work, abounds in all the beauties, and in all the deformities, for which he is remarkable. See *Dionys. Halicarn. de Platon*.

His
travels.

⁷⁴ Ἰλαστων δὲ (οἰμοῖ) ἡσθενεῖ. *Phædo*, 2.

C H A P. to Magna Græcia; from thence he sailed to
 XXXII. Cyrené, attracted by the fame of the mathematician Theodorus; Egypt next deserved his curiosity, as the country to which the science of Theodorus owed its birth, and from which the Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia derived several tenets of their philosophy.

He settles
 in the
 academy.

At his return to Athens, Plato could have little inclination to engage in public life. The days were past when the virtues of a Solon, or of a Lycurgus, could reform the manners of their countrymen. In early periods of society, the example and influence of one able and disinterested man may produce a happy revolution in the community of which he is a member. But in the age of Plato, the Athenians had fallen into dotage and imbecillity. His luxuriant fancy compares them sometimes to old men, who have outlived their senses, and with whom it is vain to reason; sometimes to wild beasts, whom it is dangerous to approach; sometimes to an unfruitful soil, that choaks every useful plant, and produces weeds only⁷⁵. He prudently withdrew himself from a scene, which presented nothing but danger or disgust, and purchased a small villa in the suburbs near the academy, or gymnasium, that had been so elegantly adorned by Cimon⁷⁶. To this retirement, his fame attracted the most illustrious characters in his age: the noblest youths of Athens daily frequented the school of Plato; and here he

⁷⁵ Republic, l. vi. p. 38.

⁷⁶ See above, vol. ii. p. 207.

continued above forty years, with little interruption except from his voyages into Sicily, instructing his disciples, and composing his dialogues, to which the most distinguished philosophers in ancient and modern times are greatly indebted, without excepting those who reject his doctrines, and affect to treat them as visionary.

The capacious mind of Plato embraced the whole circle of science. The objects of human thought had, previously to his age, been reduced, by the Pythagoreans, to certain classes or genera⁷⁷; the nature of truth had been investigated; and men had distinguished the relations⁷⁸, which the predicate of any proposition can bear to its subject. The sciences had already been divided into the natural and moral; or, in the language of Plato, into the knowledge of divine and human things. The frivolous art of syllogism was not as yet

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General
character
of his
philoso-
phy.

⁷⁷ Many less perfect divisions had probably been made before. Archytas of Tarentum distinguished the ten Categories. Simplicius et Jamblichus apud Fr. Patricium, *Discuss. Peripatet.* t. ii. p. 182. This division, the most perfect of any that philosophers have yet been able to discover, Plato learned from Archytas. It consisted in substances and modes. The former are either primary, as all individual substances, which neither are in any other subject, nor can be predicated of it; or secondary, which subsist in the first, and can be predicated of them, to wit, the genera and species of substances. Of modes there are nine kinds, quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, having, doing, and suffering. *Aristot. de Categor.*

⁷⁸ These are called by logicians the five Predicables, or more properly, the five classes of Predicates. They are the genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident. The use of these distinctions is universal in every subject requiring definition and division; yet if meant to comprehend whatever may be affirmed of any subject the enumeration is doubtless incomplete.

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invented; and the Logic of Plato⁷⁹ was confined to the more useful subjects of definition and division, by means of which he attempted to fix and ascertain not only the practical doctrines of morals and politics, but the abstruse and shadowy speculations of mystical theology. It is much to be regretted that this great and original genius should have mistaken the proper objects as well as the natural limits of the human understanding, and that most of the inquiries of Plato and his successors should appear extremely remote from the public transactions of the times in which they lived. Yet the speculations in which they were engaged, how little soever they may be connected with the political revolutions of Greece, seem too interesting in themselves to be entirely omitted in this historical work, especially when it is considered that the philosophy of Plato and his disciples has been very widely diffused among all the civilized nations of the world; that, during many centuries, it governed with uncontrolled sway the opinions of the speculative part of mankind; and that the same philosophy still influences the reasonings, and divides the sentiments, of the learned in modern Europe.

Difficulty
of ex-
plaining
and a-
bridging
his doc-
trines-

The lively, but immethodical, manner in which the opinions of Plato are explained by himself, renders it difficult to collect and abridge them. The great number of interlocutors in his dialogues,

⁷⁹ The science properly called Logic was invented by Aristotle; the division of the sciences into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, was first given by his contemporary Xenocrates. Vid. Brucker, de Aristot. et Xenocrat. Of Aristotle more hereafter.

the irony of Socrates, and the continual inter- C H A P.
mixture of Plato's own sentiments with those of XXXII.
his master, heighten the difficulty, and make it
impossible, from particular passages, to judge of
the scope and tendency of the whole. The works
of Xenophon, however, may enable a diligent
student to separate the pure ore of Socrates from
the adventitious matter with which it is combined
in the rich vein of Platonism; and by carefully
comparing the different parts of the latter, he
may with certainty determine the principal designs
of its author.

From this view of the subject, it would appear
that Plato aimed at nothing less, than to reconcile
the appearances of the natural and moral world
with the wise government of a self-existent un-
changeable cause; to explain the nature and origin
of the human mind, as well as of its various
powers of perception, volition, and intellect; and,
on principles resulting from these discoveries, to
build a system of ethics, which, in proportion as
it were followed by mankind, would promote not
only their independence and security in the present
world, but their happiness and perfection in a
future state of existence.

The great
views of
that Philo-
sopher.

Let us look where we will around us, we shall
every-where, said Plato, perceive a passing pro-
cession⁸⁰: the objects which compose the material

His theo-
logy.

⁸⁰ This was borrowed from Heraclitus, who expressed the
same idea, by saying, that all corporeal things were in a per-
petual flux. Vid. Platon. in Theætet. p. 83. et in Sophist. p. 108.

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world, arise, change, perish, and are succeeded by others, which undergo the same revolutions⁸¹. One body moves another, which impels a third, and so forwards in succession; but the first cause of motion resides not in any of them. This cause acts not fortuitously; the regular motions of the heavenly bodies⁸², the beautiful order of the seasons, the admirable structure of plants and animals, announce an intelligent Author⁸³. It is difficult by searching to find out the nature of the Divinity, and impossible by words to describe it; yet the works which he has done, attest his power, his wisdom, and his goodness, to be greater than human imagination can conceive⁸⁴. In the self-existent cause, these attributes must unite. He is therefore unchangeable⁸⁵, since no alteration can increase his perfections, and it would be absurd to suppose him ever inclined to diminish them⁸⁶.

Cosmo-
gony.

Impelled by his goodness, the Deity, viewing in his own intellect the ideas or archetypes of all possible existence, formed the beautiful arrangement of the universe from that rude indigested matter, which, existing from all eternity, had been for ever animated by an irregular principle of

⁸¹ Timæus, sub initio.

⁸² By these he meant the fixed stars; the motions of the planets he ascribed to another cause, as will appear below.

⁸³ Plato de Legibus, l. x. p. 609.

⁸⁴ Timæus, p. 477. et de Repub. l. ii. p. 144.

⁸⁵ For the immutability of the Deity, Plato, contrary to his general custom, condescends to use an argument from induction: "Even of material things, the most perfect least feel the effects of time, and remain longest unaltered." De Repub. p. 150.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 150.

motion²⁷. This principle, which Plato calls the irrational soul of the world, he thought sufficiently attested, in the innumerable deviations from the established laws of nature, in the extravagant passions of men, and in the physical and moral evil, which, in consequence of these deviations and passions, so visibly prevail in the world. Without admitting a certain stubborn intractability, and disorderly wildness, essential to matter, and therefore incapable of being entirely eradicated or subdued, it seemed impossible to explain the origin of evil under the government of Deity²⁸.

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From these rude materials, God, according to the fanciful doctrine of Plato, formed the four elements, and built the beautiful structure of the heavens and the earth, after the model of those eternal exemplars²⁹, or patterns, which subsist in

Plato's
doctrine
of ideas.

²⁷ Politic. p. 120, et seqq. et Timæus, passim.

²⁸ De Legibus, l. x. p. 608. Philem. p. 160.

²⁹ These exemplars, or παραδειγματα, are the *ideas* of Plato, which were so much misrepresented by many of the later Platonists, or Eclectics. He names them, indifferently, *ιδεας*, *ειδη*, *εικονας*, τα κατὰ ταυτα, et ὁσωντως εχοντα. The two last expressions are used to distinguish them from the fleeting and perishable forms of matter. Plato represents these ideas as existing in the divine intellect, as beings entirely mental, not objects of any of the senses, and not circumscribed by place or time. By the first universal Cause, these ideas were infused into the various species of created beings, in whom (according to Ammonius, in Porphyry. Introduct. p. 29.) they existed, as the impression of a seal exists in the wax to which it has been applied. In its pre-existent state, the human mind viewed these *intelligible* forms in their original seat, the field of truth. But since men were imprisoned in the body, they receive these ideas from external objects, as explained in the text. Such is the doctrine of Plato. But many of the later Platonists, and even several

C H A P. the divine Intelligence⁹⁰. Considering that beings
 XXXII. possessed of mental powers were far preferable to those destitute of such faculties, God infused into the corporeal world a rational soul, which, as it could not be immediately combined with body, he united to the active, but irrational principle, essentially inherent in matter⁹¹. Having thus formed and animated the earth, the sun, the moon, and the other visible divinities, the great Father of spirits proceeded to create the invisible gods and dæmons⁹², whose nature and history Plato describes with a respectful reverence for the religion

writers of the present age, have imagined that he ascribed to ideas a separate and independent existence. Vid. Brucker, *Histor. Philosoph.* p. 695, et seqq. Gedike, *Histor. Philosoph. ex Ciceron. Collect.* p. 183, et seqq. Monboddo, *Origin of Language*, vol. i. c. ix. Of all the absurdities embraced by philosophers, this doubtless would be the greatest, to believe eternal unchangeable patterns of the various genera and species of things existing apart, and independent of the mind by which these abstract notions are conceived. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that many writers of the Alexandrian school, whose extravagant fancies could fix and embody metaphysical abstractions, and realise intellectual ideas, should animate and personify the *λογον τῆς θεᾶς*, the divine intellect, in which, according to Plato, these ideas resided, and from which they were communicated to other intelligences. The same visionary fanatics who discovered, in the *λογος* of Plato, the second person of the Trinity, recognised the Holy Spirit in his Soul of the World; but as this irrational principle of motion ill corresponded to the third person of the Godhead, they invented an hyper-cosmian soul, concerning which Plato is altogether silent. See the *Encyclopedie*, article *Eclectique*. Brucker. *Hist. Philosoph.* vol. i. p. 712, et seqq. et Meiner's *Beytrag zur Geschichte der Denkart der ersten Jahrhunderte nach Christi Geburt in einigen Betrachtungen über die neue Platonische Philosophie*.

⁹⁰ Timæus, *Polit.* l. vi.

⁹¹ *Ib.* p. 477, et seqq.

⁹² Timæus, p. 480.

of his country⁹³. After finishing this great work, the God of gods, again contemplating the ideal forms in his own mind, perceived there the exemplars of three species of beings, which he realised in the mortal inhabitants of the earth, air, and water. The task of forming these sensible, but irrational beings, he committed to the inferior divinities; because, had this last work likewise proceeded from his own hands, it must have been immortal like the gods⁹⁴. The souls of men, on the other hand, he himself formed from the remainder of the rational soul of the world. They first existed in the state of dæmons, only invested with a thin æthereal body. Having offended God by neglecting their duty, they were condemned to unite with the gross corporeal mass, by which their divine faculties are so much clogged and encumbered⁹⁵.

It was necessary briefly to explain the metaphysical theology of Plato, how visionary soever it may appear, because the doctrine of ideal forms, together with that of the pre-existent state of the human mind, are the main pillars of his philosophy. Before their incarceration in the body, the souls of men enjoyed the presence of their Maker; and contemplated the unchangeable ideas and essences of things in the field of truth. In viewing and examining these eternal archetypes of order, beauty, and virtue, consisted the noblest energy, and highest perfection of celestial spirits⁹⁶, which,

Plato's
morals.

⁹³ Apolog. Socratis.

⁹⁴ Timæus, p. 480, et 481.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Repub. l. vi. Phædrus, Philebus, etc.

C H A P. being emanations of the Deity, can never rest
 XXXII. satisfied with objects and occupations unworthy their divine original. But in their actual state, men can perceive, with their corporeal senses, only the fleeting images and imperfect representations of these immutable essences of things, in the fluctuating objects of the material world, which are so little steady and permanent, that they often change their nature and properties, even while we view and examine them⁹⁷. Beside this, our senses themselves are liable to innumerable disorders; and unless we are constantly on the watch, never fail to deceive us⁹⁸. Hence the continual errors in our judgments of men and things; hence the improper ends we pursue; hence the very inadequate means by which we seek to attain them; hence, in one word, all the errors and misery of life. Yet even in this degraded state, to which men were condemned for past offences, their happiness ceases not to be an object of care to the Deity. As none can rise so high, none can sink so low, as to escape the eye and arm of the Almighty⁹⁹. The divine Providence observes and regulates the meanest, as well as the greatest, of its productions. But the good of the part being subordinate to that of the whole, it is necessary that each individual should be rewarded or punished, in proportion as he fulfils the task assigned him. It is by the performance of his duty alone, that man can regain the favor of his Maker¹⁰⁰; for

⁹⁷ Phædo, Timæus, etc.⁹⁸ Phædo, p. 31. et Repub. l. v.⁹⁹ De Legibus.¹⁰⁰ Eutyphron.

it is ridiculous to think that this inestimable benefit can be purchased by rich presents and expensive sacrifices. Religion cannot be a traffic of interest¹⁰¹. What can we offer to the gods, which they have not first bestowed on us? Will they thank us for restoring their own gifts? It is absurd to think it. To please the Divinity, we must obey his will concerning us; nor can we comply with the purpose of our creation, and fulfil our destiny, without aspiring at those noble powers with which we were originally endowed¹⁰²; and which, even in our present degenerate state, it is still possible, by proper diligence, to recover¹⁰³.

Our senses give us information of external objects, which are stored up in the memory, and variously combined by the imagination¹⁰⁴. But it is remarkable that those ideas, thus acquired and retained have the power of suggesting others far more accurate and perfect than themselves, and which, though excited by material objects, cannot be derived from them, unless (which is impossible) the effect were more beautiful and perfect than the cause. That we possessed, in a pre-existent state, those ideas which modern philosophers refer by an easy solution to the powers of generalization and abstraction¹⁰⁵, Plato thought evident from the

His account of the origin of human knowledge.

¹⁰¹ Repub. l. ii. p. 100, et seqq.

¹⁰² Minos, p. 510. Timæus, p. 500.

¹⁰³ Repub. l. v.

¹⁰⁴ Theætet. p. 85, et seqq. et Philem. 184, et seqq.

¹⁰⁵ The ancients were not ignorant of this philosophy. Simplicius, speaking of the origin of intelligible forms, or ideas, in

C. H. A. P. facility with which we recalled them ¹⁰⁶. Of this
 XXXII. he gave an example in Meno's slave, who, when properly questioned by Socrates, easily recollected and explained many properties of numbers and figures, although he had never learned the sciences of arithmetic and geometry ¹⁰⁷. According to Plato, therefore, all science consisted in reminiscence, in recalling the nature, proportions, and relations of those uniform and unchangeable essences, about which the human mind had originally been conversant, and after the model of which all created things were made ¹⁰⁸. These intellectual forms, comprehending the true essences of things, were the only proper objects of solid and permanent science ¹⁰⁹; their fluctuating representatives

the human mind, says, ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέροις ἐννοίαις κατὰ ἑαυτὰ ὑπέστησάμεν: "We ourselves, abstracting them in our thoughts, have, by this abstraction, given them an existence in themselves." Simp. in Præd. p. 17.

¹⁰⁶ Menon. p. 344.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Repub. l. vi.

¹⁰⁹ Επισήμη, science, in opposition to δόξα, opinion. The material world, he called το δόξαζον, that of which the knowledge admitted of probability only. Repub. l. v. The *ideas* of Plato, which, according to that philosopher, formed the sole objects of real and certain knowledge, were powerfully combated by his scholar and rival Aristotle. Yet the latter, who was so sharply fought to the faults of Plato, never accuses him of maintaining the separate and independent existence of intellectual forms. The obscure passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, p. 201, which has been construed into such an accusation, means nothing more, than that Socrates regarded the τὰ καθ' ὅλγ, general ideas, as differing in no respect from our notions of the genera and species of things; whereas Plato made a distinction between them, assert-

in the material world, the actions and virtues of men, the order and beauty visible in the universe, were only so far real and substantial as they corresponded to their divine archetypes¹¹⁰; but as this correspondence never became complete, the examination of the perishing objects of sense could only afford us unsteady and uncertain notions, fleeting and fugitive like themselves¹¹¹. From these observations, Plato thought it evident, that

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Of the
powers of
percep-
tion and
intellect.

ing these ideas to have existed in the divine intellect before the creation, etc. as explained in the text. Aristotle discusses the doctrine of ideas more perspicuously in his *Ethics to Nicomachus*, l. i. c. vi. He regards them as mere fictions of the fancy, and the knowledge founded on them as altogether visionary. "The idea of good," he observed, "might be applied to substances, as the Deity, the mind of man; to qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as mediocrity; to time, as the juncture or nick of time; in short through all the categories. There is not, therefore, any one general idea of good common to all these. Were there one idea, the same in all, there could be but one science respecting it. But there are many, physic, gymnastic, the military art, etc. which all have some good in view. Things are good in themselves, or good as means to an end. But even those things which are ultimately good, as wisdom, honor, pleasure, are not comprehended under any one definition of good, though distinguished by the same epithet from some analogy or resemblance, as the understanding is called the eye of the mind. If there is any such general idea, it is surely incapable of being applied to any practical use; not as a model, otherwise the arts and sciences, all of which have some good in view, would continually have this model before them. Yet they all neglect it, and justly; for what benefit could they derive from this abstract idea? A physician, for instance, contemplates not health in that general manner, but the health of man, or rather of a particular man, who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only his art is concerned."

¹¹⁰ *Parmen.* p. 140.

¹¹¹ *Repub.* l. vii.

C H A P. the duty and happiness of men consisted in with-
 xxxii. drawing themselves from the material, and approaching the intellectual world¹¹², to which their own natures were more congenial. To promote this purpose was the great aim of his philosophy. If we were deceived by the senses, he observed, that we were still more fatally endangered by the passions, those flimsy sails of the mind, which were expanded and agitated by every varying gust of imagined good or evil¹¹³. The pains and pleasures of the body were all of a mixed kind, and nearly allied to each other. The God who arranged the world, desirous to unite and incorporate these seemingly opposite natures, had at least joined their summits; for pleasure was nothing else but a rapid cessation of pain; and the liveliest of our bodily enjoyments were preceded by uneasiness, and followed by languor¹¹⁴. To illustrate the necessity of governing with a strong hand the appetites and passions, Plato compared the soul to a little republic, composed of different faculties or orders¹¹⁵. The judging or reasoning faculty, justly entitled to the supremacy, was seated, as in a firm citadel, in the head; the senses were its guards and servants; the various desires and affections were bound to pay it obedience.

Of the
 passions.

Of these desires, which were all of them the natural subjects of the ruling faculty, Plato

¹¹² *Repub.* p. 134. et *Phæd.* p. 26.

¹¹³ *Phædrus.*

¹¹⁴ *Philem.* et *Repub.* l. ii. p. 262, et seqq.

¹¹⁵ *Repub.* l. iv.

distinguished two orders, ever ready to rebel against their master. The first consisted of those passions which are founded in pride and resentment, or in what the schoolmen called the irascible part of the soul¹¹⁶; and were seated in the breast. The second consisted of those passions which are founded in the love of pleasure, or in what the schoolmen called the concupiscible¹¹⁷ part of the soul, and were seated in the belly, and inferior parts of the body. These different orders, though commonly at variance with each other, were alike dangerous to the public interest, and unless restrained by the wisdom and authority of their sovereign, must inevitably plunge the little republic of man into the utmost disorder and misery¹¹⁸.

Yet, according to Plato, both these sets of passions were, in the present state of things, necessary parts of our constitution; and, when properly regulated, became very useful subjects. The irascible asserted our rank and dignity, defended us against injuries, and when duly informed and tempered by reason, taught us with becoming fortitude to despise dangers and death, in pursuit of what is honorable and virtuous. The concupiscible provided for the support and necessities of the body; and, when reduced to such submission as to reject every gratification not approved by reason, gave rise to the virtue of temperance. Justice

Of the virtues; and wisdom the greatest virtue.

¹¹⁶ The *To θυμωδεις* of Plato.

¹¹⁷ The *To επιθυμητικον* of Plato. Both are included under what Plato and Aristotle call the *ορετικον*, the seat of the desires and passions.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 254.

C H A P. took place, according to Plato, when reason directed and passion obeyed, and when each passion performed its proper office, and acknowledged due respect towards its superior. In the strength, acuteness, and perfection of the ruling faculty, consisted the virtue of prudence, the great source and principle of all other virtues, without which temperance, fortitude, and even justice itself, were nothing but empty shadows, that deluded the ignorant vulgar. In the exercise of prudence or wisdom, man resembled his Maker, and contemplated those intellectual forms, which taught him to discern with certainty the ends proper to be pursued, and the means necessary to attain them. The wise man compares the mind with the body, eternity with time, virtue with pleasure. He thus learns to despise the inferior parts of his nature, to defy its pains, to disdain its pleasures. Without attaining this true elevation of mind, he never can be virtuous or happy, since whoever depends on the body, must consider death as an evil, the fear of which can only be overcome by some greater terror, so that in him who is not truly wise, fortitude itself must be the effect of timidity¹¹⁹. In the same manner, his pretended moderation and temperance will spring from the impure source of the opposite vices. He will deny himself some pleasures, to attain others which he regards as more valuable, and will submit to small pains to avoid the greater¹²⁰. He thus continues through life,

¹¹⁹ *Repub.* l. vi.¹²⁰ *Phædo*, p. 26, et seqq.

exchanging one trifle for another; a traffic which never can enrich him, while he rejects wisdom, the only precious merchandise.

But the temple of wisdom is, according to Plato, situate on a rock, which few men have the strength to ascend¹²¹. This difference of ability proceeds from various causes: 1. At their creation, all minds were not alike excellent and perfect¹²². 2. They were not alike criminal during their pre-existent state¹²³. 3. The gross bodies which they now inhabit are variously moulded, some being too strong, others too weak, and very few in just harmony with the divine principle by which they are animated¹²⁴. 4. Early institution and example occasion great differences among them. Such, indeed, is the power of education and habit, that the errors and crimes of men are less chargeable on those who commit them, than on their parents, guardians, and instructors¹²⁵; and it seems hardly possible for those who have the misfortune to be born in a licentious age and country, to attain wisdom and virtue. Even when the most favorite circumstances unite, the mind must still, however, have a tendence to degenerate, while united with matter¹²⁶. The body, therefore, must be continually exercised and subdued by the gymnastic, the soul must be purified and ennobled by philosophy. Without such attention, men can neither reach the perfection of

C H A P.
XXXII.

Causes of
the diver-
sity of
moral cha-
racter.

¹²¹ Repub. l. vi. p. 74.

¹²² Phædrus.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Timæus.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid. p. 484. et Repub. passim.

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Plato's
fage.Immor-
tality of
the soul.State of
retribu-
tion.

their nature, nor, when they have reached it, maintain that elevated post, from which they look down with compassion on the errors and misery of their fellow-creatures¹²⁷.

In the description of his imaginary fage, Plato employs the colors which were afterwards borrowed by the Stoics and Epicureans. But neither of these sects, as will appear hereafter, were so well entitled as the Platonists, to boast their philosophical happiness, and to assert their superiority to the vicissitudes of time and fortune. Plato was the first philosopher who supported the doctrine of a future state, by arguments that seemed capable to convince intelligent and thinking men. From the properties of mind, he inferred the simplicity and indestructibility of the substance in which they reside¹²⁸. He described the mental powers with an eloquence that Cicero¹²⁹ and Buffon¹³⁰ have not been able to surpass. And since he regarded the soul as the principle of life and motion, he thought it absurd to suppose that the diseases and death of the body should take from this principle such qualities as it essentially possessed in itself, and accidentally communicated to matter¹³¹. It was his firm persuasion, that according to the employment of its rational and moral powers, the soul, after its separation from the body, would be raised

¹²⁷ Timæus, p. 484. et Repub. passim.

¹²⁸ Phædo, p. 25, et seqq.

¹²⁹ See Cicer. de Offic. l. i. et passim.

¹³⁰ Buffon sur l'Homme.

¹³¹ Phædo.

to a higher, or depressed to a lower state of existence ¹³².

C H A P.
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His re-
public.

This belief, which raised his hopes to a higher scene, gave him not, however, that contempt, affected by a very different class of philosophers, for the perishing affairs ¹³³ of the present world. Like some others of the scholars of Socrates, he traced the plan of a perfect commonwealth; though his work, known by that title, as has been justly observed by a great genius ¹³⁴, is rather a treatise of education than a system of policy. The real republic of Plato is contained in his books of laws, in which he explains, with no less acuteness than elegance, the origin and revolutions of civil society, and traces the plan of a republic nearly resembling the Spartan model.

Genius
and cha-
racter of
Plato.

His practical morality, which he borrowed from Socrates, is profusely scattered through his dialogues; and in his own times, Plato was not considered as that visionary speculatist which he has appeared to later ages. His scholars, Aristonymus, Phormio, and Eudoxus, were successively sent by him to regulate the republics of the Arcadians, Elians, and Cnidians ¹³⁵, at the earnest request of those communities. From Xenocrates, another of his disciples, Alexander desired rules for good government ¹³⁶. The fame of Aristotle

¹³² Phædrus, et Phædo, passim.

¹³³ The Epicureans.

“ Non res humanæ, perituraque regna. ”

GEORG.

Of this more below.

¹³⁴ Rousseau in his Emile.

¹³⁵ Plutarch. advers. Colot. Epicur.

¹³⁶ Idem, ibid.

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XXXII.

is well known; and it will afterwards appear how much he was indebted to a master, whose opinions he often combated with seeming reluctance, and real satisfaction. Plato was no less capable to distinguish ideas than to combine images. He united warmth of fancy and acuteness of understanding, in a greater degree than perhaps has fallen to the share of any other man. Yet when compared with his master Socrates, his genius will appear more subtle than sagacious. He wanted that patient spirit of observation which distinguished the illustrious sage, who in all his reasonings kept facts ever in his view, and at every step he made, looked back with wary circumspection on experience. Accompanied by this faithful guide, Socrates trod securely the paths of truth and nature; but his adventurous disciple, trusting to the wings of fancy, often expatiates in imaginary worlds of his own creation.

C H A P. XXXIII.

History of Macedon. — Reign of Archelaus. — Series of Usurpations and Revolutions. — Perdiccas defeated by the Illyrians. — Distracted State of Macedon. — First Transactions of Philip. — State of Thrace and Pæonia. — Philip defeats Argæus and the Athenians. — His Treatment of the Prisoners. — His military Arrangements. — He defeats the Illyrians. — His Designs against Amphipolis. — He prevents an Alliance between Athens and Olynthus. — Amuses the Athenians. — Takes Amphipolis. — His Conquests in Thrace. — The Mines of Crenidæ. — Philip marries Olympias. — His Letter to Aristotle.

FOUR hundred and sixteen years before the Christian æra, and little more than half a century before Philip assumed the government of Macedon, that country, to a superficial observer, might have appeared scarcely distinguishable from the barbarous kingdoms of Thrace, Pæonia, and Illyricum, which surrounded it on the north, east, and west. Towards the south, it was excluded from the sea by a chain of Grecian republics, of which Olynthus and Amphipolis were the most flourishing and powerful. To this inland

C H A P.
XXXIII.
The kingdom of Macedon founded by Caranus.
A. C. 814.

CHAPTER. district, originally confined to the circumference
 XXXIII. of about three hundred miles, Caranus, an Argive prince of the numerous race of Hercules, eluding the dangers which proved fatal to royalty¹ in most communities of Greece², conducted a small colony of his adventurous and warlike countrymen, and, having conquered the barbarous natives, settled in Edeffa, the capital of the province then named Emathia, and afterwards Macedonia, for reasons equally unknown³. The establishment of this little principality, which, under Philip, grew into a powerful kingdom, and, under Alexander, swelled into the most extensive empire known in the ancient world, was adorned (could we believe historic flattery) by many extraordinary circumstances, presaging its future greatness. The gods took care of the infancy of Macedon, and sent, as oracles had announced, a herd of goats to conduct Caranus to his new capital of Edeffa, which thence changed its name to Ægæ, the city of goats; a fiction unworthy of record, did it not explain the reason why goats were adopted as the ensigns of Macedon, and why the figures of those animals are still to be seen on the coins of Philip, and those of his successors.

Prudent
conduct of
its first

Caranus, as well as the princes Cœnus⁴ and Thyrimas, who immediately followed him, had occa-

¹ Justin. l. vii. c. i. Velleius Paterculus, l. i. c. vi.

² See vol. i. p. 105.

³ Crophius Antiquit. Macedon.

⁴ Justin. ubi supra. Syncell. Chronic.

sion to exercise their prudence still more than their valor. Their feeble colony of Greeks might have fallen an easy prey to the unhospitable ferocity of the barbarous tribes, by whom it was on all sides surrounded. But the policy of the first kings of Macedon, instead of vainly attempting to repel or to subdue, endeavoured, with more success, to gain, by good offices, the ancient inhabitants of Ema-
thia and the neighbouring districts. They commu-
nicated to them the knowledge of many useful arts; they gave them the Grecian religion⁶ and govern-
ment⁷ in that state of happy simplicity which pre-
vailed during the heroic ages; and while, to ren-
der intercourse more easy and familiar, they adopted,
in some degree, the language and manners of the
barbarous natives, they, in their turn, imparted to
the latter a tincture of the Grecian language and
civility⁸. By this judicious and liberal system, so
unlike to that pursued by their countrymen in other
parts of the world, the followers of Caranus
gradually associated with the warlike tribes in their
neighbourhood, whom it would have been alike
impossible for them to extirpate or to enslave; and

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kings the
primary
cause of
the great-
ness of
Macedon.

⁵ Pausanias Achaic. et Thucyd. l. ii.

⁶ Arrian, Exped. Alexand. l. iv. p. 83.

⁷ Φίλιππος μὲν παῖδι, Ἡρακλείδῃ δὲ ἀπο γένους, ὅτε οἱ προγονοὶ ἐξ Ἀργεὸς εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, καὶ δὲ εἰσαλλανομῶ Μακεδόνων ἀρχόντες διατελεσαν. Arrian, l. iv. p. 86. In another passage of the same book he says, the subjects of Macedon had more liberty than the citizens of Greece.

⁸ Demosthenes, Arrian, and Curtius.

C H A P. the same generous policy, being embraced by their
XXXIII. descendants, deserves to be regarded as the primary
cause of Macedonian greatness.

Transac-
tions of
the Mace-
donians
preceding
the reign
of Arche-
laus I.

A. C. 713
—416.

Perdiccas, the first of that name, so far eclipsed the fame of his three predecessors, that he is accounted the founder of the monarchy by Herodotus⁹ and Thucydides¹⁰. His history has been magnified by fable, which has also obscured or distorted the actions of the five princes¹¹ that intervened between him and Alexander I. who filled the Macedonian throne when Xerxes invaded Greece¹². Here we attain historic ground. Alexander, as related above¹³, took an important and honorable part in the affairs of Greece and Persia, without neglecting the interest of his own kingdom, which he extended to the river Nessus on the east, and to the Axius on the west. His son, Perdiccas II. inherited the abilities of his father, without inheriting his integrity. During the Peloponnesian war, [the alliance of this prince formed an object of important concern to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. He espoused the cause of the latter, which he regarded as his own, because the Athenians, who had occasionally levied tribute on his ancestors¹⁴, were then masters of the Greek settle-

⁹ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxxxvii.

¹⁰ Thucyd. l. ii. p. 163.

¹¹ Argæus I. Philip I. Æropus I. Alcetas, Amyntas I. Justin. l. vii. c. ii.

¹² Herodot. l. v. c. xix.

¹³ Vol. ii. p. 105.

¹⁴ Thucyd. ubi supra, et Demosthenes passim.

ments along the Macedonian coast, the vicinity of which naturally tempted the ambition of Perdiccas. Under the specious pretence of enabling Olynthus and the other cities of Chalcidicé to recover their independence, he lent his aid to destroy the Athenian influence there, expecting to establish the Macedonian in its stead. But this design failed of success. The Olynthian confederacy was broken, its members became subject to Sparta, and after the misfortunes of that republic had encouraged the Olynthians to resume their freedom, they felt themselves sufficiently powerful not only to resist the encroachments of Macedon, but to make considerable conquests in that country¹⁵.

Archelaus I. who succeeded to the throne, displayed an enlightened policy, far more beneficial to his kingdom than the courage of Alexander, or the craft of Perdiccas. Like those princes, Archelaus was ambitious to enlarge his dominions (having conquered Pydna and other towns in the delightful region of Pieria¹⁶); but his main care was to cultivate and improve them. He facilitated communication between the principal towns of Macedon, by cutting straight roads through most parts of the country; he built walls and places of strength in the situations most favorable for that purpose; encouraged agriculture and the arts, particularly those subservient to war; formed magazines of

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XXXIII.

The state
of Mace-
don great-
ly im-
proved
by that
prince
A. C. 416
—410.

¹⁵ See above, vol. iv. c. xxix. p. 80, et seqq.

¹⁶ Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. xvi.

C H A P. arms ; raised and disciplined a considerable body of
 XXXIII. cavalry ; and in a word , added more to the solid
 grandeur of Macedon than had been done by all
 his predecessors together¹⁷. Nor was he regardless
 of the arts of peace. His palace was adorned by
 the works of Grecian painters. Euripides was
 long entertained at his court ; Socrates was ear-
 nestly solicited to live there after the example of
 this philosophic poet, formed by his precepts, and
 cherished by his friendship : men of merit and ge-
 nius , in all the various walks of literature and sci-
 ence, were invited to reside in Macedon, and treated
 with distinguished regard by a monarch duly atten-
 tive to promote his own glory and the happiness of
 his subjects¹⁸.

Series of
 usurpa-
 tions and
 revolu-
 tions.

A. C. 405
 —360.

A reign of six years was too short a period for
 accomplishing the important ends which Archelaus
 had in view. By his death the prosperity of Ma-
 cedon was interrupted for almost half a century,
 crowded by a succession of ten¹⁹ princes or usurpers,

¹⁷ Thucydides says , “ than the eight kings who preceded him , ”
 counting Perdicaas for the first. Αρχελαος ὁ Περδικκας υἱος , Βασιλεὺς
 γενομένου τοῦ τείχεος οὗτος ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἀποδομήσας , καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἐποίησε ,
 καὶ τ’ ἄλλα διέκοσμήσας τότε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ
 ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ κρείσσειν ἢ συμπαῖντες οἱ ἄλλοι Βασιλεῖς οὕτω οἱ πρότεροι
 γενομένοι. Thucydides , p. 168.

¹⁸ Aristot. Rhetor. l. ii. c. xxix. Stobæus , Sermon. 237.

¹⁹ Their names , with the dates of their accession or usurpation ,
 are as follows :

follows :			
1 Orestes ,	A. C. 405	6 Argæus II. A. C. 385	
2 Æropus II.	402	Amyntas again re-esta-	
3 Archelaus II.	364	blished ,	383
4 Amyntas II.	392	7 Alexander II.	372
5 Pausanias ,	391	8 Perdikkas III.	371
Amyntas II.	390	9 Ptolemy ,	370
			whose

whose history forms a perpetual series of crimes and calamities. Amidst these disorders, the sceptre still remained in the family of Hercules; but almost every prince of the blood had an ambition to reign. In order to attain their purpose, the different competitors courted the assistance of the Thracians, of the Illyrians, of the Thessalians, of the Olynthian confederacy, of Athens, of Sparta, and of Thebes; and each of those powers endeavoured to turn to their own immediate profit the dissensions in Macedon. Bardyllis, an active and daring chief, who by his abilities in acquiring, and his equity²⁰ in dividing the spoil, had risen from the condition of a private robber to the command of the Illyrian tribes, entered Macedon at the head of a numerous army, dispossessed Amyntas II. the father of Philip, and placed Argæus on the throne, who consented to become the tributary of his benefactor²¹. The Thracians supported the title of another prince named Pausanias: but the assistance of Thessaly and Olynthus enabled Amyntas to resume the government; the Olynthians refusing, however, to surrender several places of importance which Amyntas had intrusted to their protection, or which they had conquered from his competitor. Amyntas complained to Sparta; and that republic, for reasons above²² related, declared war against

C H A P.
XXXIII.

A. C. 385.

A. C. 383.

Perdiccas, A. C. 368

Ptolemy, 367

Perdiccas, 365

to Amyntas, A. C. 360

To him Philip succeeded in the same year.

²⁰ Cicero de Offic. l. ii.

²¹ Diodor. l. xiv. c. xcii.

²² See vol. iv. c. xxix. p. 89.

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XXXIII.

A. C. 380

Olynthus, and reinstated the Macedonian king in full possession of his dominions. In consequence of that event, Amyntas established, and thenceforth held, his court at Pella, where he enjoyed several years of tranquillity, cultivating the friendship of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.

The usurper Pausanias.

The short reign of his son Alexander was disturbed by a fresh invasion of the Illyrians, from whom he purchased a precarious peace²³. He left two brothers, Perdiccas and Philip, of whom the eldest was still a minor. Availing himself of *their* youth and weakness, Pausanias found means to usurp the throne, being supported not only by the Thracians, but by a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, as well as by a powerful party in Macedon.

Dethroned by Iphicrates, at the entreaty of Eurydicé. A. C. 370.

Iphicrates, the Athenian, happened at this critical juncture to return from Amphipolis, the recovery of which formed the main object of his expedition. In former journies to the coast of Thrace, he had been treated with distinguished regard by Amyntas, whose widow Eurydicé now craved the protection of Iphicrates for the sons of his friend. This princess was descended from the Bacchiadæ, the noblest family of Corinth, who, rather than live on an equality with their fellow-citizens in that republic, had become the leaders of the Lyncestæ, a barbarous tribe inhabiting the most western district of Macedon. Eurydicé inherited all the ambition of her race, and was distinguished by a bold

²³ Diodorus et Justin. ubi supra.

intriguing spirit ²⁴ still more than by her beauty and accomplishments. With her young sons she suddenly appeared before Iphicrates, in the supplicating form of calamity and woe; presented the eldest to his hand, placed Philip, the younger, on his knee, and conjured him, by "the sincere friendship which Amyntas had ever entertained for Athens and for himself, to pity their tender years, oppressed by cruel usurpation." The dignity of her sorrow prevailed with Iphicrates, who respected the sacred ties of hospitality, and who saw the advantage that might accrue to Athens by gaining an interest in Macedon. We are not informed by what means he established Perdiccas on the throne. The revolution was effected with such rapidity ²⁵, that we may suppose a sudden insurrection of the people, who, on important emergencies, were accustomed, as in the heroic ages, to assemble in arms.

During the minority of the young prince, the kingdom was governed by his natural brother Ptolemy, whose ambition, unsatisfied with a delegated power, openly aspired to reign. This usurper (as we have related above) was dethroned by Pelopidas and the Thebans, who reinstated Perdiccas in his dominions; and, in order to secure the dependence of Macedon on Thebes, carried into that city as hostages thirty Macedonian youths, and with them Philip, the younger brother of the king.

Perdiccas seemed proud of his chain. Elated with the protection of the Thebans, then in the

Ptolemy
dethroned
by Pelopidas, who
sends Philip as a
hostage to
Thebes.
A. C. 367.

Perdiccas
defeated
by the Il-
lyrians.

²⁴ Justin. l. vii. c. iv.

²⁵ Cornel. Nepos, in Iphicrat. Æschin. de falsa Legatione.

C H A P. height of their prosperity, he forgot the gratitude
 XXXIII. due to Iphicrates and the Athenians; disputed the right of that people to Amphipolis, which had been acknowledged by the general council of Greece²⁶; and his opposition rendered fruitless their well-directed endeavours to recover that important establishment. The Athenians found an avenger in Bardyllis the Illyrian, to whom Perdiccas had denied the tribute that had been paid by his predecessors Argæus and Alexander. Bardyllis maintained his claim by force of arms. The Macedonians met him in the field, but were totally defeated with the loss of four thousand men²⁷. Perdiccas was taken prisoner, and soon after died of his wounds. His son Amyntas was an infant. Thebes having lost her pre-eminence in Greece, was unable to protect her distant allies. Athens was hostile, and Macedon, surrounded by enemies on every side, already experienced the fury of Barbarian invaders.

Macedon
 distracted
 by two
 pretend-
 ers to the
 throne,
 and deso-
 lated by
 four
 foreign
 armies.

Not only the Illyrians and Bardyllis, who ravaged the west, but the Pæonians, a powerful and warlike tribe, having received some cause of offence from Perdiccas, now indulged their revenge, and insulted the northern frontier without interruption or control. The Thracians still supported the cause of Pausanias, whom they prepared to send back into Macedon at the head of a numerous army. Ptolemy was dead; but Argæus, the ancient competitor of king Amyntas, emboldened by the victory of the Illyrians, who had formerly placed him on the throne, renewed his pretensions

²⁶ Æschin. de falsa Legat.

²⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. sect. 2.

to that dignity ; and , grown old in intrigue , easily persuaded the Athenians , by the hopes of recovering Amphipolis , to exert themselves in his favor , especially against the son and brother of Perdiccas , by whose insolence and ingratitude they were justly provoked and disgusted. Impelled by such motives , the Athenians launched their fleet , and sailed towards the coast of Macedon , with three thousand heavy-armed men , commanded by Mantias ²⁸.

Such were the evils which threatened , and the calamities which oppressed , that unfortunate and distracted kingdom , when Philip appeared , asserting , unterrified , the rights of his infant nephew , against two candidates for the throne , and four formidable armies. A prince of less courage than Philip would have shrunk from a design seemingly desperate and impracticable ; and had courage been his principal virtue , he would have only heightened the disorders which he hoped to remedy ²⁹. But on this emergency , the young Macedonian (for he was only in his twenty-third year ³⁰) displayed those extraordinary abilities which distinguish his reign , and render it the most interesting spectacle that history can present to those who are delighted with surveying , not the vulgar revolutions of force and fortune , but the active energies and resources of a vigorous and comprehensive mind. Such was the obscurity in which his merit had hitherto lain concealed from the

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Amidst
these ca-
lamities
Philip
arrives in
Macedon.
Olymp.
cv. 1.
A. C. 360.

²⁸ Diodorus, ubi supra.²⁹ Olivier Vie de Philippe, p. 47.³⁰ Comp. Diodor. p. 510. et Justin. l. ix. c. viii.

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XXXIII.

His edu-
cation-
and transf.
actions
preceding
that pe-
riod.

public, that historians³¹ disagree as to the place of his residence, when he was informed of the defeat and death of his brother Perdiccas. From the age of fifteen he had lived chiefly in Thebes, in the family, and under the direction of Epaminondas³², whose lessons and example could not fail to excite, in a kindred mind, the emulation of excellence, and the ardor of patriotism³³. It is probable that, agreeably to the custom of Greece and Rome, where the youth alternately frequented the school and the camp, and might sometimes find a school of philosophy in the tent of a general, that Philip accompanied the Theban hero in many of his military expeditions. It is certain that, attended suitably to his rank, he visited the principal republics of Greece, whose institutions in peace and war he examined with a sagacity far superior to his years³⁴. The tactics of the Lacedæmonians were the first new establishment which he introduced into Macedon. Nor was the improvement of his knowledge the only fruit of his travels. The brother of a king found an easy access to whomever he had an interest to know and cultivate. Even in Athens, then hostile to Thebes, and naturally unfavorable

³¹ Diodorus places him in Thebes; Athenæus, l. ii. p. 506, in Macedon; and adds, Διατρεφὼν δὲ ἐνταυθα δύναμιν, ὥς ἀπεθανε Περδικκας, ἐξ ἐτοίμης, δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης, ἐπέπεσε τοῖς πραγμάσι. Words which admirably correspond to the rapid motions of Philip after the death of Perdiccas.

³² Plutarch. in Pelopida.

³³ Plutarch speaks with the partiality of a Bœotian for Epaminondas, and the resentment of a native of Chæronea against Philip. See Plutarch. in Pelopid.

³⁴ Plutarch. in Alexand. Athenæus, l. xi. p. 506.

to a pupil of Epaminondas, Philip acquired the friendship and esteem of Plato³⁵, Isocrates³⁶, and Aristotle³⁷; and the early connexion which he formed with the principal leaders of Athens, and the neighbouring republics, contributed, perhaps, in no small degree, to the success of his future designs³⁸.

His seasonable appearance in Macedon, after the defeat and death of Perdiccas, suddenly changed the fortune of that seemingly devoted kingdom. Yet our admiration of Philip ought not to make us overlook the favorable circumstances which seconded his abilities, and conspired to promote his success. The places of strength built by Archelaus furnished a secure retreat to the remains of Perdiccas's army; the Macedonians, though conquered, were not subdued; they had considerable garrisons in the fortresses and walled towns scattered over the kingdom³⁹; their whole forces had not been engaged in the unfortunate battle with the Illyrians⁴⁰; and those fierce invaders, impatient of delay, and only solicitous for plunder, having ravaged the open country, returned home to enjoy the fruits of their violence and rapine. They probably intended soon to assault Macedon with increased numbers, and to complete their devastations; but

The Illyrians evacuate Macedon.

³⁵ Athenæus, l. xi. Ælian, l. iv. c. xix.

³⁶ Isocratis Epistolæ, et Oratio ad Philipp.

³⁷ Aristotle at this time lived in the Academy with Plato, where, most probably, Philip first saw him. Dionys. Halicarnas. Epist. ad Ammæum.

³⁸ Demosthen. passim.

³⁹ Thucyd. l. xi. p. 168.

⁴⁰ Athenæus, l. xi. p. 506.

C H A P. they seem to have been alike incapable to concert
 XXXIII. or to pursue any permanent plan of conquest; and being distinguished, as historians relate, by their blooming complexions, active vigor, and longevity ⁴¹, they were not less distinguished by that irregular and capricious mode of acting, and that inattention to remote consequences, which characterize the manners of Barbarians.

State of
 Thrace
 and Pæo-
 nia.

The warriors of Pæonia and Thrace ⁴² were less formidable by their numbers, and equally contemptible for their ignorance and indocility. In early times, the Pæonians indeed had been regarded as a tribe less savage, and more considerable ⁴³ than their Macedonian neighbours; but the former had remained stationary, in the rudeness of their primitive state, while the latter had been improved by a Grecian colony, and by frequent communication and intercourse with the Grecian republics. Of the Thracians we have had occasion to speak in the preceding parts of this work. The destructive ravages of Seuthes ⁴⁴ represent the ordinary condition of that unsettled and inhospitable country, sometimes united under one chief, more frequently divided among many, whose mutual hostilities banished agriculture, industry, and every useful art. Exclusive of the Grecian settlements on the coast, Thrace contained not any city, nor even any considerable town. The Barbarian Cotys, who was

⁴¹ Lucian. in Macrobiis, et Cornel. Alexand. apud Plinium, lib. vii. cap. clvii.

⁴² Cornel. Nepos in Iphicrat. Xenoph. Anab. l. vii. p. 393.

⁴³ Hippocrat. de Epidem.

⁴⁴ See vol. iii. p. 381, et seqq.

dignified with the title of king, led a wandering life, encamping on the banks of rivers with his flocks and followers⁴⁵. War and pasturage formed the only sources of his grandeur, and even the only means of his subsistence.

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Such were the first enemies with whom Philip had to contend. Their own capricious unsteadiness delivered him from the Illyrians. To the Pæonians, who ravaged the north, he either sent a deputation, or applied in person; and partly by bribes, partly by artful promises and flattery, persuaded the invaders to retire. The same arts prevailed with the selfish king of Thrace⁴⁶, whose avarice readily sacrificed the cause of Pausanias, while Philip thought the remaining wealth of Macedon usefully consumed in removing those barbarous foes, that he might resist, with undivided strength, the more formidable invasion of Argæus and the Athenians.

Philip dis-
arms the
resent-
ment of
those
countries.

The Athenian fleet already anchored before the harbour of Methoné; Argæus, with his numerous followers, had encamped in the province of Pieria; and their united forces prepared to march northward to Edessa, or Ægæ, the ancient capital of Macedon, where they expected to be joined by a powerful party, whom fear or inclination would bring to the standard of the banished king. The Macedonians

Philip de-
clared
king of
Macedon.
Olymp.
cv. i.
A. C. 360.

⁴⁵ Athenæus, l. xii. p. 331.

⁴⁶ Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 3. Horace alludes to these events:

——— diffidit urbium

Portas vir Macedo, et subruit æmulos

Reges muneribus.

Lib. iii. Ode 16.

C H A P. XXXIII. who adhered to the interest of Perdiccas, or rather of his infant son, had been dispirited by the recent victory of the Illyrians, and the misfortunes consequent on that event. But the manly exhortations, and undaunted deportment of Philip, roused them from their despair. They admired the dexterity with which he had disarmed the resentment of the Thracians and Pæonians. His graceful person, insinuating address, and winning affability, qualities which he possessed in a very uncommon degree⁴⁷, gained the affections of the Macedonians, who either recollected, or were studiously reminded of, a prophecy⁴⁸, that announced great glory to their nation under the reign of the son of Amyntas. In an assembly held at Ægæ, they exclaimed, with one consent, "This is the man whom the gods point out as the founder of the Macedonian greatness. The dangerous condition of the times admits not of an infant reign. Let us obey the celestial voice, and intrust the sceptre to hands alike worthy to hold, and able to defend it"⁴⁹. This proposal seemed not extraordinary in a country which had been long accustomed to interruptions in the lineal order of succession. Amyntas was set aside, and Philip, who had hitherto possessed

⁴⁷ Æschin. de falsa Legatione.

⁴⁸ In the Sibylline verses preserved in Pausanias (in Achaic.) Philip is named as the author of the Macedonian greatness, and the destruction of the kingdom is foretold under another Philip. These verses, though evidently composed after the event, serve to confirm the fact, that the superstition of the multitude was wrought upon for the purposes of Philip. Justin. l. vii. c. vi.

⁴⁹ Ibid. idem.

only the delegated power of regent, was invested with the royal title and authority⁵⁰.

While all ranks of men were thus animated with affectionate admiration of their young king, the obsolete claims of Argæus could only be maintained by arms. Attended by his Athenian allies, he marched towards Edessa; but that city shut its gates against him. Dispirited by this repulse, he made no farther attempts to gain admission into any of the Macedonian cities, but directed his course backward to Methoné. Philip, who had now collected sufficient strength to take the field, harassed his retreat, cut his rear to pieces, and defeated him in a general engagement, in which Argæus himself fell, with the flower of his army. The rest, whether Greeks or Barbarians, were made prisoners of war⁵¹.

It was on this occasion that Philip first displayed that deep and artful policy, which, in the course of a long reign, gained him such a powerful ascendant over the passions of other men, and enabled him uniformly to govern his own by the interest of his ambition. In the midst of prosperity, his proud and lofty spirit must have been highly provoked by the Athenians, as well as by the followers of Argæus; and the barbarous maxims and practices which prevailed in that age, left him at full liberty to wreak his vengeance on the unhappy prisoners of both, who had fallen into his hands.

C H A P.
XXXIII.

He defeats
the pre-
tender
Argæus,
and his
Athenian
auxilia-
ries.

Uncom-
mon
treatment
of the
Athenian
and Ma-
cedonian
prisoners.

⁵⁰ Diodorus, l. xvi. sect. 3.

⁵¹ Diodorus, ibid. et Demosth. in Aristocrat.

C H A P. But the interest of Philip required him rather to
XXXIII. footh than to irritate the people of Athens, and to obtain by good offices (what he could not command by force) the confidence of his Macedonian subjects. The captives of the latter nation were called into his presence, rebuked with gentleness and humanity, admitted to swear allegiance to their new master, and promiscuously distributed in the body of his army. The Athenian prisoners were treated in a manner still more extraordinary⁵². Instead of demanding any ransom for their persons, he restored their baggage unexamined, and entertained them at his table with such condescending hospitality, that they returned home, full of admiration for the young king, and deeply persuaded of his attachment and respect for their republic⁵³.

Philip
 amuses
 the Athe-
 nians with
 a treaty
 of peace
 and
 friend-
 ship.
 Olymp.
 cv. 2.
 A. C. 359.

They had only time to blaze forth the praises of Philip, when his ambassadors arrived at Athens⁵⁴. He knew that the loss of Amphipolis principally excited the resentment of the Athenians; he knew that the interest of Macedon required that resentment to be appeased. Impressed with these ideas, he renounced all jurisdiction over Amphipolis,

⁵² The fair side of Philip's character is described by Diodor. l. xvi. p. 510, et seqq. and 539. By Just. l. ix. c. viii. The most disadvantageous description of him is given by Demosthenes, *passim*, and by Athenæus, l. iv. c. xix. l. vi. c. xvii. et l. x. c. x. Cicero seems not to have regarded the assertions of Demosthenes, when, in speaking of Philip and Alexander, he says, "Alter semper magnus, alter sæpe turpissimus. But the artificial character of Philip, which varied with his interest, merits neither the panegyrics nor invectives too liberally bestowed on it.

⁵³ Demosthenes in *Aristocrat.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

which was formally declared a free and independent city, subject only to the government of its own equitable laws⁵⁵. This measure, together with the distinguished treatment of the Athenian prisoners, insured the success of his embassy. An ancient treaty was renewed, that had long subsisted between his father Amyntas and the Athenians. That capricious and unsteady people, not less susceptible of gratitude, than prone to anger, were thus lulled into repose, at a time when Fortune having placed them at the head of Greece, both their present power and ancient glory urged them to take the front of the battle against Philip. Confiding in the insidious treaty with that prince, they engaged in a ruinous war with their allies⁵⁶; and ceased, during several years, to make any opposition to the ambitious designs of the Macedonian.

The young king having given such illustrious proofs of his abilities in negotiation and war, availed himself of the affectionate admiration of his subjects to establish, during a season of tranquillity, such institutions as might maintain and extend his own power, and confirm the solid grandeur of Macedon. The laws and maxims which prevailed in the heroic ages, and which, as we have already observed, had been early introduced into that kingdom, circumscribed the royal authority within very narrow bounds. The chiefs and nobles, especially in the more remote provinces, regarded themselves as the rivals and equals of their sovereign. In

Philip institutes the order of *δορυφόροι*, *spear-men, companions*. Olymp. cv. 2. A. C. 359.

⁵⁵ Polyæn. Stratag. l. iv. c. 17.

⁵⁶ See vol. iv. c. xxxii.

C H A P.
XXXIII.

foreign war they followed his standard, but they often shook his throne by domestic sedition; and, amidst the scanty materials for explaining the internal state of Macedon in ancient times, we may discover several instances in which they disavowed their allegiance, and assumed independent government over considerable districts of the country⁵⁷. The moment of glory and success seemed the most favorable for extinguishing this dangerous spirit, and quashing the proud hopes of the nobles. In this design Philip proceeded with that artful policy which characterizes his reign. From the bravest of the Macedonian youth, he chose a select body of *companions*⁵⁸, who, being distinguished by honorable appellations, and entertained at the royal table, attended the king's person in war and in hunting. Their intimacy with the sovereign, which was regarded as a proof of their merit, obliged them to superior diligence in all the severe duties of a military life⁵⁹. The noble youth, animated with the hope of glory, vied with each other to gain admission into this distinguished order; and while, on one hand, they served as hostages⁶⁰ for the allegiance of their families, they formed, on the other, a useful seminary of future generals⁶¹, who, after conquering for Philip and Alexander,

⁵⁷ Strabo, l. vii. p. 326. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. v.

⁵⁸ Arrian, et Ælian.

⁵⁹ Ælian, l. xiv. c. 49

⁶⁰ Arrian says, "των εν τελει Μακεδονων της παιδας," "the sons of men in office;" which well agrees with the idea of their being hostages for the fidelity of their parents. He also ascribes the institution to Philip. Εκ Φιλιππου ηδη καθεστηκος. Arrian, l. iv. p. 89.

⁶¹ Curtius, l. viii. c. 6.

at length conquered for themselves, and divided the spoils of the ancient world.

XXXIII.

His military arrangements.

It is ignorantly said by some writers ⁶², that Philip, in the first year of his reign, invented the phalanx, a body of six thousand men, armed with short swords, fit either for cutting or thrusting; strong bucklers, four feet in length, and two and a half in breadth; and pikes fourteen cubits long, which, usually arranged sixteen deep, formed the main battle of the Macedonians. But this is nothing different from the armor and arrangement which had always prevailed among the Greeks, and which Philip adopted in their most perfect form; nor is there reason to think that a prince, who knew the danger of changing what the experience of ages had approved, made any alteration in the weapons or tactics of that people ⁶³. His attention was more judiciously directed to procure, in sufficient abundance, arms, horses, and other necessary instruments of war; in reviewing and

⁶² Diodorus Siculus, l. xvi. f. 3. and all the Roman writers of Greek history. It was natural for the Romans, who began to know Greece and Macedon almost at the same time, and who found the phalanx most complete in the latter, to suppose it invented in that country.

⁶³ The improvement in the countermarch, to which Philip gave the appearance of advancing, instead of retreating, mentioned by Ælian in his tactics, c. xxviii. was borrowed, as this author tells us, from the Lacedæmonians. If Philip increased the phalanx, usually less numerous, to six thousand men, this was far from an improvement; and the latter kings of Macedon, who swelled it to sixteen thousand, only rendered that order of battle more unwieldy and inconvenient. The highest perfection of Grecian tactics is to be found in Xenophon's expedition. See vol iii. c. xxvi. p. 354, et seqq. See also Polyb. l. xvii. p. 764. et Liv. l. xlv. c. 40.

C H A P. exercising his troops; and in accustoming them
 XXXIII. to that austere and laborious life ⁶⁴, which is the
 best preparation for the field.

Conquers
 Pæonia.
 Olymp.
 cv. 3.
 A. C. 358.

The military resources which his activity had provided, his ambition did not allow to remain long unemployed. The death of Agis, the most warlike chieftain, or, as he is called by an historian ⁶⁵, king of the Pæonians, drew Philip into the field, to revenge recent injuries which those Barbarians had inflicted on Macedon. Among a people where the laws of peace or war are neglected or unknown, almost every thing depends on the precarious character of their leaders. Deprived of the valor of Agis, the Pæonians lost all hopes of defence. Philip over-ran their country without resistance; carried off slaves and plunder; imposed a tribute on their chiefs; took hostages; and reduced Pæonia to an absolute dependence on Macedon.

Defeats
 the Illy-
 rians, and
 extends
 his terri-
 tory to the
 Ionian
 sea.

It is probable that, according to the practice of the age, he permitted or required a certain number of the vanquished to follow his standard; but the Pæonians were no sooner reduced, than Philip, to whom all seasons seemed alike proper for war, undertook a winter's campaign against Bardyllis and the Illyrians, the hereditary enemies of his family and kingdom. He marched towards the frontier of Illyria ⁶⁶ at the head of ten thousand

⁶⁴ Pólyænus, l. iv. c. 3. Frontin. Strat. l. iv. c. l.

⁶⁵ Diodorus, l. xvi. sect. 4.

⁶⁶ The Greek name of this country is *Ιλλυρίς*, but more commonly *ἡ Ἰλλυρία*, from its inhabitants. Vid. Arrian, l. i. passim.
 foot

foot and six hundred horse, and, before entering the country, animated the resentment and valor of his troops by a military oration, after the custom of the Greeks, whose manners he seemed, on every occasion, ambitious to imitate. Indignation of past injuries, the honor of his subjects, and the glory of his crown, might be topics proper to influence the Macedonian soldiers⁶⁷, who could not fully enter into the more refined motives of their sovereign. Illyria had been extended on the east, to the prejudice of Macedon, which it totally excluded from the excellent harbours on the Adriatic⁶⁸. This was an important consideration to a prince, who seems to have early meditated the raising of a naval power. Beside this, it was impossible for Philip to undertake with safety the other measures which he had in view, should he leave his kingdom exposed to the predatory incursions of a neighbouring enemy, who, unless they feared Macedon, must always be formidable to that country. Directed by such solid principles of policy, rather than governed by resentment, or allured by the splendor of victory, Philip proceeded

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The Latin name is] *Illyricum*; most English writers of ancient history use *Illyria*, probably from the French *Illyrie*. The Greek *Ἰλλυρίς* is described by Strabo, l. vii. p. 317. It comprehended the eastern shore of the Adriatic, between Epirus and Istria. The Latin *Illyricum* had a signification far more extensive. See Gibbon's History, vol. i. p. 28.

⁶⁷ The heads of the speech are given, indirectly, in the fragments of Theopompus,

⁶⁸ Strabo says, *ἀπαντα τὸν Ἰλλυρικὸν (scilicet) χώρον σφόδρα εὐλιμενον εἶναι*; and adds, that the shore of Illyria is as abundant, as the opposite coast of Italy is defective, in good harbours. Strabo l. vii.

C H A P. forward, with the caution necessary to be observed
 XXXIII. in a hostile territory. After a fruitless negociation, Bardyllis met him in the field with an adequate body of infantry, but with only four hundred horse. The precise scene of the engagement is unknown. The Macedonian phalanx attacked the Illyrian column⁶⁹ in front, while the targeteers and light-armed troops galled its flanks, and the cavalry harassed its rear. The Illyrians, thus surrounded on every side, were crushed between two opposite assaults, without having an opportunity to exert their full strength⁷⁰. Their resistance, however, must have been vigorous, since seven thousand were left on the field of battle, and with them their gallant leader Bardyllis, who fell, at the age of ninety, fighting bravely on horseback. The loss of their experienced chief, and of the flower of their youthful warriors, broke the strength and courage of the Illyrian tribes, who sent a deputation to Philip, humbly craving peace, and submitting their fortune to the will of the conqueror. Philip granted them the same terms⁷¹ which he

⁶⁹ The Illyrians were drawn up in the order of battle called *πλινθισμός*, from *πλινθος*, a brick; which clearly points out its form.

⁷⁰ Frontinus Stratag. l. ii. c. 3.

⁷¹ It should seem from Diodorus, that the Illyrians had entertained the same superstitious terror of neglecting the interment of the dead, which prevailed among the Greeks. Yet Diodorus, perhaps, only used a privilege too common among historians, of transferring their own feelings to those concerning whom they write. He says, that Philip “restored their dead, and erected a trophy.” Pausanias (in *Bœotic.*) denies that either Philip or his son Alexander ever erected any of those monuments of victory; which practice, he says, was contrary to a Macedonian maxim,

had lately imposed on the Pæonians. *That* part of their country which lies east of the lake Lychnidus he joined to Macedon, and probably built a town and settled a colony on the side of the lake, which watered a fertile country, and abounded in different kinds of fish, highly esteemed by the ancients. The town and lake of Lychnidus were fifty miles distant from the Ionian sea; but such was the ascendant that the arms and policy of Philip acquired over his neighbours, that the inhabitants of the intermediate district soon adopted the language and manners of their conquerors; and their territory, hitherto unconnected with any foreign power, sunk into such an absolute dependence on Macedon, that many ancient geographers considered it as a province of that country⁷².

Having settled the affairs of Illyria, Philip returned home, not to enjoy the sweets of victory and repose, but to pursue more important and more arduous designs than those which he had hitherto carried on with such signal success. He had secured and extended the northern and western frontier of Macedon; but the rich southern shores, chiefly inhabited by Greeks, presented at once a more tempting prize, and a more formidable enemy. The confederacy of Olynthus, having thrown off

established as early as the time of Caranus, when a lion having overturned one of his trophies, the wise founder of the monarchy regarded this event as a warning to forbear raising them in future. But the medals of Philip and Alexander, of which the reverse is sometimes charged with trophies, refute the assertion of Pausanias; which is likewise contradicted by Arrian, Curtius, and all the writers of the life, or expedition, of Alexander.

⁷² Strabo, l. vii. p. 327.

C H A P.
XXXIII.

Philip's
designs
against
Amphi-
polis.
Olymp.
cv, 4.
A. C. 357.

C H A P. the yoke of Sparta, had become more powerful
 XXXIII. than ever. It could send into the field ten thousand heavy-armed men, and a large body of well-disciplined cavalry. Most towns of the Chalcidicé had become its allies or subjects; and this populous and wealthy province, together with Pangæus on the right, and Pieria on the left, the cities of both which were either independent, or subject to the Athenians, formed a barrier sufficient not only to guard the Grecian states against Macedon, but even to threaten the safety of that kingdom. Every motive concurred to direct the active policy of Philip towards acquisitions immediately necessary in themselves, and essential to the completion of his remote purposes. In the course of twenty years he accomplished his designs, and conquered Greece; often varying his means; never changing his end; and notwithstanding the circumstances and events that continually thwarted his ambition, we behold the opening and gradual progress of a vast plan, every step in which paved the way for that which followed, till the whole ended in the most signal triumph, perhaps, ever attained by human prudence, over courage and fortune.

Import-
 ance of
 that place.

The importance of Olynthus and Chalcidicé could not divert the sagacity of Philip from Amphipolis, which he regarded as a more necessary, though less splendid, conquest. The possession of Amphipolis, which would connect Macedon with the sea, and secure to that kingdom many commercial advantages, opened a road to the woods and mines of mount Pangæus, the former of which

was so essential to the raising of a naval power, and the latter to the forming and keeping on foot a sufficient military force. The place itself Philip in the beginning of his reign had declared independent, to avoid a rupture with the Athenians, who still asserted their pretensions to their ancient colony. But their measures to regain Amphipolis had hitherto been rendered ineffectual by the caprice or perfidy of Charidemus, a native of Eubœa, who, from the common level of a soldier of fortune, had risen to the command of a considerable body of mercenaries, frequently employed by the indolence and licentiousness of the Athenians, a people extremely averse both to the fatigue and restraint of personal service. They determined, however, to renew their attempts for recovering their dominion, while the Amphipolitans, having tasted the sweets of liberty, prepared to maintain their independence.

In this posture of affairs, the hostile designs of Philip, which all his artifice had not been able to conceal from the suspicious jealousy of the new republic, alarmed the magistrates of Amphipolis, and obliged them to seek protection from the Olynthians, who readily admitted them into their confederacy. Emboldened by this alliance, they set at defiance the menaces of their neighbouring, as well as of their more distant, enemy; and their imprudent insolence readily furnished Philip with specious grounds of hostility. The Olynthians perceived that the indignation of this prince must soon break forth into action, and overwhelm the

C H A P.
XXXIII.

Amphipolis enters into the Olynthian confederacy.

C H A P. XXXIII. Amphipolitans; while they themselves might be involved in the ruin of their new confederate. To anticipate this danger, they sent ambassadors to Athens, requesting an alliance with that republic against the natural enemy of both states, and an enemy whose successful activity rendered him a just object of terror.

The intrigues of Philip prevent an alliance between Athens and Olynthus.

This alliance, had it taken place, must have given a fatal blow to the rising greatness of Macedonia, which as yet was incapable to contend with the united strength of Olynthus and Athens. The spies and emissaries of Philip (for he had already begun to employ those odious, but necessary, instruments of policy) immediately gave the alarm. The prince himself was deeply sensible of the danger, and determined to repel it with equal vigor and celerity. His agents reached Athens before any thing was concluded with the Olynthian deputies. The popular leaders and orators were bribed and gained; the magistrates and senate were flattered and deceived by the most plausible declarations and promises. A negociation was immediately set on foot, by which Philip stipulated to conquer Amphipolis for the Athenians, on condition that they surrendered to him Pydna, a place of far less importance. He promised, besides, to confer many other advantages on the republic, which it was not proper at present to mention, but which time would reveal". Amused by the artifices

²³ Καὶ τὸ βεβουλευμένον ποτὲ ἀπορρητὸν ἔκεινο. Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 6. edit. Wolfii. It is strange that Wolfius has changed the order of the Olynthian orations, so distinctly marked by Dion. Halicarn. in his letter to Ammaeus.

of the Macedonian, deceived by the perfidy of their own magistrates, and elated with the hopes of recovering Amphipolis, the great object of their ambition, the senate of the Five Hundred (for the transaction was carried on with such haste as allowed not time for assembling the people) rejected with disdain the overtures of the Olynthians⁷⁴, who returned home disgusted and indignant.

They had scarcely time to communicate to their countrymen the angry passions which agitated their own breasts, when the ambassadors of Philip craved audience in the assembly of Olynthus. That artful prince affected to condole with the Olynthians on the affront which they had received from the insolence of Athens; but at the same time testified his surprise, that they should condescend to court the distant protection of that proud republic, when they might find in Macedon an ally near at hand, who wished for nothing more earnestly than to enter into equal and lasting engagements with their confederacy. As a proof of his moderation and sincerity, he offered immediately to put them in possession of Anthemus, a town of some importance in their neighbourhood, the jurisdiction of which had long been claimed by the kings of Macedon⁷⁵; at the same time assuring them of his intentions to deserve their gratitude by still more important services, and particularly by employing his arms to

Artifices
by which
he gained
the Olyn-
thians.

⁷⁴ Demosthenes expresses it in the strongest terms, as if they had driven the Olynthians from Athens: "ὅτε Ολυνθίους ἀπηλαυνόντων ἐν ἑσέσδε." Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 6.

⁷⁵ Demosthen. Philip. ii. 4.

C H A P. reduce the cities of Pydna and Potidæa, commanding the opposite sides of the Thermaic gulph; places, therefore, of considerable value, which he wished to see dependent on Olynthus, rather than, as at present, subject to Athens.

Philip besieges Amphipolis.
Olymp.
cv. 4.
A. C. 357.

The immediate offers of Philip, his professions and promises, in which, as they suited his interest, he doubtless was sincere, and still more, his secret practices with some powerful men of Olynthus, effectually prevailed with that republic to abandon the cause of Amphipolis, whose imprudent inhabitants had been at little pains to prevent those offences and complaints which naturally arise between the jealous members of an unequal confederacy. By these intrigues, the Macedonian not only removed all opposition to his views on the part of the Olynthians, but acquired the sincere friendship of that people, who were ready to assist his arms, and to second his most ambitious designs. He therefore prepared for action, because he might now act with safety; marched rapidly towards Amphipolis, and pressed that city with a vigorous siege. The inhabitants, deeply affected by the near prospect of a calamity which they had taken little care to prevent, had recourse, in their distress, to Athens. Thither they dispatched Hierax and Stratocles, two of their most distinguished citizens, to represent the danger of an alliance between Philip and Olynthus; to entreat the Athenians to accept the sincere repentance of their unfortunate colony, and once more to take Amphipolis under the protection of their fleet.

At that time the Athenians were deeply engaged in the social war; yet the hopes of recovering so important a settlement might have directed their attention to Macedon, had not the vigilant policy of Philip sent them a letter, renewing the assurances of his friendship, acknowledging their pretensions to the city, which he actually besieged, and of which he artfully said, that, in terms of his recent engagement, he hoped shortly to put them in possession. Amused by these insinuating representations, the Athenians treated the deputies of Amphipolis with as little respect as they had lately done those of Olynthus. The besieged city was thus deprived of all hopes of relief; Philip pressed the attack with new vigor; a breach was made in the wall; and the Amphipolitans, after an obstinacy of defence which could have no other effect than to provoke the resentment of the conqueror, at length surrendered at discretion ⁷⁶.

The prudent Macedonian always preferred his own profit to the punishment of his enemies. It was his interest to preserve and to aggrandize, not to depopulate, Amphipolis. He banished a few daring leaders, whose seditious or patriotic spirit might disturb the measures of his government. The bulk of the citizens were treated with sufficient mildness. Their territory was reunited to Macedon, from which Philip resolved that it should never be dismembered, notwithstanding his promises to the Athenians.

C H A P.

XXXIII.

Amuses
the Athe-
nians.

Amphipo-
lis sur-
renders.

Olymp.
cv. 4.

A. C. 357.

Is annexed
to Mace-
don.

⁷⁶ Diodor. l. xvi. c. viii. Demosthen. Olynth. iii. sect. 4—7.

C H A P.

XXXIII.

Philip puts
the Olyn-
thians in
possession
of Pydna
and Poti-
dæa.

That he might arm himself against the resentment of a people, whom, if he could not deceive, he was determined to defy, he cultivated, with great earnestness, the Olynthian confederacy; and having besieged and taken the towns of Pydna and Potidæa, he readily ceded them to the Olynthians, who had but feebly assisted him in making these conquests. In the whole transaction Philip affected to act merely as an auxiliary. The Athenian garrison in Potidæa, who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war, he took under his immediate protection, and dismissed them without ransom, artfully lamenting that the necessity of his affairs, and his alliance with Olynthus, obliged him to oppose the interests of their republic, for which he entertained the most sincere respect⁷⁷.

Philip
pursues
his con-
quests in
Thrace.

It is impossible that the Athenians, weak and credulous as they were, should have been the dupes of this gross artifice. But they could not immediately withdraw their exertions from the social war, the events of which grew continually more unprosperous. Philip, ever vigilant and active, profited of this favorable diversion, to pursue his conquests in Thrace, to which the possession of Amphipolis afforded him an opening. In the beginning of his reign, he had found it necessary to purchase a peace from Cotys, who still governed that country, but from whom Philip could not actually apprehend any formidable opposition. The late acquaintance of that Barbarian with the Grecian

⁷⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. c. viii. et Demosth. Philip. ii. et Olynth. i.

religion and manners, which he had adopted in consequence of his connexion with Iphicrates and the Athenians, served only to deprave his faculties and to cloud his reason. We should pronounce absolutely mad, the man who fancied himself enamoured of Minerva; but the ancients, who believed that the gods often appeared in a human form, regarded with more tenderness this frantic enthusiasm. Cotty was allowed to possess his freedom and his crown, whether, with his ambulatory court, he traversed the inhospitable mountains of Thrace, or pitched his tents on the fragrant banks of the Strymon or the Nessus; or, to enjoy with more privacy the favors of his celestial mistress, penetrated into the deep recesses of the beautiful forests which adorned his kingdom.

At the approach of the Macedonians, having abandoned the grove of Onocarsis, the favorite scene of his wild and romantic enjoyments⁷⁸, he endeavoured to stop the progress of the enemy by a letter; but a letter from such a man could excite nothing but ridicule or pity. Philip penetrated eastward thirty miles beyond Amphipolis, to the town of Crenidæ, situated at the foot of Mount Pangæus, and distant ten miles from the sea. He admired the solitary beauty of the place, which being bounded on one side by the sea, and on the other by lofty mountains, was watered by many streams and rivulets, which, tempering the dryness of the soil, produced the finest and most delicious

C H A P.
XXXIII.

Takes possession of the gold-mines at Crenidæ, afterwards called Philippi. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

⁷⁸ Theopomp. apud Athenæum, l. xii. p. 531.

C H A P. fruit and flowers, especially roses, of a peculiar
XXXIII. hue and fragrancy. But the attention of Philip was attracted by objects more important, by the gold-mines in that neighbourhood, formerly wrought by colonies from Thafos and from Athens, but totally neglected since the ignorant Thracians had become masters of Crenidæ. Philip expelled those Barbarians from a possession which they seemed unworthy to hold. Having descended into the gold-mines, he traced, by the help of torches, the decayed labors of the ancient proprietors. By his care the water was drained off; the canals, broken or choaked up, were repaired; and the bosom of the earth was again opened and ransacked⁷⁹ with eager avidity by a prince who well knew the value of the precious metals. A Macedonian colony was planted at Crenidæ, which thenceforth assumed the name of Philippi⁸⁰, a name bestowed also on the golden coins struck by order of Philip⁸¹, to the annual amount of nearly a thousand talents, or two hundred thousand pounds sterling⁸².

Philip
settles the
affairs of
Thessaly.

Having effected the main purpose of his Thracian expedition, the prudence of Philip set bounds

⁷⁹ Senec. Natur. Quæst. l. v. p. 760. et Demosthen. in Leptin.

⁸⁰ The fatal defeat and death of Brutus and Cassius have eclipsed, in their melancholy splendor, all the preceding events which distinguish Philippi. There liberty expired, and virtue yielded to force.

Cum fracta virtus, et minaces

Turpe solum tetigere mento.

HORACE.

⁸¹ Regale numisma Philippos.

⁸² Diodor. l. xvi. c. ix. Justin. l. viii. c. iii. speaks differently; but the whole of that chapter bears evident marks of ignorance and error.

to his conquests in that country, and carried his arms into Thessaly, which, by the murder of Alexander of Pheræ, had got three tyrants instead of one. These were, Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron, the brothers-in-law, the assassins, and the successors of Alexander. The resentment of the Thessalians, and the valor of the Macedonian troops, totally defeated those oppressors of their country, who were reduced to such humiliating terms as seemed sufficient to prevent them from being thenceforth formidable either to their own subjects or to their neighbours⁸³. The Thessalians, who were susceptible of all impressions, but incapable of preserving any, concluded, in the first emotions of their gratitude, an agreement with their deliverer, by which they surrendered to him the revenues arising from their fairs and towns of commerce, as well as all the conveniences of their harbours and shipping; and extraordinary as this cession was, Philip found means to render it effectual and permanent⁸⁴.

Advantages which he derived from that country.

He immediately contracted an alliance with Arybbas, king of Epirus, a small principality which skirted the western frontier of Thessaly. In his excursions from Thebes, Philip had early seen Olympias, the sister of that prince, whose wit and spirit, joined to the lively graces of her youth and beauty, had made a deep impression on his heart. They were initiated, at the same time, in the mysteries of Ceres, during the triennial festival in the

Philip marries Olympias. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

⁸³ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xiv. et Plut. in Pelopid.

⁸⁴ Demosth. Philip. l. 10. Polyæn. Stratag. l. iv. c. xix.

C H A P. XXXIII. isle of Samothrace, which had been long as much distinguished as Eleusis ⁸⁵ itself, by the peculiar worship and protection of this bountiful goddess. But the active ambition which employed and engrossed the first years of Philip's reign had probably banished the memory of his love, when his expedition into Thessaly recalled the image of Olympias. Their first interview naturally revived his tender passions; and as the kings of Epirus were lineally descended from Achilles, the match appeared every way suitable; Arybbas readily yielded his consent, and the beautiful princess was conducted into Macedon ⁸⁶.

During the solemnities of his nuptials, the neighbouring princes take arms.

The nuptials of Philip were solemnized at Pella with unusual pomp and splendor. Several months were destined to religious shows and processions, to gymnastic games and exercises, to musical and dramatic entertainments. The young and fortunate prince naturally took a principal share in all these scenes of festivity; and it is probable that, amidst the more elegant amusements of his court, Philip might discover that strong propensity to vicious indulgence, that delight in buffoons and flatterers, and other disgraceful ministers of his more criminal pleasures, which, however counteracted and balanced by his ambition and magnanimity, disgraced and tarnished the succeeding glories of his reign. It is certain that the voluptuous inactivity in which he seemed sunk, encouraged the hopes of his enemies ⁸⁷. The tributary princes of

⁸⁵ See vol. iii. c. xxi. p. 192.

⁸⁶ Justin. l. vii. c. vi.

⁸⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxii.

Pæonia and Illyria prepared to rebel; the king of Thrace engaged in their designs, which were concerted with more caution than is usual with Barbarians; and this general conspiracy of neighbouring states might have repressed for a while the fortune of Macedon, if Philip had not been seasonably informed of the danger by his faithful partisans and emissaries in those countries.

Early in the ensuing spring he took the field with the flower of the Macedonian troops. Parmenio, the general in whom he had most confidence, crushed the rebellion in Illyria. Philip was equally successful in Pæonia and Thrace. While he returned from the latter, he was informed of the victory of Parmenio. A second messenger acquainted him that his horses had gained the prize in the chariot-races at the Olympic games; a victory which he regarded as far more honorable, and which, as it proved him a legitimate son of Greece, he carefully commemorated, by impressing a chariot on his coins. Almost at the same time a third messenger arrived to tell him that Olympias had brought forth a prince at Pella; to whom, as born amidst such auspicious circumstances, the diviners announced the greatest prosperity⁸⁸ and glory.

Such a rapid tide of good fortune did not over-
set the wisdom of Philip, if we may judge by the first authentic transaction which immediately followed those events. This was the correspondence

Philip
quashes
their con-
spiracy.
Olymp.
cvi. 1.
A. C. 356.

Philip's
letter to
Aristotle,
announ-
cing the
birth of
Alexan-
der.

⁸⁸ Plut. in Alexand.

C H A P. with Aristotle the philosopher, whose merit Philip
 XXXIII. had early discerned at Athens, when he still resided with his master Plato. The first letter (fortunately preserved) is written with a brevity which marks the king and the man of genius. "Know that a son is born to us. We thank the gods, not so much for their gift, as for bestowing it at a time when Aristotle lives. We assure ourselves that you will form him a prince worthy of his father, and worthy of Macedon." Aristotle commenced this illustrious employment about thirteen years afterwards⁸⁹, when the opening mind of Alexander might be supposed capable of receiving the benefit of his instructions. The success of his labors will be explained in the sequel. The fortune of Alexander surpassed that of all other conquerors as much as his virtues surpassed his fortune.

⁸⁹ The chronology appears from Dionysius of Halicarnassus's letter to Ammæus, who, in order to prove that Demosthenes had attained the highest perfection in the practice, before Aristotle had delivered the theory, of eloquence, marks, with great exactness, the principal events in the lives of the philosopher and orator. Aristotle, a native of Stagira, came to Athens in his eighteenth year, 367 A. C. There he continued twenty years, as the scholar or assistant of Plato, who died 348 A. C. Aristotle left Athens on the death of his master, and spent three years at Atarnæus, and two at Mytlené. From thence he went to Macedon, in the forty-third year of his age, and 343 years A. C. He was employed eight years in the education of Alexander. He returned to Athens 335 A. C. taught twelve years in the Lyceum, and died the year following at Chalcis, ætat. sixty-three, A. C. 323, and a year after the death of Alexander. Dionysius ad Ammæum. He reckons by the Archons of Athens; I have substituted the years before Christ.

Yet the fame of the philosopher abundantly re- C H A P.
pays the honor reflected on him by his royal XXXIII.
pupil, since sixteen centuries after the subver-
sion of Alexander's empire, the writings of Aris-
totle still maintained an unexampled ascendant
over the opinions, and even over the actions of
men.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Philip's Prosperity. — Imprudent Measures of the Amphictyonic Council. — The Phocian, or Sacred War. — Philomelus seizes the Temple of Delphi. — Takes the Field against the Thebans and their Allies. — Defeat and Death of Philomelus. — Affairs of Thrace, Macedon, and Attica. — Onemarchus takes the Command of the Phocians. — Encounters Philip in Thessaly. — He is defeated and slain. — Philip's Designs against Olynthus and Byzantium. — Traversed by the Athenians. — Phayllus takes the Command of the Phocians. — Philip marches towards Thermopylæ. — Anticipated by the Athenians. — Demosthenes's first Philippic. — Philip's Occupations at Pella. — His Vices — and Policy.

CHAP.
XXXIV.
Prosperity
of Philip
in the
fifth year
of his
reign.
Olymp.
evii. 1.
A. C. 356.

PHILIP had now reigned almost five years. He had greatly enlarged the boundaries, he had still more augmented the revenues, of his kingdom. Pæonia, no longer the rival, was become an obsequious province of Macedon. At the expense of Thrace and Illyria, he had extended his frontier on the east to the sea of Thafos; on the west to the lake Lychnidus. He was master of Thessaly without having the trouble to govern it. He secured many commercial advantages by the possession of Amphipolis. His troops were

numerous and well disciplined ; his large finances were regulated with œconomy ; and the mines of Philippi furnished him with an annual resource alike useful to his designs, whether he pursued the ambitious career of foreign conquest, or set himself to build up and consolidate the internal grandeur of his dominions.

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The power of Philip was admired, and feared, by those who were unable to penetrate the deep principles of his policy, which alone rendered him really formidable. The first and most natural object of his desire was the territory of Olynthus, the most populous and fertile portion of the Macedonian coast. His second and far more arduous purpose was to obtain the sovereignty of Greece. But instead of discovering these designs, he had hitherto cultivated the Olynthians with a careful assiduity, and had deserved their gratitude by many solid and important services. His success had been complete, and if, elated by the many advantages which we have enumerated, he had already prepared to invade Greece, it is more than probable that the Olynthians would have consented to follow his standard. But Philip was sensible, that by snatching too eagerly at this glorious prize, he might destroy for ever his prospect of obtaining it. While the Athenians were occupied and harassed by the destructive war with their confederates, he had, indeed, embraced the opportunity to gain possession of several of their dependent settlements in Thrace and Macedon ; coloring, however, these proceedings by the pretence of justice or necessity,

His profound and impenetrable policy.

C H A P. and tempering even his hostilities by many partial
 XXXIV. acts of kindness and respect. Before the social war was ended, the seeds of dissension, so profusely scattered in Greece, were likely to ripen into a new quarrel far more general and important. Philip patiently waited their maturity. His hopes were founded on the domestic animosities of Greece; but the too early discovery of his system might have united a hundred thousand¹ warriors against their common enemy; whereas, by the secret refinements of a slow and steady policy, he effected his vast purposes without being obliged, on any one occasion, to fight against thirty thousand men.

He carefully watches the imprudent measures of the Amphictyonic council;

The Amphictyons having recovered their authority in consequence of the events which have formerly been described, began early to display those dangerous passions with which the exercise of uncontrolled power too naturally corrupts the heart. They pretended, that during the decline of their jurisdiction, many unwarrantable abuses had been introduced, which it became them to remedy. The rights of religion (they said), which it was their first duty to maintain, had been materially violated by the Phocians, who, alike regardless of the decision of the oracle, and of an Amphictyonic decree, had ploughed lands consecrated to

¹ The number is chosen as a very moderate medium between the two hundred and twenty thousand men, afterwards promised to Philip in the general convention of the States at Corinth for the service of the Persian expedition, and the eighty thousand which the Greeks actually raised against Xerxes, and which Thucydides says, that the Peloponnesian confederacy alone could send into Attica.

Apollo, and therefore withdrawn from agriculture². C H A P.
 These lands, however, were confined to the narrow XXXIV.
 district between the river Cephissus and Mount
 Thurium, on the western frontier of Bœotia. The
 crime of the Phocians (if their useful labors de-
 serve the name of crime) was neither great nor
 unprecedented, since the Locrians of Amphissa
 had long cultivated the Crissæan plain; a more ex-
 tensive territory, and consecrated to the god by
 far more awful ceremonies³. But the proud ty-
 ranny of the Amphictyons, careless of such dis-
 tinctions, fulminated an angry decree against Pho-
 cis, commanding the sacred lands to be laid waste,
 and imposing a heavy fine on that community.

It is believed that the Thebans, the enemies
 and neighbours of Phocis, and whose influence at
 that time predominated in the council, were the
 principal abettors of this arbitrary measure⁴; a
 supposition rendered probable by the ensuing de-
 liberations of the Amphictyons. Their next sen-
 tence was directed against Sparta, to punish the
 injury of Phæbidas, who, in time of peace, had
 surprised and seized the Theban citadel. This
 breach of public faith, however criminal and fla-
 grant, had been committed so many years before,
 that prudence required it to be for ever buried in
 obscurity. But, at the instigation of the Thebans,
 the Amphictyons brought it once more to light;
 commanded the Lacedæmonians to pay a fine of
 five hundred talents; decreed that the fine should

which are
 principally
 abetted by
 the The-
 bans;

² See vol. i. c. v. p. 224.

³ See vol. i. c. v. p. 222, et seqq.

⁴ Justin. l. viii. c. i. et seqq.

C H A P. be doubled, unless paid within an appointed time;
 XXXIV. and if the decree were finally disregarded, that the Lacedæmonians should be treated as public enemies to Greece⁵.

who excite
 the resentment of
 the Phocians.
 Olymp.
 cv. 4.
 A. C. 357.

The Phocians, singled out as the first victims of oppression, were deeply affected by their danger. To pay the money demanded of them exceeded their faculties. It would be grievous to desolate the fields which their own hands had cultivated with so much toil. The commands of the Amphictyons were indeed peremptory; but that council had not on foot any sufficient force to render them effectual, should the devoted objects of their vengeance venture to dispute their authority. This measure, daring as it seemed, was strongly recommended by Philomelus, whose popular eloquence and valor gave him a powerful ascendant in Phocis. He possessed great hereditary wealth; contemned the national superstition; and being endowed with a bold ambitious spirit, he expected to rise, amidst the tumult of action and danger, to unrivalled pre-eminence in his republic. After repeated deliberations, in which he flattered the vanity, and tempted the avarice of his countrymen, by proving, that to them of right belonged the guardianship of the Delphian temple, and the immense treasures contained within its sacred walls⁶,

⁵ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxiii. et seqq.

⁶ Philomelus cited the respectable authority of Homer:

Αὐτὰρ Φωκίων Σχέδιος καὶ Ἐπιστροφὸς ἦρχον

οἱ Κυπαρίσσον εἶχον Πυθωνα τε πετρῆεσσαν.

“ But Schedius and Epistrophus led the Phocians, who inhabited Cyparissus, and the rock Pythion,” the ancient name of Delphi.

he brought the majority of the senate and assembly into his opinion. As the properest instrument to execute his own measures, Philomelus was named general: the Phocian youth flocked to his standard; and his private fortune, as well as the public revenues, were consumed in purchasing the mercenary aid of those needy adventurers, who abounded in every province of Greece.

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The following year was employed by Philomelus in providing arms, in exercising his troops, and in an embassy which he undertook in person to Sparta. As that community had not discharged the fine imposed by the Amphictyons, the penalty was doubled, and the delinquents were condemned to pay a thousand talents. The exorbitance of this imposition might have justified the Spartans in following the example of Phocis, and setting the Amphictyons at defiance. But Archidamus, who possessed all the caution and address of his father Agefilaus, was unwilling to take a principal part in the first dangerous experiment, and to post himself in the front of battle, against the revered decrees of an assembly, considered as the legal guardian of national religion and liberty. He assured Philomelus that both himself and the Spartans fully approved his cause; that reasons of a temporary nature hindered their declaring themselves openly, but that he might depend on secret supplies of men and money⁷.

The Phocians under Philomelus prepare for war, and engage the Spartans in their cause. Olymp. cvi. 1. A. C. 356.

⁷ Ὁ δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ἀποδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον, φανερώς μὲν, κατὰ τὸ παρόν, οὐκ ἐποίησε βοηθεῖν, λαθρὰ δὲ πάντα συμπράξειν, χορηγῶν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ μισθοφόρων. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 426.

C H A P.

XXXIV.

Philome-
lus seizes
the temple
of Delphi.
Olymp.
cvi. 2.

A. C. 355.

Encouraged by this assurance, and by a considerable sum^s immediately put into his hands, Philomelus, at his return, ventured on a measure not less audacious than unexpected. The temple of Delphi, so awfully guarded by superstition, was scarcely defended by any military force. Philomelus, having prepared the imagination of his followers for this bold enterprise, immediately conducted them towards Delphi, defeated the feeble resistance of the Thracidæ, who inhabited the neighbouring district, and entered the sacred city with the calm intrepidity of a conqueror. The Delphians, who expected no mercy from a man devoid of respect for religion, prepared themselves in silent horror, for beholding the complicated guilt of sacrilege and murder. But the countenance of Philomelus re-assured them, and his discourse totally dispelled their ill-grounded fears. He declared that he had come to Delphi with no hostile disposition against the inhabitants, with no sacrilegious designs against the temple. His principal motive was to emancipate the one and the other from the arbitrary proceedings of the Amphictyons, and to assert the ancient and unalienable prerogative of Phocis to be the patron and protector of the Delphian shrine. To the same purpose he scattered declarations through the different republics of Greece; his emissaries acquainted the Spartans that he had destroyed the brazen tablets containing the unjust decrees against Sparta and Phocis; they inflamed the resentment of the Athenians, naturally

^s Diodorus (l. xvi. p. 426.) says, fifteen talents.

hostile to Thebes; and both those republics came C H A P. to the resolution of supporting the measures of Philomelus. XXXIV.

The Thebans, on the other hand, who *directed*, and the Locrians, Thessalians, with other states of less consideration, who tamely *obeyed* the decrees of the Amphictyons, determined to take the field in defence of their insulted religion and violated laws. Their operations were conducted with that extreme slowness natural to confederacies. Philomelus acted with more vigor. He received little assistance from his distant allies. But, first, by imposing a heavy tax on the Delphians, who had been enriched by the devotion of Greece, and then, notwithstanding his declaration, by taking very undue liberties with the treasure of Apollo⁹, he collected above ten thousand mercenaries, men daring and profligate as himself, who sacrificed all scruples of religion to the hopes of dividing a rich spoil. Such at least was the general character of his followers. To the few who had more piety, or less avarice, he endeavoured to justify his measures by the authority of an oracle. The Pythia at first refused to mount the sacred tripod. Philomelus sternly commanded her. She obeyed with reluctance, observing, that being already master of Delphi, he might act without sanction or control¹⁰. Philomelus waited for no other answer, but gladly interpreted the words as an acknow-

Employs
the sacred
treasure in
raising
mercena-
ries.

⁹ Diodorus sometimes acknowledges, and sometimes denies, that Philomelus meddled with the sacred treasure.

¹⁰ Αποφθενξάμενους δ' αὐτῆς πρὸς τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς βιάζομεναι "ὅτι ἐξέσι αὐτῷ πράττειν ὃ βούλεται." Diodor. p. 428.

C H A P. ledgment of his absolute authority ; and, with the
XXXIV. address suitable to his situation and character, confirmed the auspicious declaration of the priestess by the report of many favorable omens¹¹.

**Takes
the field
against the
Thebans
and their
allies.
Olymp.
cvi. 2.
A. C. 355.**

Having obtained the supposed sanction of religion, Philomelus proceeded to fortify the temple and city of Delphi, in which he placed a strong garrison ; and, with the remainder of his forces, boldly marched forth to repel the incursions of the enemy. During two years, hostilities were carried on with various fortune against the Locrians and Thebans. Victory for the most part inclined to the Phocians ; but there happened not any decisive action, nor was the war memorable on any other account but that of the excessive cruelty mutually inflicted and suffered. The Phocian prisoners were uniformly condemned to death, as wretches convicted of the most abominable sacrilege and impiety ; and the resentment of their countrymen retaliated with equal severity on the unhappy captives whom the chance of war frequently put into their hands¹².

**Philo-
melus de-
feated.
Olymp.
cvi. 4.
A. C. 353.**

As both armies anxiously expected reinforcements, they were unwilling to risk a general engagement, till chance rendered that measure unavoidable. Entangled among the woods and mountains of Phocis, the convenience of forage attracted them towards the same point. The vanguards met unexpectedly near the town of Neone, and began to skirmish. A general and fierce action followed, in which the Phocians were repelled

¹¹ Diodor. p. 429.

¹² Ibid. p. 530, et seqq.

by superior numbers. Pathless woods, abrupt rocks and precipices, obstructed their retreat. In vain Philomelus strove with his voice and arm to rally the fugitives. He himself was carried along by the torrent to the brow of a precipice, afflicted with wounds, and still more with anguish and despair. The enemy advanced; it seemed impossible to escape their vengeance; the resolution of Philomelus was prompt and terrible; with a vigorous bound he sprang from the rock, thus eluding the torment of his own guilty conscience, and the resentment of his pursuers¹³. While the Thebans and their allies admired this spectacle as a manifest indication of divine vengeance¹⁴, Onomarchus, the lieutenant and brother of the Phocian general, collected and drew off the scattered remains of the vanquished army towards Delphi. The confederates determined to expel them from that holy place, and to inflict on the enemies of Greece and Heaven, a punishment similar to that to which the wrath of Apollo had driven the impious Philomelus¹⁵.

Different causes concurred to prevent Philip on the one hand, and Athens and Sparta on the other, from taking a principal or early part in the Phocian war. The interested policy of Archidamus,

The Spartans attempt to recover their dominion in

¹³ Diodorus hints, that had Philomelus been taken captive, his body would have been shockingly mangled: φοβεμένος την ἐκ της αιχμαλωσίας αἰκίαν. p. 432.

¹⁴ Such it appeared to future historians: καὶ τὸν τὸν τρόπον δὲ τῷ δαιμονίῳ δικᾷ καταστρέψε τον ἔχον. Diodor. ibid.

¹⁵ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 432.

C H A P.

XXXIV.

the Peloponneseus.

Olymp.

cvi. 3.

A. C. 353.

who directed with absolute authority the councils of Sparta, was less anxious to support the arms of his distant confederates, than solicitous to recover the Lacedæmonian dominion in Peloponneseus. The opportunity seemed favorable for this purpose, the Thebans being deeply engaged in another contest, and the Athenians in strict alliance with Sparta. For several years, the arms and intrigues of Archidamus were employed against the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives. But his ambitious design failed of success; the inferior cities of Peloponneseus, roused by a common danger, confederated for their mutual defence; and Athens, though actually the ally of Sparta, was unwilling to abandon to the tyranny of that republic her more ancient and faithful allies, the Arcadians and Messenians¹⁶.

The affairs
of Thrace
occupy
Philip and
the Athenians.

While the politics of the Peloponneseus formed a system apart, the sacred war shook the centre of Greece, and the affairs of Thrace occupied Philip and the Athenians. Cotys was dead; his sons, Kerfobleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus, were all dissatisfied with the partition of his dominions. While their hostilities against each other exhibited the odious picture of fraternal discord, the prizes for which they contended were successively carried off by Philip. The encroachments of that prince

¹⁶ The question appears to have occasioned warm debates in the Athenian assembly: the Spartan and Arcadian parties were animated with the utmost zeal; and, according to the lively observation of Demosthenes, the Athenian orators, had they not spoke the Attic dialect, would have appeared, the one half Spartans, the other Arcadians. Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 83.

at length engaged Kerfobleptes, the most powerful of the co-heirs, to cede the Thracian Chersonesus to the Athenians, who sent Chares with a numerous fleet to take possession of that peninsula. The town of Sestos alone made resistance. It was taken by storm, and treated with great severity by Chares; while Philip besieged and took the far more important city of Methoné in Pieria. In this siege he lost an eye, a loss which he is said to have borne with impatience¹⁷, as the circumstances attending it were alike dishonorable to his judgment and humanity¹⁸.

It appears extraordinary that the Thebans, after the defeat and death of Philomelus, should not have pursued their good fortune, without allowing the enemy time to breathe and recover strength. They probably imagined that the fatal exit of that daring chief would deter a successor; and that the

C H A P.
XXXIV.

Onomarchus takes the command of the Phocians. Olymp. cvi. 4. A. C. 353.

¹⁷ Lucian de Scribend. Hist. p. 365.

¹⁸ These circumstances, however, rest on the authority of Suidas and Ulpian. It is said, that when the arrow was extracted, the following inscription appeared on it: "After to Philip's right eye." After, it seems, had offered his services to Philip, as an excellent marksman; to which Philip replied, that he would employ him when he waged war with starlings. Philip caused the arrow to be shot back into the place, with a new inscription, "That he would hang up After;" a threat which was executed as soon as he was master of Methoné. Fictions still more incredible were related on this subject by the fabulous writers of the age of Alexander. Philip, it was said, lost his right eye by his unseasonable curiosity in prying into the amours of Olympias and Jupiter Ammon. This ridiculous flattery to Alexander has been so widely diffused, that it was supposed to be the subject represented on the celebrated vase, which is so much better explained by Mr. D'Hancarville. See *Recherches sur les Arts de la Grèce*, vol. ii.

C H A P. XXXIV.] Phocians would crave peace, if not driven to despair. Such indeed was the resolution of the more respectable part of the Phocians. But the bold, impious, and needy, who composed the most numerous description of that people, were bent on continuing the war. An assembly was convened, when Onomarchus, in a set speech¹⁹, flattered their hopes, and encouraged them to persevere. His opinion prevailed; he was named general; and his conduct soon proved, that he equalled his brother in boldness and ambition, and surpassed him in activity and enterprise. None better knew the power of gold, or had more address in employing it. With the Delphic treasure he coined such a quantity of money as perhaps had never before circulated in Greece. The Phocian army was restored and augmented; their allies were rendered more hearty in their cause; even their enemies were not proof against the temptations which continually assailed their fidelity. By seasonable bribes, Onomarchus distracted the councils of Thebes, and kept their arms inactive. The neighbouring states were persuaded to observe a neutrality; while the Thessalians, a people at all times noted for avarice and fraud²⁰, and of whose country

¹⁹ Πεφροντισμενον λογον διελαθων. Diodor. p. 432.

²⁰ The Thessalians had the same character in Greece, as the Ligurians in Italy:

——— Vane Ligus

Nequicquam patrias tentasti lubricas artes.

VIRG.

Euripides speaks of the slippery deceits of the Thessalians. Demosthenes (Olynth. i. p. 4. ex edit. Wolf.) says, εἶτα τὰ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ταῦτα γὰρ ἀπιστοῦσιν ἢ ἡ δὴ πρὸς φύσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ πατὶς ἀνθρώποις.
 “Philip was farther distressed by the insurrections of the Thessalians, a people faithless by nature, at all times, to all men.”

the proverb said, that it had never produced a bad horse or an honest man, openly embraced the cause of Phocis.

C H A P.
XXXIV.

These multiplied advantages were not allowed to languish in the hands of Onomarchus, who hoped to eclipse the unjust motives of his enterprise by the sudden splendor of victory. At the head of a numerous and well-appointed army, he poured down on Locris and Doris, ravaged the country, took Thronium by storm, laid several cities under contribution, pierced into Bœotia, and made himself master of Orchomenus. The Thebans assembled their forces to stem the torrent. Onomarchus first met with a repulse before the walls of Chæronea, and ventured not to renew the engagement, having weakened his forces by placing garrisons in the important places which he had taken, as well as by sending a detachment of seven thousand men, under his brother Phayllus, into Thessaly²¹.

Success of
his arms.

In that country, the intrigues of Philip had counteracted the gold of Onomarchus. But Lycophron, who was the chief partisan of the latter, and whom Philip had formerly divested of his authority, had again established himself in Pheræ. Pegasæ, Magnesia, and several places of less note, declared for the tyrant, and for Phocis. The Macedonian interest prevailed elsewhere; and the factions were equally balanced, when Philip, with his usual diligence, entered Thessaly, defeated Phayllus,

He en-
counters
Philip in
Thessaly,
and ob-
liges him
to retire.

²¹ Diodor. p. 434.

C H A P. XXXIV. besieged and took Pegasæ, and drove the enemy with disgrace towards the frontier of Phocis. The fear of losing his newly acquired interest among the Thessalians, made Onomarchus evacuate Bœotia, and advance against Philip with his whole army. The Macedonians, though less numerous, did not decline the engagement. At the first charge the Phocians gave way, and retreated towards the neighbouring mountains. Philip ordered his men to pursue in their ranks. It was then that the Phocians really began the battle. Onomarchus, foreseeing that the Macedonians would follow in close order, had posted a detachment on the summit of the precipice, who were ready, on a given signal, to roll down fragments of rock, and stones of an enormous size, on the embattled phalanx. This was the only mode of attack for which the Macedonians were not prepared. The line of march, in which the moment before they proceeded with such firmness and confidence, was converted into a dreadful scene of carnage and ruin. Before they recovered from their consternation, the flying Phocians, who had decoyed them into this ambush, returned to the charge. Philip, however, rallied his men; and while Onomarchus hesitated to advance, drew them off in good order, saying, that they did not retreat through fear, but retired like rams, in order to strike with the more impetuous vigor²².

Onomarchus defeated and slain.

This saying was finally justified, although the Phocians and Lycophron first enjoyed a short

²² Polyxen. Stratag. l. ii. c. xxviii. Diodor. l. xvi. 34, et seqq. triumph.

triumph. The tyrant established himself, as he O. H. A. P.
 thought, securely, in his native city; the Phocians, XXXIV.
 reinforced by their Thessalian allies, again invaded
 Bœotia, assaulted and took Coronæa, and dread-
 fully alarmed the Thebans, by the devastations
 committed in the very centre of their territory.
 But the time of vengeance arrived. Philip having
 recruited his army, returned into Thessaly. The
 unsteady partisans of Lycophron, had they deter-
 mined to share his danger, would have proved un-
 able to support his cause. A considerable portion
 of the Thessalians received the king of Macedon
 as their deliverer. Onomarchus was thus obliged
 to withdraw his forces from Bœotia. At the head
 of twenty thousand foot and five hundred horse,
 he marched to the defence of Lycophron, and was
 met by the enemy, still more numerous, on the
 level coast of Magnesia. To remind his soldiers
 that they fought in the cause of Delphi and of
 Heaven, Philip crowned their heads with the laurel
 consecrated to Apollo, and adorned his ensigns and
 standards with the emblems and attributes of that
 divinity²³. Their onset was impetuous and fierce,
 and their valor, animated by enthusiasm, rendered
 them irresistible, though the enemy, conscious of
 guilt, fought with the fury of despair. Three thou-
 sand Thessalian cavalry, who had signally contributed
 to the victory of Philip, rendered the pursuit bloody
 and destructive; while the Phocians, having thrown
 away their armor, fled towards the sea, allured

²³ Justin. l. viii. 2.

C H A P. by the fight of the Athenian fleet under Chares,
 XXXIV. which was returning from the Chersonesus. That commander seems not to have made any attempt to protect them. Above six thousand perished in the battle, or in the pursuit. The body of Onomarchus was found among the slain; Philip ordered it to be hung on a gibbet, as a mark of peculiar infamy; the rest were thrown into the sea, as unworthy, by their impious sacrilege, of the rites of funeral. Three thousand were taken alive; but it is not absolutely certain whether they were drowned, or reduced into captivity; though the latter opinion is the more probable²⁴.

Philip's
 designs
 against
 Olynthus
 and By-
 zantium.

It might be expected that such a decisive blow should have proved fatal to the Phocians. But Philip, who had conquered them in Thessaly, durst not pursue his advantages by invading Phocis;

²⁴ The leaving such a circumstance at all doubtful, is very dishonorable to the accuracy of the compiler Diodorus. His words are, τέλος δε, των Φωκεων και μισθοφορων ανηρεθησαν μεν υπερ της εξα-
 κισχιλης, εν οις ην και αυτος ο στρατηγος. ηλωσαν δε εκ ελαττης των
 τρισχιλιων. ο δε Φιλιππος τον μεν Ονομαρχον εκρεμεσεν, της δε αλλης ως
 ιεροσυλης κατεποντισε. Literally, "At length above six thousand
 of the Phocians and mercenaries were, on the one hand, taken
 up dead, among whom was the general. Not less than three
 thousand were, on the other hand, taken prisoners. Philip hung
 up Onomarchus, and threw the rest into the sea, as guilty of sa-
 crilege." The learned reader will perceive, that I have given the
 full force of the word ανηρεθησαν: and from the precise and distinc-
 tive force of the particles μεν and δε, which separate the two first
 clauses of the text, I am of opinion that the της αλλης can apply
 only to the rest of those who were taken up dead. There is
 nothing determinate to be learned from the word κατεποντισεν,
 which signifies barely to plunge into the sea.

well knowing, that an attempt to pass the straits of Thermopylæ would alarm not only his enemies but his allies. It was his interest to perpetuate dissensions in Greece. For that reason he fomented the discord that reigned among the states of Peloponnesus; and though he had punished the obnoxious Phocians, he was unwilling to terminate a war which diverted the public attention from watching too studiously his own ambitious designs. His victory over an odious enemy extended his just renown. He secured the dominion of Thessaly, by planting garrisons in Pheræ, Pegasæ, and Magnesia. His army was ready to march towards Greece on the first favorable opportunity; but till that should arrive, he rejoiced to see both divisions of that country involved in war, which allowed him to accomplish, unmolested, the subordinate purposes of his reign. He had long deceived the Olynthians by good offices and promises, but now began to throw off the mask, and to show that he meant to be their master. He actually applied to Kerfobleptes, whom he detached from the interest of Athens; and having raised him on the ruins of the neighbouring chieftains of Thrace, thereby obtained his confidence, and waited an occasion to destroy him with security²⁵. The dominions of that prince opened the way to Byzantium, the possession of which must have early tempted the ambition of Philip, who knew so well to estimate the importance of its situation both in commerce

²⁵ Justin. l. viii. 3. Demosth. Olynth. 2 et 3.

C H A P. and in war. He began to discover his designs
xxxiv. against Byzantium by attacking the fortrefs of
Heræum, a place fo called from the neighbouring
temple of Juno, which formed its principal orna-
ment. The town of Heræum was fmall, and in
itself unimportant; its harbour was dangerous and
deceitful; but being fittuate contiguous to Byzan-
tium, it ferved as an outwork and defence to that
rich and populous city²⁶.

His mea-
fures
counter-
acted by
the Athe-
nians.

The Athenians had fufficient penetration to dif-
cern the drift of thofe enterprifes. They formed
an alliance with the republic of Olynthus; they
warned Kerfobleptes of his danger; they voted a
numerous fleet to fail to the defence of Heræum, or
rather of Byzantium, with which, though rendered
independent of Athens by the focial war, they
ftill carried on a lucrative commerce. But thefe
fpirited exertions were not of long continuance.
Philip's wound at Methoné, together with the
continual labor and fatigue to which he had after-
wards fubmitted, threw him into a dangerous
malady. The report of his ficknefs was, before it
reached Athens, magnified into his death. The
Athenians rejoiced in fo feafonable a deliverance,
and laying afide their naval preparations, bent their
principal attention to the fabled war²⁷.

The Pho-
cian, or
fabled war
continued
by Phayl-
lus.

That unhappy conteft was renewed by Phayllus,
the laft furviving brother of Philomelus and Ono-
marchus. As his caufe became more desperate,
Phayllus availed himfelf to the utmoft of the only

²⁶ Justin. l. viii. 3. Demofth. Olynth. 2 et 3.

²⁷ Idem, ubi fupra.

resource which was left him. Having converted into ready money the most precious dedications of Delphi, he doubled the pay of his mercenaries. This extraordinary encouragement brought new adventurers to his standard, and soon rendered his army equal to that of either of his predecessors. The fugitive Thessalians, assembled in a body by Lycophron, entered into his pay. By means of the Delphic treasure, he acquired, likewise, the public assistance of a thousand Lacedæmonians, two thousand Achæans, five thousand Athenian foot, with four hundred cavalry. These powerful reinforcements enabled the Phocians to take the field with a good prospect of success, and rendered those who had so lately been the objects of pity, again formidable to their enemies²⁸.

C H A P.

XXXIV.

Olymp.

cviii. 1.

A. C. 352.

Philip, meanwhile, had recovered from his indisposition. The votes and preparations of the Athenians had taught him that his designs could no longer be concealed. He was acquainted with the alliance formed between that republic and Olynthus. His emissaries gave him intelligence of the actual commotions in Greece, where the countenance and assistance of so many powerful states abetted the sacrilege of the Phocians. The occasion required that he should appear in favor of his allies, and in defence of the pious cause which he had formerly maintained with so much glory. His trophies gained over Onomarchus were still fresh and blooming; and not only the Thebans,

Philip, in order to oppose him, marches towards Thermopylæ.

²⁸ Diodor. p. 436.

C H A P. Dorians, and Locrians, who were principals in the
 XXXIV. war, but the sincere votaries of Apollo in every
 quarter of Greece, secretly expected him as their
 deliverer, while his enemies admired his piety
 and trembled at his valor; and as they had been
 lately amused with the news of his sickness and
 death, they would now view with religious terror
 his unexpected appearance at Thermopylæ, to
 assert the violated rights of the Delphian temple.
 Such were the hopes and motives on which Philip,
 at the head of a numerous army, directed his
 march²⁹ towards those celebrated straits, which we
 have formerly described, and so often mentioned.

This mea-
 sure alarms
 the Athe-
 nians;

who fail to
 Thermo-
 pylæ, and
 guard the
 straits.

But the event showed, that on this occasion he
 had made a false estimate of the superstition or
 timidity of the Greeks, and particularly had built
 too much on the patience and indolence of the
 Athenians. That people penetrated his designs,
 and determined to oppose them. Under the veil of
 religious zeal, they doubted not that he concealed
 the desire to invade and conquer their country;
 and, on the first intelligence of his expedition,
 their foresight and patriotism represented the Mace-
 donians, Thessalians, and Thebans, pouring down
 like a destructive inundation, on Attica and
 Peloponnesus. With an alacrity and ardor, of
 which there was no recent example in their coun-
 cils, they flew to arms, launched their fleet, failed
 to Thermopylæ, and took possession of the straits³⁰.

²⁹ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 437.

³⁰ Demosthen. de Falsâ Legat. sect. 29.

Never did Philip meet with a more cruel disappointment, than in being thus anticipated by a people whom he had so often deceived. He retired with deep regret, leaving the Phocian war to be carried on by the Thebans and their allies. Meanwhile, the Athenians placed a guard at Thermopylæ; and, elated by the first instance of their success against the Macedonian, called an assembly to deliberate on measures proper to restrain his ambition.

This assembly is rendered memorable by the first appearance of Demosthenes against Philip, whose measures from this moment he ceased not to watch, and to counteract. Two years before, this illustrious orator, whose works have been more praised than read, and more read than understood, began, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, to appear on the theatre of public life. The Athenians were then involved in the sacred war; their northern possessions were continually insulted, plundered, or conquered by Philip; yet in this situation of affairs, the mercenary partisans of that prince, in order to divert the public attention from his too aspiring designs, affected to extend their views to Asia, and to be alarmed by the motions of Artaxerxes Ochus, who was preparing to reduce the rebels of Cyprus, Egypt, and Phœnicia. In every assembly of the people, the creatures of Philip dwelt, with exaggerated terror, on the naval and military preparations of the great king, which they represented as certainly destined to revenge the recent injuries committed by the Athenian troops, under Chares, on the coast of Asia. The trophies

C H A P.
XXXIV.

Philip retires in disappointment.

Demosthenes's first appearance against Philip.

C H A P of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon, were
XXXIV. adorned with all the pomp of eloquence; and the Athenians were exhorted to imitate those memorable exploits of their ancestors in the Persian war, which shed a lustre on all the succeeding periods of their history.

Sentiments
 of the
 wisest
 Athenians
 respecting
 this prince.

In this popular enthusiasm joined Isocrates the orator, together with the statesman and general Phocion, two men whose talents and virtues would have done honor to the most illustrious age of the republic. The unblemished integrity of Isocrates, the disinterested poverty of Phocion, afford sufficient proof that neither of these great men were corrupted by Macedonian gold. But they both perceived that the indolence and unsteadiness of Athens were incapable to contend with the unceasing activity of Philip, and both exhorted their countrymen to gain and cultivate the friendship of a prince, against whom they could not make war with any reasonable prospect of success.

Those of
 Isocrates
 in particu-
 lar.

Isocrates, from the most accurate and extensive survey of the political history of Greece, discovered that a foreign war alone could heal the domestic dissensions which reigned in every quarter of that divided country; and from a thorough knowledge of the inherent defects in the government of Thebes, Athens, and Sparta, he regarded Macedon as the state, and Philip as the general, best entitled, and best qualified, to assume the command of a military expedition into Asia, to revenge ancient wrongs, and to deliver the Grecian colonies from the actual oppression of Barbarians.

On this important subject he addressed a discourse to Philip; he repeatedly insisted on the same topic with the Athenians; and it is obscurely related, that on one occasion he reconciled those hostile powers³¹, and engaged them to concur in this extensive yet rational scheme of conquest.

The sentiments and views of Demosthenes were equally different from those of Isocrates and Phocion on the one hand, and from those of the infamous hirelings of Philip on the other. None knew better than he did the corruption and degeneracy of his countrymen; but he hoped to rouse them from their lethargy; a design arduous as it may seem, sometimes effected by his eloquence, the most powerful, glowing, and sublime, ever employed by man; and which, of all men, he had been at most pains to acquire and cultivate³². His imagination was filled with the ancient glory of the republic; in the ardor of patriotism he forgot the moderation of philosophy; and while he sternly maintained the prerogatives and pretensions of his country, he would rather have seen Athens defeated at the head of her allies, than victorious under the standard of the Macedonians, or any standard but her own. With such sentiments and character, he was naturally a favorite of the people, and a warm partisan of popular government; while Phocion, like most men of sense and worth in that age, preferred a moderate aristocracy;

C H A P.
XXXIV.

The peculiar views of Demosthenes.

³¹ See the life of Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of his works.

³² Dionys. Halicarn. et Plut. de Demost.

C H A P. and Isocrates was inclined to regard a well-
 XXXIV. regulated monarchy as the best of all govern-
 ments³³.

appear in
 public ora-
 tions.

In his first speeches before the assembly, Demosthenes announced himself as the minister of the people at large, whom he exhorted to awaken from their indolence, and at length to assume the direction of their own affairs. They had been too long governed by the incapacity of a few ambitious men, to the great detriment and disgrace of the community. First an orator at the head of all, under him a general, abetted by a faction of three or four hundred, availed themselves of the sloth and negligence of a people careless of every thing but pleasure, to domineer in the public councils, and to become masters of the state. From considerations of their present corruption and weakness, as well as of the designs and commotions of neighbouring powers, he advised them to forsake all distant and romantic schemes of ambition; and, instead of carrying their arms into remote countries, to prepare for repelling the attacks that might be made against their own dominions. He insisted earnestly on a better regulation of their finances, on the retrenching of many superfluous branches of expense, and especially on a more equitable repartition of public burdens, in proportion to the fortunes of individuals; which, though the income of the state had dwindled to four hundred talents, were actually more considerable than at any former period. While the rich cheerfully paid

³³ See his Nicocles, Evagoras, etc.

their contributions, the poor must be willing to forego the burdensome gratuities which they derived from the treasury; and all must be ready to take the field in person, that the public service might be no longer betrayed, or disgraced, by strangers and mercenaries ³⁴.

C H A P.
XXXIV.

Subsequent events justified the opinions, and enforced the counsels of Demosthenes. The Athenians were delivered from their ill-grounded fears of Artaxerxes Ochus, when they beheld the preparations of that monarch directed against his rebellious subjects. The encroachments of Philip became continually more daring and more formidable; and his recent attempts to seize the straits of Thermopylæ showed the necessity of opposing him with re-united vigilance and vigor.

His first
Philippic.

In this juncture, so favorable to awakening the activity of Athens, Demosthenes mounted the rostrum ³⁵ before any other orator, apologizing for this forwardness in a man not yet thirty years of age, by observing, "That already the usual speakers had given their opinions on the subject of Philip; and that, had *their* advices been useful and practicable, they must have precluded the necessity of any farther deliberation. First of all, Athenians! you ought not to despair; no! not although your affairs seem indeed involved in equal confusion and danger. For the same circumstance which is

³⁴ Vid. Oration. de Classibus, et de Ordinand. Republic.

³⁵ I have used that word, because adopted in our language to express the *Bema*, pulpit or gallery appropriated to the speakers in the Athenian assembly.

C. H. A. P. the cause of your past misfortunes, ought to furnish
 XXXIV. the source of your present hope. What is that? Your own negligence and sloth, not the power of your enemies, have disordered the state. Had your distress arisen, notwithstanding your utmost care to prevent it, there would then be little hope of relief. But since it is occasioned by your own misconduct, you need only repair your errors, in order to retrieve your affairs. Considering the weakness of Athens, thus despoiled of her dominions, and the strength of Philip, which has increased immoderately at our expense, should you think him a formidable enemy, you doubtless think aright. Yet reflect, Athenians! that there was a time when we possessed Pydna, Potidæa, Methoné, and all the surrounding territory; that the nations in that neighbourhood, now subject to Philip, were then independent, and preferred the alliance of Athens to that of Macedon. In the infancy of his fortune, had Philip reasoned timidly, as we do now, 'How shall I, destitute of allies, attack the Athenians, whose garrisons command my frontier?' he would not have engaged in those enterprises which have been crowned with such signal success, nor raised his kingdom to such an unexampled pitch of grandeur. No, Athenians! he knew well, that towns and fortresses are but prizes of skill and valor³⁶,

³⁶ Αλλ' οἶδεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ καλῶς ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι ταῦτα εἰσι πάντα τὰ χωρία ἀθλὰ τὰ πολέμῳ κείμενα ἐν μέσῳ. In ancient times the figure had more force, as well as dignity; because at the Olympic, and other sacred games, the spectators were used to behold the prizes proposed to the victors, κείμενα ἐν μέσῳ, exposed in the middle of the field, to excite their emulation and ardor. See vol. i. c. v.

proposed to the combatants, and belong of right to the conqueror; that the dominions of the absent are seized by those who take the field, and the possessions of the negligent and slothful by the vigilant and intrepid. Guided by these principles, he has subdued, and governs all; holding some communities by right of conquest, and others under the title of allies; for allies no prince nor state can want, who are not wanting to themselves. But should you, Athenians! imitate the example of Philip, and at length, rousing from your lethargy, apply seriously to your interest, you would speedily recover those advantages which your negligence only has lost. Favorable occasions will yet occur; for you must not imagine that Philip, like a god, enjoys his prosperity for ever fixed and immutable³⁷. No, Athenians! there are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among those seemingly the most devoted to his cause. These are universal passions, from which the allies of Macedon are not, surely, exempted. They have hitherto concealed them, finding no resource in you; but it depends on your councils to call them into action. When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigor? when roused by some event—when urged by some necessity—What can be more urgent than the present juncture? To freemen, the most necessary of all motives

³⁷ The original is inimitable: μη γὰρ ὡς θεῶν νομιζέτ' εἶναι τὰ παρόντα πεπλεγμένα πρᾶγματα ἀθανάτα. Join the τὰ and the πρᾶγματα, the article and the substantive, and the charm will be dissolved.

C H A P. is the shame of misconduct. Or say, will it still
 XXXIV. be your sole business to saunter in the public place, inquiring after news? What can be more new, than that a Macedonian should conquer Athens, and enslave Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but in great danger. How are you concerned in these rumors? What matters it to you whether he is sick or dead, since, if you thus manage your affairs, your folly will soon raise up another Philip³⁸?"

Measures
 proposed
 by Demos-
 thenes for
 resisting
 Philip.

After this animated remonstrance, Demosthenes proposes a plan of operations calculated chiefly for defence. The Athenians, he observes, were not yet prepared to meet Philip in the field. They must begin by protecting Olynthus, and the Chersonesus, from his incursions. For this purpose, it was necessary to raise a body of two thousand men light-armed, and an adequate proportion of cavalry, which were to be transported under a proper convoy (as Philip had his fleet) with all expedition to the isles of Lemnos, Thasos, and Sciathos, contiguous to the coast of Macedon. Conveniently posted in those islands, where they would enjoy necessities in abundance, the Athenian troops might avail themselves of every favorable incident, to appear at the first summons of their allies, and either to repel the inroads of the Macedonians, or

³⁸ The sense indeed of that period, but neither its force nor its harmony, can be translated. Τέθνηκε Φίλιππος; & μα δια! ἀλλ' ἀσθενεῖ. τι δὲ ὑμῖν διαφέρει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἕτος τι πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε, ἂν περ ἔτω προσεχῇτε τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νῦν· ἔδε γὰρ ἕτος παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βωμὴν τοσούτον ἐπὶ νύξῃται, ὅσον παρὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀμελείαν.

to harass the extended, and, in many parts, defenceless territory of that people. Meanwhile, preparations would be made at home for carrying on the war in due time, with more numerous forces, and with greater vigor. Such moderate proposals prove that Demosthenes well understood the genius of his countrymen. He required that only the fourth part of the troops should consist of Athenian citizens, and the immediate supplies were only to amount to ninety talents. He knew that higher demands would alarm their indolence and love of pleasure; and so fatally were they sunk in the dissipated amusements of the city, that it is probable the small armament proposed did not actually set sail; it is certain that no future preparations were made adequate to the public service.

The profound policy of Philip fostered the supine negligence of his enemies. For more than two years after his retreat from Thermopylæ, that crafty prince much confined himself to his dominions, and chiefly to his capital, anxious to dissipate the clamor occasioned by his too great precipitation to seize the gates of Greece. In that interval he indeed made an expedition to chastise the rebellious spirit of the Thessalians. But the greatest part of his time was spent at Pella, and addicted to the arts of peace, which he judged with skill, and encouraged with munificence. That favorite city was adorned with temples, theatres, and porticoes. The most ingenious artists of Greece were summoned, by liberal rewards, to the court

C H A P.
XXXIV.

Philip affects to lay aside his ambition.

His occupation during a long residence at Pella.
A. C. 350, & 349.

С И А Р. of Macedon ³⁹; and men of talents and genius ⁴⁰,
 XXXIV. who were too often exposed to envy and persecution in the former country, were received with open arms by a prince, who, amidst the tumult of war, assiduously cultivated the studies of literature and eloquence. In his domestic government, Philip administered justice with impartiality, listened with condescension to the complaints of his meanest subjects, and disdaining the ceremonious and forbidding pomp of tyranny, maintained an intercourse of visits and entertainments with his courtiers and generals ⁴¹.

His vices;

In a prince so respectably employed, it is difficult to conceive the odious and detestable vices with which Philip is upbraided by Demosthenes ⁴²; yet the brief descriptions occasionally sketched by the orator are filled up by an ancient historian, who represents the infamies of the life of Philip in language well fitted to arraign the horrors of Nero or Heliogabalus. Could we believe the acrimony of Theopompus, a writer who flourished in the age of Alexander, by whom he was rewarded and honored, not perhaps the less willingly because he had exposed or exaggerated the vices of his father, Philip sullied his great actions by the most enormous and detestable crimes. Alike avaricious and prodigal, the wealth which he had amassed by

³⁹ Justin. l. viii. c. 3.

⁴⁰ Among other Greeks who lived at Philip's court were, Isesthenes the orator, Neoptolemus the poet, Aristodemus and Satyrus, celebrated players. Æschin. et Demosthen. passim.

⁴¹ Plut. in Apophth. et in Demosthen. et Alexand.

⁴² Vid. Demosthen. ex edit. Wolf, pp. 5. 8. 48. 66. etc.

injustice

injustice and rapacity, the dissipated in the most flagitious gratifications, and in company with the meanest and most worthless of mankind. His companions were chosen promiscuously from Macedonians and Greeks, and especially from Thes- salians, the most profligate of the Greeks, and were admitted to his familiarity and friendship in proportion to their proficiency in the most odious and unnatural abominations⁴³ that ever polluted the worst men in the most corrupt ages of the world. We must, doubtless, make allowances for the gall

⁴³ The epithets given them by Theopompus are, Βδελυροί, *abominabiles*; and Λατρυροί; the last word is compounded of λα, *valde*, and τρυρός, *taurus*, and translated *insigniter mentulatus*, which corresponds to the *enormitas membrorum* of the Augustan historians. The following description of the friends of Philip is too indecent for modern language: "Horum enim quidam jam viri barbam identidem radebant et vellebantur: alii vero barbati citra pudorem vicissim se impudicabant, stupris intercutibus se flagitantes; regi vero duo vel tres circumducebantur qui paterentur muliebria, et eandem operam navarent alios subagitantes. Quamobrem illos jure aliquis non amicos regis, sed amicos esse credidisset, nec milites sed prostibula nuncupasset, ingenio quidem et naturâ sanguinarios, moribus autem virilia scorta, etc." This passage is quoted from the forty-ninth book of Theopompus. In his twenty-sixth book he speaks to the same purpose: "Philippum cum Thessalos intemperantes esse, ac lascivæ petulantisque vitæ prospiceret, eorum conventus ac contubernia instituisse: iisque uti placeret modis omnibus fuisse conatum, Cum illis saltasse, commissatum fuisse, cuius libidini se ac nequitiae tradidisse." A mistaken passage of Diodorus has made some learned men doubt the authenticity of these descriptions. Diodorus (l. xvi. sect. 3.) says, that Theopompus γεγραφεναὶ οκτὼ βιβλῆς, πρὸς τοῖς πεντηκοντα ἐξ ὧν πέντε διαφωνοῦσι; "had written the history of Philip in fifty-eight books, five of which differ in style from the rest." Were we therefore to suppose the five last books spurious (for that is the inference which has been drawn), the observation of Diodorus would not at all affect the passages above-cited.

C H A P. of a writer, noted to a proverb for severity. Yet
 XXXIV. there is sufficient collateral evidence, that Philip's strong propensity to low wit, obscenity, and drunkenness, rendered him a prey to buffoons, and parasites, and flatterers, and all the worthless retinue of intemperance and folly. These disgraceful associates of the prince, formed, in time of war, a regiment apart, of about eight hundred men, whose gradual waste was continually recruited by new members, who either were, or soon became, worthy of the old; for, as we shall soon have occasion to relate, the whole band were alike cowardly and profligate.

and po-
 licy.

But in whatever manner Philip employed his private hours, he at no time lost sight of those great principles of policy which regulated his public administration. Under pretence of wanting money to supply the expense of his buildings, and other public works, he employed an expedient which is well known in latter times, and which has been carried to such excess as threatens the safety of those governments which it was intended to uphold. The letting loose of the Delphic treasures had diffused near a million sterling over Greece⁴⁴. The unsettled state of that country

⁴⁴ The sacred war lasted ten years, and cost the Phocians ten thousand talents, near two millions; it had already lasted five years, and may be supposed to have cost near the half of that sum. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 453. He says, that the gold and silver dedications (which were coined into money) ὑπερβαλλειν τα μυρια ταλαντα "exceeded ten thousand talents;" a prodigious sum (considering the relative value of money in those days), of which the sudden diffusion could not fail to produce most important consequences.

rendered those who had acquired wealth very uncertain of enjoying it. With the rich and avaricious, Philip employed proper agents to take up⁴⁵ money at high interest, which procured him two advantages of a very important kind, the attaching to his government and person a numerous and powerful band of creditors; and the enabling him to pay, under the title of debts, and therefore without suspicion, the various pensions and gratuities by which he maintained his influence among the orators and leading men in the several republics.

⁴⁵ Justin. viii. 3.

C H A P. XXXV.

Negligence and Licentiousness of the Athenians. — Philip's Intrigues in Eubœa. — Phocion defeats the Macedonians and Eubœans. — Philip invades the Olynthian Territory. — Demosthenes's Orations in favor of the Olynthians. — Expedition of Chares. — Philip takes Olynthus. — Celebrates the Festival of the Muses at Diium. — Commits naval Depredations on Attica. — His Embassy to Athens. — The Athenian Embassy to Philip. — Character of the Ambassadors. — Their Conference with the King. — Differently reported to the Senate and Assembly. — Philip's Conquests in Thrace. — The Phocian War. — Negotiations. — Philip's Intrigues. — Decree of the Amphictyons against Phocis. — Executed by Philip. — Macedon acknowledged the principal member of the Amphictyonic Council.

C H A P.

XXXV.

*Negligence and
licentiousness of the
Athenians.*

*Olymp.
cvii. 4.*

A. C. 345.

THE Athenians, deceived by the inactivity of the king of Macedon, indulged themselves, without reserve, in their favorite amusements. Their confederates, the Phocians, were abandoned; the war with Philip, in which they might well have considered themselves as principals, was neglected. Magistrates and people seemed solely attentive to regulate public festivals and processions, and to ascertain the respective merit of dramatic poets and performers. The fund originally intended for the

exigences of war, had already been appropriated to the theatre; and a law was now enacted, on the motion of Eubulus, an artful flatterer of the multitude, rendering it a capital crime to propose altering this unexampled and most whimsical destination. It was in vain for Demosthenes to resist the popular torrent. He was opposed and overcome by Eubulus and Demades, the latter of whom, with talents that might have adorned his country, condescended to sell its interests to the public enemy.

C H A P.
XXXV.

Born in the lowest condition of life, Demades retained the vices of his birth; and always discovered that fordid spirit, and weltered in those brutal excesses, which betray the want of early culture. Yet the acuteness of his apprehension, the strength of his reason and memory, and, above all, the bold and copious flow of his unpremeditated eloquence, in which he was allowed to excel even Demosthenes¹ himself, raised him to a conspicuous rank in the assembly; and it being his business, as the hireling of Philip, to sail along with the stream of popular frenzy, which the patriotism of his rival endeavoured to struggle with, and to stem, he possessed a free and ample scope for exercising his abilities.

Justified
by Demades.

The people of Athens triumphed in the victory of perfidious demagogues over the wisest and best of their fellow-citizens, or rather over the laws and constitution of their country, when Philip began to

Philip's
intrigues
in Eubœa.
Olymp.
cvii. 4.
A. C. 342:

¹ Plutarch. in Demosthen.

C H A P. XXXV. play those batteries which he had patiently raised with such skill and secrecy. The island of Eubœa, which he called the fetters of Greece, was the first object of his attack. Since the expulsion of the Thebans of which we have formerly taken notice, the Athenians had preserved their interest in the island, where they maintained a small body of troops. The different cities, however, enjoyed the independent government of their own laws; they appointed their own magistrates; they sometimes made war against each other; and separately assumed the prerogatives of free and sovereign states, while they all collectively acknowledged their dependence on Athens. Such political arrangements made room for the intrigues of Philip. He fomented their civil discord; gained partisans in each city; and, at length, under color of protecting his allies, landed several Macedonian battalions in the island².

Danger to which the Athenian interest in that island was exposed;

Matters were soon disposed to his wish. The Macedonians were allowed to occupy the most advantageous posts. The Athenian party exclaimed and threatened; but Plutarch, the leader of that party, was gained to the interests of Philip, and demanded auxiliaries from Athens, only to betray them into the hands of their enemies. Demosthenes, who alone penetrated this dark scheme of villany, entreated and conjured his countrymen to put no confidence in Plutarch. But he was single in his opinion. The confidants of Philip were

² Æschin. in Ctesiphont. et Demosth. de falsa Legation, et de Pace.

true to their master, and therefore urged the expedition. The friends of their country were eager to save the isle of Eubœa, and the capricious multitude, ever in extremes, rushed with as much impetuosity to an enterprize intended for their ruin, as they had long shown backwardness to engage in every other³. The promptitude and vigor of their preparations much exceeded the expectation, and even alarmed the fears, of the Macedonian faction. But the latter had gone too far to retreat; nor could they foresee the consequences that happened, so contrary to their hopes. The Athenians, in fact, obtained a decisive victory, not by the strength of their arms, which was inferior to the enemy's, but by the wise choice of a general.

The consummate prudence of Phocion, who, on his arrival in Eubœa, found things in a worse state than had been represented, risked no chance of defeat, and lost no opportunity of advantage⁴. Having chosen a favorable post, which was on all sides surrounded by broken and uneven ground, he despised the clamors of his men and the insults of the enemy. The treacherous Plutarch was quickly defeated in a mock battle, in which he fell back on the Athenian cavalry, who fled in disorder to the camp of Phocion. The Eubœans and Macedonians pursued with a rash and intemperate ardor; and, elated with victory, and confident in their superior numbers, prepared to assail the camp. The general, meanwhile, performed a sacrifice, which he studiously prolonged, either from

from
which
they are
extricated
by Pho-
cion.

³ Demosth. de Pace.

⁴ Plutarch. in Phocion.

C H A P.

XXXV.

He defeats
the Mace-
donians
and Eu-
bœans.

religion or policy, until he beheld the disorder of the assailants, embarrassed by the unequal ground, and by their own rashness. He then commanded his men to stand to their arms, and sallying from his entrenchments with intrepid valor, increased the confusion of the enemy, who were repelled with great slaughter towards the plain which they had at first occupied. The activity of Cleophanes, who had rallied and formed the Athenian cavalry, rendered the victory complete. The remains of the vanquished took refuge in the fortrefs of Zera-tra, in the northern corner of the island, which, being attacked, made a feeble resistance⁵. The garrison surrendered; but Phocion restored all the Eubœans to liberty, lest the people of Athens, inflamed by their popular leaders, might treat them with that cruelty, which, on a similar occasion, they had inflicted on the rebellious citizens of Mitylené⁶. Having spent a few weeks in settling the affairs of the island, he returned in triumph to Athens, his ships drawn up in line of battle, their sterns crowned with garlands, and the rowers keeping time to the sound of martial music. His fellow-citizens received him with acclamations of joy; but their imprudence did not allow them to reap the fruits of his success. Molossus, an obscure stranger, was appointed, by cabal, to command the troops left in the island; and Philip, having renewed his intrigues, carried them on with the same dexterity, and met with better success⁷.

⁵ Plut. in Phocion.⁶ See above, vol. ii. c. xvi. pp. 377, et seqq.⁷ Plut. in Phocion.

It is worthy of attention, that Demosthenes followed the standard of Phocion to Eubœa, though he had strongly disapproved the expedition. Both he and his rival Æschines, of whom we shall soon have occasion to speak more fully, served in the cavalry. Demosthenes was reproached with being the first who deserted his rank, and among the last who returned to the charge. Æschines behaved with distinguished gallantry, and had the honor of being appointed by Phocion to carry home the first intelligence of the victory*.

C H A P.

XXXV.

Opposite
behaviour
of Demos-
thenes and
Æschinet
in the bat-
tle.

Philip's disappointment in Eubœa only stimulated his activity. His toils were spread so widely all around him, that when one part failed he could catch his prey in another. The Olynthians, against whom he seemed to have long forgotten his resentment, were astonished to observe that several of their citizens grew rich and great in a manner equally sudden and unaccountable; and that they enlarged their possessions, built stately palaces, and displayed a degree of magnificence and grandeur hitherto unknown in their frugal republic. The unexpected invasion of Philip revealed the mystery. A considerable party had grown wealthy by betraying the secrets, exposing the weakness, and fostering the ill-timed security of their country*. Their influence at home had recommended them to Philip, and the wages of their iniquity had increased that influence. It would not probably have been difficult to prove their treason, but it seemed dangerous to punish it; and the Olynthians

Philip in-
vades the
territory of
Olynthus.
Olymp.
cvii 4.
A. C. 349.

* Æschin. de falsa Legatione, et Demosth. in Midiam.

† Demosthen. Olynth. passim.

C H A P.

XXXV

The Olyn-
thians im-
plore the
aid of
Athens.

were more immediately concerned to repel the open ravagers of their territory. In this emergency they trusted not to their domestic forces of ten thousand foot and one thousand horse^{1°}, but sent an embassy to Athens, inveighing in the strongest terms against Philip, who had first courted, then deceived, and at last invaded and attacked them, and craving assistance from the Athenians, in consequence of the alliance formerly concluded between the two republics, to defeat the designs of a tyrant equally daring and perfidious.

State of
parties in
Athens.

Had the people of Athens heartily undertaken the cause of Olynthus, Philip would have been exposed a second time to the danger which he had eluded with so much address in the beginning of his reign. Thebes was employed and exhausted in the Phocian war; the grandeur of Sparta had decayed as much as her principles had degenerated; the inferior states extended not their views of policy beyond their respective districts. But the Athenians, recently successful in Eubœa, and reinforced by the strength and resentment of such a republic as Olynthus, might have still rendered themselves formidable to the public enemy, especially as at this juncture the rebellious humors of the Thessalians broke out afresh, and led them capriciously to oppose, with as much eagerness as they had often helped to promote, the interest of Macedon. But to compensate these unpromising circumstances, Philip possessed strenuous abettors of his power within the walls of Athens and Olynthus; and his garrisons actually commanded the principal posts

^{1°} Demosth. de falsa Legatione.

in Theſſaly. Above all, the indolence and vices of his enemies were moſt favorable to his cauſe. The late ſucceſs in Eubœa, which ſhould have animated a brave and generous people to new exertions and dangers, only replunged the Athenians into a ſlothful ſecurity. While they enjoyed their theatrical entertainments, their ſhows and feſtivals, and all the eaſe and luxury of a city-life, they were little inclined to engage in any enterpriſe that might diſturb the tranquil courſe of their pleaſures. In this diſpoſition they were encouraged by their perfidious orators, who ſtrongly exhorted them to beware of involving themſelves in the danger of Olynthus, or of provoking the reſentment of a prince whoſe power they were unable to reſiſt. The orator Demades particularly diſtinguiſhed his zeal in the Macedonian intereſt; adviſing an abſolute and total rejection of the demands of the Olynthian ambaffadors.

Demofthenes at length aroſe, and as the deſign of calling the aſſembly had been already explained, entered immediately on the queſtion under deliberation. “On ¹¹ many occaſions, Athenians! have the gods declared their favor to this ſtate, but never more manifeſtly than in the preſent juncture.

First ora-
tion of
Demofthe-
nes in fa-
vor of
the Olyn-
thians.

¹¹ I mean not a tranſlation of Demofthenes. The inserting his ſpeeches entire would deſtroy the humble uniformity of this hiſtorical work, with the deſign of which it would be inconſiſtent to tranſcribe what the orator found it neceſſary to ſay, repeat, and enforce ſo often. Beſides, Demofthenes is one of the few Greek writers that has been tranſlated, as the late Mr. Harris ſays in his *Philological Inquiries*, by competent perſons: Drs. Leland and Francis, in Engliſh; Mr. Turreil and the abbé Auger, in French; and the Abbé Ceſarotti, in Italian.

C H A P. XXXV. That enemies should be raised to Philip, on the confines of his territory, enemies not contemptible in power, and, which is more important, so determined on the war, that they regard every accommodation with Macedon, first as insidious, next as the destruction of their country, can be ascribed to nothing less than the bountiful interposition of heaven. With every thing else on our side, let us not be wanting to ourselves; let us not be reproached with the unspeakable infamy of throwing away, not only those cities and territories which we inherited from our ancestors, but those occasions and alliances offered us by fortune and the gods. To insist on the power and greatness of Philip belongs not to the present subject. He has become great through your supine neglect, and the perfidy of traitors whom it becomes you to punish. Such topics are not honorable for you: I wave them as superfluous, having matter more material to urge. To call the king of Macedon perjured and perfidious, without proving my assertions, would be the language of insult and reproach. But his own actions, and not my resentment, shall name him; and of these I think it necessary to speak for two reasons; first, that he may appear, what he really is, a wicked man; and, secondly, that the weak minds who are intimidated by his power and resources, may perceive that the artifices to which he owes them are now all exhausted, and that his ruin is at hand. As to myself, Athenians! I should not only fear but admire Philip, had he attained his present height of

grandeur by honorable and equitable means. But C H A P. XXXV.
 after the most serious examination I find, that at first he seduced our simplicity by the flattering promise of Amphipolis; that he next surprised the friendship of Olynthus by the deceitful gift of Potidæa; that, lastly, he enslaved the Thessalians, under the specious pretence of delivering them from tyrants. In one word, with what community hath he treated which hath not experienced his fraud? Which of his confederates hath he not shamelessly betrayed? Can it be expected, then, that those who promoted his elevation, because they thought him *their* friend, will continue to support it, when they find him a friend to his own interest alone? Impossible! When confederacies are formed on the principles of common advantage and affection, each member shares the toils with alacrity; all persevere: such confederacies endure. But when worthlessness and lawless ambition have raised a single man, the slightest accident overthrows the unstable edifice of his grandeur. It is not, no! Athenians! it is not possible to found a lasting power on treachery, fraud, and perjury. These may succeed for a while: but time reveals their weakness. For, as in a house, a ship, and in structures of every kind, the foundation and lower parts should be firm and solid, so the grounds and principles of action should be just and true. But such qualities belong not to the actions of Philip¹².

¹² The important, though trite proverb, that in public, as well as in private transactions, "honesty is the best policy," was

C H A P.

XXXV.

“I am of opinion, then, that fearless of consequences, you ought to assist Olynthus with the utmost celerity and vigor, and to dispatch an embassy to the Theſſalians, to inflame their hoſtility. But take care, Athenians! that your ardor evaporate not in reſolutions and decrees. Be ready to pay your contributions; prepare to take the field; ſhow yourſelves in earneſt, and you will ſoon diſcover not only the hollow faith of the allies of Philip, but the internal and concealed infirmity of Macedon itſelf. That kingdom has emerged from obſcurity amidſt the conteſts of neighbouring ſtates, during which the ſmalleſt weight, put into either ſcale, is ſufficient to incline the balance. But, in itſelf, Macedon is inconfiderable and weak, and its real weakneſs is increaſed by the ſplendid but ruinous expeditions of Philip. For the king and his ſubjects are actuated by very different ſentiments. Domineered

never expreſſed, perhaps with ſuch dignity, as in the following words of Demoſthenes: *ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' εὐνοίας τὰ πρᾶγματ' αὖτις, ἢ πασι ταῦτα συμφορὴ τοῖς μετεχέσσι τῆς πόλεως, ἢ συμπονεῖν, ἢ φερεῖν τὰς συμφοράς, ἢ μένειν ἐβέλγεσι οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ὅταν δὲ ἐκ πλεονεξίας τις, ὥς περ' ἔτος ἰσχυρὴ, ἢ πρώτη προφασίς, ἢ μικρὸν πταίσμα ἅπαντα ἀνελχαιτίσῃ, ἢ διαλυτῇ. ἔγ' γὰρ εἰμι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖντ' αὖ ἐπιβεβηέντ' αὖ ψευδομένον, δύναμιν ἐξέβαιον κτήσασθαι· ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μὲν ἅπαξ, ἢ βραχὺν χρόνον, ἀντεχεῖ· ἢ σφοδρὰ γὰρ κινήσῃ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἀν' ἑκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωραταί, ἢ περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ. ὥς περ' γὰρ οἰκίας, οἰμαῶ, ἢ πλοῖα, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ κενωθέντα ἰσχυροτάτα εἶναι δεῖ, ἔγωγε ἢ τῶν πράξεων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ τὰς υποθέσεις ἀληθεῖς ἢ δικαίας εἶναι προσηκεί· τὸ δὲ ἔκ' ἐνὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς πεπραγμένοις Φιλίππῳ.* Demosthen. Olynth i. or Olynth. ii p. 7th, in the common but incorrect edition of Wolfius.

by ambition, he disregards ease and safety; but his subjects, who individually have little share in the glory of his conquests, are indignant, that, for the sake of one man, they should be harassed by continual warfare, and withdrawn from those occupations and pursuits, which afford the comforts and happiness of private life. On the great body of his people, Philip, therefore, can have no reliance; nor, whatever may be said of their valor and discipline, can he depend more on his mercenaries. For I am informed, by a man of undoubted veracity, who has just arrived from Macedon, that none of Philip's guards, even those whom he treats with the affectionate, but deceitful names of companions, and fellow-soldiers, can merit his esteem, without incurring his hatred and persecution. Such is the intolerable jealousy, such the malignant envy, which crowns the other odious vices of this monster, who, defying every sentiment of virtue and decency, drives from his presence all who shudder, all who are disgusted, at the most unnatural enormities; and whose court is continually crowded by buffoons, parasites, obscene poets and drunkards; wretches who, when drunk, will dance, but such dances¹³ as modesty dare not name. Slight and trivial as these matters may to some appear, they exhibit the worthlessness of Philip, and announce the infelicity

¹³ The κορδαλισμος. Demosth. p. 8. Vid. Schol. ad Aristoph. in Nubib. From the description above given of Athenian manners, it appears that Demosthenes's delicacy was merely complimentary.

C H A P. which awaits him. The dangerous defects of his
 XXXV. character are hid in the blaze of prosperity¹⁴; but when misfortune happens, his native deformity will appear. For it is easy to prove that, as in the bodily frame, men, during the season of health, are insensible of what is weak and disordered in their constitutions, which imperfections are immediately felt on the first approach of sickness; so the glory of foreign conquest conceals the vices and defects of republics and monarchies; but let calamity happen, let the war be carried to their frontiers, and those hitherto latent evils immediately become manifest.

“If there is a man among you, Athenians! who thinks that Philip is a formidable enemy, because he is fortunate, I agree with that man. Fortune¹⁵ has a mighty influence, or rather Fortune alone domineers in human affairs. Yet could you be persuaded to do but the smallest part of your duty, I would greatly prefer your fortune to Philip's; for *you*, surely, have better reason to trust in the assistance of Heaven. But we remain, I think, inactive, hesitating, delaying, and deliberating, while our enemy takes the field, braving seasons and dangers, and neglecting no opportunity of advantage. And if the indolent and careless are abandoned by their best friends, can we expect that the gods, however favorable, should assist us, if we will not help ourselves?”

¹⁴ *Secundæ res mirè sunt vitiis obtentui.* Sallust.

¹⁵ From what is said below, it appears that, by Fortune, Demosthenes here means the dispensations of Providence; and by good Fortune, the Favor of Heaven.

The people of Athens, animated to their duty, on the one hand, by Demosthenes, and seduced, on the other, by the hirelings of Philip¹⁶ and their own deceitful passions, imprudently steered a middle course, which, in public affairs, is often the most dangerous. Convinced that the preservation of Olynthus was the best safeguard of Attica, yet unwilling to tear themselves from their beloved pleasures, they determined to send Chares, with a fleet and two thousand mercenaries, to the assistance of their allies. This commander, who was the idol of the multitude, but the disgrace of his country and of his profession¹⁷, showed no solicitude to protect the dependences of Olynthus, which successively submitted to the Macedonian arms. To gratify the rapacity of his troops, he made a descent on the fertile coast of Pallené, where, falling in with eight hundred men commanded by Audæus, called the friends of Philip, he obtained over those contemptible cowards an easy and ludicrous victory, which served only to amuse the comic poets of the times. Having gained this advantage, Chares became unwilling to try his fortune in any severer conflict; and disdain, as he affected, to follow the motions of Philip, returned home, and celebrated his triumph over the vain, boastful, and voluptuous Audæus¹⁸;

C H A P.

XXXV.

The extravagant expedition of Chares.

¹⁶ Philochorus in Dionys. Epist. ad Ammonium.

¹⁷ Timotheus said of him, (" that he was fitter to carry the baggage, than to command an army." Plut. in Apophth.

¹⁸ Among his contemporaries, he was nicknamed αλεκτρων, the cock. Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

C H A P.
XXXV.

Philip be-
sieves
Olynthus.

not, however, with the spoils of the vanquished, but with the sum of sixty talents, which he had extorted from the Phocians, who were actually in alliance with Athens¹⁹.

The thoughtless multitude, who judged of the expedition of Chares by the expensive pomp with which he entertained them at his return, talked extravagantly of invading Macedon, and chastising the insolence of Philip²⁰, when a second embassy arrived from Olynthus. The inhabitants of this place had been shut up within their walls; they had lost Stagyra, Miciberna, Toroné, cities of considerable strength, besides many inferior towns, which, on the first appearance of Philip, were forward to receive his bribes, and to open their gates²¹; and this shameful venality, in places well provided for defence, made the king of Macedon observe to his generals, that he would thenceforth consider no fortress as impregnable, which could admit a mule laden with money²². Dejected by continual losses, the Olynthians turned their thoughts to negotiation, that they might at least amuse the invader till the arrival of the Athenian succours. Philip penetrated their design, and dexterously turned their arts against them; affecting to lend an ear to their proposals, but meanwhile continuing

¹⁹ Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

²⁰ Demosthen. Olynth. ii.

²¹ Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 450.

²² Plutarch. ubi supra. Diodorus, p. 451, relates the matter somewhat differently. But he acknowledges that the king of Macedon boasted that he had augmented his dominions more by gold than by arms. Diodorus, p. 450.

his approaches, till, having got within forty stadia of their walls, he declared that of two things one was necessary, either *they* must leave Olynthus, or *he* Macedon²³. This explicit declaration from an enemy, who often flattered to destroy, but who might always be believed when he threatened, convinced the Olynthians of what they had long suspected, that their utter ruin was at hand. They endeavoured to retard the fatal moment by a vigorous sally, in which their cavalry, commanded by Apollonides, particularly signalized their valor²⁴. But they were repulsed by superior numbers, and obliged to take refuge in the city.

In this posture of affairs, the ambassadors failed for Athens; and having arrived there, found, to their utter astonishment, the multitude still enjoying the imaginary triumph of Chares. This commander, who chiefly owed his credit to the ascendant of superficial qualities over the undiscerning folly of the people, was a warm and active partisan of democracy, and as such viewed, even by Demosthenes, with too partial eyes. The orator, besides, well knew that the irregular, useless, or destructive operations of the Athenian arms, ought not always to be charged on the misconduct of the general. The troops were always ill paid; sometimes not paid at all; and therefore disobedient and mutinous. Instead of submitting to control, they often controlled their leaders; their resolutions were prompt and ungovernable; when they could not persuade, they threatened; and

C H A P.
XXXV.

Second
embassy to
Athens.

²³ Demosthen. Philipp. iii.

²⁴ Id. *ibid.*

C M A P. compelled even prudent commanders to measures wild, ruinous, and dishonorable.

XXXV.

The demands of the Olynthians again enforced by Demosthenes.

Demosthenes, therefore, who again undertook to second the demands of Olynthus, waved all accusation against particular persons. After endeavouring to repress the vain confidence of his countrymen, which had been excited by the supposed advantages of Chares, and the venal breath of corrupt orators, he describes the real danger of their allies, which he persuades them to regard as their own. The crisis was now arrived; and if they neglected the present opportunity of fulfilling their engagements to Olynthus, they must soon be obliged to meet Philip in Attica. He reminds them of the various occasions, which they had already lost, of repelling this rapacious tyrant, this hostile Barbarian, this mixture of perfidy and violence, for whom he cannot find any name sufficiently reproachful. "But some perhaps will say, it is the business of a public speaker to advise, not to upbraid. We wish to assist the Olynthians, and we will assist them; but inform us how our aid may be rendered most effectual. Appoint magistrates, Athenians! for the inspection of your laws; not to enact new laws; they are already too numerous; but to repeal those whose ill effects you daily experience; I mean the laws respecting the theatrical funds (thus openly I declare it), and some about the soldiery. By the first, the soldier's pay is consumed, as theatrical expenses, by the useless and inactive; the second screen from justice the coward who declines the service, and damp the ardor of

the brave who would be ready to take the field. C H A P. XXXV.
 Till these laws be repealed, expect not that any man will urge your true interest, since his honest zeal must be repaid with destruction." After insisting still farther on this delicate and dangerous subject, Demosthenes probably observed displeasure and resentment in the countenances of his hearers, and then (as his custom was) artfully turning the discourse: "I speak thus, not with a view to give offence, for I am not so mad as wantonly to offend; but because I think it the duty of a public speaker to prefer your interest to your pleasure. Such were the maxims and conduct (you yourselves know it) of those ancient and illustrious orators whom all unite to praise, but none venture to imitate; of the virtuous Aristides, of Nicias, of Pericles, and of him whose name²⁵ I bear. But since ministers have appeared who dare not address the assembly, till they have first *consulted* you about the *counsels* which they ought to give, who ask, as it were, What shall I propose? What shall I advise? In what, Athenians! can I do you pleasure? the sweet draught of flattery has concealed a deadly poison; our strength is enervated, our glory tarnished, the public beggared and disgraced, while those smooth-tongued declaimers have acquired opulence and splendor²⁶."

²⁵ Demosthenes, who acted such a distinguished part in the Peloponnesian war. See above, vol. iii. c. xvii. p. 2. et seqq.

²⁶ It is worthy of observation that, in this discourse throughout, Demosthenes insists that the people at large enjoyed much less authority in his time than in the days of Aristides, etc. All

C H A P. Consider, Athenians! how briefly the conduct
 XXXV. of your ancestors may be contrasted with your own; for if you would pursue the road to glory and happiness, you need not foreign instructors: it will be sufficient to follow the example of those from whom you are descended. The Athenians of former times, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence to which you are accustomed, held, with general consent, the sovereignty of Greece for sixty-five years²⁷; deposited above ten thousand talents in the citadel; kept the king of Macedon in that subjection which a Barbarian owes to Greece; erected many and illustrious trophies of the exploits which their own valor had atchieved by land and sea; in a word, are the only people on record whose glorious actions transcend the power of envy. Thus great in war, their civil administration was not less admirable. The stately edifices which they raised, the temples which they adorned, the dedications which they offered to the gods, will never be excelled in magnificence; but, in private life, so exemplary

depends, he asserts, on the popular orators and magistrates, "οἱ πολιτευόμενοι." Yet it is well known that, since the age of Aristides, the government had become more democratical. Demosthenes himself allows this: the orators, he says, dare not address the people now with that freedom which they used formerly. — This apparent contradiction shows the nature and tendency of that species of popular government which the Greeks called ochlogarchy. — The populace are the slaves of their demagogues, and the demagogues of the populace. Instead of liberty, there is an interchange of servitude.

²⁷ Demosthenes's chronology here is not accurate. See above, vol. iii. 232. in the note.

was their moderation, and so scrupulous their adherence to the frugal maxims of antiquity, that if any of you has examined the house of Aristides or Miltiades, he will find them undistinguished above the contiguous buildings by superior elegance or grandeur. The ambition of those illustrious statesmen was to exalt the republic, not to enrich themselves²⁸; and this just moderation, accompanied by piety and patriotism, raised their country (and no wonder!) to the height of prosperity. Such was the condition of Athens under those sincere and honest men. Is it the same, or nearly the same, under the indulgence of our present ministers? I wave other topics on which I might enlarge. But you behold in what solitude we are left. The Lacedæmonians lost; the Thebans harassed by war; no other republic worthy of aspiring to the sovereignty. Yet, at this period, when we might not only have defended our own possessions, but have become the arbiters and umpires of all around us, we have been stripped of whole provinces; we have expended fifteen hundred talents fruitlessly; we have lost, in time of peace, the alliances and advantages which the arms of our ancestors had acquired; and we have raised up and armed a most formidable enemy against ourselves. If not, let the man stand forth who can show from what other cause Philip has derived his greatness. But the miserable condition of our foreign affairs is, perhaps, compensated by the happiness of our

²⁸ Privatus illis census erat brevis
Commune magnum.

HOR. ode xv. l. ii.

CHAPTER XXXV. domestic state, and the splendid improvements of our capital. Roads repaired, walls whitened, *fountains*, and *follies* ²⁹! And the ministers who have procured us those magnificent advantages, pass from poverty and meanness to opulence and dignity; build private palaces which insult the edifices of the public; grow greater as their country becomes less, and gradually rise on its ruins. What is the source of this disorder? It is, Athenians! that formerly the people did their duty, took the field in person, and thus kept the magistrates in awe."

Licentiousness of the Athenian troops under the profligate Charidemus.

The assembly remained insensible to the motives of interest and honor. Instead of taking the field in person, they sent to Olynthus a body of foreign infantry, amounting to four thousand, with a hundred and fifty horse, under the command of Charidemus. This unworthy general, who was the slave of his mercenaries, and of his own detestable passions, gratified the rapacity of his troops by ravaging the Macedonian province of Bottiæa, on the confines of Chalcis. At length, however, he threw his forces into Olynthus; and the besieged, encouraged by this reinforcement, hazarded another sally, in which they were defeated and repelled with considerable loss. The Athenian mercenaries were rendered every day more contemptible by their cowardice, and more dangerous by their licentiousness. The beastly Charidemus had

²⁹ Πηγαι και ληραι. Demosthenes disdained not such a gingle of words when it presented itself naturally, but as it rarely occurs in his works, it is plain that he never sought for it.

neither inclination nor ability to restrain their irregularities. According to his custom, he drank, at every meal, to a scandalous excess: his brutality insulted the women of Olynthus; and such was his impudent and abandoned profligacy, that he demanded of the senate, as a reward for his pretended services, a beautiful Macedonian youth, then captive in the city³⁰.

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In this state of affairs, the Olynthians a third time applied to Athens. On the present occasion, Æschines, who afterwards became such an active partizan of the Macedonian interest, particularly distinguished his zeal and his patriotism. The speech of Demosthenes, to the same purpose, is still on record. He exhorts and conjures his countrymen to send to Olynthus an army of citizens, and at the same time to make a diversion, by invading the Macedonian coast. Unless both be done, the indefatigable industry of Philip would render either ineffectual. "Have you ever considered the rapid progress of this prince? He began by taking Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidæa, and Methoné; from thence he poured his troops into Thessaly, and became master of Pheræ, Pegasæ, and Magnesia. Then, turning towards Thrace, he over-ran provinces, conquered and divided kingdoms, and seated himself on the trophies of fallen crowns and broken sceptres. I speak not of his expedition against the Pæonians and Illyrians, into Epirus,—and where has not ambition conducted his arms? But why this long enumeration?

The cause
of the
Olynthi-
ans vigor-
ously sup-
ported by
Æschines
and De-
mosthenes.

³⁰ Theopomp. apud Athen. l. x. p. 436.

C H A P. — To prove the important opportunities which
 XXXV. your negligence has lost, and the unextinguishable ardor of an adversary, whose successive conquests continually bring him nearer to your walls. For is there a man in this assembly, whose blindness perceives not that the sufferings of the Olynthians are the forerunners of our own? The present conjuncture calls you, as with a loud voice, at length to rouse from your lethargy, and to profit by this last testimony of the bountiful protection of the gods. Another is not to be expected, after the many which you have despised and forgotten: I say *forgotten*; for favorable conjunctures, like riches, and other gifts of heaven, are remembered with gratitude, only by those who have understanding to preserve and to enjoy them. The spendthrift dissipates his thankfulness with his wealth³¹, and the same imprudent folly renders him both miserable and ungrateful." After these bold expostulations, or rather reproaches, he encourages them to relieve Olynthus, by observing, that Philip would never have undertaken the siege of that place, if he had expected such a vigorous resistance; especially at a time when his allies were ready to revolt; when the Thessalians wished to throw off the yoke; when the Thracians and Illyrians longed to recover their freedom. Thus the power of Philip, lately represented as so formidable, is by no

³¹ The observation is uncommon, but just: ἀλλὰ οἶμαι, παρομοιον εἶσι, ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεως. ἀν μὲν γὰρ ὅσα αὐτὶς λαβὼν καὶ σωσῇ, μεγάλην ἔχει τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν. ἀν δὲ ἀναλωτὰς λάβῃ, συναναλωσέῃ καὶ τὸ μεμνησθαι τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν. Demost. Olynth. iii. Olynth. i. p. 2. ex edit. Wolf.

means real and solid; one vigorous effort might yet overwhelm him; and the passion of hope, as well as that of fear, is rendered subservient to the purpose of the orator. He again touches on the article of supplies; but with such caution as shows that his former more explicit observations had been heard impatiently. "As to money for the expenses of the war (for without money nothing can be done), you possess, Athenians! a military fund exceeding that of any other people. But you have unfortunately withdrawn it from its original destination, to which were it restored, there could not be any necessity for extraordinary contributions. What! do you propose *in form*³², that the theatrical money should be applied to the uses of the soldiery? No, surely. But I affirm, that soldiers must be raised; that a fund has been allotted for their subsistence; and that in every well-regulated community, those who are paid by the public, ought to serve the public. To profit of the present conjuncture, we must act with vigor and celerity, we must dispatch ambassadors, to animate the neighbouring states against Philip; we must take the field in person. If war raged on the frontiers of this country, with what rapidity would the Macedonians march hither? Why will you throw away a similar opportunity? Know, that but one alternative remains, to carry the war into Macedon, or to receive it in Attica. If Olynthus resists, we may ravage the territories of Philip;

³² Such a proposal, the Athenians had absurdly declared punishable by death.

C H A P. should that republic be destroyed, who will hinder
XXXV. him from coming hither? The Thebans! To say nothing too severe, they would rather reinforce his arms. The Phocians! they who, without our assistance, cannot defend themselves. O! but he dares not come! It is madness to think that the designs of which he already boasts with such bold imprudence, he will not venture to execute, when nothing opposes his success³³. I think it unnecessary to describe the difference between attacking Philip at home, and waiting for him here. Were you obliged, only for one month, to encamp without the walls, and to subsist an army in the country, your husbandmen would sustain more loss than has been incurred by all the former exigences of the war. This would happen, although the enemy kept at a distance; but at the approach and entrance of an invader, what devastation must be produced! Add to this, the insult and disgrace, the most ruinous of all losses, to men capable of reflection."

Philip
takes
Olynthus.
Olymp.
cviii. i.
A. C. 348.

The arguments of Demosthenes prevailed; an embassy was sent into Peloponnesus, to inflame the hostility of that country against Philip; and it was determined to assist the Olynthians with an

³³ With all his policy, Philip seems to have had the vanity of a Greek. The vigor of the original is not to be translated:
 “Αν δε εκεινα Φιλιππος λαβῃ, τις αυτον ετι κωλυσει δουρο βαδιζειν; Θηβαιοι; μη λιαν πικρον ειπειν η, η̃ συνεισβαλῃσι ετοιμως. αλλα Φωκις; ο̃ι την οικειαν εχ̃ ο̃ιοι τε οντες φυλαττειν, εαν μη βοηθησιντε υ̃μεις; η αλλος τις; αλλ' ωταν εχι βελησεται — των ατοποτατων μεντοι αν ειη, ει̃ αν̃ ανοιαν οφλισκωνων, ο̃μως εκλαλει, ταυτα δυνηθεις μη πραξει. I have used a little freedom with the “εχι βελησεται.”

army of Athenian citizens. But before this resolution could be carried into effect, Olynthus was no more. The cavalry belonging to that place had acted with great spirit against the besiegers. As the works were too extensive to be completely invested, the Olynthian horsemen made frequent incursions³⁴ into the surrounding territory, where they not only supplied themselves with provisions and forage, but beat up the quarters, attacked the advanced posts, and intercepted the convoys of the enemy. These advantages were chiefly owing to the merit of one man. In the various skirmishes, as well as in the two general engagements which had happened since the commencement of the siege, Philip perceived that Apollonides, who commanded the enemy's horse, displayed such valor and abilities as might long retard, perhaps altogether defeat, the success of his undertaking. His secret emissaries were therefore set to work; perfidious clamors were sown among the populace of Olynthus; Apollonides was publicly accused; and, by the malignant practices of traitors, condemned to banishment on a suspicion of treason³⁵. The command of the cavalry was bestowed on Lasthenes and Euthykrates, two wretches who had sold their country to Philip. Having obtained some previous successes, which had been concerted the better to mask their designs, they advanced against a Macedonian post; carried it at the first onset; pursued the flying

³⁴ Diodorus, l. xvi. 53.³⁵ Demosth. de falsa Legatione.

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garrison; and betrayed their own troops into an ambush prepared by the enemy. Surrounded on all sides, the Olynthians surrendered their arms; and this fatal disaster encouraging the Macedonian partisans within the walls, soon opened the gates of Olynthus³⁶. The conqueror entered in triumph, plundered and demolished the city, and dragged the inhabitants into servitude³⁷. Lasthenes, Euthycrates, and their associates, shared the same, or even a worse fate. Philip is said to have abandoned them to the indignant rage of the Macedonian soldiers, who butchered them almost before his eyes. It is certain, that though his mean and blind ambition often employed treachery, his justice or his pride always detested the traitor³⁸.

This important conquest inspires Philip with the ambition to seize Thermopylae

The conquest of Olynthus put Philip in possession of the region of Chalcis, and the northern coast of the Ægean sea; an acquisition of territory, which rendered his dominions on that side round and complete. His kingdom was now bounded, on the north by the Thracian possessions

³⁶ Demosth. de falsa Legatione.

³⁷ Four reasons conspired to produce the severe treatment of the Olynthians: 1. Philip had lost a great many men in the siege; πολλὰς τῶν στρεπτιῶτων ἐν ταῖς τειχομαχίαις ἀπέβαλεν. Diodor. p. 450. 2. The Olynthians had received his natural brothers, Aridæus and Menelaus, accused of treason. Justin. l. viii. c. iii. 3. Philip wanted money to carry on his intrigues in other cities; διαρπάσας δὲ αὐτὴν (scil. Ολυνθον) καὶ τὰς ἐνοικούντας ἐξ ἀνδραποδισαμένου, ελαφύροπωλησε. τὸ δὲ πρᾶξας, χρημάτων τε πολλῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπόρησε. 4 Diodorus immediately after adds the fourth reason, "That he might deter the neighbouring cities from opposing his measures." Diodor. p. 450.

³⁸ Demosth. Olynth. iii. sect. 3.

of Kerfobleptes, and on the south by the territory of Phocis, a province actually comprehending the straits of Thermopylæ, which had formerly belonged to a different division of Greece. Besides the general motives of interest, which prompted him to extend his dominions, he discerned the peculiar importance of acquiring the Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, since the former was emphatically styled the Gates of Greece, and the latter formed the only communication between that country and the fertile shores of the Euxine. Greece, exceeding in population the proportion of its extent and fertility, annually drew supplies of corn from those northern regions. The Athenians, in particular, had settlements even in the remote peninsula of Crim Tartary, anciently called the Taurica Chersonesus, by means of which they purchased and imported the superfluous productions of that remote climate³⁹. Their ships could only sail thither by the Hellespont; and should that important strait be reduced under the power of an enemy, they must be totally excluded from a useful, and even necessary, branch of commerce.

Philip perceived these consequences. It was the general interest of all the Grecian republics to assist Kerfobleptes and the Phocians, which was, in other words, to defend the Hellespont and Thermopylæ. The interest of the Macedonian was diametrically opposite; nor could he expect to

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and the
Helle-
spont.Philip
celebrates
the festival
of the
Muses at
Dium.
Olymp.
cviii. 1.
A. C. 348.

³⁹ Demosthenes, in Leptin.

C H A P. accomplish the great objects of his reign, unless
 XXXV. he first rendered himself master of those important posts. This delicate situation furnished a proper exercise for the dexterity of Philip. After the destruction of Olynthus, he celebrated a public festival of gratitude and joy, at the neighbouring town of Dium; to which, as at the Olympian and other Grecian games, all the republics were promiscuously invited, whether friends or enemies⁴⁰. It appears that several Athenians assisted at these magnificent entertainments, which lasted nine days, in honor of the Muses, and which wanted no object of elegance or splendor, that either art could produce or wealth could purchase. The politeness and condescending affability of Philip obliterated the remembrance of his recent severity to Olynthus; and his liberal distribution of the spoils of that unfortunate city⁴¹ gained him new

⁴⁰ Demosth. de falsa Legatione, et Diodor. p. 451.

⁴¹ Both Demosthenes and Diodorus mention an anecdote which does honor to Philip, and still more to Satyrus the player. After dinner, the king, according to his custom, was distributing his presents; amidst the general festivity, Satyrus alone wore a sad countenance. The king addressed him kindly, and, in the language of the times, desired him to ask a boon. Satyrus said, that such presents as others received (cups of gold, etc.) seemed to him of little value: that he had indeed some thing to ask, but feared a denial. Philip having encouraged him, he proceeded: "Apollophanes of Pydna was my friend: at his death, his two daughters, both arrived at a marriageable age, were sent to Olynthus, taken captive, and subjected to all the calamities of servitude. These are the presents I request, not with any design unworthy of their father or myself, but that I may give them such portions as shall enable them to marry happily." Apollophanes had been an active opponent, and even friends,

friends, and confirmed the attachment of his old partisans. C H A P.

Amidst these scenes of rejoicing and festivity, Philip seems not to have forgotten, one moment, that the most immediate object of his policy was to detach the Athenians from the cause of Phocis and Kerfobleptes, who were both their allies. For this purpose, while he courted individuals with peculiar address, he determined to make the public feel the inconvenience of the war, the better to prepare them for the insidious proposal of a separate peace. The bad conduct of Chares left the sea open to the Macedonians, who had silently acquired a considerable naval force. Philip began to attack the Athenians on their favorite element. His fleet ravaged their tributary islands of Lemnos and Imbros; surprised and took a squadron of Athenian vessels, stationed on the southern coast of Eubœa; and, encouraged by these advantages, boldly sailed to Attica, made a descent on the shore of Marathon, repelled the Athenian cavalry, headed by Deotimus, ravaged the territory, and carried off the Salaminian galley. From thence they proceeded to the isle of Salamis, and defeated a considerable detachment commanded by Charidemus. The illustrious trophies of Marathon and Salamis were effaced by the insults of the Macedonians, whose fleet returned home in triumph,

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Philip unexpectedly commits naval depredations on Attica.

the personal enemy, of Philip; yet this prince granted the request of Satyrus, and enabled him liberally to provide for the daughters of his friend.

C H A P. adorned with hostile spoils, and with military and
XXXV. naval glory⁴².

His in-
trigues
give him
possession
of Eubœa.

His deceit-
ful embassy
to Athens;

The activity of Philip seconded his good fortune. His intrigues were renewed in Eubœa. Under pretence of delivering the island from the tyranny and extortions of Molossus, the Athenian commander, he landed such a body of troops there, as proved sufficient, with the assistance of his adherents, to expel the Athenians. Such a multiplication of calamities might have disgusted that people with the war against Philip, whose hostility, directed against them alone, seemed to have forgotten the Phocians and Kerfobleptes; when secret but zealous partisans of Macedon arrived at Athens, as ambassadors from Eubœa, commissioned to settle amicably all differences between the two countries. They observed, that Philip had left the island absolutely free and independent; and that, though constrained to take arms in defence of his allies, he was sincerely desirous of making peace with the Athenians. The representations of the Eubœan ambassadors were enforced by the influence of two Athenians, Aristodemus and Neoptolemus, the first distinguished as a player, the second as a player and poet, who having acquired fortunes in Macedon, returned to their own

⁴² In the chronology of these events, I have followed Dr. Leland. See his Life of Philip, vol. ii. p. 43. The events themselves are related in the oration of Demosthenes commonly entitled the First Philippic, but which the Doctor, with great probability, considers as two distinct orations spoken at different times.

country, to forward the measures of their liberal protector. They affirmed that the king of Macedon earnestly wished to live on good terms with the republic; and the Athenians paid much regard to men, whose talents were then highly esteemed, and who had remitted the riches amassed in a foreign country, to purchase lands in Attica, and to supply with alacrity the exigences of the public service.

Demosthenes saw through these dark and deep artifices⁴³; but in vain endeavoured to alarm the unsuspecting credulity of his countrymen. On a future occasion, after the plot had become manifest, he upbraids their careless indifference and delusion at this important crisis. "Had you been spectators in the theatre, and not deliberating on matters of the highest moment, you could not have heard Neoptolemus with more indulgence, nor me with more resentment⁴⁴."

Such was the disposition of the assembly, when Æschines returned from his Peloponnesian embassy. He had assembled the great council of the Arcadians; revealed to them the dangerous views of Philip, which threatened the liberty of Greece; and, notwithstanding the powerful opposition of Hieronymus, and other Macedonian partisans, had engaged that people to approve the patriot zeal of Athens, and to deliberate on taking arms in the common cause. In relating the success of his embassy, he inveighed with great severity against

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in vain exposed by Demosthenes.

Æschines returns from his embassy, and awakens the public resentment against Philip.

⁴³ Demosthen. de Chersoneso, et de Pace.

⁴⁴ Demosthen. de Chersoneso.

C H A P. those mercenary traitors, who had sold the interests
 XXXV. of their country to a cruel tyrant. The Greeks had full warning of their danger. The miserable fate of Olynthus ought ever to be before their eyes. At his return through Peloponnesus, he had beheld a sight sufficient to melt the most obdurate heart; thirty young Olynthians, of both sexes, driven like a herd of cattle, as a present from Philip to some of the unworthy instruments of his ambition⁴⁵.

The susceptible and ever-varying temper of the multitude was deeply affected by the representations of Æschines; the pacific advices of Neoptolemus and his associates were forgotten; war and revenge again echoed through the assembly. At the requisition of Æschines, ambassadors were dispatched to confirm the hostile resolutions of the Arcadians, and to awaken the terror of the neighbouring republics. The Athenian youth were assembled in the temple of Agraulos to swear irreconcilable hatred against Philip and the Macedonians, and the most awful imprecations were denounced against the mercenary traitors who cooperated with the public enemy. This fermentation might at length have purified into strong and decisive measures; and had Philip possessed only an ordinary degree of vigilance, a confederacy might have been yet formed in Greece sufficient to repel the Macedonian arms. But that consummate politician thought nothing done while any

⁴⁵ Demosthen. de falsa Legatione, sect. 5.

thing was neglected; and, as he allowed not the slightest opportunity to pass unimproved, he often derived very important benefits from seemingly inconsiderable causes.

An Athenian of the name of Phrynon, a man wealthy and powerful, had been attacked, robbed, and confined by some Macedonian soldiers, who obliged him to purchase his liberty by a very considerable ransom⁴⁶. As this violence had been committed during the fifteen days of truce that followed the celebration of the Olympic games, Phrynon very judiciously supposed that the king of Macedon, who had long been ambitious of obtaining a place in the Grecian confederacy, would not abet this act of injustice and impiety. He had therefore requested his countrymen, who at that time prepared to negotiate with Philip an exchange of prisoners, to join him in commission with Ctesiphon, a man of experience and capacity, who had been already named to that embassy; imagining that by appearing in a public character, he might the more easily recover the ransom and other monies that had been unjustly extorted from him. Having arrived in Macedon, the ambassadors were received and treated by Philip with uncommon politeness and respect; their demands were most obligingly granted, or rather prevented; the king apologized to Phrynon for the ignorant rusticity of his soldiers, which had led them to act so unwarrantably; and he lamented both to Phrynon and Ctesiphon, the necessity of their present

Dexterity
of that
prince in
diverting
the storm.

⁴⁶ Æschines de falsa Legatione.

C H A P. mission, since he had nothing more sincerely at
 XXXV. heart than to live on good terms with their re-
 public ⁴⁷. At their return to Athens, the repre-
 sentations of such men could not be without
 weight; nor could they fail being extremely fa-
 vorable to the king of Macedon.

He im-
 proves
 every fa-
 vorable
 incident.

Another incident followed, which was improved
 with no less dexterity ⁴⁸. At the taking and sack
 of Olynthus, Stratocles and Eucrates, two Athe-
 nians of distinction, had been seized and carried
 into Macedon. By some accident these men had
 not been released with the other prisoners. Their
 relations were anxious for their safety, and there-
 fore applied to the Athenians, that a proper per-
 son might be sent to treat of their ransom. Aris-
 todemus was employed in this commission, but
 was more attentive to paying his court than per-
 forming his duty; and, at his return home, ne-
 glected to give an account of his negociation.
 Philip, meanwhile, whose vigilance never slept,
 and who well knew the hostile resolutions in agita-
 tion against him at Athens, released the prisoners
 without ransom, and dismissed them with the
 highest expressions of regard. Moved by grati-
 tude, Stratocles appeared in the assembly, blazed
 forth the praises of the king of Macedon, and
 loudly complained against the careless indifference
 of Aristodemus, who had neglected to report his
 embassy ⁴⁹.

The Athe-
 nians are
 persuaded

The artful player, thus called upon to act his
 part, excused his omitting to relate one example of

⁴⁷ Æschines de falsa Legatione.

⁴⁸ Id. ibid.

⁴⁹ Id. ibid.

andness, in a man who had recently given so many proofs of the most unbounded generosity. He expatiated on the candor and benevolence of Philip, and especially on his profound respect for the republic, with which, he assured them, the king of Macedon was earnest to conclude a peace, and even to enter into an alliance, on the most honorable and advantageous terms. He probably reminded them of the misfortunes which had attended their arms since they commenced war against this prince. Fifteen hundred talents expended with disgrace; seventy-five dependent cities, including those of the Chalcidic region, lost irrecoverably; Olynthus destroyed; Eubœa revolted; Athens dishonored and exhausted; and Macedon more powerful and more respected than at any former period. This representation did not exceed the truth; and the calamities of the war had long inclined to peace the more moderate and judicious portion of the assembly. The artificial generosity of Philip, in his treatment of Phrynon and Stratocles, blazoned by the eloquence of Aristodemus, fixed the wavering irresolution of the multitude. The military preparations were suspended. Even Demosthenes and Æschines yielded to the torrent; and imagining that a bad peace was better than a bad war (since it was impossible to expect success from the fluctuating councils of their country), supported a decree⁵⁰ of Philocrates for sending a

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to send an
embassy to
Philip.

⁵⁰ The decree was attacked by one Licinus. Demosthenes defended it; and both Demosthenes and Æschines, as appears from the text, were on the embassy.

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Character
of the am-
bassadors.

herald and ambassadors to discover the real intentions of Philip, and to hearken to the terms of accommodation with which he had so long amused them.

The ministers appointed to this commission seem to have been purposely chosen among men of opposite principles, who might mutually be checks on each other. Phrynon, Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, and Philocrates, who had uniformly testified their confidence in the king of Macedon, were opposed by Æschines and Demosthenes, who had long discovered their suspicions of that prince. To the embassy were added Naucles and Dercyllus, men distinguished by the public offices which they had discharged with equal patriotism and fidelity; Jatrocles, the chosen friend of Æschines; and Cimon, illustrious for the name he bore, which descended to him from the greatest and most fortunate of the Athenian commanders. The whole number amounted to ten, besides Agalocreon of Tenedos, who was sent on the part of the Greek islands in alliance with Athens⁵¹.

Difficulties occasioned by the quarrel between Demosthenes and Æschines.

Thus far contemporary authors agree; but in describing the events which followed the departure of the ambassadors, all is inconsistency and contradiction. The misunderstanding that arose between Æschines and Demosthenes, the former of whom was impeached by the latter, furnish us, in the accusation and defence, with the fullest and most diffuse, but at the same time the least authentic, materials, that present themselves in any passage of

⁵¹ Demosthen. et Æschin. de falsa Legatione.

Grecian history. The whole train of the negotiation, as well as the events connected with it, are represented in colors the most discordant; facts are asserted and denied; while both parties appeal to the memory of the assembly before which they spoke, to the testimony of witnesses, and even to the evidence of public decrees and records; circumstances that must appear very extraordinary, unless we consider that suborning of witnesses, perjury, and even the falsifying of laws and records, were crimes not unusual at Athens⁵². Amidst this confusion, the discerning eye of criticism would vainly endeavour to penetrate the truth. Æschines was indeed acquitted by his countrymen. But nothing positive can be learned from a partial sentence, pronounced three years after the alleged crimes had been committed, when the power of Philip had increased to such an alarming degree, as gave his faction a decided ascendant even in the Athenian assembly.

To disentangle such perplexity, we shall keep chiefly to those facts which are allowed on both sides, deducing from them such consequences as seem most natural and probable. In the course of one year, three embassies were sent to Philip; the first to propose a peace, the second to ratify it, the third to see the conditions of it observed; and in that space of time Kerfobleptes, being stripped of his dominions, was reduced into captivity, and Philip having seized Thermopylæ, invaded Phocis,

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Account
of the ne-
gociation.
Olymp.
cviii. 1.
cviii. 2.
A. C. 348
and 347.

⁵² See my Discourse on the Character and Manners of the Athenians, prefixed to Lysias and Isocrates.

C H A P. and destroyed the twenty-two cities of that province
 XXXV. in less than twenty-two days. Nor was this all:
 a foreign prince having made himself master of
 Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, the most valu-
 able safeguards of Greece — having invaded and
 desolated the territory of a Grecian republic, the
 most respectable for its antiquity, power, and wealth,
 the seat of the Amphictyonic council, and of the
 revered oracle of Delphi — These daring measures
 tended so little to excite the displeasure of Greece,
 that the king of Macedon had no sooner accom-
 plished them, than he threatened to attack Athens
 (who weakly lamented calamities which she had
 neither prudence nor courage to prevent) at the
 head of a general confederacy of the Amphictyonic
 states.

Diffension
 of the am-
 bassadors.

Such extraordinary transactions, of which history
 scarcely offers another example for the instruction
 of posterity, Demosthenes ascribes entirely to the
 corruption and perfidy of the Athenian ambassa-
 dors. "The felicity of Philip," he says, "consists
 chiefly in this; that having occasion for trai-
 tors, fortune has given him men treacherous and
 corrupt beyond his most sanguine hopes and
 prayers⁵³." This, doubtless, is the exaggeration
 of an orator, desirous by every means to blacken
 the character of his colleagues in the embassy, and
 particularly that of his adversary Æschines. Yet
 it will appear, from the most careful survey of the

⁵³ Subsequent writers have copied the language of Demos-
 thenes, και χρηματων πληθος διαδωκε τοις εν ταις πολεσι ισχυρσι
 πολλας εσχε προδοτας των πατριδων. Diodorus, ubi supra.

events of those times, that the incapacity and neglect, if not the treason, of the Athenian ministers, greatly contributed to the success of the Macedonian arms.

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From the first moment of their departure from Athens, the ambassadors began to betray their mutual jealousies and suspicions of each other's fidelity. The dangerous character of Philocrates was equally dreaded by Æschines and Demosthenes⁵⁴; and the latter, if we may believe his rival, so much disgusted the other ambassadors, by the morose severity of his temper, that they had almost excluded him their society; a circumstance rendered credible, not merely by the partial evidence of an adversary, but by the resentment and indignation always expressed by Demosthenes against the behaviour of his colleagues. Having arrived at Pella, they were introduced to an audience; and spoke, as had been agreed on, in the order of their seniority. The discourse of Æschines was the most copious and elaborate, but seemed rather calculated for gaining merit with the Athenian assembly, than for influencing the conduct of Philip. "He recalled to the memory of the king, the favors of the Athenians towards his ancestors; the distressed condition of the children of Amyntas; the sollicitations of Euridicé; and the generous interpositions of Iphicrates, to whom the family of Philip owed the crown of Macedon. Having touched slightly on the ungrateful returns made by Ptolemy and Perdiccas, he dwelt on the

Conference of
the ambassad-
adors with
Philip.

Speech of
Æschines

⁵⁴ Demosthen. et Æschin. de falsa Legatione.

C H A P. injustice of those hostilities which Philip had committed against the republic, especially in taking
 XXXV. Amphipolis which his father Amyntas had acknowledged to be a dependent colony of Athens. He insisted on the impropriety of retaining this possession, which as it could not be claimed by any ancient title, neither could it be held by the right of conquest, not being gained in any war between the two states. In the time of profound peace between Athens and Macedon, Philip had taken from the Amphipolitans an Athenian city, which it concerned his justice and his honor to restore without delay, to its lawful and acknowledged owners".

That of
 Demos-
 thenes.

Had Æschines wished to furnish Philip with a pretence for protracting the negociation, he could not have done it more effectually than by such a demand. It could not possibly be expected, that a victorious monarch should set bounds to his own triumphs, in order to purchase peace by tamely surrendering one of the most important of his acquisitions. In this light the proposal appeared to Demosthenes, who thought that his colleague had totally forgotten the object of the embassy, the distressed state of Athens, how greatly the people had been harassed by the war, and how eagerly they wished for peace. It was now his own turn to speak before a prince whom he had often and highly offended, whose character and actions he had ever viewed and represented with the utmost severity; but whom, on the present occasion, it was his business to soothe rather than to irritate.

The novelty of the situation might have disconcerted a man of less sensibility than Demosthenes. C H A P. XXXV.

The envious jealousy of his colleagues was prepared to listen, with a malicious ear, to those irresistible arguments which the orator is said to have promised, with a very unbecoming confidence; the Macedonian courtiers expected some prodigy of eloquence from the perpetual opponent of their admired master. Amidst the silent suspense of an unfavorable audience, Demosthenes began to speak with ungrateful hesitation, and after uttering a few obscure and interrupted sentences, his memory totally forsook him. Philip endeavoured to remove his embarrassment with a mortifying politeness, telling him that he was not now in a theatre⁵⁵, where such an accident might be attended with disagreeable consequences; and exhorting him to take time for recollection, and to pursue his intended discourse. Demosthenes again began, but without better success. The assembly beheld his confusion with a malignant pleasure; and the ambassadors were ordered to withdraw,

His embarrassment and confusion.

After a proper interval, they were summoned to the royal presence. Philip received them with great dignity, and answered with precision and elegance the arguments respectively used by the several speakers, particularly those of Æschines.

Philip answers the ambassadors;

⁵⁵ Notwithstanding the passion of the Athenians for dramatic entertainments, and their consideration for the character of players beyond that of any other nation, they were indecently severe against their negligences and faults on the theatre; as appears from various passages of the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Æschines.

C H A P. The confused hints of Demosthenes he passed over
XXXV. with merited neglect; thus proving to the world, that the man who had ever arraigned him with most severity in the tumultuous assemblies of Greece, had not dared to say any thing in his presence which deserved the smallest notice or reply. The ambassadors were then invited to an entertainment, where Demosthenes is said to have behaved with great weakness, and where Philip displayed such powers of merriment and festivity, as eclipsed his talents for negociation and war. The ambassadors were persuaded of his candor and sincerity, and dismissed with a letter to the people of Athens, assuring them that his intentions were truly pacific, and that as soon as they consented to an alliance with him, he would freely indulge those sentiments of affection and respect which he had ever entertained for their republic.

invites
them to
an enter-
tainment.

Their de-
parture
from Ma-
cedon,

Artifices
of Demos-
thenes.

The mortification which Demosthenes had received, made him at first vent his chagrin by condemning the conduct of his colleagues; but when he reflected, that a fair representation of facts would greatly depreciate his character at Athens, policy prevailed over resentment. He began privately to tamper with his companions on the road, freely rallied the confusion into which he had been betrayed, extolled the ready genius and memory of Æschines; and endeavoured, by promises and flattery, to ingratiate himself with those whom his recent behaviour had justly provoked and disgusted. In a conversation at Larissa in Thessaly, he acknowledged the masterly reasoning

of the king of Macedon. The ambassadors all C H A P.
 joined in the praises of this extraordinary man. XXXV.
 Æschines admired the strength and perspicuity
 with which he had answered their respective dis-
 courses; and Ctesiphon cried out in transport,
 that, in the course of a long life, he had never
 beheld a man of such a polite and engaging de-
 portment. Demosthenes then artfully said, "he
 apprehended they would not venture to make such
 representations to the Athenian assembly; that
 their honor and safety required them to be con-
 sistent in their reports;" to which they all assented;
 and Æschines acknowledges, that he was prevailed
 on by the entreaties of his rival to promise, that he
 would give a favorable and false account of the
 behaviour of Demosthenes, and assure the people
 of Athens, that he had spoken with dignity and
 firmness on the affair of Amphipolis.

According to the forms of the republic, the
 ambassadors first reported the success of their ne-
 gociation, and delivered the letter of Philip, to
 the senate of the Five Hundred. They explained,
 in order, what each had said in presence of the
 king; when Demosthenes, rising up the last,
 affirmed with his usual oath of asseveration "
 "that the ambassadors had not spoken in the
 senate as they did before Philip; that they had
 spoken much better in Macedon: he then moved,
 that they should be honored with a crown of

They re-
 port their
 negoti-
 ation to the
 senate.

"Μα Δία, indecently explained "by Jove," since the expres-
 sion is elliptical, and includes a short prayer, εὐχομαι τὸν Δία σωζέειν
 τὰ ἐμὰ; "my assertion is true, may Jove thus protect em."

C H A P. sacred olive ⁵⁷, and invited next day to an entertainment in the Prytanæum ⁵⁸.
XXXV.

The same
reported to
the assembly.

Extraor-
dinary be-
haviour of
Demosthe-
nes.

The day following, they made their report to the assembly of the people; when the ambassadors, finding the subject not disagreeable to their hearers, expatiated on the politeness, condescension, eloquence, and abilities of the prince, with whom their republic was ready not only to negotiate a peace, but to contract an alliance. Having allowed them to exhaust this fertile subject, Demosthenes at length arose, and, after those contortions of body, which, if we believe his adversary, were familiar to him, declared, that he was equally surprised at those who, in a deliberation of such importance, could talk of such trifles, and at those who could endure to hear them. "The negociation may be briefly reported. Here is the decree by which we are commissioned. We have executed this commission. Here is Philip's answer (pointing to the letter). You have only to examine its contents". A confused murmur arose in the assembly, some applauding the strength and precision of the speech, others condemning the asperity of the speaker. As soon as he could be heard, Demosthenes thus proceeded: "You shall see how I will lop off those superfluous matters. Æschines praises the memory and eloquence of Philip, in which, however, I find nothing extraordinary, since any other man, placed in the same advantageous

⁵⁷ See the Discourse of Lyfias on an accusation for cutting down a consecrated olive.

⁵⁸ Æschin. de falsa Legatione.

circumstances

circumstances of rank and fortune, would be equally attended to and admired. Ctesiphon praises the gracefulness and dignity of his person; my colleague Aristodemus does not yield to him in these particulars. Others admire his mirth and gaiety at table; yet in such qualities Philocrates excels him⁵⁹. But this is unseasonable. I shall therefore draw up a decree for convening an extraordinary assembly, to deliberate on the peace and the alliance⁶⁰.

C H A P.
XXXV.

The decree was proposed on the eighth of March, and the assembly was fixed for the seventeenth of the same month. In the interval, arrived, as ambassadors from Philip, Antipater, the most respected of his ministers, Parmenio, the bravest of his generals; and Eurylochus, who united, almost in an equal degree, the praises of eloquence and valor. Parmenio had been employed in the siege of Halus, a place filled with malecontents from Thessaly, who still resisted the Macedonian power in that country. That he might have leisure to join his colleagues, Parmenio ordered the siege to be converted into a blockade; and the merit of three such ambassadors sufficiently announced the important purposes which Philip wished to effect by the present negociation. They were received with great distinction by the senate, and (what seems extraordinary) lodged in the house of Demosthenes,

Philip
sends am-
bassadors
to Athens,

⁵⁹ Even by Demosthenes's testimony, it required the combination of several Athenian characters to match the various excellences of Philip.

⁶⁰ Æschin, de falsa Legatione.

C H A P. XXXV. who was careful to adorn their seats in the theatre, and to distinguish them by every other mark of honor⁶¹. Having been introduced, on the appointed day, into the assembly, they declared the object of their commission, to conclude in the name of their master a peace and alliance with the people of Athens. Demosthenes, in an elaborate speech, urged the expedience of listening to their demands; but without neglecting the interest of the Athenian allies. Æschines delivered the same opinion, and severely reproached Philocrates, who urged the necessity of precipitating the treaty. The two first days were spent in debate; but on the third, the influence of Philocrates prevailed, chiefly, if we believe Demosthenes, by the unexpected accession of Æschines to that party. He, who had hitherto been a strenuous defender of the interest of Kerfobleptes, declared that he had now altered his opinion. That peace was necessary for Athens, and ought not to be retarded by the slow deliberations of other powers. That the circumstances of the republic were changed; and that, in their actual situation, it was an idle vanity to attend to those who flattered them with pompous panegyrics of the magnanimity of their ancestors; since the weakness of Athens was no longer called on to undertake the protection of every state that could not defend its own cause⁶².

who corrupt Æschines.

During the negotiation, Philocrates

Demosthenes had formerly suspected the treachery of Æschines; but this speech fully convinced him,

⁶¹ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

⁶² Demosthen. de falsa Legatione.

that if his adversary had not before sold himself to Philip, he had then been tampered with, and gained by the Macedonian ambassadors. But Demosthenes, and the assembly in general, saw the necessity of immediately ratifying the peace with that prince, who had actually taken the field in Thrace, along the coast of which the Athenians still possessed Serrium, Doriscus, and several other tributary cities. A decree was proposed for this purpose, and ambassadors were named, who might, with all convenient speed, repair to Philip, in order mutually to give and receive the oaths and ratifications of the treaty just concluded at Athens. The ambassadors were Eubulus, Æschines, Ctesiphon, Democrates, and Cleon; the principal of whom, being entirely devoted to the Macedonian interest, contrived various pretences to delay their departure. In this interval, Kerfobleptes met with the unhappy fate of which we have already taken notice; and Philip, encouraged by the success of his intrigues, ventured to attack the cities of Serrium and Doriscus, which readily submitted to his arms⁶³. Upon intelligence of the latter event, the Athenians dispatched Euclides to inform the king of Macedon, that the places which he had taken belonged to Athens; to which he coldly replied, that he had not been so instructed by his ambassadors, nor was there any mention of those cities in the treaty recently signed, but not yet ratified, between the two powers.

Æschines and his colleagues still delayed to set

⁶³ Demosthen. Orat. v. in Philipp.

C II A P.

XXXV.

lip continues to make conquests in Thrace.

Third embassy to Philip.

C H A P.
XXXV.

out, although the conduct of Philip continually urged the necessity of hastening their departure. They were finally ordered to be gone, in consequence of a decree proposed by Demosthenes⁶⁴, who was unable to prevail on the Athenians, till it was too late, to pay due regard to the interest of Kerfobleptes. In twenty-five days the Athenian ministers arrived at Pella, a journey which they might have performed in six; and instead of directly proceeding to Philip, who was employed in reducing the cities on the Propontis, they patiently waited, above three weeks, the return of that monarch to his capital. During their residence in Pella, they were joined by Demosthenes, who, at his own request, had been added to this commission, under pretence of ransoming some Athenian captives, but in reality with a view to watch the conduct of his colleagues. Philip at length arrived: the ambassadors were called to an audience. On this occasion they spoke, not as formerly, according to their respective ages, but in an order, if we believe Æschines, first established by the impudence of Demosthenes; whose discourse, as represented by his adversary, must have appeared highly ridiculous, even in an age when the decent formality of public transactions was little known or regarded.

Speech of
Demosthe-
nes;

Anticipating his more experienced colleagues, he observed, "That they were unfortunately divided in their views and sentiments. That his own were strictly conformable to those of Philip. From

⁶⁴ Demosth. de falsa Legatione.

the beginning he had advised a peace and alliance with Macedon. That he had procured all possible honors for the ambassadors of that country during their residence in Athens, and had afterwards escorted their journey as far as Thebes. He knew that his good intentions had been misrepresented to Philip, on account of some expressions that had dropped from him in the Athenian assembly. But if he had denied the superior excellence of that prince in beauty, in drinking, and in debate⁶⁵, it was, because he believed such qualities to belong to a woman, a sponge, and a hireling rhetorician and sophist, rather than to a warlike monarch, and mighty conqueror." This extraordinary apology excited the derision of the Macedonian courtiers, and made the Athenian ambassadors hold down their heads in confusion⁶⁶.

Æschines first recovered his composure; and modestly addressing Philip, observed, "That the present was not a proper occasion for the Athenian ministers to praise or to defend their own conduct. They had been deemed worthy of their commission by the republic which employed them, and to which alone they were accountable⁶⁷. Their actual business was to receive Philip's oath in ratification of the treaty already concluded on the part of Athens. The military preparations carrying on in every part of Macedon could not but excite

⁶⁵ See above, p. 401.

⁶⁶ Æschin. de falsa Legatione.

⁶⁷ The speech of Æschines, as reported by himself, is inimitably graceful and dignified. λέγων ὅτι πεμψείων ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι πρεσβυται, etc. Vid. p. 261, et seqq. edit. Wolf.

C H A P. their fears for the unhappy Phocians. But he
 XXXV. entreated Philip, that, if he was determined to gratify the Thebans by making war on that unfortunate people, he would make at least a proper distinction between the innocent and the guilty. The sacrilegious violators of the temple ought to be punished with due severity; the state itself must be spared; since the laws and institutions of Greece guard the safety of every Amphictyonic city. Æschines then spoke, in the severest terms, against the injustice and cruelty of the Thebans, who, he ventured to prophesy, would repay the partiality of Philip with the same falshood and ingratitude with which they had been accustomed to requite their former allies and benefactors."

Philip's
 profound
 dissimula-
 tion in
 treating
 with the
 Athenian
 ambassa-
 dors.

The discourse of Æschines, though it could not be expected to move the resolutions of the king, was well calculated to raise the credit of the speaker, when it should be reported in his own country. Philip confined himself to vague expressions of friendship and respect. The ambassadors of Thebes were already at Pella, a circumstance which furnished him with a pretence for declining to make an explicit declaration in favor of Phocis. But he hinted his compassionate concern for that republic; and requested the Athenians to accompany him to Theffaly, that he might avail himself of their abilities and experience to settle the affairs of that country, which required his immediate presence. Extraordinary as this demand was, the Athenians readily complied with it, notwithstanding the king, who had ordered his army to march, was

attended in this expedition by the ambassadors of Thebes, who, as well as the Athenians, were daily entertained at his table, and whose views were diametrically opposite to the interests both of Phocis and of Athens⁶⁸.

The unhappy and distracted situation of the former republic promised a speedy issue to the Sacred War, which, for more than two years, had been feebly carried on between the Phocians on one side, and the Thebans and Locrians on the other, by such petty incursions and ravages as indicated the inveterate rancor of combatants, who still retained the desire of hurting, after they had lost the power⁶⁹. During the greater part of that time, the Athenians, amused by their negotiation with Philip, afforded no assistance to their unfortunate allies. The treasures of Delphi, immense as they were, at length began to fail. The Phocians, thus abandoned and exhausted, reflected with terror and remorse on their past conduct; and, in order to make atonement for their sacrilegious violations of the temple, instituted a judicial inquiry against Phaleucus, their general, and his accomplices, in plundering the dedications to Apollo⁷⁰. Several were condemned to death; Phaleucus was deposed; and the Phocians, having performed these substantial acts of justice, which tended to remove the odium that had long adhered to their cause, solicited with better hopes of success the assistance of Sparta and Athens.

C. H. A. P.
XXXV.

The Phocian war carried on with little activity on either side. Olymp. cviii. 2. A. C. 349.

The Phocians condemn the plunderers of the temple.

⁶⁸ Demosthen. de falsa Legatione.

⁶⁹ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 454.

⁷⁰ Idem, l. xvi. p. 452.

C H A P.

XXXV.

The Spartans claim the superintendency of the temple.

Phaleucus and his mercenaries seize Nicæa.

Disaster of the Phocians in the temple of Abæan Apollo.

But the crafty Archidamus, who had long directed the Spartan councils, considered the distress of the Phocians as a favorable opportunity to urge the claim of his own republic to the superintendency of the Delphic temple; and actually sent ambassadors into Thessaly, to confer with the king of Macedon on that subject". The Athenians paid more attention to the request of their allies, who, as an inducement to excite their activity, offered to put them in possession of the towns of Nicæa, Alpenus, and Thronium, which commanded the straits of Thermopylæ. But this salutary plan, which might have retarded the fate of Greece, was defeated by Phaleucus, who commanding eight thousand mercenaries, that acknowledged no authority but that of their general, established his head-quarters at Nicæa, and despised the menaces both of Phocis and of Athens.

Mortifying as this disappointment must have been, it was followed by a disaster in another quarter still more terrible. The Phocians had fortified the city of Abæ, to defend their northern frontier against the depredations of the Locrians. The Thebans, reinforced by some auxiliaries of Macedon, marched against that place. The Phocians, with more courage than prudence, met them in the field; but were defeated with great slaughter, and pursued, in their disordered flight, through the surrounding territory. A party of above five hundred took refuge in the temple of

Demosthen. et Æschin. ubi supra.

Abæan Apollo, where they remained for several days, sleeping under the porticoes, on beds of dried herbs, straw, and other combustible materials. An accidental fire, that began in the night, was communicated to the whole edifice, part of which was consumed, while the unhappy Phocians were stifled, or burnt to ashes⁷².

The Thebans failed not to represent this calamity as a judgment of heaven, against the daring impiety of wretches, who had ventured to take refuge in the temple of a god whom their sacrilege had long offended. They entreated Philip to assist them in destroying the remnant of the guilty race. This was the chief purpose of their embassy to that prince, whom the Athenians, as related above, entreated to spare the nation, while he punished the criminals; and the Lacedæmonians, regardless of the fate of Phocis, thought only of making good their ancient claim to the guardianship of the Delphic temple.

The Thebans instigate Philip to desolate Phocis.

Philip treated the deputies of the three republics with apparent frankness and cordiality, under the veil of which he knew so well to disguise the interests of his policy and ambition. He assured the Thebans, that his arms should be employed to recover for them the towns of Orchomenus, Coronæa, and Tilphosseum, which, ever ready to rebel against a tyrannical capital, had readily submitted to the Phocians, during their invasion of Bœotia. The Phocians, he said, had rendered

Philip attempts in vain to corrupt the Theban ambassadors.

⁷² Diodorus, p. 454.

C H A P. themselves the objects of divine displeasure; it
XXXV. would be as meritorious to punish, as it was impious to protect them. He was determined that both they and their allies should suffer those calamities which their crimes so justly deserved. Thus far Philip was sincere; for, in these particulars, the views of Thebes were exactly conformable to his own. But in his mind he agitated other matters, in which the interest of Thebes interfered with that of Macedon. To accomplish those purposes, without offending his allies, it was necessary to gain the ambassadors. Caresses, flattery, and promises, were lavished in vain. Money was at length tendered with a profuse liberality; but, though no man ever possessed more address than Philip in rendering his bribes acceptable, the Theban deputies remained honest and uncorrupted, firmly maintaining to the end their patriotism and their honor. Philon, the chief of the embassy, answered for his colleagues: "We are already persuaded of your friendship for us, independent of your presents. Reserve your generosity for our country, on which it will be more profitably bestowed, since your favors, conferred on Thebes, will ever excite the gratitude both of that republic and its ministers⁷³."

Philip
corrupts
and de-
ceives the
Athenian
ambassa-
dors.

Demosthenes extols the dignity of this reply, as becoming rather the ambassadors of Athens. But these ministers, though one object of their commission was to save the Grecian state which the

⁷³ Demosthen. de falsa Legatione.

Thebans wished to destroy, discovered neither integrity nor spirit. All of them, but Demosthenes himself, accepted the presents of the king of Macedon, who found little difficulty in persuading men, thus prepossessed in his favor, that he pitied the Phocians; that he respected Athens; that he detested the insolence of Thebes; and that, should he ever proceed to the straits of Thermopylæ, his expedition would be more dangerous to that state than to its enemies. At present, however, he observed, that he had private reasons for managing the friendship of a people who set no bounds to their resentment. From such motives, he had hitherto declined ratifying the peace with Athens; but this measure he would no longer defer. He only entreated, that to save appearances with the Thebans, the name of the Phocians might be omitted in the treaty. This arduous work was at length brought to a conclusion; and, for the more secrecy, transacted in a place which Demosthenes calls a tavern, adjoining to the temple of Pollux, in the neighbourhood of Pheræ. The Athenian ambassadors took leave, affecting to be persuaded (perhaps persuaded in reality) of the good intentions of the king of Macedon. About the same time, the ambassadors of Sparta departed, but with far less satisfaction. They either perceived, from the beginning, the artifices of the prince with whom they came to treat, or at least made such a report to Archidamus, as convinced him that his republic had not any advantage to expect from the preponderance of the Macedonian interest,

CHAPTER. and the destruction of the Phocians; and that,
 XXXV. should the Spartans persist in their claim to the
 superintendency of the Delphic temple, they must
 prepare to assert it by force of arms.

Philip's
 flattering
 letter to
 the Athe-
 nians.

Archidamus raised an army for this purpose, and
 marched towards the straits. But the intrigues of
 Philip, as we shall have occasion to relate, rendered
 his hostility as impotent as his negotiations had
 been fruitless. From Thessaly that prince had al-
 ready sent a letter to the Athenians, couched in the
 most artful terms. He expressed his profound re-
 spect for the state, and his high esteem for its am-
 bassadors; declaring that he should omit no op-
 portunity of proving how earnestly he desired to
 promote the prosperity and glory of Athens. He
 requested that the means might be pointed out to
 him, by which he could most effectually gratify
 the people. Of the conditions of the peace and
 alliance, he was careful to make no mention; but
 after many other general declarations of his good-
 will, he entreated them "not to be offended at
 his detaining their ambassadors, of whose eloquence
 and abilities he wished to avail himself in settling
 the affairs of Thessaly⁷⁴."

Æschines
 gives an
 account of
 the em-
 bassy to the
 Athenian
 assembly.

Soon afterwards these ambassadors returned home;
 and having given an account of their negotiation
 to the senate of the Five hundred, with very little
 satisfaction to that select body, they next appeared
 before the popular assembly. Æschines first mount-
 ed the rostrum, and in an elaborate and artful

⁷⁴ Demosthen. et Æschin. ubi supra.

discourse, set forth the advantages resulting from his successful embassy, in which he had persuaded Philip to embrace precisely those measures which the interest of Athens required. That, now, the people had peace instead of war, and that, without harassing themselves by military expeditions, they had only to remain quietly at home, enjoying the amusements of the city, and in a few days they would learn that Philip had passed Thermopylæ, to take vengeance, not on the Phocians, but on the Thebans, who had been the real authors of the war, and who, having entertained a design of seizing the temple, were not the less culpable (as had been proved to Philip) because they had failed in this impious purpose. That the Bœotian allies of Thespiæ and Plataea, whose hatred to Thebes was as inveterate as their attachment to Athens was sincere, would be restored to their pristine strength and splendor. That the Thebans, not the Phocians, would be compelled to pay the fine imposed by the Amphictyonic council, and to repair the fatal effects of sacrilege and profanation. That the magistrates of Thebes foresaw the hostility of Philip, and well knew by whom it had been excited. "They have therefore," said Æschines, "devoted me to destruction, and actually set a price upon my head. The people of Eubœa are equally alarmed by our accommodation with Philip, not doubting that their island will be restored to us, as an equivalent for Amphipolis. Nor are these the only advantages of the treaty: another point of still higher importance, a point of the

C H A P. most intimate concern to the public, has been secured. But of this I shall speak at another time, since at present I perceive the envy and malignity of certain persons ready to break forth." The advantage hinted at, with such significant obscurity, was the recovery of Oropus, a considerable city on the Athenian frontier, which had long been subject to Thebes.

The suspicions of Demosthenes ridiculed by his colleagues.

This specious harangue, so flattering to the indolence and vain hopes of the multitude, was received with general approbation, notwithstanding the opposition of Demosthenes, who declared that he knew nothing of all those great advantages promised by his colleague; and that he did not expect them. Æschines and Philocrates heard him with the supercilious contempt of men who possessed a secret with which he was unacquainted. But when he endeavoured to continue his discourse, and to expose their artifice and insincerity, all was clamor, indignation, and insult. Æschines bade him remember, not to claim any share of the rewards due to the important services of his colleagues. Philocrates, with an air of pleasantry, said, it was no wonder that the hopes of Demosthenes were less sanguine than his own, "since he drinks water; I wine." This insipid jest was received with loud bursts of laughter and applause, which prevented the assembly from attending to the spirited remonstrances of Demosthenes. A motion was made, and agreed to, for thanking Philip for his equitable and friendly intentions, as well as for ratifying a perpetual peace and alliance between

Athens and Macedon. In the same decree, it was determined that the Phocians should submit to the Amphictyonic council, under pain of incurring the displeasure of the republic".

C H A P.
XXXV.

These articles, together with the secret motives which produced them, were, by the emissaries of Philip, immediately communicated to the Phocian ambassadors then residing at Athens; who, transported with joy at the prospect of averting the calamities which long threatened their country, lost no time in transmitting the agreeable intelligence to their fellow-citizens. They concluded, with a high degree of probability, that, however Philip might deceive the Phocians, the ministers of Athens could never be so bold as publicly to deceive the Athenians; and that, therefore, they could no longer entertain any reasonable doubt of the favorable disposition of the king of Macedon. This belief was so firmly established, that when Archidamus marched into Phocis at the head of an army in order to defend the temple against Philip, the Phocians rejected his assistance, observing, that they feared for Sparta much more than for themselves; upon which the Lacedæmonians returned into Peloponnesus⁷⁵.

The success of Philip's artifices with the Athenians deceives the Phocian ambassadors at Athens;

which makes the Phocians reject the assistance of Sparta.

Philip was now prepared for executing his grand enterprize. Halus, long besieged, had submitted to the united arms of Parmenio and his own. Fresh troops had arrived from Macedon. The Athenians were appeased; the Lacedæmonians had

Philip negotiates with Phaulcus the cession of Nicæa.

⁷⁵ Demosthen. de falsa Legatione.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

C H A P. retired; the Phocians were imposed on; the
XXXV. Theſſalians, Thebans, and Locrians, were ready to follow his ſtandard. One obſtacle only remained, and that eaſy to be ſurmounded. Phaleucus, who commanded eight thouſand mercenaries, ſtill kept poſſeſſion of Nicæa. But a man who had betrayed the intereſt of his own republic, could not be very obſtinate in defending the cauſe of Greece. Philip entered into a negociation with him, in order to get poſſeſſion of Nicæa⁷⁷, without which it would have been impoſſible to paſs the Thermopylæ; and while this tranſaction was going forward, wrote repeated letters to the Athenians, full of cordiality and affection.

Philip
 continues
 to veil his
 deſigns in
 obſcurity.

He ſuſpected the dangerous capriciouſneſs of a people, whoſe ſecurity might yet be alarmed; and whoſe oppoſition might ſtill prove fatal to his deſigns, ſhould they either march forth to the ſtraits, or command their admiral Proxenus, who was ſtationed in the Opuntian gulph, between Locris and Eubœa, to intercept the Macedonian convoys; for the frontiers both of Phocis and Theſſaly having long lain waſte in conſequence of the ſacred war, Philip received his proviſions chiefly by ſea. The reaſonable profeſſions of friendſhip, contained in the letters, not only kept the Athenians from liſtening to the remonſtrances of Demotheues, but prevailed on them to depute that orator, together with Æſchines, and ſeveral others, whoſe advice and aſſiſtance Philip affected to deſire in ſettling the arduous buſineſs in which he was engaged. Demotheues

⁷⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 455.

saw through the artifice of his enemies, for with-
 drawing him, at this important crisis, from his duty
 in the assembly: he therefore absolutely refused
 the commission. Æschines, on pretence of sickness,
 staid at home to watch and counteract the measures
 of his rival. The other ambassadors departed, in
 compliance with the request of Philip, and the
 orders of their republic, and in hopes of seeing a
 treaty fulfilled, which, they had been taught to
 believe, would be attended with consequences
 equally advantageous and honorable ⁷⁸.

C H A P.
 XXXV.

While the ambassadors travelled through Eubœa,
 in their way to join the king of Macedon, they
 learned, to their utter astonishment, the wonderful
 events that had been transacted. Phaleucus had
 been persuaded to evacuate Nicæa. He retired
 towards Peloponnesus, and embarked at Corinth,
 with a view to sail to Italy, where he expected
 to form an establishment. But the capricious
 and ungovernable temper of his followers com-
 pelled him to make a descent on the coast of
 Elis. After this they re-embarked, and sailed to
 Crete, where their invasion proved fatal to their
 general. Having returned to the Peloponnesus,
 they were defeated by the Elians and Arcadians.
 The greater part of those who survived the battle,
 fell into the hands of the enemy, by whom they
 were shot with arrows or precipitated from rocks.
 A feeble remnant escaped to their ships, but
 perished soon afterwards in an insurrection which

Disasters
 of Phaleu-
 cus and
 his fol-
 lowers.

⁷⁸ Demosthen. de falsa Legatione.

C H A P. they had excited, or fomented, in the isle of Sicily.
 XXXV. The destruction of this numerous body of men is ascribed by ancient historians⁷⁹ to the divine vengeance which pursued their sacrilege and impiety. It is astonishing that those superstitious writers did not reflect on the swifter and more terrible destruction that overtook the whole Phocian nation, by whom the wickedness of Phaleucus and his followers had been so recently condemned; and by whom, had not power been wanting, it would have been punished with an exemplary rigor.

Cruel decree of the Amphictyons against Phocis;

Philip having passed the straits of Thermopylae, was received by the Phocians as their deliverer. He had promised to plead their cause before the Amphictyonic council, to the decisions of which that credulous people consented to submit, well knowing that a prince who entered Greece at the head of a numerous army might easily control the resolutions of the Amphictyons, and fondly believing that prince to be their friend. The deputies of Athens had not yet arrived; those of the southern republics had not even been summoned. The Locrians, Thebans, and Thessalians, alone composed the assembly that was to decide the fate of Phocis; a country which they had persecuted with unrelenting hostility in a war of ten years. The sentence was such as might be expected from the cruel resentment of the judges. It was decreed that the Phocians should be excluded from the general confederacy of Greece, and for ever deprived of the right to send representatives to the

⁷⁹ Diodorus, l. xvi. c. xx. gives this as the general opinion.

council of Amphictyons: that their arms and horses should be sold for the benefit of Apollo; that they should be allowed to keep possession of their lands, but compelled to pay annually from their produce the value of sixty thousand talents, till they had completely indemnified the temple; that their cities should be dismantled, and reduced to distinct villages, containing no more than sixty houses each, at the distance of a furlong from each other; and that the Corinthians, who had recently given them some assistance, should therefore be deprived of the presidency at the Pythian games; which important prerogative, together with the superintendency of the temple of Delphi, as well as the right of suffrage in the Amphictyonic council, lost by the Phocians, should thenceforth be transferred to the king of Macedon. It was decreed that the Amphictyons, having executed these regulations, should next proceed to procure all due repairs and expiations to the temple, and should exert their wisdom and their power to establish, on a solid foundation, the tranquillity and happiness of Greece⁸⁰.

This extraordinary decree, when communicated to the Phocians, filled that miserable people with such terror and dismay, as rendered them totally incapable of acting with vigor or with union. They took not any *common* measures for repelling the invader; a few cities only, more daring than the rest, endeavoured, with unequal strength, to defend their walls, their temples, and the revered

C H A P.
XXXV.

which is
cruelly
executed
by the
Macedo-
nians.
Olymp.
cviii. 2.
A. C. 347.

⁸⁰ Diodor. l. xvi. c. lix. et seqq.

CHAP. tombs of their ancestors. Their feeble resistance
 XXXV. was soon overcome; all opposition ceased; and the
 Macedonians proceeded to execute the will of the
 Amphictyonic council with inflexible cruelty, and
 with such undisturbed order and silence as seemed
 more dreadful than the tumultuary ravages of the
 fiercest war. Without dropping a tear, or heaving
 a sigh, since the smallest mark of regret was con-
 strued into an obstinacy of guilt, the wretched
 Phocians beheld the destruction of their ancient
 monuments and trophies, their proud walls levelled
 with the ground, the fertile banks of the divine
 Cephissus covered with ruin and desolation, and
 the venerable cities of Daulis, Penopeus, Lilæa,
 and Hyampolis, which had flourished above nine
 centuries in splendor and prosperity, and which
 will ever flourish in the song of Homer, so totally
 burned or demolished as scarcely to leave a vestige
 of their existence". After this terrible havoc of
 whatever they possessed most valuable and re-
 spected, the inhabitants were driven like herds of
 cattle to the settlements allotted for them, and
 compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the
 benefit of stern and unrelenting masters. At the
 distance of three years, travellers, who passed
 through Phocis to visit the temple of Delphi,
 melted with compassion, or shuddered with horror,
 at the sight of such piteous and unexampled de-
 vastation. They turned their reluctant eyes from
 the shattered ruins of a country, and a people,
 once so illustrious; the youth, and men of full age,

" Pausanias in Phocic. et Diodor. l. xvi. c. lix. et seqq.

had either perished in the war, or been dragged into captivity; the populous cities were no more; and the villages were thinly inhabited by women, children, and wretched old men, whose silent but emphatic expressions of deep-rooted misery exceeded all power of words to describe³².

C H A P.
XXXV.

The unexpected news of those melancholy events reached Athens in five days. The people were then assembled in the Piræus to examine the state of their harbours and shipping. The dreadful intelligence filled them with consternation. They imagined that they already beheld the destructive armies of Macedon and Thessaly, excited by the inveterate hostility of Thebes, pouring in upon their northern frontier, and overwhelming the whole country with havoc and desolation. A decree immediately passed, at the motion of Callisthenes, which marked the utmost danger and dismay. It was resolved, "that the Athenians, who usually resided in the country, should be summoned to the defence of the city; that those, within the distance of twelve miles round, should, along with their persons, transport their most valuable effects into the city or the Piræus; that those at a greater distance should respectively convey themselves and their property to the nearest fortresses, particularly Eleufis, Phylé, Aphidna, and Sunium, the principal places of strength in the Attic territory³³."

The news of these events produce consternation in Athens.

This decree shows, that terror was the first movement of the Athenians; but vengeance was

Philip writes the Athenians

³² Demosthen. et Æschin. de falsa Legat. et de Coron.

³³ Demosthen. de falsa Legat. sect. 20.

C H A P.

XXXV.

in a style
very dif-
ferent
from what
he had
formerly
used.

the second. Reluctantly cooped up within their walls, they called aloud for arms: levies were prepared for the relief of Phocis; and their admiral Proxenus, who had lately returned from the neighbouring coast, was ordered again to direct his course towards that country. The king of Macedon was duly attentive to those transactions, of which he had been regularly informed by his emissaries. He therefore wrote a letter to the Athenians, in that style of superiority which the success of his policy and of his arms, justly entitled him to assume. After acquainting them with his treatment of the Phocians, he mentions his being informed of their preparations for supporting that impious people, who were not included in the treaty of peace recently signed and ratified between Athens and Macedon. He exhorts them to lay aside this unwarrantable design, which could have no other effect than to show the iniquity and extravagance of their conduct, in arming against a prince, with whom they had so lately concluded an alliance. "But if you persist, know that we are prepared for repelling your hostilities with equal firmness and vigor."

The Athe-
nians pass
a decree
for re-
ceiving the
fugitive
Phocians.

This mortifying letter was received at the same time that the Athenian ambassadors returned from Eubœa, and brought such accounts of the destruction of the Phocians, that it appeared scarcely possible to afford them any relief. All that remained was to save, from the unrelenting vengeance of their enemies, the miserable wreck of that unfortunate

community. The Athenians passed a decree for receiving the fugitives with kindness, and for providing them with settlements in Attica, or in the foreign dependences of the republic; a resolution which, though it was founded on the most evident duties of gratitude and humanity towards ancient and faithful allies, gave great offence to the inexorable cruelty of the Thessalians and Thebans⁸⁴.

Philip
protects
the Pho-
cians
against the
inhuman
vengeance
of their
Grecian
foes;

Amidst these transactions the Macedonian partisans, and especially Æschines and Philocrates, whose vain assurances had been attended with such fatal effects, had just cause to dread the resentment of their country. The former, who had been the principal agent in this disgraceful scene of intrigue and delusion, no longer affected sickness; he forgot the threatenings denounced against him by Thebes; he disregarded the Athenian decree, prohibiting any citizen to stir from the walls; and having waited for, and beheld, the destruction of the Phocians with as much indifference, if we may believe his adversary, as he would have seen the conclusion of any ordinary affair, which concerned merely his pecuniary interest, he repaired to Philip to receive the wages of his iniquity. Æschines accounts for his journey at this time by a more honorable, but less probable cause, the desire of saving the feeble and unhappy remnant of the Phocian nation, who were persecuted to extremity by

⁸⁴ Demosthen. et Æschin. de falsa Legat. sect. 20.

C H A P. the barbarous vengeance of their Grecian foes,
 XXXV. and protected at the intercession of the Athenian orator, by the clemency or compassion of the Macedonians. There is reason to believe that Æschines, in order to gain merit with his countrymen, whose resentment he had so highly provoked, opposed an inhuman resolution of precipitating from rocks all those of the Phocians who had attained the age of puberty. But the king of Macedon, whose character was not naturally flagitious, or cruel without necessity, must, of his own accord, have been inclined to avert such an atrocious and bloody sentence, which, without promoting his interest, would have for ever ruined his fame.

and the
 Bœotians
 against the
 cruelty of
 Thebes.

This conclusion appears the more probable, since, we are assured, that, upon the same principle, but with far less success, he assumed the protection of the oppressed Bœotians. Orchomenus, Coronæa, Hyampolis, with other cities of less note in Bœotia, were, in consequence of the ruin of their Phocian allies, again subjected to the dominion of Thebes; a republic, always haughty and unrelenting, who, on this occasion, prepared to treat the rebels with more than her usual insolence and cruelty. Philip espoused the cause of the injured with a generous ardor, extremely disagreeable to the Thebans. His humanity, whether real or affected, was loudly extolled by his partisans in most republics of Greece. It redounded, however, more to his own glory, than to the benefit of the afflicted Bœotians; who, being expelled from their

own country by the intolerable oppression of Theban tyranny, sought refuge in the compassionate bosom of Athens".

C H A P.

XXXV.

Having finished the sacred war in a manner so favorable to his own interest and ambition, Philip convened the members of the Amphictyonic council, to the number of two hundred, and assisted in the hymns, prayers, and sacrifices offered to Apollo, in acknowledgment of his divine protection of their councils and arms. The name of the pious king of Macedon, who had been the principal instrument of their success, resounded in the sacred Pœans sung in honor of the God. The Amphictyons ratified all the transactions of that prince, erected his statue in the temple of Delphi, and acknowledged, by a solemn decree, the kingdom of Macedon as the principal member of the Hellenic body". Philip at the same time appointed deputies to preside at the Pythian games, the celebration of which was nearly approaching, and to which most of the Grecian states had already sent their representatives. The Athenians, stung with indignation and regret, abstained from this festival. An embassy was therefore dispatched to them in the name of the Amphictyons, requiring their concurrence with measures recently embraced by the general council of Greece; and remonstrating against their displeasure at the aggrandizement of a prince with whom they had so lately contracted an alliance.

Macedon
declared
by the
Amphic-
tyons a
member of
the Hel-
lenic body.
Olymp.
cviii. 3.
A. C. 346.

²⁵ Demosthen. et Æschin. de falsâ Legat. sect. 20.

²⁶ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 60.

C H A P.

XXXV.

Even the
Athenians
admit this
pretension.

The deliberations of the Athenian assembly, on this occasion, showed the full extent of their own folly, and evinced the consummate policy of Philip. They acknowledged, with dejection and anguish, that they had neglected the many opportunities presented them by the favor of heaven, for repressing the ambition of their rival; that the time of acting, with vigor and boldness, was now no more; that the cause of Greece was an empty name, since the Greeks surrendered their dignity to the king of Macedon; and that it became their own republic to consult rather its safety than its honor, and to maintain peace with a monarch against whom they were by no means prepared to wage war. Even Demosthenes³⁷ recommended this resolution; lest, says he, we should offend those now assembled, who call themselves the Amphictyons, and thus excite a general war against ourselves. The Thebans, beside ancient causes of quarrel with us, are incensed at our harbouring their exiles; the Locrians and Thessalians resent our protecting the Phocians; the Argives, the Messenians, and Megalopolitans, are displeased at our concurring with the views of Lacedæmon. If we refuse the demands of Philip and the Amphictyons, they may assault us with the combined arms of all those states, which we are totally unable to resist. One point, therefore, is necessary, the continuance of the present peace; not that it is so very excellent, or so worthy of you; but, of what kind soever it may be, it were more for the interest of

³⁷ Demosthen. de Pace.

your affairs, that it never had been concluded, than C H A P.
that now, when it is concluded, you should infringe XXXV.
it. This opinion was universally approved: Macedon was acknowledged a member of the Grecian confederacy; and Isocrates, an Athenian of the highest merit and reputation, addressed a discourse to Philip, in which he exhorted him to disdain inglorious victories over his countrymen and friends, to employ his authority to extinguish, for ever, the animosities of Greece, and to direct the united efforts of that country, of which Macedon now formed a part, against the wealth and effeminacy of Persia, its ancient and natural enemy⁸⁸.

Whether these exhortations proceeded from the virtuous simplicity which did not suspect, or from the insinuating and artful policy which, though it suspected, hoped to prevent, the hostile projects⁸⁹ of Macedon, the measures of Philip were, doubtless, taken with too much care, and his plans founded too deep and firm, to be shaken by the specious eloquence of a rhetorician. He had long meditated the invasion of Asia; the conquest of the Persian empire was an object that might well tempt his ambition; but neither his own passions, nor the arguments of other men, could hasten, retard, or vary his undeviating progress in a system which could only be completed by consolidating his ancient, before he attempted new conquests.

⁸⁸ Isocrat. Orat. Philipp.

⁸⁹ See the Life of Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of his works.

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.




THE HISTORY OF GREECE

your name, that it never had been concluded, than it is now, which is cancelled, you might suppose it. This opinion was universally approved: Alceon was acknowledged a member of the Greek nobility; and Alceon, an Athenian of high merit and reputation, addressed a discourse to Philip, in which he exhorted him to abandon glorious victories over his countrymen and friends, to employ his authority to extinguish, for ever, the animosities of Greece, and to direct the united efforts of that country, of which Alceon now formed a part, against the wars and dissensions of Asia, its ancient and natural enemy.

We best see these exhortations produced from the virtuous simplicity which the nobles of Greece, the intemperate and cruel policy which, though it respected, hoped to prevent, the hostile projects of Alceon, the measures of Philip were, doubtless, taken with too much care, and his plans too deep and bold, to be shaken by the opinion, eloquence of a rhetorician. He had long meditated the invasion of Asia; the conquest of the Persian empire was an object that might well tempt his ambition; but neither his own passions, nor the arguments of other men, could hinder, to say his undeviating progress in a system which could only be completed by conquering his ancient, before he attempted new conquests.

At the same time, the Greeks, pressed to my remembrance, were in a state of great anxiety, and yet a reversal

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME







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